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A SHORT HISTORY OF FRANCE

by

SIR J. A. R. MARRIOTT

HON. FELLOW (FORMERLY FELLOW AND LECTURER) OF
WORCESTER COLLEGE, OXFORD; LATE M.P. FOR YORK

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PREFACE

THIS book has been written in response to a specific request and to supply what I understand to be a widely felt need. It attempts to sketch in brief compass the *political* development of France, excluding, with one insignificant exception, all reference to its literature, art, and general culture. It has been written almost entirely from secondary authorities, which (in French) are both abundant and of exceptionally high quality. Its sole claim to originality is that it has been written from an angle never (so far as I know) hitherto selected for a 'History of France'. I have throughout tried to keep in mind the desire of *English* readers, fairly well versed in the history of their own country, to know where the development of France runs parallel with, and where, when, and why it has diverged from that of England.

Consequently the English, and still more the French reader, will miss here much of the detail which other histories in both languages supply. In compensation, however, I hope that English readers will find here in a compact form information about the political institutions of France, which they can obtain only by reference to many works, mostly, if not all, in French.

I have drawn freely on previous works of my own without the disturbing formality of quotation marks. In the few footnotes there are also more references to those works than my modesty approves. They have been made partly to avoid the tedium of repetition, but chiefly to save my strictly limited space. For these reasons readers will perhaps excuse them.

The many imperfections which I fear this little book may reveal will, I hope, be partially condoned by the fact that it has been written entirely by an exile from London, denied access by a German bomb to his own library and memoranda, and also to the great libraries in London. This grave disability has been, as far as possible, minimized by the borrowing powers of several public libraries, and in particular by the infinite kindness, patience, and helpfulness of the Chief Librarian of the City of York Public Library, and his assistants. To them, to the excellent library under their control, and to the courtesy of the librarians of the other city and university libraries from which, to meet my need, they have borrowed, I wish to acknowledge a deep debt of gratitude. I am indebted to Mrs. Bambridge and to the Macmillan Company of Canada for permission to quote seven lines from Rudyard Kipling's poem *France*, and in special degree to my friend Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw who has very kindly read all the proofs.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT

YORK, April 1942

NOTE TO THE SECOND EDITION

IT would convict me of gross insensibility to kindness if I failed to acknowledge the cordiality of the reception given to the first edition of this rather audacious adventure. Audacious, because I had to write the book under handicaps so grave that not without trepidation did I decide to publish it. The demand for a second edition so soon after the publication of the first is therefore as gratifying as it was unexpected.

I have taken advantage of that demand to correct a few errors—almost entirely typographical—pointed out by reviewers or detected in revision. In particular I have adopted the suggestion of the most constructive of the reviewers and have inserted a number of genealogical tables, intended solely to elucidate the text, and consequently manifesting many inconsistencies of method, e.g., the inclusion or omission of the names of husbands or wives who had no dynastic significance.

In reply to some criticisms I must repeat the warning in the Preface to the First Edition, that the *scope* of this book is avowedly limited by the special purpose it was designed to serve. The restrictions on the supply of paper also compelled me to omit much that I would gladly have included, in particular several maps.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT

April 1944

NOTE TO THE THIRD EDITION

A CONSIDERABLE number of misprints have been corrected, and two or three elucidations of the text have been made.

The *corrigenda* have mostly been detected, and the elucidations suggested, by Mr. A. G. B. Glover, to whose careful and accurate reading I am greatly indebted.

J.A.R.M.

October 1944

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CHAPTER 1

PRELUDE

'Still the Gods love her, for that of high aim
Is this good France, the bleeding thing they stripe,
She shall rise worthier of her prototype
Through her abasement deep.'

GEORGE MEREDITH

DEEP to-day is the abasement of France, prostrate in the grip of Germany. For a thousand years Gauls had been glaring at Germans, across the Rhine, and Germans at Gauls. Not, however, until 1870 was France ever at war with Germany. Even the war of 1870-1 was Franco-Prussian rather than Franco-German. That war put the coping-stone on the edifice of a Germany for the first time conscious of national unity, attained under the leadership of the Hohenzollern Kings of Prussia. There had, indeed, existed since the tenth century the Holy Roman Empire of the German people, the Crown of which had been worn almost continuously, since the thirteenth century, by the Habsburg Archdukes of Austria. Against the Habsburgs France fought for more than two centuries (1494-1713), but it was less against Habsburgs as Archdukes of Austria, or even as Roman Emperors, than as Kings of Spain, Lords of the Low Countries, and inheritors of the great Duchy of Burgundy.

The Italian Expedition of Charles VIII is commonly reckoned to have initiated the era of international wars. But that war may be regarded with equal accuracy as the culmination of the secular conflict between the Kings of France and their powerful feudal vassal the Duke of Burgundy. With another and still more powerful vassal, the kings of a strictly circumscribed France had fought the famous Hundred Years War (1338-1453). The Hundred Years War was the making of France. France emerged from it an all but completely consolidated Nation-State. One by one the great feudal principalities—Normandy and Anjou, Maine, Touraine, Aquitaine, Champagne, Toulouse, and the rest had been absorbed by the Crown. The Duchy of Burgundy was annexed on the death of Charles the Bold in 1477, and in 1491 Brittany, the last of the great Duchies, fell into the Crown by marriage.

The Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century and the 'Wars of Religion' might have broken France in twain as they broke Germany, but disruption was finally averted by the tact of Henry IV and Cardinal Richelieu's firm but moderate policy.

Into the labours of a long succession of great kings, assisted latterly by several sagacious ministers, Louis XIV entered. Under the Roi Soleil (1643-1715) the French Monarchy reached its zenith. But the

insensate pride of Louis XIV brought him into conflict with the commercial Oligarchy in the United Provinces, and, what was more serious, into conflict with the young Prince of Orange who in 1672 displaced the Oligarchy and in 1689 added the English Crown to the Stadholderate of Holland.

Then began the Second Hundred Years War between France and England. It ended only with the defeat of Napoleon on the field of Waterloo. This war was not confined to Europe. It was fought on three Continents and in all the Seven Seas. As a result France as a World Power had to yield pride of place to Great Britain. In the nineteenth century France built up another Colonial Empire only second in extent to that of Great Britain, if wholly different in character. There is no 'Greater France' in the same sense as there is a 'Greater Britain': France has no daughter or sister nations who not only take the field alongside the sons of the Motherland, but share her councils and help to shape her policy. Nor is there a French counterpart to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

§ PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS. The contrast between the British and French Empires runs also through the whole history of the respective homelands.

To insist upon this contrast is the more necessary because to the superficial observer the course of French and English History seems to run on parallel lines. Both countries were conquered by the Romans and by the Germans; in both the fierce Norsemen effected permanent settlements; in both the Monarchy stood for centralization and unity against a feudal aristocracy tending to localization and disruption; in both (though later in France than in England), the Crown achieved victory; in both, representative institutions came into existence in the thirteenth century; both countries had Parliaments which developed out of the Royal Household, the *Curia Regis*; to both countries the Protestant Reformation threatened disruption; both suffered—though at a long interval—revolutions involving the execution of the hereditary monarch.

Nevertheless, the pages that follow will demonstrate that, though the parallel is not wholly illusory the likeness is, almost invariably, superficial. The successive conquests, for example, were wholly different in character and in results. Again, to the French the Parlements meant one thing, to the English, Parliament meant another. Socially and economically the evolution of France has differed *toto caelo* from the evolution of England. In personal characteristics, moreover, the two peoples differ so greatly that it has become a commonplace to say that an Englishman can understand a Frenchman as little as a Frenchman can understand an Englishman. Every one agrees that Frenchmen are more thrifty and more steadily industrious than the English; but how many Englishmen recognize that the French are essentially realists, infinitely patient, and compact

of common sense? The Frenchman is at least as patriotic as the Englishman, but patriotism to him means worship of the soil he cultivates and largely *owns*: to the Englishman, patriotism consists primarily in a belief in the superiority of his institutions. The Frenchman fights to defend the *soil* of France—the Englishman to defend his *Country*, and all for which his ‘Country’ stands. This contrast is no doubt partly due to the fact that just as the Frenchman is far more of an individualist than the Englishman, so France is much more self-sufficing—in every sense—than England. The Englishman lives by trading with foreigners; the Frenchman derives his living from the soil he tills. The French workman is essentially a craftsman; the Englishman contributes co-operatively to mass production. The Englishman gives largely to ‘charity’ and to public objects; the first care of a Frenchman is his family. The Englishman is convinced that he is the most peaceable of men, and that the Frenchman is exceptionally bellicose. Yet no one detests war more than the average Frenchman. But to him peace is useless unless it means *security*. He submits to conscription, not in order to prepare for wars of aggression, nor even for the defence of more or less remote ‘possessions’, but for the security of La Patrie. Finally, the Englishman suspects that the Frenchman is unstable in character, and that his political institutions, at least since the first Revolution, have been in a state of flux. Nor is suspicion confined to political institutions; it is part and parcel of a more general misunderstanding. Mrs. Browning bitterly rued these misapprehensions:

‘The English have a scornful insular way
Of calling the French light. The levity
Is in the judgement only. . .’

We may hope that this indictment, based on an analysis no longer accurate, is exaggerated, but it cannot be entirely refuted.

To contribute towards a more precise apprehension by Englishmen of the political evolution of France, towards a more perfect understanding of the national characteristics resulting therefrom, is the purpose of the pages that follow.

CHAPTER II

PHYSICS AND POLITICS—FRANCE AND ITS FRONTIERS

‘La Politique française avait été désignée par la géographie; l’instinct national la suggéra avant que la raison d’état la conseillât.’

ALBERT SOREL

THAT cannot be said of Prussia or of Prussianized Germany. Prussia was created by the skill and persistence of its kings, backed by an

efficient Civil Service, and a powerful army. France, on the contrary, though owing much to the sagacity of kings and statesmen, forms a 'natural' unit; its frontiers were for the most part defined by geography; its history has been greatly influenced by physiographical features. Consequently, from the time of Cardinal Richelieu to that of Marshal Foch, its statesmen and soldiers have emphasized the importance of making the frontiers of France correspond precisely with the indications of nature.


§ NATURAL FRONTIERS. The doctrine of *les limites naturelles* has powerfully and continuously influenced French history and politics. But what are those limits? What precisely does Nature indicate? With one calamitous exception Nature has avoided ambiguity. The Channel, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean have set obvious limits to the expansion of France, but they have also bestowed upon it an invaluable situation for defence and commerce. Its coast-line, though not so long as that of Great Britain, is more deeply indented, and more varied in aspect. Its harbours, if not much less numerous, are less conveniently situated than our own in reference to the important areas of productive industry. On the south-west the Pyrenees form a well-defined and almost impregnable frontier. On the south-east the Alps suggest a frontier hardly less obvious, though more disputable politically and more easily pierced.

Much more disputable, and indeed persistently disputed, is the eastern and north-eastern frontier. Between the crest of the Cevennes on one side, and that of the Alps, Jura, and Vosges on the other, lies the Rhône-land which in days long past formed the Middle Kingdom of Arles or Burgundy. The main difficulty arises, however, when we pass from the Rhône basin, which has long since been incorporated in France, to the Rhine basin. To whom does the Rhine-land 'naturally' belong? On the French side there is an irresistible temptation to claim it. 'It was the supreme object of my ministerial career to restore to Gaul the frontiers designed for her by Nature, . . . to identify Gaul with France, and in all the lands which had belonged to old Gaul there to establish the new.'¹ So Richelieu's so-called *Testament* runs.

By 'ancient Gaul' Frenchmen have always understood the whole of the territory bounded by the sea, the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine; that is, the whole of modern France as well as Belgium, Luxemburg, part of Holland and Rhenish Prussia, and the Palatinate. That was virtually the frontier offered to Napoleon by Metternich in the autumn of 1813. But never, except under Napoleon I, has France ever been within measurable distance of making the Rhine

¹ Richelieu's *Testament*, though probably spurious, accurately represents his views.

from source to delta the eastern boundary of its dominion.¹ Nor is it certain (though Foch was, on strategical grounds, undeniably right to demand the Rhine frontier in 1919) that Nature intended that France should.



In 1814 Hardenberg argued on behalf of Germany, that Nature indicated the Jura and the Vosges as the scientific frontier of France, or even perhaps the line of the Cevennes and the Argonne. North of the Vosges Nature has unfortunately been ambiguous. Consequently, the Rhineland has always been debatable ground, and several attempts have been made to solve the difficulty by erecting therein a Middle Kingdom—or buffer State.² The problem persists.

¹ Napoleon might, indeed, have retained it if England could have been induced to permit (a very doubtful point) the incorporation of Belgium.

² See *infra*, pp. 51f., 100.

§ INTERNAL PHYSIOGRAPHY. The lie of the land, within the frontiers just mentioned, is immensely important to the understanding of French history. 'Unity in Diversity' is perhaps the phrase that best describes the natural features of France. Prussia is devoid of any distinctive geographical features. The Balkan peninsula, though far from featureless, is evidently condemned by Nature to disunity. To Spain geography has combined with history to dictate provincialism. The history of Italy is written large in its geography—in the long spine-like Appennines, giving it length without breadth, in a coast-line of exceptional length but lacking in harbours.

Of the effect of geography upon history, there is, however, no more illuminating illustration than France. France has mountains, but they either form frontiers making for security, or, as in the case of the great central *massif*, they are not lofty enough to impair unity. The interior mountains of France are in fact crossed in places by roads and even by canals. With 3,800 miles of navigable rivers, supplemented by 3,300 miles of canals and no fewer than 550 inland ports, France possesses facilities for internal communication unsurpassed, if equalled, by any other country. The canals, like the roads and railways, follow, of course, the lines of the physical depressions, and indicate the main routes taken from time immemorial by trade and traders. The valley of the Garonne, or 'Pyrenean isthmus' (as it has been aptly called), was for centuries the great highway for Gauls and Romans, for Visigoths and Franks. Another ancient route ran along the Rhône-Saône valley: starting from Marseilles, a great trading centre for the Phoenicians and the Greeks, it runs by Lyons, Arles, Chalons, Dijon, Reims to Aachen and Laon. It has been truly observed that this alien area, dominated by the Rhône, for a long time diverted the centre of gravity from the Seine, to which the Capetians restored it when they founded Paris.

From the days of the Capetian Monarchy the basin of the Seine and the Loire has formed the heart and nerve-centre of national France. In that basin are situated not Paris only, but the royal cities of Orleans, Bourges, Blois, and Tours. The Seine is connected by a series of canals with the Loire, the Scheldt, the Meuse, the Rhône, the Saône, and the Rhine. The basin of the Loire is similarly connected with that of the Rhône, that of the Rhône with the valleys of the Garonne and the Rhine.

Not until the end of the fifteenth century was France completely unified either in a political or a geographical sense. France formed two distinct zones: one south of the Loire, predominantly Mediterranean in climate, culture, and other characteristics; the other, particularly Brittany, Normandy, and Picardy, akin to Britain. The one zone, the land of the olive and the vine, is divided from the other, the region of agriculture, industry, and mines, by the great central *massif*—the high tableland of the Auvergne—sloping down

on the east to the Rhône valley, on the south-west towards the Garonne, on the north-west to the Loire, and on the north to the Seine. It has been noted, however, that between the two zones there are no harsh or abrupt transitions. 'The subtle modulations contribute,' as is happily said, 'to a climatic symphony.'¹ This symphony has, but only since the thirteenth century, been more than climatic. Not until Philip III (1270-85) did the Capetians establish the royal power in the south-west. Only in 1453 was Guienne incorporated in France, and the Rhône-Saône basin in 1481. These dates nevertheless represent a relatively early development, due mainly to the central geographical position occupied by France in Europe. The same cause may also account for the heterogeneity of the French population. The fact that France lies at 'the intersection of the natural routes of Western Europe' explains, as Seignobos argues, the 'international character of the French mind, and the universal character of French literature'. In the population of France, though it is basically Celtic, are to be found representatives of all the European races—except the Slavs. Nor does the 'diversity in unity' end with population. France, it is claimed, has 'all the climates and geological terrains'; it has 3,660 species of vegetables, 2,290 more than England can grow, 1,380 more than Germany!²

These facts may partially account for the self-sufficiency of France. Though the percentage of agricultural workers has fallen from 75, in the middle of the nineteenth century, to about 53, the total foreign trade of France is still less than half that of the United Kingdom; its mercantile marine is only one-sixth, and about three-fourths of Norway's, which comes next to Britain's. The process of urbanization and industrialization has been slower in France than in most European countries. Few towns show any marked increase in population: many show an actual decrease. As compared with England, Germany, and Italy, not to mention Belgium and Holland, France is thinly populated, having less than 200 persons to the square mile, while Germany has 363, Italy 374, and England and Wales 703.

The preceding summary, rapid and selective, does not pretend to give the whole of the picture, still less can bare statistics assess the debt which the world has owed to French civilization in the past, and may again incur.

¹ By J. Moreton Macdonald, to whose excellent *History of France*, 3 vols., Methuen, now unfortunately out of print, I am greatly indebted.

² *History of the French People*, p. 17.

CHAPTER III

GAUL AND ITS INVADERS

(*circ.* 58 B.C.—A.D. 48)

‘Before you came under our rule Gaul saw nothing but wars and attempts at domination. The only use which we have made of our victory is to keep the peace.’


TACITUS: *Histories* IV, 74

§ ROMAN GAUL. Roman interference in the land north of the Alps had already begun in the second century B.C. A substantial strip of land bordered by the Mediterranean and running from the Alps (excluding Marseilles) to the Pyrenees had been organized by the Romans as *Gallia Transalpina* in 120–118 B.C. Marseilles itself was a Greek colony and was not annexed to the Roman Province until 49 B.C. Narbonensis (comprising Provence, Languedoc, Dauphiné, and parts of Switzerland and Savoy) provided, as already noticed, an important trade-route via Toulouse to the Atlantic, and, strategically, gave Rome military access to Spain.

By the middle of the first century the pressure of the ‘Barbarians’ upon the Roman frontiers became so insistent that Julius Caesar was sent into Gaul to reduce to obedience the Gallic tribes, to extend the organization of a Roman province to the whole country, and make it a strong bulwark against German invasions. Caesar found in Gaul three distinct peoples; in the *Basses Pyrénées* the Iberians, migrants perhaps from Africa, and still represented by the Basques; the Gauls or Celts in the centre and north-west; and in the north-east the Belgae. Basically the population was Celtic and the Celts were far from uncivilized. In some branches of agriculture they could give lessons to the Romans, and in various primitive industries, such as weaving, pottery, and glass-blowing, they were expert craftsmen. Politically, however, they were split up into innumerable tribes and consequently could offer no effective resistance to Roman armies. But once he had reduced the country to submission, Caesar interfered with native customs and organization as little as possible. He exacted a tribute of 40,000,000 *Sesterces* (about £350,000); he struck the first great blow at the cult of Druidism; for the rest, his rule was mild and tolerant.

If Julius Caesar was the conqueror of the Gaul, Augustus, who always regarded Gaul with special favour, was its organizer. For two hundred years the world enjoyed what has been happily called the ‘Augustan Peace’. In that blessing Gaul shared and found the Roman rule sagacious and sympathetic, beneficent and mild. The Gauls retained a large measure of local autonomy; their notables were permitted to aspire to, and in some cases obtained, seats in the

Roman Senate, and assemblies of native notables were summoned by Augustus to meet at Lyons. The Celts who, in striking contrast with the Teutons, have always shown a wonderful aptitude for assimilation, absorbed all the alien elements periodically introduced into the body politic of France.



Of Celtic persistence there is a remarkable illustration in the fact that cities like Paris, Reims, Soissons, and Amiens are still known not by their Roman names, but by those derived from Celtic tribes. Nevertheless, except in blood, France was almost completely Romanized, most completely in Narbonensis. The language test is conclusive. It is estimated that out of 6,000 root-words in modern French 8,800 are Latin, and only 20 Celtic. In jurisprudence also, in political institutions, in social usages, in science and architecture,

land tenure and agricultural practice, in industrial organization, in education, trade, and taxation—in brief, in all the apparatus of civilization, Gaul accepted the ideas, and followed the practice of Rome. Under one sovereign and a centralized administration, the Celtic tribes for the first time attained to unity, and for the first time appreciated the meaning of government and law.

The conception of empire that commended itself to Augustus was that of a federation or union of city-states. Between the Mediterranean and the Scheldt might be counted no fewer than 115 *civitates*. In the north there were relatively few, but in the south, cities like Lyons and Marseilles, Narbo, Arles, Nîmes, Avignon, and Toulouse became centres alike of commerce and of culture. From Lyons the five great trunk roads, devised by Augustus, radiated, and to the road system and to the abundance of navigable rivers Gaul owed much of its prosperity. To that prosperity the steady development of the export trade greatly contributed. Latin furnished a *lingua franca* for merchants as well as scholars, and a common tongue combined with a common currency and a complete absence of tariff barriers to give a great impulse to the export trade of the Empire as a whole and not least of Gaul. In Gaul schools were established, libraries were collected, temples, palaces, amphitheatres, aqueducts were constructed. All this testified to the material prosperity and the artistic sense of a great Province of the Empire which was completely and painlessly Romanized. It is not, indeed, too much to say (as a gifted Frenchman has said) that 'Gaul contributed more than any other province to a widening of the Empire's horizon, and an extension of Roman civilization beyond its birthplace and home in the Mediterranean lands'.¹ Towards the close of the third century, however, the Roman Empire began to exhibit unmistakable symptoms of decay.

As the power of the Roman Empire waned, the power of the Roman Church waxed. Exactly how and when Christianity first reached Gaul is uncertain, but by the middle of the second century, there were certainly many Christian communities in southern Gaul, and in the third century Rome made a determined effort to extend Christianity to the Province, though it was not until after the conversion of Constantine (312) that Christianity became the official religion of Rome and its provinces. In the towns—the real centres of Roman Government and ecclesiastical organization—the Bishop quickly established his supremacy over his secular colleague, the Count, and the rapid growth of endowments brought to the Church power as well as wealth.

§ THE TEUTONIC INVASIONS. It was, then, into a Gaul, Romanized and Christianized, that, early in the fifth century, the Germans began to penetrate. They came in three waves. After the

¹ Professor Albertini.

capture of Rome by their King Alaric the Bold (410), the Visigoths, migrants who reached Gaul from the shore of the Black Sea via the Balkans, began to establish themselves in Provence between the Alps and the Atlantic. About the same time, the Burgundians established themselves in Rhenish Gaul and afterwards in the Rhône-Saône valley. More important than the Visigothic or Burgundian migrations was the advent of the Franks. Coming from the shores of the Baltic, they advanced into north-eastern Gaul and in the course of the fifth century established themselves in two groups. The Salian Franks occupied the country between the Scheldt and the Middle Rhine; the Ripuarians settled on both banks of the Meuse. The early history of the Franks is at best legendary, and at worst mythical, but with the election of Clovis to be King of the Salian Franks (481) we get on to a reasonably solid basis of historical fact.

§ THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY. Clovis (*circ.* 461–511) has been described as ‘the creator of the hereditary Monarchy of France’. That is perhaps anticipatory, but he undeniably stands out as the man who rescued Gaul from the chaos which prevailed after the fall of Rome, and, partly by victories in the field, partly by the assassination of rival Frankish ‘Kings’, brought the whole of Roman Gaul, except Brittany and the Basque country, under a single ruler. At Soissons (486) Clovis overthrew Syagrius, who, claiming to be a Roman official, had established an independent kingdom in the modern Champagne and Lorraine. That country was now occupied by Clovis. A victory over the Alemanni—a rival German tribe—near Strasburg in 496 gave Clovis Swabia, Baden, Würtemberg, the western part of Bavaria, Alsace, and part of Switzerland.

Meanwhile (493) Clovis had married Clothilde, a Burgundian princess, and under the influence of his Christian wife had been baptized at Reims on Christmas Day, 496. Eleven years later he defeated Alaric II, King of the Visigoths, near Poitiers, and, driving the Visigoths into Spain, advanced his kingdom up to the Pyrenees. Paris became in his time the capital of Gaul. The victory of Clovis over Alaric not only put an end to the power of the Visigoths in Gaul, but to the great satisfaction of orthodox Catholics, extinguished the Arian heresy to which, though officially condemned by the Council of Nicaea (325), the Visigoths had adhered. Under the influence of his ecclesiastical allies, Clovis also applied to Teutonic Gaul the Roman system of government, through Bishop, Count, and City.

§ BRITAIN AND HER INVADERS. When in 511 Clovis died, the Teutonic conquest of Gaul had reached its term. At this point we may pause to ask: Why the Roman Occupation left so great an impress upon France and so little upon Britain; and why the Teutonic conquests affected France so little while in England

they laid foundations upon which the whole superstructure was built.

‘Rome, though her eagles through the world had flown,
Could never make this island all her own.’

Edmund Waller was strictly accurate. Rome never made Britain *all* her own. Was her occupation ever more than partial and superficial? Though certain facts are beyond dispute, the question is still a matter of controversy. The Romans were masters of Britain for at least three hundred years (*circ.* 43—*circ.* 410)—a period exceeding that of British rule in India. It might, then, be reasonably presumed that the Romans would have left as much impress upon Britain as upon Gaul, and not less than the English, if they withdrew to-morrow, would be found to have left upon India. A *portion* of Britain was unquestionably Romanized. Within the quadrilateral, Chester—Lincoln—Canterbury—Caerleon-on-Usk—Chester, the Romans permeated Britain, transforming not merely the face of the country, but the life of the Celtic population.¹ In the rest of the island, notably in the north and west, the occupation was merely military, and its effects were wholly superficial. Within the quadrilateral were all the important Roman cities except York. But Britain, unlike southern Gaul, never became a land of cities. As a whole the organization of Roman Britain was mainly agricultural and centred on the *villa*, not dissimilar in character from, if not the lineal ancestor of, the Norman *manor*.

Outside the quadrilateral the Romans held the country by means of three great garrison towns—York, Chester, and Caerleon-on-Usk—and a large number of small forts, each garrisoned by auxiliary regiments, and all interconnected by a network of splendid military roads. The northern limit of Roman Britain was marked by Hadrian’s famous wall, built (about 120) from Tyne to Solway.

For nearly two centuries Britain shared in the *Pax Romana*, but towards the end of the third century Saxon pirates from North Germany began to raid the island, and in 367 hordes of Saxons, Scots, and Picts swept over the whole country and caused widespread devastation. Only fortified towns escaped destruction.

Then in 410 the Roman legions were withdrawn from Britain and The Emperor Honorius bade the Britons defend themselves. That was precisely what the Britons, debilitated by three centuries of subjection to the Romans, could not do. What happened during the century and a half that intervened between the departure of the Roman legions and the arrival of the Roman missionaries (597) we can, owing to the complete lack of contemporary records, only conjecture. When the dark curtain is lifted we see Jutes, Saxons, and Angles established in a number of kingdoms, larger and smaller, on English soil, and we know that by the end of the sixth century

¹ For further details cf. Marriott: *This Realm of England*.

Romano-Celtic Britain was in a fair way to become England. But was the England that emerged a Romanized England, based, as Gaul was, upon Roman civilization, or was it in all essentials fundamentally Teutonic? Had the Romans merely occupied the country, or had their civilization permeated the people. In the latter alternative, had the Romanized Celts handed on Roman ideas and institutions to their Teutonic conquerors, or had they, if not virtually exterminated, been driven into Wales and the south-western and north-western extremities of Britain?

To enter into the controversy between the Romano-Celtic and the Teutonic schools would be beyond the scope of the present narrative. It must suffice to say that the best critical opinion to-day inclines to acceptance, if in modified measure, of the conclusions of the 'Teutonic' School, and roughly summarizes them as follows: The Celts in Gaul accepted Roman rule, and with it Roman civilization. That the Celts in Britain were equally interpenetrated by Roman civilization is improbable. Nor, if they had been, would it have much mattered, since they were, if not exterminated by the Teutonic invaders, completely annihilated, and, after prolonged and bitter wars, were in no position to hand on such Roman culture as they had (or had not) accepted from the Romans to their Teutonic conquerors. Consequently, in Fisher's words: 'The living influence of Rome, its speech, its religion, its towns, its institutions,' were 'obliterated',¹ and the basic foundation of English civilization is not Celtic but Teutonic.

In Gaul, on the contrary, there was no breach of continuity between Celt, Roman, and Teuton, and there was no war of extermination either as between Roman and Celt or between Romanized Celts and Teutons. The Teutonic Franks, meeting with little resistance from Celts, accepted Roman civilization in the broadest sense, as they accepted Catholic Christianity, and on these twin foundations—the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church—the structure that we know as France was built.

CHAPTER IV

MEROVINGIANS AND CAROLINGIANS— CHARLEMAGNE (481–987)

'He (Charlemagne) transferred the idea of absolute sovereignty . . . from the sphere of the Roman Curia to the Frankish State.'

G. SEEHAGER

THE period between the death of Clovis and the accession of Hugh Capet (511–987) is, as a whole, the dreariest in the annals of France.

¹ H. A. L. Fisher (*History of Europe*, p. 123), who comes down definitely on the side of the 'Teutonic School', and cf. also Collingwood: *Roman Britain*, and Haverfield: *Romanization of Roman Britain*, and other works.

The descendants of Clovis were hopelessly decadent and their rule was distinguished by a reaction more marked by contrast with contemporary Britain. Yet, apart even from the commanding personality of Charlemagne, the period of the Merovingians and Carolingians is not devoid of significance.

Britain was advancing towards consolidation and unification under a monarchy, which intensively increased in power with the extension of its territorial authority. Gaul, once united under Augustus, was, at the same time, moving steadily in an opposite direction. As chieftain of the German tribe, Clovis had been hardly more than a *primus inter pares* among the fierce warriors whom he led into battle. As *Rex Francorum* he was almost absolute. But Clovis had come to Gaul less as a conqueror than as a friend and protector; his followers were 'conquered' by the higher civilization into which they were absorbed. Without a regular army or a permanent revenue the Merovingian kings would have found it difficult to establish a strong monarchy even had their position not been fatally undermined by their adherence to the Frankish custom of equal partition. On the death of Clovis (511) his inheritance was divided among his four sons, who established their capitals respectively at Paris and Orleans, Metz and Soissons. Burgundy, after an independent and brilliant existence of nearly a century, was conquered and similarly portioned among the sons of Clovis, as also was Provence (536). The whole land outside Brittany and the Basque country was united under Chlotar (558), but on his death was again partitioned among his four sons.

Partly owing to this fatal custom, and partly to the despicable character of the later Merovingian kings, all real power fell into the hands of successive 'Mayors of the Palace', who, starting from the position of mere household officers (*major domus*), gradually made their office hereditary, and virtually superseded their nominal masters. The Franks had established themselves in two groups. The district occupied by the Ripuarians came (about 560) to be known as Austrasia, and remained essentially German, while Neustria, the territory of the Salian Franks, corresponded roughly to modern France. The fortress of Metz, which arrested the westward advance of the Ripuarian Franks, marked for long centuries the frontier between the Germans and the French.

§ AUSTRASIA. Of Austrasia, Dagobert became king in 622, and under him the power of the Merovingian dynasty reached its zenith, ultimately extending from the Weser to the Pyrenees. After Dagobert's death (638) the decline of the Merovingians was rapid; all real authority was exercised not by successive *rois fainéants* but by their Mayors of the Palace.

§ MAYORS OF THE PALACE. Of these officials the most

important, in the eyes of history, were the Pippins, or Héristals, the ancestors of Charlemagne. Pippin I of Landen, who became in 622 Mayor of the Palace and Duke of Austrasia, greatly strengthened his position by marrying his daughter, Beega, to Ansegisel, the son of Arnulf, Duke and Bishop of Metz. Their son, Pippin II, a devoted Churchman and a mighty warrior, succeeded as Mayor of Austrasia in 681. He presently made himself master of Neustria and Burgundy (687–714), virtually superseded the degenerate Merovingians, and on his death bequeathed all three kingdoms to his illegitimate son—known as the ‘Hammer’—Charles Martel.

§ CHARLES MARTEL. Charles inherited his father’s policy in Church and State. He reasserted—not without resistance—the supremacy of Austrasia over Neustria; conquered the Saxons who threatened the frontiers of Gaul; by a great victory won over Abdur Rahman, the Arab Governor of Spain, near Poitiers (732) he delivered southern Gaul from the terror of the Moslems; and rescued the Pope (Gregory III) from the danger which threatened from the Lombards.

Pippin III, to whom, under his father’s partition scheme, was assigned Neustria, Provence, and Burgundy, took the long impending, and at last decisive step. Having deposed the last feeble representative of the Merovingian dynasty, he was anointed King of the Franks by Boniface, the famous English missionary who brought Christianity to the Germans (752). In the following year Pope Stephen II himself journeyed to the Court of Pippin in northern Gaul, nominated Pippin and his two sons as ‘Patricians’ of the Romans, anointed them afresh, and bound the Franks to choose their kings henceforward only from Pippin’s descendants. Not insensible of the value of the Papal Confirmation of his title, Pippin was prompt to reciprocate the favours bestowed upon his house. The opportunity soon came.

For the last two centuries the Lombards had been extending their dominion in Italy, and not only ‘Lombardy’ but the greater part of Tuscany and almost the whole of Apulia was now in their possession. The Emperor, himself resident in Constantinople, held in Italy only some scattered territories on the sea coasts, which were ruled by his lieutenant, the Exarch, from Ravenna. Much greater in extent were the estates held by the Pope in Italy and Sicily, collectively known as ‘St. Peter’s Patrimony’. In 751 the Lombard King Aistulf attacked and captured Ravenna, and having virtually extinguished the Imperial power in Italy, threatened that of the Papacy. Pope Stephen II then invoked the help of Pippin III, who not only reconquered Ravenna but bestowed the Imperial territories upon the Pope, thus laying in the ‘Papal States’ the foundations of the ‘Temporal Power’. The alliance between the Frankish king and the Papacy, cemented by Pippin’s splendid but fatal donation, was

destined to be of capital importance to the history of Italy, of Germany, and not least of France.

§ CHARLEMAGNE. More especially was it important during the reign of Pippin's famous son. In the history of Western civilization Charlemagne is one of the most commanding figures. His father, Pippin, following the fatal custom of the Franks, had divided his kingdom between his two sons (768). Fortunately the younger son was removed by death in 771, and from then until his own death in 814, Charlemagne ruled the undivided Kingdom of the Franks; and ultimately much more.

Gibbon has observed that of all the heroes distinguished by the title of 'The Great' it is only in the case of Charlemagne that the title ascribed to him is incorporated in the name by which in France he is known. Nor is this unique distinction undeserved. The man himself was cast in an heroic mould. Of commanding presence; agile in body and brain; tireless in energy; as profound in thought as fertile in imagination; ambitious, but never losing sight of the practical in pursuit of the ideal; a man of strong animal instincts, yet capable of real tenderness; the protector of the Church and deferential to its ministers, but determined to remain 'over all persons and in all causes, ecclesiastical as well as temporal, within his dominions supreme', Charlemagne was sustained throughout a long and not untroubled reign by an honest desire to serve God and promote the well-being of his peoples.

Primarily a great warrior and an omnivorous conqueror, Charlemagne waged, in a reign of nearly half a century, only the bare results of which can here be summarized, no fewer than fifty-three campaigns. After the defeat of the Lombards and the extinction of their rule in North Italy (773-4), Charlemagne proclaimed himself as 'Rex Langobardorum', and placed on his own brows the historic Iron Crown of Lombardy. On this event followed a war of thirty years (772-804) against the Saxons, sanctified by Charlemagne as at once a Crusade against the pagan, and for the Franks a truly national enterprise. Before each campaign the King was wont to summon to a Council of War, held at Eastertide, all the great men of his Austrasian and Neustrian dominions, and with their support and sanction he went forth on his crusades, which bore fruit in the extension of his Empire to the Elbe and in the conversion of the Saxons to Christianity. The conversion was, indeed, forcible and meant much shedding of blood, but many bishoprics and abbeys were founded, and towns were built which for the first time brought civilization to a barbarian people. In other campaigns Charlemagne cleared the Avars out of Pannonia and planted the Frankish Empire and the Cross of Christ in Hungary, Bohemia, Poland, and in the land destined to form the Duchy of Austria.

The first of seven expeditions led or dispatched by Charlemagne across the Pyrenees led to the one military reverse of the reign, at Roncevalles (778), a disaster which supplied the theme of the national epic of France, the *Chanson de Roland*. Six subsequent campaigns added Catalonia to the Empire of Charlemagne and enabled him to annex the March of Gascony (later known as the Kingdom of Navarre) and to drive the infidels out of Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic Isles.

The vast Empire of Charlemagne thus extended from the Eider to the Ebro, from the Rhine nearly to the Tiber, from the Carpathians to the Atlantic.

§ THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE. It was as King of the Lombards that Charles first visited Rome (774). Awestruck by the sight of the Eternal City, Charles readily confirmed Pippin's Donation to the Papacy. Twenty-six years later he entered Rome as a judge, to inquire into a brutal outrage committed against the person of Pope Leo III, and certain counter-accusations against the Pope himself. The perpetrators of the outrage were banished, and the Pope, cleared of the charges against him, seized the opportunity of the celebration of Christmas Mass in St. Peter's, to place upon the head of his protector the Imperial Crown (800).

The moment selected by the Pope was opportune. The Eastern Empire was in suspense; a bad woman, Irene, reigned at Byzantium; over the whole Western world Charles was master. The action of the Pope was doubtless a usurpation of the rights of the Roman Senate, People, and Army. What matter? Seizing his opportunity, the Pope had struck a decisive blow for the Papacy; he had founded an institution which determined the destiny of Germany and Italy for centuries, and surviving, though in increasing feebleness, for a thousand years, was finally extinguished only when a new Charlemagne was ready to substitute a vivid reality for an antique sham. Throughout those centuries the Holy Roman Empire was inseparably connected with the German Kingship, thus depriving Germany, at a critical moment in the evolution of nations, of the strong monarchy which it sorely needed. That monarchy France obtained, though small thanks to Charlemagne, who stood not for nationality but for the Roman claim to universality. His title, like the Pope's, was from God: his rule was at once Theocratic and Imperial.

§ DOMESTIC POLICY. Not that Charlemagne neglected, as King of the Franks, the humbler duties of domestic administration. The sixty-five *Capitularies*, or Royal Decrees, which survived, contain no fewer than 1,151 articles dealing meticulously with every kind of administrative detail. These *Capitularies* were issued with the imprimatur of the great men of the realm, the bishops and abbots, dukes and counts, who were periodically summoned to assist the King with their advice. Four times a year, *missi dominici*, generally

bishops and counts, were sent out to supervise local administration. It was their duty to see that all the King's subjects got justice, and that the landowners performed the duties imposed on them by the *trinoda necessitas*—the duty to repair roads and bridges, and to provide lodging and transport facilities for the King and his officials (*purveyance*). Nor was Charles neglectful of his duties as son of the Church. He established bishoprics and abbeys, and displayed that zeal for education so characteristic of the unlettered man. To superintend the schools of the palace the dioceses and the monasteries, scholars were imported from abroad. Of these the most famous was Alcuin, who brought with him from York the great traditions of Northumbrian scholarship and culture, and gave an immense impulse to learning among the Frankish bishops, clergy, and monks.

Whether this king of men belongs to France or Germany (to anticipate later nomenclature) is a question which it were hazardous for an Englishman to discuss. On this point a great French historian has said the last word:

'La politique française . . . se fonda sur un fait; l'empire de Charlemagne. Le point de départ de ce grand procès qui occupe toute l'histoire de France, c'est l'insoluble litige de la succession de l'Empereur. C'est là que les rois trouveront le motif de leurs ambitions. C'est là que les légistes trouveront l'origine des droits, c'est là que tout d'abord trouve sa source la tradition populaire qui conduira les rois à élever les prétentions et les légistes à rechercher les droits. . . . A mesure que le temps s'éloigne l'image du grand Empereur s'élève et prend des proportions colossales. De Philippe-Auguste à Napoléon, elle plane sur l'histoire de France.'

Albert Sorel states a fact. To speak disdainfully of 'Charlemagne', to insist on spelling his name with a 'K', to repeat the shibboleths of the Teutonic school, will not rebut Sorel's statement. Let the tradition be historically fallacious, it remains politically vital and valid. Karl may have been a Teutonic Emperor; he was certainly by birth a Ripuarian Frank. Either way it matters not. It is enough that this great Emperor has been regarded by Frenchmen, throughout the ages, as the King not merely of the Franks, but of the French; that the tradition of his Empire has been through countless generations an abiding inspiration to the people who dwell in the valleys of the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, not less than to the people beyond the Rhine. With a tradition like this you may quarrel as you will. The significant point is that the tradition has persisted; that it has inspired policy; that it has aroused and sustained ambitions.

Yet not for many centuries after Charlemagne's death could the King of the Franks claim to be King of France. To vindicate that claim a secular struggle was waged for six hundred years between

the nominal King of France and the great feudatories among whom the western portion of the Carolingian Empire was in fact partitioned.

The history of that struggle is the history of medieval France.

§ THE LATER CAROLINGS (814-987). Like Clovis, Charlemagne, following the Frankish custom, had partitioned his Empire between his three sons.¹ Only a superman could indeed have ruled over the whole of Charlemagne's vast and heterogeneous empire. Moreover Gaul, the western portion of it, was becoming for the first time an entity. Franks, Celts, Romans, and Iberians were fusing under the influence of their common allegiance to the faith and discipline of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the period between Charlemagne's death (814) and Hugh Capet's election (987) is marked by progressive degeneration and disintegration. No fewer than ten kings successively reigned, but they counted for little. Whether a Louis was 'Pious' or 'Debonair', whether a Charles was 'Fat' or 'Simple', or merely a 'German' mattered nothing. Weaklings on the throne, periodical partitions, perpetual family squabbles, produced confusion which it boots not to disentangle. The Treaty of Verdun, the development of feudal principalities, the advent of the Normans, and the emergence of the French Monarchy in the person of Hugh Capet, demand, however, some notice.


§ THE TREATY OF VERDUN. The family quarrels which ensued on the death of Louis the Pious (840) were temporarily allayed by the partition of the Carolingian Empire between his three sons. Charles the 'Bald' received *Francia Occidentalis*—Neustria and Aquitania, perhaps two-thirds of modern France; to Lewis 'the German' was allotted the bulk of Austrasia and the land between the Rhine and the Oder—the East Frankish dominions of his grandfather; the eldest grandson Lothar became Emperor, and with that landless title, got the 'Middle Kingdom', extending from the mouth of the Weser to the Tiber, a long, narrow strip of territory. Although awkward in configuration, and heterogeneous in population, Lotharingia included the cities of the Low Countries and the Imperial capitals of Aachen (Aix), Arles, Milan, and Rome. At the Treaty of Verdun, then, we get our first glimpse of two kingdoms, roughly corresponding to modern France and modern Germany, kept apart by the 'Middle Kingdom' of the Rhineland and the Rhôneland.

Some contemporary writers lamented this partition as destructive of the unity of Christendom. Other recent French historians regret the creation of the 'Middle Kingdom', carved out of France (or Germany) and destined to be the cause of prolonged conflict between its two neighbours. An impartial commentator may on the contrary regret that a later Charles (the Bold of Burgundy) did not succeed in creating a kingdom which should form a barrier between Gauls

¹ Two of them predeceased him.

and Germans and so avert the secular conflict between them. Lotharingia as a political unit did not long survive.

Of much longer duration were the feudal principalities which, under the feeble rule of the later Carolings, certain great nobles were able to establish in France. When Hugh Capet was elected King there existed more than fifty great fiefs in France; the most



important being the Duchies of France, Brittany, Burgundy, Normandy, Gascony, and Guienne, and the Counties of Flanders, Anjou, and Touraine.

§ THE NORMANS IN FRANCE. The Duchy of Normandy was the result of another great wave of alien immigration. At the moment when King Alfred's children were reconquering the Danelaw (901-925) for the West Saxons, the Norse corsairs were planting another Danelaw on the banks of the Seine. As in England, the Norsemen came at first merely as pirates intent on plunder and waste. But from about 840 they made an annual expedition to that rich but ill-defended realm. Sailing up the great rivers and guided too often by the timid and traitorous inhabitants, they carried fire and slaughter into the interior of the country. Sailing up the Seine, they burnt the city of Rouen in 841 and reached Paris four years later. Between

845 and 850 the country bordering on the Loire was ravaged, and in the course of successive expeditions Nantes and Orleans, Tours and Bordeaux were put to the sack. But the first fury of these pagan pirates was soon spent. 'The Normans', says Herbert Fisher, 'grew to be the most brilliant of European races. All the virile energy of their northern origin they retained; much of the polish of the Latin races with whom their descendants mingled they succeeded in acquiring. Paganism was exchanged for Christianity, Danish for French, the tumultuous memories of the north for the defined traditions of the Latin world.'¹

Charles the Simple (898-929) purchased peace with Rollo, Chief of the Vikings, by a treaty closely resembling Alfred's Peace of Wedmore. Rollo was to rule over the valley of the Seine as Duke of Normandy; to marry the King's daughter and embrace Christianity (912). How great became the devotion of the Normans to the Church, and how superb their artistic skill, is attested by the noble fanes they built in Normandy. Though the Normans drove the Celts westwards into Brittany, they themselves were quickly absorbed by that assimilative race, and became like them good 'Frenchmen'. But the best gift of the Normans to France was the example of a compact, well-organized, feudal State. Except for the development of these small feudal States the condition of France in the tenth century would have been completely chaotic, and nowhere else so thoroughly as in Normandy was feudalism, as Fisher truly says, 'organized and controlled for public ends. Military service was fixed by custom and rendered in respect of the tenure of land by feudal vassals. Private war was limited, castle building conceded only under ducal licence. The coinage made a ducal monopoly, the local administration entrusted to a *vice-comes*, or sheriff, who represented the ducal or public, as opposed to the feudal or local interest. Even the Church . . . was in Normandy controlled by the Duke.'² Students of English history will not fail to recognize that in this succinct epitome we can discern many of the features characteristic also of Norman policy in England.

France, meanwhile, was impatiently awaiting a saviour of society. He appeared towards the end of the tenth century in the person of Hugh Capet.

¹ *Europe*, p. 187.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

CHAPTER V

THE CAPETIAN MONARCHY—THE ANGLO-NORMAN-ANGEVIN EMPIRE (987-1270)

'The history of France and even the separate existence of France begins with the election of Hugues Capet.'

SIR JAMES STEPHEN

§ HUGH CAPET. Hugh Capet sprang from one of the many Houses which rose to prominence on the ruins of the Carolingian monarchy. The founder of the House, Robert 'the Strong', a man of humble origin, was so mighty a warrior that Charles the Bald, in terror of the Norsemen, committed to him the defence of Paris and most of the country between the Seine and the Loire. For his services he was made Count of Paris. Robert fell in battle against the Normans in 866 and was succeeded as Count of Paris by his son Odo (Eudes), memorable for the defence of Paris against Rollo the Norman (885-7). On the death of Charles the Fat (887) Odo, though his kingdom did not extend beyond the territory he had ruled as Count of Paris, was elected King of France. There were, indeed, at the close of the ninth century no fewer than five kings in France. This confusion was ended only when in 987 Hugh Capet, the most powerful of the great feudal princes, was elected King of France.

For many years the direct authority of the Capetians did not extend beyond the central district round Paris, and their position was persistently menaced by the rivalry of the great feudal lords, particularly by that of the Duke of Normandy, whose Duchy, like the Counties of Maine, Anjou, and Champagne, was actually carved out of the old Duchy of France.

§ GROWTH OF THE MONARCHY. The development of the royal authority was very slow. But, despite occasional set-backs, it was steady. Moreover, the Capets in their contest with the great feudatories, enjoyed some conspicuous advantages. From the deposition of Charles the Fat (887) down to the accession of Hugh Capet the monarchy had been, in theory and fact, elective, but the Capetians adopted the prudent device of getting the heir elected and crowned during the lifetime of his predecessor. The Capets were also fortunate in that for more than three centuries there was no failure of an heir male, and that among them were several really great rulers: Philip Augustus, Louis IX (St. Louis), and Philip the Fair must indeed take rank among the most astute and sagacious statesmen of the Middle Ages. The actual domain of the Capets was at the outset strictly circumscribed, but it was compact, centrally situated, and in Paris and Orleans contained cities of high political, as well as

strategical, significance. Moreover, feudalism, though centrifugal as a system of government, is in respect of land tenure a centripetal force. Thus, in the eleventh century, feudalism began to operate in favour of the supreme landowner, the King.

§ THE CROWN AND THE CRUSADES. Another reason for the steady growth in the power of the Crown was its alliance with the Church. This alliance operated in a variety of ways. The proclamation of a *Truce of God* (1041) was an attempt to abate the prevalence and persistence of private wars. Though imperfectly observed, the 'Truce' proved a real blessing to the poor, upon whom the burden of waging private wars had mainly fallen. Again, the institution and development of the several orders of chivalry effected a sensible amelioration in the manners and customs of feudal society, while the Crusades drained the strength of the feudal nobility. Though the Crusades belong to European rather than specifically to French history, it was a French Pope (Urban II) who in 1095 conceived the idea of combining Europe against the infidel Turks; it was Peter of Amiens, a French hermit, whose fiery eloquence aroused the enthusiasm of the soldiers of the Cross; it was Godfrey de Bouillon who established (1099) the Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem; it was under the common name of Franks that all the crusaders—French and German, English and Italian—were known in the East. Above all, it was upon France that the Crusades produced their most significant and permanent effects. Not only did they divert the energies of the great vassals to distant warfare and induce them to make a wholesale sacrifice of life and fortune, but, by a far more subtle process, they undermined the foundations upon which the whole superstructure of feudalism rested. They introduced new, not to say revolutionary, ideas; they gave an immense impulse both to commerce and to learning; they necessitated new methods of taxation and brought into prominence new social classes. In a word, they dealt a fatal blow alike at feudalism as an institution and at the persons and fortunes of individual feudatories.

In another way the Crusades contributed to the growing strength of the monarchy. From Constantinople the Crusaders returned with renewed reverence for the Justinian Code and increased readiness to accept the maxims of Roman law. Nor were the French kings slow to improve the opportunity in the interests of the Crown. Thus, while feudalism emerged from the Crusades broken, wasted, and undermined, the Crown emerged with increased authority and enhanced prestige. In the growth of towns and in the new centres of learning, both powerfully stimulated by the Crusades, the King found fresh allies against the feudal lords: merchants and scholars alike looked to the Crown for protection and patronage.

§ UNIVERSITIES AND TOWNS. From many lands scholars began

to flock to the schools of Paris in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and laid the foundations of a university which soon rivalled that of Bologna. From Paris came, in the twelfth century, that migration of scholars who established in Oxford the earliest English university. Though other universities were established in France, none ever rivalled the University of Paris, which by the beginning of the thirteenth century received its Statutes from the Crown.

An even more direct contribution to monarchical power was made by the development of municipal corporations. Ever since Roman days the great municipalities of the south had enjoyed extensive privileges and immunities. The Capetian kings conferred similar privileges upon the city communes of the north: the right of self-government; of making their own by-laws; of electing their own magistrates; of free and open markets; independence in regard to taxation and jurisdiction; and the privilege and duty of providing for their own defence. In these, and many other ways, the municipal corporations escaped from feudal domination and became not unworthy of alliance with the Crown. Louis VI (1108–37) was responsible for the enfranchisement of eight communes, and his son for twenty-five, though they carefully abstained from extending the process to their own domains.

§ THE ANGLO-ANGEVIN EMPIRE. The reign of his son Louis VII (1137–80) registered a set-back. Personally pious rather than strong, he hearkened to the eloquent voice of St. Bernard of Clairvaux and went on the Second Crusade, to the satisfaction, maybe, of his conscience but not to the advantage of his kingdom, though France suffered, in truth, less from his absence than from the matrimonial complications which ensued on his return. Married in his father's lifetime to Eleanor, the heiress to the great Duchy of Aquitaine, Louis VII divorced her in 1152, whereupon Eleanor promptly married Henry Plantagenet, son of Geoffrey, Count of Anjou, and Matilda, the daughter of Henry I of England. That marriage split the kingdom of France in twain.

Succeeding to the English throne in 1154, Henry II was also in his own right Duke of Normandy, and Count of Anjou and Maine. By his marriage with Eleanor he succeeded to the Duchy of Aquitaine and to rights, more or less contested, over the County of Toulouse. The marriage of his son Geoffrey with the heiress of Brittany brought that Duchy also—of all the great feudal principalities the most tenacious of its independence—into Henry's powerful grasp. Though loosely compacted, the Anglo-Angevin Empire was of immense extent, extending from the Solway Firth to the Bay of Biscay, and commanding within those limits the whole of the Atlantic sea-board. The power of his nominal suzerain would have been reduced to a shadow had not the effective power of Henry II been undermined by his quarrel with Becket and its tragical issue, by his quarrels

with his sons, by the disloyalty of some of the English barons, by the hostility of William the Lion of Scotland, and by the perpetual opposition of Queen Eleanor to her second husband.

Eleanor of Aquitaine was a most remarkable personality. A mass of contradictions, an impossible wife but a devoted mother; 'generous yet often unforgiving, strong as a man, capricious as a child; tender as a woman, and then in turn sudden, fierce, and dangerous as a tigress',¹ Queen Eleanor was mainly responsible for rescuing her first husband from her second. Her death in 1204 was a fatal blow to the fortunes of her son John.

§ PHILIP AUGUSTUS (1180-1223). Long before that the Crown of France had passed into the hands of one of the strongest of the Capetian kings. Under Philip II (Augustus) the recovery of France was rapid. From the day of his accession he set before himself two supreme objects: the reduction of the feudal nobility, and the expulsion of the English from France. He went a long way towards achieving both objects. He gave every encouragement to Richard Cœur-de-Lion in his rebellion against his father Henry II in 1189, but this far from disinterested friendship did not survive the rivalry which quickly developed between Philip and Richard in the Third Crusade (1189-92). From that Crusade Philip hastened back to France to take advantage of his rival's absence, and allied himself with the younger brother John, but after John's accession (1199), the suspicious death of John's young nephew Arthur, Duke of Brittany, turned alliance into bitter hostility. Suspected of the murder, John was summoned, as Philip's vassal, to appear before the twelve peers of France and answer the charge. His fiefs were declared forfeit and annexed to the Crown of France. But Philip was bent upon a greater prize. He marched into Normandy, and town after town, including the great fortress built by Richard near Les Andelys—the Château Gaillard—surrendered to him. John, at last roused to resistance, then formed a formidable coalition with the Counts of Flanders and Boulogne and the Duke of Brabant. This coalition, though joined by the Emperor Otto IV, was, however, defeated by Philip in the famous battle of Bouvines.

§ BATTLE OF BOUVINES (1214). Bouvines was something more than the greatest military achievement of Philip Augustus. It involved the loss of Normandy to England; it was the proximate cause of the revolt of the Barons against John; it led to the concession of *Magna Carta*; above all, it marked an important stage in the evolution of the French monarchy and the making of the French nation. Philip's great victory, as a French historian has truly said, 'gave to the Capetian dynasty the baptism of glory which it had lacked till then, and revealed France to herself'.

¹ This is the description of F. Marion Crawford whose *Via Crucis* contains the best portrait of Eleanor known to me.

After Bouvines the situation was, both in France and England, peculiarly complicated. The Anglo-Norman baronage, posing as champions of English national liberties in 1215, invoked the aid of Philip Augustus against their own legitimate, if faithless, sovereign. Thereupon the Pope Innocent III interfered to protect his 'vassal' John against his English subjects and against the French king. The English people were distracted by the choice between a Rome-ridden king and a rebellious baronage fighting as the allies of a French prince—on English soil.

The tangle was partially unravelled by the death of John (1216). In England national sentiment reasserted itself. The Regent, the Earl of Pembroke, defeated Prince Louis and his Anglo-Norman allies at Lincoln in 1217, and before the end of that year England was rid of the foreigners.

In France, a long and a great reign came to an end in 1223. Philip Augustus had gone a long way towards expelling the Plantagenets from France; he had doubled the extent of the royal domain; he had beautified his capital and endowed it with a university; he had checked private war, and by the appointment of royal officials known as *baillis*, or *seneschals*, effectually curtailed the independence of the feudal lords. His son Louis VIII (1223–6) faithfully carried on his father's work, but died at the early age of thirty-nine, and was succeeded by the saintliest, if not the greatest, of French kings.

§ SAINT LOUIS (1226–70). 'The moral beauties of St. Louis, better suited to a knight-errant than to a statesman, added lustre rather than strength to the Capetian Monarchy,' wrote an English historian. French historians do not concur in this criticism. Though ready to justify the canonization of their king, they hold him also to have been a statesman in the highest sense of the word. 'This Saint, this man of peace,' writes Duruy, 'did more in the simplicity of his heart for the progress of Monarchy than the most subtle Councillors or ten warrior Kings.'

For the first ten years of the reign of Louis IX his mother, Blanche of Castile, ruled as regent, and a great ruler she was. She broke up a dangerous confederacy between Henry III of England, anxious to recover the French provinces lost by his father, and a strong party among the French feudal lords (1230); she added Languedoc to the kingdom of France; she married King Louis to Marguerita, daughter of Raymond, Count of Provence, and so prepared the way for the absorption, at long last, of the old Roman province into France. Another son she married, with a similar motive, to a daughter of the Count of Toulouse.

In 1236 Louis IX was declared to be of age; in 1242 he inflicted, at Taillebourg, a severe defeat on the English, again in league with some of his own feudatories, in 1244 he took the Cross. The Crusade, delayed until 1248, was a dismal failure. Louis spent most of his

time in Syria in captivity, and when in 1254 he returned to his kingdom, it was to find that his mother, a truly good woman and a great ruler, had died (1252), and that his barons, taking advantage of her death and her son's absence, had reasserted their independence and were seeking to break up the newly won unity of France.

§ ANTI-FEUDAL POLICY. Louis IX, though a saint, was no weakling. He struck a series of shrewd blows at the self-seeking baronage. Important fiefs lapsing by failure of heirs or forfeiture he bestowed on members of his family: to his brother Alphonse he gave the counties of Poitou and Toulouse; to his brother Robert, the county of Artois; to his brother Charles, Anjou and Maine; to his son Peter, the county of Alençon; and to his son Robert, the county of Clermont. Insisting that 'a battle is not the way to establish a right', St. Louis forbade trials by combat and ultimately issued a total prohibition of private wars. He curtailed the profitable privilege of private coinage by enacting that the royal coinage should be the only legal tender throughout the royal domain and concurrently valid with the coinage of his vassals in their respective fiefs. Though he organized the trade-guilds and extended the rights of the citizens, St. Louis withdrew a number of town charters and curbed the independence of the municipalities as rigorously as that of the nobles. This was all part of his policy to centralize the administration of justice. Not only did he constitute himself a court of appeal from all courts feudal or municipal, but, like Charlemagne, he sent out itinerant justices (*missi dominici*) to report to him on local affairs. Nothing he loved more than to administer justice in person. Joinville, his friend and biographer, tells how the King would, after Mass, in summer-time, go and sit under an oak in the wood of Vincennes: 'all those who had business came to speak to him, unhindered by the guards or by any one else. And then he would ask with his own mouth, "Is any one here who has a cause?" And those who had a cause stood up. And then he said, "Be silent all, that we may take one after another."' A charming picture, truly, of paternal government at its best.

So high was the repute of St. Louis that even the Pope and the Emperor appealed to him as arbitrator. English students will recall how the Barons' war was temporarily averted by referring to St. Louis the question of the validity of the *Provisions of Oxford*. Well might the English people have confidence in a French king, who, having qualms as to the equity of the recent treatment of English claims on French provinces, had lately (1259) restored to England the great Duchy of Gascony with the cities of Bordeaux and Bayonne, and also the bishoprics of Limoges, Cahors, and Perigord. At the same time Henry III renounced all claim on Normandy, Anjou, Touraine, and Poitou. Though French historians rightly describe

this transaction as a 'bargain', it was a bargain inspired by a motive only too rare in the annals of diplomacy.

§ LAW, JUSTICE, AND ADMINISTRATION. Treaty-making was the exclusive function of the King, who was not only the sole and technically irresponsible executive but also the sole source of legislation, justice, and administration before the differentiation of these functions.¹ That was in accord with the views of the French lawyers, who, increasingly interested in the study of Roman Law, were anxious that their sovereign should exercise all the powers of a Roman Emperor. St. Louis had the *Digest* translated into French, and established special schools for the study of Roman Law in the Universities of Paris, Angers, and Orleans. The Pope, jealous for the Canon Law, discouraged this development. In 1250 Robert Sorbonne, the Confessor of St. Louis, established (1250) the college known by his name for the study of theology.

In his dealings both with the Papacy and with the French Church, St. Louis was entirely respectful but not lacking in firmness. To heretics and even 'blasphemers' he showed himself merciless: burning their tongues with a red-hot iron: but at the same time he kept a firm hand on the abuse of spiritual weapons such as excommunication and interdict; the clergy were brought within the jurisdiction of the Crown, and a check was put upon the diversion of revenue to Rome.

§ THE PARLEMENT OF PARIS. Of special interest to the English student of comparative politics is the impulse given by St. Louis to the development of the Parlement of Paris.² Students must, however, be on guard against the temptation to emphasize overmuch the contrast between France and England; or, conversely, to discover parallels where none exists.

Institutions destined to long life have parents but not birthdays. A written Constitution can be precisely dated; not so institutions which though 'never born' have grown. Such was the English Parliament, such were the French Parlements. The parentage of both can, indeed, be traced to the King's Court (*Curia*) or Chamber in the *domus regis*, and the adjacent wardrobe (*camera*). There all the business of State was transacted; there all the officials and Ministers of State originally served. Both in France and England the administrative system as ultimately evolved was the result of the gradual differentiation of functions: judicial business being assigned to this body of men, legislation to that, and so on. But in France, *Parlement* was the name by which the Supreme Courts of

¹ This differentiation came only with the Revolution of 1789.

² Despite the laborious researches of French historians—Luchaire, Langlois, Aubert, Esmein, Viollet, Picot, Glasson, and others—there is still great obscurity about the early history of the Parlements and the States-General. This account is merely a brief but I hope accurate summary of a difficult subject.

Justice in Paris and various provincial capitals were known. Taxation, legislation (so far as these functions were not monopolized by the King), the airing and redress of grievances formed the business not of the central law-courts but of another body, the *States-General*. The term *Parlement* began, probably in the reign of St. Louis, to be applied exclusively to the King's Court in its judicial aspect; its judgments began to be recorded on rolls; its location fixed, and its personnel defined. The *Parlement* was originally composed of vassals, nobles, and prelates, but a professional or lay element was gradually introduced; and though the peers of France remained the hereditary *ex officio* Councillors of the Crown, the work of the *Parlement* was actually done by a permanent legal staff known as *maîtres*, or *clercs du roi*, who were required to sit regularly from November to August, dispersing only for the 'Long Vacation' in September and October.

§ CRUSADES. A great administrator, a systematic reformer, St. Louis was primarily a Crusader, and in 1266 in consequence of news from the East, undertook yet another expedition against the infidel. After four years of careful preparation he set sail in 1270, but got no farther than Tunis, where on August 25, 1270, he fell a victim to the prevailing plague. Though only fifty-five, and though his ardent spirit was unbroken, Louis was physically worn out. If we could ignore his record as a persecutor of Jews and heretics—the stigma of which attaches less to the man than to his age—we might count St. Louis an almost perfect character. Pitiless towards heretics, he regularly gave his own body to be scourged; in all things he practised what he taught. Notre Dame and the exquisite Sainte-Chapelle remain as monuments to his devotion to the externals of Christianity, but it was not for externals only that he cared; his personal piety was genuine; his memory is that of a good Christian and a great king.

CHAPTER VI

THE LATER CAPETIANS—THE PARLEMENTS—THE STATES-GENERAL (1270–1328)

'The deputies remained agents in relation to their electors, petitioners in relation to the King, and never became Senators empowered and obliged to consider the interests of the whole commonwealth and to exercise the discretion of a Sovereign legislature.'

F. C. MONTAGUE

'The victory of the (English) Constitution was won by the Knights of the Shires.'

BISHOP STUBBS

§ THE PARLEMENTS. Constitutionally and territorially Philip II (1270–85) carried on his father's work. He further defined and

differentiated the functions of the *Parlement of Paris*. He concentrated its financial work in a special committee known as the *Chambre des Comptes*, and distributed other functions between a *Grande Chambre*, a *Chambre des Enquêtes*, and two *Chambres des Requêtes*. To an English student the *Grande Chambre* seems to resemble our own High Court of Parliament. There the great nobles sat with the *Maîtres* in the *Grande Chambre de Parlement* and the professional lawyers, just as, at the opening of Parliament at Westminster, the Judges of the High Court sit with the Peers; there stood the King's throne and seated on it (the *lit de justice*) the King resumed the powers he had delegated to the *Parlement*, and by his royal presence superseded its authority. The *Grande Chambre* dealt with appeals from inferior courts, and as a court of first instance tried cases of high treason and other important cases. The *Chambres des Enquêtes* made preliminary inquiries into cases put down for appeal to the *Grande Chambre*, while other committees decided cases of minor importance. Besides the *Parlement of Paris* there were established by the end of the fifteenth century no fewer than twelve provincial *Parlements*. The *Parlement of Toulouse* was set up for Languedoc (1443); the *Parlement of Grenoble* for Dauphiné (1453); of *Bordeaux* for Guienne (1462); of *Dijon* for Burgundy (1477); of *Aix* for Provence (1501); of *Rouen* for Normandy (1499). Outside these limits the *Parlement of Paris* remained the sole Court of Appeal.

§ TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. The reign of Philip III was not less fruitful in respect of territorial expansion than of constitutional reform. The great Poictevin inheritance fell in to the Crown, and thus the power of the French monarchy was (subject to the vicissitudes of the Hundred Years War) finally established south of the Loire.

The long reign of Philip IV—'the Fair'—(1285–1314) was, in respect of territorial expansion, less important. His marriage with the heiress of Navarre and Champagne brought two valuable provinces into the royal domain, but the annexation of the still wealthier County of Flanders, obtained by a victory over a weakling count, at Furnes (1297), was not permanent. Five years later the Flemish burghers revolted against their new master and at the battle of Courtrai (1302) took their revenge upon the too confident chivalry of France. That battle, though it ominously anticipated the victories of the English bowmen over the same degenerate caste at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, was for the moment retrieved by the French knights at the battle of Mons-en-Puelle (1304). An accommodation followed: the Flemings got back their Count; the French king retained the district up to the Scheldt, and a large sum of money.

Of money Philip IV was, throughout his reign, in great need, and his policy was largely dictated by that necessity. No fiscal device known to the Middle Ages did he neglect: he raided the hoards of

the Jews and the Lombard bankers; he debased the coinage; he allowed the serfs of the royal domain to commute their services for money payments; he dissolved the Military Order of Knights Templars, and confiscated their vast possessions—in fine, he extorted money from every institution and every class in his dominions.

§ KING AND POPE. Not excluding the clergy. Hence Philip's quarrel with Pope Boniface VIII, and hence the summoning of the States-General. In 1294 Benedict Gaetano had been elected Pope under the title of Boniface VIII, and quickly manifested his determination to assert to the full and in a more aggressive temper all the most extravagant claims of his predecessors Gregory VII (Hildebrand) and Innocent III.

In 1294 Boniface issued his famous Bull *Clericis Laicos*, forbidding the clergy to pay taxes to a Temporal Sovereign. Against this Bull Philip the Fair, like his great contemporary Edward I of England, immediately protested; but though the Bull was temporarily revoked it was reissued in *Salvator mundi* (1302), in terms especially menacing to the French king. Still more insulting to the King, and still more assertive of the Papal supremacy over all Temporal rulers, was a third Bull, *Ausculda fili*, which has been justly stigmatized as taking 'the tone of a pedagogue to an unruly pupil'. The King's appropriate retort was to burn the Bull publicly, and summon the States-General to support him against Papal interference. The burghers summoned as a Third Estate left the King in no doubt as to their attitude towards the disputants. 'To you most noble prince, to you our lord Philip, the people of your realm make prayer and demand that you preserve the free sovereignty of this State, which is such that you shall recognize no sovereign in these lands in temporal matters save God.'¹

The spirit of nascent nationality was evidently beginning to inspire Frenchmen. Undeterred, the Pope accused the King of blasphemy against the 'Holy One of Israel', and, in default of complete submission, threatened him with excommunication. Thereupon the King's agent in Italy seized the person of the Pope at Anagni, but the citizens, deeply roused by this outrage upon the Holy Father, drove the French out of the town and there, in the city of his birth, the intrepid Pope shortly afterwards died at the age of eighty-six (1303). His successor, Benedict XI, died by poison in the following year, and on his death the Papal chair was left vacant until, in June 1305, Bertrand de Got, Archbishop of Bordeaux, was elected to occupy it as Clement V. This French Pope abandoned Rome for Avignon, which, though contiguous to France, was annexed to France only by Napoleon I.

During the seventy years (1305-77) of the 'Babylonian Captivity', a succession of French Popes were little more than puppets in the

¹ Duruy: I, 285.

hands of French kings. At long last, however, an Italian, Urban VI, was elected Pope (1378), but the French Cardinals, not to be outdone, elected their own candidate as Clement VII, thus initiating the Great Schism, to be ended only by the Council of Constance.

Philip the Fair in his contest with the Papacy had won, hands down. But the victory was due less to the statesmanship of the King than to the inopportune arrogance of a Pope who asserted claims inconsistent with the growing sentiment of nationality. Fortunately for the French monarchy national sentiment coincided with the interests of the Crown. Historically, the quarrel between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII is, however, most of all important for the impulse which it gave to the development of an institution which might well have laid (as did Edward I's model Parliament in England) the foundations of popular liberty in France.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL. Philip the Fair is justly reckoned to be the founder of the *States-General*. There had indeed been similar assemblies in previous reigns, but it was from Philip's summoning of the *States-General* in 1302 that the *States-General* takes its place in the constitutional machinery of the French kingdom. Moreover, Philip IV summoned the 'Estates' more frequently than his predecessors, and on more critical occasions. Yet, no more than the English Parliament, did the States-General originally represent a concession made by the King to his subjects. On the contrary, this 'embryo Parliament' was imposed by the Crown upon the nobles, clergy, and commons, as an obligation, and to serve the purposes of the King. The barons and prelates were required, unless they obtained permission from the Crown to send proctors or attorneys, to attend in person; though the towns were necessarily represented by proctors who formed the *Tiers État*.

The States were frequently summoned during the three following reigns (1314-28), but the assemblies were more often local than 'General'; nor were the Estates of Languedoc ever summoned with those of Langue d'oc. Procedure was, however, regularized: the King made his demands upon the purses of his subjects; the latter submitted a statement of grievances to the King; and the King issued in due course an Ordinance which announced his concessions, albeit in terms frequently vague and illusory. In England a similar defect in machinery was not remedied until, under Henry VI, legislation by *bill* superseded legislation by *petition*, and the House of Commons thus obtained a co-ordinate share in legislation. In France it was by the States-General of 1338 that the principle was asserted that no extraordinary taxation might be imposed without the assent of all three Estates. But the principle was in a variety of ways evaded. Of a States-General summoned in 1351 to meet the King's financial necessities, no record survives, but the Estates met again in 1355 in order to supply funds for the defence of the country against an

invasion led in person by Edward III and the Black Prince. The States undertook to raise and maintain a large force, but only on condition that the subsidy to be raised from a *gabelle* (or tax on salt), and an *aide* of eightpence in the *livre* on sales, should be paid into the hands of treasurers responsible to the States for its expenditure. The States-General was thus advancing rapidly towards the assertion of two vital principles: control of taxation and control over expenditure.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL OF 1356-7. Even more important was the States-General which sat in 1356-7 after the disaster to French arms and the capture of King John at Poitiers. The three Estates met in somewhat truculent mood, particularly the *Tiers État*, who were incited to opposition by Etienne Marcel, who, as Provost of the merchants of Paris, had virtually become master of the capital, and now assumed the leadership of the discontented bourgeoisie in the States-General. With Robert le Coq, Bishop of Laon, Marcel drew up a list of grievances which, having been endorsed by the States of each province, were presented to the Dauphin Charles, acting as Lieutenant of his imprisoned father. Backed by an authority which was hardly less than national, the demands made by the Estates could not be resisted, and were embodied in the Royal Ordinance of 1357. The States-General were to meet at least twice a year, and oftener if need be, and were to nominate thirty-six Councillors to act on their behalf in the intervals between sessions. Other deputies were to be sent on mission into the provinces with authority to summon and consult provincial Estates and endowed with a large measure of control over local officials. The Estates were to be consulted before treaties were concluded. There was to be no tampering with the coinage, and taxes were to be voted and collected by the Estates, and the proceeds expended under their control. Justice was to be administered more cheaply and expeditiously; purveyance to be abolished, and no alienation of lands in the royal domain to be permitted. Service in the army was to be universal, and the soldiers were to be paid by the State. On these terms the States agreed to raise and maintain 30,000 men. This was a step towards the complete reorganization of the army which was one of the most important achievements of Charles V.

Of constitutional development, this Great Ordinance of 1357 was the high-water mark. From the reign of Charles V 'the Wise' (1364-1380) onwards there was in this respect progressive degeneration, nor is it wholly fanciful to discern thus early the sowing of the bad seed, destined to fructify so abundantly in the Revolution of 1789. Between 1369 and 1440 there was a gradual relaxation of popular control over taxation, and from then onwards the independence of the Crown in fiscal matters was virtually complete. In 1356 *élus* had been appointed to assist, on behalf of the Estates, in the collection

of the *aides* and the apportionment of the *taille*, or direct tax, assessed *en bloc* and locally apportioned among those who were not exempted.¹ In 1372, however, the *élus* were transformed into functionaries of the Crown, and in 1625 were suppressed altogether, though the designation survived in the distinction between the *Pays d'élection*—districts such as Paris, Tours, Orleans, Bourges, Lyons, Bordeaux, and others—and the *Pays d'Etat*—districts more recently annexed to the Crown, such as the Duchy of Burgundy, Languedoc, Brittany, etc. The fiscal independence of the *Pays d'Etat* retained until the seventeenth century, was a great embarrassment to successive Finance Ministers. It was, indeed, a great misfortune for France that her financial system was defined 'at a time when her kings were not yet strong enough to insist that all taxes should be paid direct into the royal treasury, and also at a time when the kingdom was not sufficiently united to secure equality of taxation in every quarter, at a time, too, when feudalism, though moribund, had still sufficient force to insist on exemption and distinctions'.² In England feudalism was replaced by a Parliament continuously growing in strength. In France there existed no authority and no body of men politically prepared to take over, or even share with the King, the centralized Government that was replacing feudal decentralization.³ The result was that as feudalism weakened the States-General simultaneously degenerated.

That degeneration was even more marked in the fifteenth than in the fourteenth century. At the famous meeting at Tours (in 1484) the Estates did, indeed, make an effort to assert their authority, but the Crown was able to defeat any projects of reform by playing off the Provincial Estates against the States-General, a device rendered easy by mutual jealousy which the Crown did not fail to accentuate. To this jealousy the failure of the States-General to establish itself as a power co-ordinate with the monarchy must be largely attributed. France was not, in fact, administratively unified until the Revolution, and in its disunity, the Crown found its strength. Another cause of weakness was the irregularity of the sessions. Between the reign of Philip IV and that of Louis XVI, a period of five hundred years, the States-General met only twice oftener than did the English Parliament during the twenty years of Edward II's reign. It is small wonder, then, that the States-General never really succeeded in keeping its hold on the purse-strings. As M. Esmein has truly said: 'The King demanded of them the vote of subsidies which he might impose without them, and the giving of counsel which he was free to disregard.'

¹ The privilege of exemption extended to all the wealthier classes—nobles, clergy, officials—and was a principal cause of the explosion of 1789.

² M. Macdonald: *France*, I, 258-9.

³ Cp. McIlwain: *Cambridge Medieval History*, VII, 710.

For the rapidly diverging development of the French States-General and the English Parliament, one thing was pre-eminently responsible. France had no rural middle class. In England it was the knights who gave strength both to the local Court of the Shire and to the House of Commons. Forming a link between their kinsmen and friends who sat in the House of Lords and their political associates in the Lower Chamber, the Knights of the Shire gave to Parliament that solidarity and cohesion which rendered hopeless any attempt on the part of the Crown to play off class against class. In France there existed no such liaison. The French Crown could, therefore, ally itself now with the clergy, now with the Commons, to destroy the power of their common enemy the feudal nobility.

Of Philip the Fair's three sons, who, as Louis X, Philip V, and Charles IV, reigned in rapid succession until 1328, none made any permanent mark upon the history of France; none of them left an heir male of his body, and under the Salic Law the Crown passed on the death of Charles IV to his cousin Philip, son of Charles of Valois and grandson of Philip III. The accession of Philip VI marks the beginning of a new dynasty, that of the Valois, and a new era in French history.

CHAPTER VII

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: I (1337-80)

'There has never been a King of France who has armed himself less, and never one who has given me more trouble.'

EDWARD III ON CHARLES V

TO the average Englishman few periods of French history are better known than that of the Hundred Years War. The causes of the war though endlessly canvassed, are not obscure. The tragic circumstances of the third Edward's accession to the English throne compelled him, on the extinction of the direct male line in France, to acquiesce in the accession to the throne of a collateral, Philip of Valois. But provoked by the support given by Philip to David Bruce, after the English victory at Halidon Hill (1333), Edward put forward his claim to the French Crown. Other causes were not lacking. If Philip of France espoused the cause of David Bruce, Edward of England supported the claims of Robert of Artois (certainly a forger, if not a murderer) against those of the French claimants to that important County. A further cause of offence to France was Edward's marriage with Philippa of Hainault, which strengthened the connexion between England and the Low Countries and facilitated an alliance between the English King and the Princes of Brabant, Gueldres, and other

districts on the north-eastern borders of France. A *rapprochement* between Edward and the Emperor Louis, and the title of Imperial Vicar assumed by the English king, supplied indeed a natural counter-stroke to the alliance between Philip and his Papal minion at Avignon, then engaged in a bitter struggle with the Emperor. To this move Philip retorted by sending a mission to each of the towns in Guienne to announce his claim on a 'French' Duchy, of which the English king was Duke. More important, however, than these personal irritants or than the dynastic rivalry of the two kings was the increasingly intimate connexion between the English merchants and the Flemish cities, a connexion cemented by the support given by Edward III to James van Artevelde, the brewer of Ghent, who in the perennial conflict between the commercial cities and their Count headed the burgher party.

A powerful economic motive thus gave a national character to a war which otherwise might have looked only like a continuation of the feudal strife between vassal and suzerain. Feudalism, though still dominant in France, was yielding in England to the advancing idea of nationalism. A change in the political and social structure was reflected in changes in the fiscal system and in army organization. Parliamentary grants were superseding feudal aids, and 'mercenary' troops, raised by contract between the Crown and the great lords, were taking the place of feudal levies. No corresponding changes were as yet discernible, or at most very faintly, in the political, social, fiscal, and agricultural economy of France. When, at long last, the French monarchy did prevail against the disintegrating forces of feudalism, the feudal princes gave place not, as in England, to a constitutional sovereign, but to an autocrat.

§ THE WAR (1337-60). Though the war extended over more than a century the actual fighting was intermittent and hostilities were interrupted by frequent truces. The first phase lasted from Edward's descent upon Flanders in 1337, down to the conclusion of the Peace of Bretigny (1360). This was a period of almost unbroken success for English arms. At Sluys (1340) the English inflicted a crushing defeat upon a fleet hastily raised, chiefly in Genoa, by Philip, and frustrated his attempt to intercept the return of Edward to Flanders. On the other hand, the English advance on St. Omer and Tournai was void of results, and both the English and French kings were glad to agree to a truce, which though temporarily interrupted by Edward's intervention on behalf of John, Earl of Montfort, a claimant to the Duchy of Brittany, lasted until 1346. The war was then resumed in Guienne, when the Earl of Derby (Grandfather of Henry IV), won a great victory over the French at Auberoche but found himself hard pressed on the Garonne by John, Duke of Normandy, Philip's eldest son and heir. To relieve the pressure on Guienne, Edward led an expedition to northern France, landed at La Hogue,

and having sacked the prosperous town of Caen, advanced on Rouen and almost reached Paris. King Philip then took the offensive, and Edward, compelled to hasty retreat, found himself on the Somme. The battle at Crécy resulted in a crushing defeat for the chivalry of France, and, as a great English historian has picturesquely put it, 'sounded the death-knell of feudalism as a means of warfare'. Edward III, if an indifferent strategist, was a superb tactician, and the disposition of his small force at Crécy was masterly. The Genoese mercenaries fighting in the ranks of the French were thrown back by the well-aimed shafts of the English bowmen upon the advancing knights, who attacked the English archers without order or plan. The result was a complete victory for the English arms. Eleven princes, including the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Lorraine, and the Count of Flanders, over 500 knights and 30,000 soldiers, were left dead on the field. But Edward's little force, not strong enough to advance on Paris, withdrew to the coast, where they laid siege to Calais, which, after a brave resistance, was starved into surrender. Edward's vengeance upon the brave citizens was stayed only (as the familiar story tells) by the intercession of the good Queen Philippa. So the French port fell into English hands never to be surrendered until the shameful days of Mary Tudor.


After the capture of Calais a truce was arranged, and owing to a terrible onset of bubonic plague (the 'Black Death') which devastated both England and France, the war was not resumed until 1355. The Black Prince, after a destructive march from Bordeaux to Carcassonne (1355), then advanced into the heart of France and at Poitiers (1356) inflicted upon the French a defeat hardly less complete than that of Crécy. King John, who in 1350 had succeeded to his father's throne, was captured at Poitiers, a piece of good fortune for the English, which was followed by a two years' truce.

§ THE PLIGHT OF FRANCE. Shortly before his death, Philip VI had purchased from Humbert II, Dauphin of Vienne, the province henceforth known as Dauphiné, which carried French territory up to the Alps and gave to the King's eldest son the title by which he was henceforth known. The first to bear it was King John's son Charles, upon whom, during his father's imprisonment in England, the government of the kingdom devolved. So terrible was the plight of France after Poitiers that the Dauphin threw himself upon the support of the States-General. The reforms promised by the resulting Ordinance of 1357 were, however, vitiated by the crimes committed in the name of the exultant burghers by Etienne Marcel, by the outbreak of civil war between the feudal nobles and the 'upstart' burghers, and by the rising of the peasants (Jacquerie) against their lords. The peasants carried fire and slaughter in all directions, nor were the 'Free Companies', the disbanded mercenaries from the French and English armies, less formidable to unarmed citizens. To

add to the general confusion Etienne Marcel called in the help of Charles the Bad, King of Navarre, who as the grandson of Louis X had a claim on the French Crown which (saving the Salic Law)¹ was superior to that of Philip of Valois or even of Edward III. Charles, a double-dyed traitor, first deserted his burgher allies to join hands with the Dauphin, and then, after the violent death of Marcel (1358), entered into negotiations with Edward III.

Meanwhile, King John, wearying of his captivity in England, honourable and even luxurious as it was, agreed to purchase his freedom by the surrender of half his kingdom, including all the coast of France (except Brittany) from Calais to the Pyrenees. The Dauphin repudiated the treaty; Edward, at the head of a great force, splendidly equipped, invaded France (1359) to enforce it and to seek coronation at Reims. But Reims closed its gates on him; the Dauphin wisely avoided battle in the open; Edward could take neither walled towns nor strong castles, and with nothing definite accomplished was willing to conclude peace with the Dauphin at Bretigny.

§ THE TREATY OF BRETIGNY. The Treaty of Bretigny (1360) was the high-water mark of Edward's success in France. The title of French King was denied to him, but he received Aquitaine and its dependencies, and Poitou, and in the north Calais, Guisnes, and Ponthieu, all free of all feudal homage, and a sum of 3,000,000 gold crowns from King John as the price of his release. By no expedient could John raise the money, and consequently honourably returned



For continuation see page 284.

to captivity in London, where he did such ample justice to English hospitality that he died from the effects of it at the age of forty-four. His brief stay in his own kingdom was marked, however, by the bestowal of the Duchy of Burgundy upon his younger son Philip the Bold. That gift had, as the sequel will disclose, disastrous consequences for John's successor.

§ CHARLES V (1364-80). His successor, Charles V, though physically and morally a weakling, well deserved his surname 'the Wise', and his reign witnessed a real if not lasting recovery in his kingdom. In nothing did he display greater wisdom than the deference he paid to the States-General, though the Estates were foolish enough to part with the most valuable prerogative of a popular assembly—the power of the purse.¹ Charles showed prudence also in his foreign policy, especially by renewing the alliance with Scotland, and most of all by his choice of counsellors, military and civil, notably by the appointment of the two famous Breton soldiers, Bertrand du Guesclin and Oliver de Clisson, to command his armies.

Until 1369, when the Peace of Bretigny was formally broken, English soldiers acted only as auxiliary volunteers. In this capacity they fought as the allies of King Charles of Navarre in his duchy of Normandy; as the allies of John de Montfort in Brittany, and, to their shame, as the allies of Pedro the Cruel, in Castile. The Duke of Normandy, however, was compelled by his defeat at Cocherel (1364) to exchange his Norman fiefs, where he could give effective help to the English, for the barony of Montpellier, where he could give none. In Brittany, du Guesclin proved no match for Sir John Chandos. But John de Montfort, though, on the death in battle of his rival, Charles of Blois, he was recognized as Duke, consented to do homage in Paris for his duchy. In Castile also it was a disputed succession that led to the intervention both of the French and the English. Henry of Trastemara sought the help of Charles the Wise against the tyranny of his natural brother, Pedro the Cruel. Pedro, expelled by du Guesclin from Castile, offered tempting bribes, territorial and monetary, to the Black Prince, to assist his restoration. The military genius of the Black Prince and Sir John Chandos again proved too much for du Guesclin, who was defeated at Najara (Navarette), and for the second time was taken prisoner by the English. Pedro was restored (1367), but two years later was defeated by du Guesclin (a second time too confidently released), and was, together with his brother, killed in single combat.

§ DU GUESCLIN. By that time (1369) England and France were once more formally at war. But the conditions were reversed. Both countries had suffered from the ravages of the Black Death, but in England the prevailing gloom was intensified by contrast. Before

¹ *Supra*, p. 33.

1348 England had been on the flowing tide of prosperity. The victories of the young Prince at Crécy and Calais had diffused a sense of buoyancy throughout the nation. But after Queen Philippa died in 1369, the King sank into premature senility and became as putty in the hands of his unscrupulous mistress, Alice Perrers; the Black Prince lost the allegiance of his Gascon subjects by imposing insupportable taxation to meet the expenses of his indefensible military adventures in Spain, and, smitten with an incurable disease, could only at intervals take the field against his wily antagonist du Guesclin. He finally returned to England in 1371, to die in 1376. In 1372 England's defeat in a sea-fight off Rochelle meant the loss of the command of the Channel, and with it a large part of the profitable trade with Flanders. Poitou was gradually recovered by the French (1371-3) and the victory of Poitiers avenged. Du Guesclin temporarily made himself master of Brittany, but it was not until 1491 that the marriage of Anne, Duchess of Brittany, to Charles VIII of France finally brought that duchy into the permanent possession of the French Crown. Meanwhile, du Guesclin's Fabian tactics, and the successful resistance of walled towns, compelled the English commanders to wear out their troops by purposeless marches. The French armies conquered the whole of Guienne, while a Castilian fleet, with French soldiers on board, ravaged the coasts of Sussex and Kent. By 1380 only the coast towns of Bordeaux, Brest, Cherbourg, and Calais, with Bayonne, remained in English hands. In that year both Charles V and Bertrand du Guesclin died. Not until 1415 was the war seriously resumed.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HUNDRED YEARS WAR: II — THE MAKING OF FRANCE (1380-1453)

‘Therefore, my Harry
Be it thy course to busy giddy minds
With foreign quarrels.’ . . . HENRY IV

WITH the accession of Henry of Monmouth to the English throne the Hundred Years War entered upon its final phase. For neither combatant had the lull in the fighting been devoid of incident or importance. In England the elder line of the Plantagenets was, in the person of Richard II, deposed by Henry, Duke of Lancaster, and the first step taken towards the Wars of the Roses. In France things were rapidly moving towards the civil war between Burgundians and Armagnacs.

§ THE DUCHY OF BURGUNDY. There had long been friction between the Flemish merchants and their French Count, whose

daughter and heiress had married Philip the Bold of Burgundy. In 1382 Philip intervened on behalf of his father-in-law, and to protect his own prospective interests in that rich inheritance. A strong French army was sent into Flanders; the burghers were utterly defeated at Roosebeck; Philip van Artevelde, who had succeeded, on his father's death, to the leadership of the burgher party, was killed, and the authority of the Count was restored. The victory of the Count of Flanders over his recalcitrant burghers, encouraged Charles VI to take strong measures against the insurgent citizens in Paris, Rouen, Orleans, and other French towns. Thus the movement—almost universal—towards municipal independence was decisively if temporarily checked. In the same year (1384) the death of the Count of Flanders gave Philip of Burgundy possession of his wife's inheritance, and enabled him to lay the foundations of that 'Middle Kingdom' which in the hands of Charles the Bold caused such embarrassment to Louis XI.

Philip's success in Flanders encouraged the French to take the offensive against England, and in 1385 elaborate preparations were made to invade England from the Flemish ports. But they proved abortive: the expedition never started. After that fiasco, accentuated by a profitless expedition against the Duke of Gueldres, the highly subsidized ally of England (1388), Charles VI deposed his uncles from the government which since his accession they had monopolized. But a few years later (1392) Charles suffered the first of the attacks of dementia which recurred at intervals until his death. In 1396 Richard II of England renewed the truce with France by his marriage to Isabella, daughter of Charles VI.

§ BURGUNDIANS AND ARMAGNACS. The truce remained virtually unbroken until 1415. In the meantime the quarrel between the two most powerful princes of the blood in France had come to a head. Alike on personal and political grounds, the Dukes of Burgundy and Orleans were opposed to each other. The death of Philip the Bold of Burgundy (1404) put his son John sans Peur, already Count of Flanders, in an immensely strong position. Nor was it more than momentarily weakened when at Burgundy's instigation Orleans was murdered (1407). In Paris, to which he restored its municipal, military, and fiscal privileges, Burgundy was welcomed as a liberator. The Orleanists organized themselves under the Count of Armagnac, by whose title they were henceforth known, and like their opponents entered into negotiations with England. Both parties were, indeed, more concerned to gain an advantage over a domestic rival than to defend the integrity of France. But negotiations counted for little during the civil war, which went on intermittently and inconclusively from 1410 to 1412.

§ RENEWAL OF WAR. In 1413 something happened. A young,

ardent, and popular prince succeeded his soured and stricken father on the English throne. Intermediate between 'the unquiet Time' of Henry IV, the 'vile politician Bolingbroke', and the disastrous times of Henry VI, a half-witted saint, the reign of Henry V stands out by mere contrast as brilliantly successful. Even to a Frenchman the substitution of a chivalrous and high-minded prince like the English Harry for Charles VI, a poor weakling subject to recurrent attacks of insanity; the reduction to obedience of entirely self-seeking princes; the restoration of strong and decent government to a distracted and disordered kingdom, might well have seemed to justify adherence to a king, who, if a foreigner, was possessed of every kingly quality.

§ AGINCOURT. In command of a fine army of 6,000 men-at-arms and 24,000 archers, Henry V weighed anchor at Southampton with his 'fleet majestical' on August 11th, 1415. Three days later he landed within three miles of Harfleur, and laid siege to the town which after a month's heroic defence surrendered on September 27th. But Henry's force was decimated by disease, many of the sick had to be sent home, and with the rest, after leaving a force to garrison Harfleur, Henry marched towards Calais. His way was barred by a French force numbering at least three times his own, under the command of the Constable d'Albret. Once again the English archers proved irresistible and at Agincourt won a splendid victory (October 25th, 1415). At least 7,000 Frenchmen were left dead upon the field. Two brothers of the Duke of Burgundy were among the slain; the Dukes of Orleans and Bourbon among the 1,500 prisoners. Henry lost at most 500 men. But his victory, if complete, was profitless.

Agincourt was a defeat primarily for the Armagnacs. But John sans Peur of Burgundy failed to take full advantage of the humiliation of his enemies and the captivity of their leaders. The Armagnacs, despite their defeat at Agincourt, stood forth as the patriotic party, and, after the death of the two elder sons of Charles VI, were strengthened by the support of the young Dauphin (afterwards Charles VII), who had been brought up by the Armagnac party. The Queen, Isabella of Bavaria, most licentious and unprincipled of women, went over, mainly from hatred and jealousy of the young Dauphin, to the Burgundians, and the conflict between the factions was at its fiercest when Henry V for the second time invaded France (August 14th, 1417). Flanders, Artois, and Picardy guarded, as friendly neutrals, his left flank; his right flank was protected by his truce with Brittany. Henry, therefore, advanced at his leisure from Harfleur, capturing Caen, Bayeux, and all the rest of the Norman towns up to Rouen. Rouen offered an heroic resistance, but on January 15th, 1418, Henry accepted its surrender on payment of the huge fine of 3,000 crowns. Normandy was again in English hands. In Paris the populace rose and carried out a pitiless massacre in which the Constable (d'Armagnac) was among the victims; 50,000 more perished in an epidemic

which followed on the massacre. In face of these disasters to the capital, negotiations for a truce were opened between the Dauphinois (as the Armagnacs began to be called) and the Burgundians. The negotiations were wrecked, however, by the treacherous assassination of John sans Peur, during a meeting with his rival the Dauphin (September 10th, 1419).

§ THE TREATY OF TROYES. John's son and successor, Philip the Good, thereupon entered into negotiations with Henry V and on May 21st, 1420, the Treaty of Troyes, shameful to France, and triumphant (though temporarily) for England, was concluded between the English king, Queen Isabella, and the young Duke of Burgundy, acting on behalf of his demented cousin the King of France. By that treaty, as a French historian has pithily expressed it, Queen Isabella 'disinherited her son to crown her daughter'. Henry V was to marry the Princess Katherine, to be recognized as heir to the kingdom of France, to succeed to it after the death of the reigning sovereign, and to administer the kingdom during his lifetime. The treaty was ratified by the States-General and approved by the University, ever increasing its influence upon French policy. On December 1st, 1420, Henry V made a triumphal entry into Paris, riding side by side with the demented king.

But Paris was not France. South of the Loire the Armagnacs rallied their forces. The Dauphin, with the help of Scotch allies, defeated the English at Beaugé in Anjou (1421) and compelled Henry to return to France to reassert his authority. But having driven the Armagnacs back to the south of the Loire, and while engaged in settling the affairs of his French kingdom, Henry died (August 31st, 1422). In October Charles VI followed him to the grave.

The new King of England and France was an infant of nine months old. Under his father's dispositions the child King's uncle, the Duke of Bedford, reigned in his name in France; another uncle, the Duke of Gloucester, 'Good Duke Humphrey', became regent in England. Bedford, a true Lancastrian in temper and tradition, a cautious diplomatist, a strong disciplinarian, and a real patriot, was under no illusions as to the situation of the English in France. He well knew that the position won by Henry V depended essentially upon maintaining the alliance with Burgundy.

The infant Henry VI was, on the death of Charles VI, immediately proclaimed King of France. He was recognized as King by the Queen, by Philip of Burgundy, the first prince of the blood, by the University of Paris, and (roughly speaking) by all France north of the Loire. Charles VII, then a youth of nineteen, nicknamed 'the King of Bourges', where he held his Court, could count on the allegiance of the south. Charles strengthened his position by marriage with Marie of Anjou, and by alliances with Brittany and Castile. The English position, on the other hand, was fortified by Bedford's

marriage (1423) with Anne, sister of John sans Peur of Burgundy. The fruits of Bedford's prudent marriage were, however, largely neutralized by the headstrong folly of his brother Gloucester. Some years earlier Gloucester had contracted an adulterous union with Jacqueline, Countess of Hainault, Holland, Zealand, and Friesland, who had deserted her husband, John of Brabant, a kinsman of the Duke of Burgundy. Burgundy was, moreover, gravely concerned when Gloucester in 1424 took forcible possession of his wife's inheritance, thus coming into dangerous proximity to Flanders. A private war ensued between the Dukes of Burgundy and Gloucester, but it had little immediate effect upon the situation, which was, indeed, improved by Bedford's success in more than one engagement, until in October 1428 his southward advance was arrested by the stubborn resistance of Orleans which held the key position on the Loire.

§ JOAN OF ARC. The surrender of Orleans was, nevertheless, imminent when help came from an unexpected quarter. The long-continued presence of an English army on French soil, the subjection of a great part of France to an English sovereign, and the sufferings and humiliations endured by the mass of the people, were beginning to arouse in France, however faintly, a nascent sentiment of nationality. At this moment there appeared on the scene a maiden who, in her native village of Domrémy in the Duchy of Bar, had seen what war meant when a troop of Burgundians burnt the village and put her brothers and kinsmen to the sword.

Joan of Arc had from childhood 'heard voices' and seen visions. The Archangel Michael, St. Catherine, and St. Margaret called her to deliver the King and Kingdom of France. Her intense and infectious faith in her 'mission', coupled with wonderful courage and persistence, induced a local captain to send her with a guard of six men-at-arms to King Charles, who was then holding his Court at Chinon. Yielding to the pressure of popular feeling in favour of the intrepid maid, the King furnished her with an army of some 7,000 men. At their head she marched from Chinon to Orleans, entered the city by water on April 29th, 1429, and in a series of engagements (May 6th-8th) scattered the terror-stricken English besiegers and delivered the town. To the English a devil-sent witch, to the French Joan was a heaven-sent saint. From Tours she carried off the Dauphin, with a promise to see him crowned at Reims, and at Reims, after successes against the English, only to be explained by miraculous intervention, Charles VII was crowned (July 17th, 1429).

Town after town opened its gates to the new-crowned King, but Paris was too deeply committed to the Burgundians to admit the Armagnacs. Encouraged by the resistance of Paris, Bedford and his Burgundian allies made a remarkable recovery, and Joan, in leading a sortie from Compiègne, fell into the hands of the Burgundians, who sold her to the English. The English, embittered by the defeats

the maid had inflicted upon them, handed her over to a Burgundian partisan, the Bishop of Beauvais, by whom she was brought to trial at Rouen on a charge of witchcraft. Upon the course of her infamous trial and condemnation, and upon her burning at the stake on Trinity Sunday, 1431, there is no need to enlarge. Casuistry may justify the burning of a witch in an age accustomed to *autos-da-fé*. Common sense compels us to condemn an act inspired by a brutal desire for revenge upon a woman who, under the guidance, as she believed, of Heaven, had frustrated the efforts of English statesmen and soldiers to maintain a hold upon France, and had brought to its people, enmeshed in the self-seeking intrigues of their natural leaders and defenders, a new hope of deliverance.

In connexion with the marvellous career of the Maid of Orleans innumerable questions have arisen and have been endlessly discussed. Two things are certain: Joan was a heroine of splendid courage, of blameless life, and spotless purity; her life-work and her death sounded the knell of the English Empire in France.

§ THE CLOSE OF THE WAR. Bedford sought to retrieve the position by having his young nephew crowned (December 31st, 1431), but the ceremony had to be performed not in Reims, which was held by the Armagnacs, but in Paris, not by any French prelate but by the Bishop of Winchester, and was attended neither by the Duke of Burgundy nor by any other French prince. Nor did success any longer attend English arms or diplomacy. The Duchess of Bedford, the main link between England and Burgundy, died childless in November 1432. Bedford promptly remarried, his bride being Jacqueline of Luxemburg, a vassal of the Duke of Burgundy, but Burgundy was deeply offended that his consent had not been asked. Finally, on July 14th, 1435, a Congress, at which all the chief Powers of Europe were represented, assembled under the mediation of the Pope, to try to put an end to a protracted war, which was devastating France without permanent profit to England. But it was soon seen to be impossible to reconcile the demands of the English and the French, and on September 6th the English delegates withdrew from the Congress. Shortly afterwards John, Duke of Bedford, died. Bedford's death greatly eased the situation, and a serious attempt was made to heal the wounds of the French by effecting a reconciliation between the Burgundians and the Orleanists. This was more successful. Philip the Good had honourable scruples about leaving his English allies in the lurch, and effecting reconciliation with men responsible for the murder of his father at Montereau. Clerical casuistry sufficed, however, to dispel these scruples, and accordingly on September 21st, 1435, the Treaty of Arras was signed.

Charles VII expressed his abhorrence of a crime for which he was in no way responsible, promised all the restitution in his power, and assigned to the Duke of Burgundy the reversion of the County of

Artois and the immediate possession in full sovereignty of Macon, Auxerre, and various strong castles and towns on the Somme. The Duke of Burgundy was no longer the vassal of France, but an independent sovereign. Heavy as was the price paid, it was not too high for the possession of Paris, which opened its gates to its king. The English garrison marched out with honour unstained and sailed down the Seine to Rouen. For the English Empire in France that was the beginning of the end.

The condition of France was, nevertheless, well-nigh desperate; but the young King embarked energetically on the task of restoration and reform. The army was reorganized (1439), and by subsequent Ordinances (1445 and 1448) a standing army was established to give renewed strength to the royal authority. The *taille* was converted into a permanent impost, and a series of financial reforms regularized, if they did not lighten, the burden on the people, and greatly strengthened the position of the Crown. Justice was decentralized by the creation of provincial Parlements at Toulouse (1443) and Grenoble (1453), a beginning was made with the codification of the law, and by the *Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges* (1438) the State reasserted its supremacy over the Papacy and at the same time accepted the authority of General Councils.

It remained only to rid the country of the foreign armies encamped on the soil of France. The Duke of Orleans had been released from his long captivity in 1440, in the hope (not realized) that he might prove a mediator between the warring nations. In 1445 a bride for Henry VI was found in the person of Margaret, daughter of the Angevin Duke René of Bar, titular King of Sicily, but French consent to the marriage was purchased by the surrender of all that remained to England of Anjou and Maine. War was, however, resumed in 1448, and a year later Rouen surrendered to the French. Then came the capture of Honfleur and Harfleur, after the defeat of an English army near Formigny (1450), Caen, Bayeux, and all the rest of the Norman towns. Cherbourg was the last to surrender. For the second time Normandy was lost to the English Crown: this time there was no recovery.

The loss of northern France was soon followed by that of Guienne, where English rule had always been mild and popular. Bordeaux opened its gates to a French army in 1451, but welcomed back in 1452 an English army commanded by the veteran John Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury. Next year, however, Talbot was decisively defeated at Châtillon. The last English Viceroy of Aquitaine, and long affectionately commemorated in that district as le Roi Talbot, our commander, fell in the battle. That was the end of the Hundred Years War. Only Calais and two small towns in its vicinity remained in English hands. The territorial making of France was almost complete.

§ RESULTS OF THE WAR. The long war had inflicted immeasurable suffering upon all classes in France. Yet it was not without its compensations for the monarchy. Territorially, it enlarged the kingdom of France by the permanent incorporation of the great Duchy of Aquitaine. Constitutionally, it meant the annihilation of feudal pretensions, the ultimate triumph of the monarchy. The nobles never recovered from the blows which at Crécy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, the English yeomen inflicted upon the chivalry of France. Nor did the war leave other interests and classes unscathed. The towns lost not only in trade, but in political liberty. The Church, the judges of the Parlement, the University, merchants, and lawyers, scholars, burghers, and peasants—all suffered in person, property, or prestige. The monarchy alone emerged from the welter and chaos of a protracted war politically strengthened by the removal or humiliation of domestic rivals, and territorially enriched by the absorption of fiefs and by conquests from the foreigner. Upon perfect symmetry there were, however, two excrescences: Brittany retained its independence; the Duke of Burgundy confronted his former suzerain as a rival sovereign. Within half a century both excrescences had been removed.

CHAPTER IX

LOUIS XI AND CHARLES THE BOLD (1461-94)

'Il estoit maistre avec lequel il falloit charrier droit.'

PHILIPPE DE COMMYNES ON LOUIS XI

'Louis XI makes use of the middle classes to pull down those above them, and to keep down those below them; he is equally anti-aristocratic and anti-democratic.'

A. DE TOCQUEVILLE

LOUIS XI, thanks to Sir Walter Scott, is to Englishmen well known. Whether Scott's full-length portrait is faithful is debatable; that it is vivid is unquestionable. Louis XI was a mass of contradictions, despicably superstitious, but unrestrained in his cruelty and vices by any fear of God or pity for man. He grossly misused great talents, and his very virtues were unlovely. Experience of peasant life gained in childhood by living on a farm, led him to humble the pride and curtail the privileges of the nobles, but his ruling passion was the greatness, the security, and the unity of the kingdom. These ends could, he conceived, be attained only by strengthening the power of the Crown.

§ DOMESTIC REFORM. The recent history and contemporary condition of France confirmed that conviction. Inevitably, however, the King's policy was attributed to personal avarice and selfish motives, not easily disentangled. Was the selection of low-born

ministers and servants due to a wish to humiliate the princes and nobles who regarded high office as their monopoly? Or was it dictated by regard for efficiency and economy, by a determination to use the instruments best fitted for the work he had in view? Louis wisely sought the advice of merchants as to the best means of improving commerce; he abolished tolls and dues, imported skilled craftsmen from Italy, encouraged fairs and markets, and greatly improved the high-roads of France. He gave security of tenure to the magistrates, though he curtailed the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris while setting up a Parlement at Bordeaux. He summoned the States-General of the kingdom only once, but assembled Estates in the recently acquired or regained provinces of Normandy and Guienne as well as in Provence, Dauphiné, and elsewhere. He encouraged learning, welcomed the new art of printing, and established or reorganized universities and vocational schools. He codified the customs and reformed the laws of the kingdom. But all this, though the work of an enlightened ruler, was overshadowed by the struggle between the King and the great territorial princes.

§ ANTI-FEUDAL POLICY. Despite the rapid absorption of feudal principalities, feudalism was still a great force, especially when the nobles had royal blood in their veins. A map of France under Louis XI shows Paris literally blockaded by the great possessions of the House of Orleans; it shows the House of Bourbon strongly entrenched in the heart of France, and other Houses such as those of Alençon and Artois also in positions too strong to allow the King to sleep peacefully in his bed. But, though less menacing to Paris, even more menacing to the unity of France and more independent of the Crown were the two great Duchies of Brittany and Burgundy. One of the great objects of Louis XI was to prevent their effective combination.

Meanwhile he added to his opponents by revoking the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges (1461) by compiling a sort of Domesday Book of all ecclesiastical property down to the smallest benefices. He increased the heavy burden on the non-privileged classes by doubling the *Taille*, and upon the feudal vassals by a strict exaction of dues and a curtailment of feudal privileges which were further infringed by conferring titles of nobility upon prosperous burghers.

In 1462 Louis occupied Roussillon and Cerdagne in pledge for the repayment of a loan to the King of Aragon, thus immensely improving the Pyrenean frontier of France. He also (1463) strengthened his vulnerable frontier to the north-east by redeeming for a payment of 400,000 crowns the fortresses on the Somme handed over (but subject to the option of re-purchase) to Burgundy by the Treaty of Arras. Two years later Louis had to meet the most serious internal crisis of the reign. Headed by the Duke of Bourbon, the 'League of the Public Weal' was formed in 1465, nominally with the object of

redressing popular grievances and putting an end to 'the exactions, oppressions, wrongs, and other countless ills done to Churches and nobles as well as to poor and lowly folk'. But, quite obviously, the primary purpose of the League was to frustrate political unification, and to reassert feudal independence. The League included the heads of the Houses of D'Albret, Saint Pol, Alençon, Armagnac, and Lorraine, as well as the two powerful Duchies of Brittany and Burgundy. As a figure-head Louis's brother and heir-presumptive, Charles, Duke of Berry, a weak lad of eighteen, was induced to join the League and advance a claim to the regency of the kingdom. Several German princes supported the League, while Louis looked for help to Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan. The confederacy, though alarmingly powerful on paper, was loose-knit: the lesser nobility, most of the clergy, and many (though not all) of the towns held aloof from it. Above all, the King had the advantage of the standing army, so prudently established by Charles VII. With its aid he brushed aside the Burgundians who at Montlhéry attempted to bar his advance on Paris (July 16th, 1465). Thus, secure in possession of the capital, Louis proceeded to open separate negotiations with the leaders of the confederacy, made to each of them large territorial concessions which he never intended to implement, and promises of money which he never paid. Most imposing of the grants was an enlarged Duchy of Normandy to his brother, the Duke of Berry. The return of the Somme towns was the main 'consideration' received by the Count of Charolais, who in 1465 had taken the government of Burgundy out of the weakening grasp of his father, Philip the Good.

§ LOUIS XI AND CHARLES THE BOLD. The moment for the decisive conflict between the two great rivals had not yet arrived. Louis prepared for it in characteristic fashion. He supported the citizens of Liège, a free city, in their revolt against their Bishop, a cousin of the Count of Charolais. He expelled his brother, the Duke of Berry, from Normandy; he won over the Duke of Brittany and the other leaders of the League, and used all the arts of which he was indisputably master to ingratiate himself with the citizens of Paris. But his position was still precarious. Charles had succeeded to the Dukedom of Burgundy in 1467, and in 1468 had strengthened his own position, and consolidated the favour of his Flemish subjects, by concluding an alliance with the Yorkist King Edward IV of England, and by marrying Edward's fascinating but strong-minded sister, Margaret of York. Meanwhile Louis XI had summoned the States-General¹ to Tours (1467) and secured its support against his enemies. He had also, as a counter-stroke to the Burgundian Alliance with the Yorkists, espoused the cause of Margaret of Anjou


¹ Its only meeting in this reign.

and her poor Lancastrian husband. But before embarking on the most critical enterprise of his reign, King Louis made a characteristic move. With rare courage and calculated coolness he put himself at the mercy of his rival. With only a small escort he sought out the Duke of Burgundy at Péronne, and endeavoured by the personal exercise of diplomatic skill to come to terms with his powerful vassal. Well aware that the Duke held him responsible for the revolt of the Liégeois, he endeavoured to exculpate himself from the charge, and acting largely on the advice of Philip de Commines, granted all Charles's demands, even to the point of joining him in the assault upon Liége. But confident that all concessions would in due time be retrieved, and that all promises might be broken with impunity, the King withheld nothing, not even the greatly valued towns on the Somme.

The shrewd calculations of the King were precisely realized. The Treaty of Péronne was never carried out. With scant regard for his honour the King did indeed help the Duke to take Liége and wreak his vengeance on the rebels, whom Louis himself had incited to rebellion, but almost before the ink was dry on the Treaty of Péronne a variation fatal to the ambitions of Burgundy was made by the King. Charles of Berry, the King's brother and heir-presumptive, had received the Duchy of Normandy. It was part of the bargain made at Péronne, that this duchy, so important financially and strategically to the Crown, should be exchanged for Champagne and Brie, an apanage that would bring Charles of Berry under the direct influence, if not control, of the Duke of Burgundy. That danger King Louis averted by substituting for the County of Champagne the Duchy of Guienne, and establishing brother Charles at Bordeaux, where he could give no help to Burgundy, but might frustrate any attempt on the part of the English to reconquer the duchy that had long been theirs. The birth of a son and heir to King Louis (1472) had deprived Charles of the hope of succession, and he once more joined the princely opposition. But in May 1472 he died, apparently from poison administered, it was suspected, not without the connivance of the King.

Meanwhile the King's plans in regard to England had temporarily miscarried. Whether Yorkist or Lancastrian reigned in England he cared nothing, but he was gravely concerned lest he should be exposed to simultaneous attack by the two brothers-in-law, Charles of Burgundy and Edward IV. Accordingly, he had laboured (1470) to reconcile the great King-maker Warwick with the Lancastrian exiles, and supplied Queen Margaret and Warwick with the means to invade England and restore Henry VI (1470). In 1471, however, Edward IV, aided by Burgundy, returned from Flanders, defeated the Nevilles at Barnet (April 14th, 1471), and extinguished the hopes of the Lancastrians by his decisive victory at Tewkesbury (May 4th)

Tewkesbury was at once a victory for Burgundy and a blow for the diplomacy of Louis XI. Louis was not without hope, however, that his rival would destroy himself.



Note: Fiefs constantly changed hands: the dates appended generally indicate the final annexation to the French crown, though (e.g. Normandy) the vassal may have temporarily recovered the Fief.

§ 'A MIDDLE KINGDOM'. Charles the Bold, now more than a rebellious feudal vassal, was definitely aiming at the creation of a Middle Kingdom. His territorial position was of enormous extent, if not closely coherent. To the Duchy and County of Burgundy,

improvidently granted by King John to Philip the Bold (1353) there had since been added by marriage, conquest, or purchase, the Counties of Flanders and Artois, the Duchies of Brabant, Limburg, and Luxemburg, the districts of Hainault, Holland, Zealand, and Friesland, not to mention a protectorate over the great Prince-Bishoprics of Cambrai, Liége, and Utrecht. All these territories, including some of the wealthiest in Europe, Charles the Bold inherited from his father. But his situation suffered from two serious weaknesses: discontinuity of territory and diversity of populations. Had Charles possessed Alsace-Lorraine he might indeed have gone far towards recreating the Kingdom of Lotharingia assigned to the Emperor Lothaire in the Treaty of Verdun (843). He did in fact purchase Upper Alsace from Sigismund of Austria, and the Duchy of Gueldres from its Duke, and, by his victory over René II, Duke of Lorraine, he also obtained a footing in that vitally important duchy. Only a Royal Crown was lacking. A promise of that Crown he obtained from the Emperor Frederick III by giving his daughter and heiress, Mary, in marriage to the Emperor's heir, Maximilian, but the Emperor managed to postpone the fulfilment of his promise until the recipient was no longer in a position to demand it. Nor were the astute calculations of the 'Spider King' at fault. Charles's greed, arrogance, and violent temper had raised up enemies on every side. Of these the most implacable were the confederated cantons and towns of Switzerland. With them Louis XI had, in 1474, concluded an alliance by which in return for a large annual subsidy the Swiss—already an embryonic 'Nation in Arms'—agreed to give the King facilities for recruiting his own standing army, and to afford him, whenever necessary, assistance in the field. The anti-Burgundian league was joined also by the Archduke Sigismund, who redeemed Alsace as well as the Rhineland towns.

With characteristic carelessness Charles neglected to join forces with his brother-in-law, Edward IV, who landed at Calais in 1475 at the head of a magnificent army ready, in accordance with traditional English policy, to support Burgundy against France, and in return to secure his own recognition as King of France. Had Charles the Bold possessed a tenth of the statesmanship of Louis XI, he would have perceived that this was a critical moment in the game he was playing so clumsily.

His careless reception of Edward IV threw the latter into the arms of Louis XI, by whom, in a treaty concluded at Pecquigni, he was bought off with hard cash. The Dauphin was to marry the Princess Elizabeth of York (destined some day to become the Queen of Henry VII): Queen Margaret was to be ransomed for 500,000 crowns; Edward IV himself was to receive a large pension ('tribute', as the English termed it), and large sums were also distributed among the English courtiers.

The price was high, but the money was well spent. The most powerful feudatory of France had lost his last chance. Charles did, indeed, make himself master of Lorraine without difficulty (1475), and early in 1476 proceeded to wreak his vengeance on the insolent 'Alpine Cowherds'. But when besieging the little town of Granson (February 1476) Charles received a humiliating check and was forced to fly, and at Morat was utterly defeated (June 1476). From his subjects assembled in the Estates of Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Flanders, the Duke could get no support, and while blockading Nancy which he had intended to make the capital of his kingdom, he was defeated and killed (January 5th, 1477).

The death of Charles the Bold dissipated the dream of a great Middle Kingdom. After his death, without male heirs, the Duchy of Burgundy reverted to the Crown of France. It had been arranged that the County Palatine or Free County of Burgundy should, together with Artois, form the dowry of Princess Margaret, daughter of Maximilian and Mary, on her betrothal under the treaty of 1482 to the Dauphin. In the event it reverted, when the French marriage was abandoned, to the Emperor, and not until after many vicissitudes and changes of masters was Franche-Comté finally acquired for France. Lorraine as a whole did not fall into France until 1766.

To return to Louis XI. His victory over Charles the Bold, if indirectly achieved, was the greatest triumph of the reign. But Charles was not the only dangerous enemy 'removed' by one means or another. The Duke of Alençon and his son and heir spent the last years of their lives in prison. The House of Armagnac perished with the murder of John V (1473), and the House of Nemours with the execution of Duke James (1477). Two years earlier the Count of St. Pol, Constable of France, had paid the penalty for treason, both to France and Burgundy, on the scaffold. Thus were great princes removed and great principalities—no fewer than eleven—including besides Burgundy, Anjou, Maine, and Provence, absorbed into the royal domain. The great prize of the Low Countries evaded the clutches of the French King, thanks to the marriage of Mary with Maximilian (1477). But when Louis XI died in 1483 Brittany was the only important province still to be incorporated in the kingdom of France. From the point of view of national consolidation the reign of Louis XI was, clearly then, the most important in the history of France.

Was Louis XI a great king? That he was a good man no one could affirm. Something may be forgiven to one who was a constant sufferer from ill health, subject to epilepsy, and tortured throughout life by a skin disease which, in his latter days, he himself believed to be leprosy. Yet sympathy must not pervert judgment. Cruel, crafty, grossly superstitious, a coward in the face of death, Louis XI possessed as a man hardly a redeeming feature. But as a king?

That he was a despot goes without saying. But France was not ready for 'Constitutional Government' of the English type. France needed first and foremost territorial unification. Louis XI did more, perhaps, than any other king to satisfy that need. That he laid heavy burdens on his people is true. 'He put nothing,' says Comynnes, 'into his treasury; he took it all and spent it all.' But he spent it mostly for what he conceived to be the good of his people, and he was at pains by the encouragement of trade, by the establishment of posts, the improvement of transport, and the organization of trade exhibitions and fairs, to provide his subjects with the wherewithal to meet his heavy demands upon their purses. He restricted municipal privileges in the interests of the centralized monarchy and created a vast bureaucracy, yet it was the heads of the tallest poppies that he struck off, and he generally preferred to spend lavishly than to spill blood. On the whole, then, France has reason to be grateful to Louis XI, if hardly to admire, still less to love him.

§ ANNE OF BEAUJEU. Louis XI was succeeded by his only son, who, though hardly more than thirteen, was of legal age to reign. During the first eight years of the reign, the government was, however, in the hands of the young king's sister, Anne, the wife of Peter of Beaujeu, the brother of the Duke of Bourbon. This strong-minded lady was truly her father's daughter, and carried on his contest against the feudal princes.

The princes and nobles, led by Louis, Duke of Orleans, the King's brother-in-law, and his cousins the Counts of Dunois and Angoulême, René of Lorraine, and other discontented princes, hoped to recover the power and position lost under Louis XI, and revive, on a broader basis, the League of the Public Weal. All their efforts were defeated by Anne of Beaujeu, but in the meantime both parties sought to strengthen their position by summoning the States-General.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL OF TOURS. The meeting of the States-General at Tours in 1484 was perhaps the most noteworthy in the whole of the chequered history of that intermittent institution. Reluctant though the Deputies were to obey the summons, they represented for the first time the whole kingdom, except Brittany. For the first time the *Tiers État* (as thenceforward designated) included deputies of the peasants as well as of the burghers; for the first time the Estates voted not as Orders, but in six divisions representing respectively France, Burgundy, Aquitaine, Normandy, Languedoc, and Provence. A long list of grievances was drawn up and redress demanded; protests were made against the infringement of the right to control taxation, against the sale of offices, and against the barriers imposed upon internal trade. The Estates also inquired into the state of the revenue, but the information given to them

being falsified, they could not check it. Upon a long list of grievances compiled from the *cahiers* demands for redress were based. But though the King freely assented thereto no Ordinances to give effect to them were issued: the reforms were consequently still-born. The States-General had no control whatever over the Executive, and, unlike the Lancastrian Parliament, left the nomination of the Council in the hands of the King. In Parliamentary Government that is the crucial point. By failing to establish that control the States-General sealed its own doom in 1484. Anne's husband, the Baron de Beaujeu, became president of the Council, thus frustrating the efforts of Orleans and other princes of the blood to obtain control over the Government. Orleans consequently went into violent opposition and found powerful allies in Francis II, Duke of Brittany, and Maximilian of Austria. Anne countered by alliance with the Flemish cities, who were in continuous revolt against their Count, now King of the Romans. Anne also had the support of the Dukes of Bourbon, Lorraine, and of Navarre, with whose help she broke up the League of Princes in *La Guerre Folle* (1485) and imposed on Francis of Brittany the Treaty of Sablé (August 20th, 1485). Francis and King Charles then entered into bonds of amity, though Anne, to ensure the good behaviour of the Duchy, occupied four of its strongest towns. Three weeks after concluding the treaty, Duke Francis died. Two questions immediately arose. Could the independence of the last independent fief in France be sustained? To whom would the new duchess give her hand and dower? In the answer to these questions Maximilian of Austria, Ferdinand of Aragon, and Henry VII of England were all, for different reasons, profoundly interested. Maximilian, the 'elderly parti of Europe', at once took the matrimonial field in person. His promptitude was rewarded. He was not only betrothed, but actually married, though by proxy, to his richly dowered child-bride. French troops were however, in virtual occupation of the duchy; their presence supplied a strong argument in favour of setting aside the proxy-marriage; and on December 6th, 1491, Charles VIII and the Duchess Anne were married at the Château of Langeais in Touraine.

Having thus achieved her purpose, Anne of Beaujeu, *La Grande Dame*, quietly retired and lived in seclusion until her death in 1522. She had put the coping-stone upon the edifice of the French monarchy. At long last France was made.

CHAPTER X

INTERNATIONAL WARS—FRANCE *v.* THE HABSBURGS (1494–1559)

‘Led by God himself we were honoured by the people when we first arrived (in Italy) as saints . . . but this opinion endured not long.’

PHILIPPE DE COMMYNES

§ THE MODERN ERA. The invasion of Italy by Charles VIII (1494) opened a new era in the history of France, of Europe, of the world. Hitherto the ‘World’ had meant Europe, the northern shore of Africa, the valley of the Nile, and so much of Asia as could be reached by land. The second half of the fifteenth century witnessed rapid and far-reaching changes. The expulsion of the English gave to France its modern shape. Exactly coincident was the capture of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks (1453). Before another century had passed the Turks had conquered the Levant, its coasts and islands, and were dominating the Mediterranean. That sea, which for thousands of years had been the main stream of European commerce, became a mere backwater: Constantinople, Alexandria, Venice, and Genoa, the great entrepôts of medieval trade, were left high and dry. The blocking of the old trade-route by the Turks impelled the peoples of Western Europe to seek a new route to the East. Vasco da Gama found it by rounding the Cape of Good Hope (1498). Columbus and the Cabots, similarly in quest of it, stumbled upon the West Indies and America. Though Portugal and Spain were the first to profit by this diversion of trade-routes, France, and in still greater degree England, were in the long run the most important beneficiaries.

The fifteenth century was an age not only of discoveries but of inventions. Without the compass the great geographical discoveries would have been impossible; without printing the results of the new learning could not have been disseminated. Printing was invented by Gutenberg in 1436; in 1464 Cosmo di Medici founded the Platonic Academy in Florence; in 1496 John Colet at Oxford gave the first of those courses of lectures on the Pauline Epistles which marked the opening of a new era in Biblical Exegesis. These coincidences are significant, but of all the manifestations of the new spirit the most important, in the present connexion, was the development of national self-consciousness among the peoples of Western Europe.

§ NATIONALISM. In this development England enjoyed a precocious priority. But France, though travelling more slowly along the same road, had also by 1491 come into being as a united nation-state under a centralized monarchy. Hardly less significant in view

of events now imminent was the unification of Spain, actually completed when Charles I (better known as the Emperor Charles V) succeeded to the thrones of Aragon and Castile, and thus became the first King of United Spain (1516).

§ THE ITALIAN WARS. It was as master of a united France that Charles VIII embarked on the first Italian Expedition in 1494. To label the ensuing period as that of the Italian wars is misleading. The wars were indeed fought largely on the Italian soil, but neither then nor for centuries to come was 'Italy' anything more than a 'geographical expression'. Of the many States into which Italy was divided the most important were the ancient republics of Venice and Genoa, the Duchies of Milan and Tuscany (Florence), the States of the Church, and the Kingdom of Naples. The rivalries of these States and their internal dissensions gave Charles VIII his opportunity; his pretext for invasion he found in the claims of the Angevin House on the Kingdom of Naples. The first series of Italian wars lasted from 1494 until 1516; the second from 1520 to 1559. Except in the cultural domain, the first series had little effect upon the evolution of France. The second series marked the beginning of the great conflict for the hegemony of Europe between France and the House of Habsburg.

§ TREATIES WITH ENGLAND, ARAGON, AND AUSTRIA. Before embarking on the Italian Expeditions Charles VIII had cleared the ground by concluding a series of treaties. Henry VII of England agreed by the Treaty of Étaples (1492) to withdraw from France on the payment of 743,000 crowns, and a promise from Charles VIII to expel Perkin Warbeck from France. By the Treaty of Barcelona, concluded with Ferdinand of Aragon, Charles gave up Roussillon, while by the Treaty of Senlis (May 1493) he abandoned in favour of the Emperor Maximilian his claims on Franche-Comté and Artois. The two latter treaties conclusively demonstrate the folly of Charles's Italian adventure. France had no business south of the Alps, nor, apart from the security of her 'natural frontiers', any interest in Italy. Roussillon, on the contrary, was vitally important to France, so was anything which would strengthen her vulnerable eastern frontier. To barter claims on Artois, or the free County of Burgundy and Roussillon, in order to facilitate the assertion of shadowy claims on Naples, or even on Milan, argued a complete lack of the sense of political proportion.

Charles was indeed able to stage a military procession through Italy and to occupy Naples practically without resistance, but he could not hold it. Alarmed by Charles's facile success, the Republic of Venice formed a league with the Pope Alexander VI, Ludovico Sforza, Duke of Milan, Ferdinand of Aragon, and the Emperor Maximilian, to expel the invader. In view of this formidable coalition Charles VIII was only too glad to get back to France safely at the cost of a single

battle, fought successfully on the Lombard plain at Fornovo (July 1495). Before the Italian Expeditions were renewed Charles VIII died from the results of an accident at the Château of Amboise. He was not yet eight-and-twenty.

§ LOUIS XII (1498–1515). Charles, dying without issue, was succeeded by his cousin, Louis of Orleans. Barren of all benefit to France though the first Italian war had proved, the lure of Italy (especially of Milan) was too strong for Louis XII. Had he resisted it Louis would still better have deserved the title of *Pater Patriae*, bestowed upon him by the States-General of Blois in 1506.

On the death of Charles VIII his consort, Anne of Brittany, decided to resume the sovereignty over her duchy. To avert the destruction of the newly won unity of France, Louis XII thereupon divorced his wife, the Princess Jeanne, the unhappy daughter of Louis XI, and married the widowed Duchess of Brittany. The last of the great principalities was thus finally united with the crown of France (1499).

Upon Louis's reign of seventeen years Frenchmen long looked back as a golden age. Out of real regard for the well-being of the poor, upon whom the main burden of taxation was imposed, Louis XII kept the taxes as light as possible. The Parlement of Paris functioned effectively, and justice was accordingly well administered. Two new provincial Parlements were established in Normandy (1499) and Provence (1501) and the redaction and codification of provincial customs begun by Louis XI was diligently carried on. This work greatly contributed to the restraint of abuses and to more equal justice for all classes. The Church was well content with the measure of independence secured to it by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges. On all sides, then, were indications that after long centuries of turmoil and disorder France was about to enter on a period of recuperation and prosperity.

§ RENEWAL OF WAR. Had Louis XII and Francis I been able to curb their military ardour it might well have been; but with rare and brief intervals France was almost continuously fighting for more than half a century (1499–1558). When the fighting was over the French (it has been truly said) 'left in Italy nothing but their graves'. The Italian wars present a confused picture. But the confusion can be partially cleared up by realizing that while each of the Italian States was fighting for its own hand, and changed sides as the interests of the hour dictated, all desired to maintain some sort of equilibrium and all were ready to combine for the moment against any power, Italian or foreign, that threatened it. By 1504, after some five years of confused fighting and still more confused diplomacy, the Spaniards were, as it seemed, established in Naples, while Louis XII was established in Milan. But in 1508 Maximilian, Louis, and Ferdinand of Aragon, at the instigation of Pope Julius II, directed their united

forces against the proud and greedy Republic of Venice. By his decisive victory over the Venetians at Agnadello (May 14th, 1509), Louis XII not only repelled the encroachments of the Venetians upon the Milanese, but annexed Venetian territory up to the Mincio. Such a resounding success alarmed his confederates, and the Pope, having summoned the foreigner into Italy to crush Venice, formed (1511) the Holy League to expel him. For Louis XII had made a false move. Exasperated by Papal tergiversation, he had demanded the summoning of a general Council and the deposition of the faithless and worldly Pope, Julius II. The Holy League, then, was designed not only to expel the intruding Frenchmen, but to avert schism and to defend Holy Church. Despite a brilliant victory at Ravenna (April 11th, 1512), won, though at the cost of his own life, by the young French general, Gaston de Foix, Duc de Nemours, these objects were achieved. Defeated by the Swiss at Novara (June 6th, 1513), the French were driven out of Italy. Henry VIII of England, having been drawn into the Holy League, won a notable victory (August 16th) in the 'Battle of the Spurs', and defeated the Scots, who were once more invading England in the interests of France, at Flodden (September 9th). But these victories, as well as others in Guienne, redounded only to the advantage of Henry's father-in-law, 'foxy Ferdinand', who, having by English help secured Navarre, promptly came to terms with France. Ferdinand's perfidy was, however, promptly avenged by the adroit diplomacy of Wolsey. In August 1514 Henry's younger sister, the sprightly and beautiful Princess Mary Tudor, was married to Louis XII, who by the death of his 'Breton girl' (as he called her) had some months earlier been left a widower. The gay life into which he was plunged by his English queen quickly proved fatal to a man prematurely old at fifty-three (January 1515). Louis was sincerely mourned by a grateful nation, less affected by the Italian adventures than might have been expected. 'The France of Louis XII was,' it has been truly said, 'the justification of Louis XI.'

§ THE CONCORDAT OF 1516. Louis XII was succeeded by his cousin and son-in-law, Francis I. Not yet twenty-one, the young King, as keen as his two predecessors to win renown in the field, promptly crossed the Alps to retrieve the loss of Milan. This object he achieved by a brilliant victory at Marignano. For the third time the French had made themselves masters of the strategical key of North Italy. An important sequel to this victory was the conclusion of the Concordat with the Medicean Pope Leo X (1516). Thanks to the Concordat the Pope received a large revenue from French benefices in the shape of First Fruits; the King obtained, by the rights of patronage, almost complete supremacy over the Gallican Church. Both the Parlement and the University protested against the Concordat, which was distasteful to the lawyers and to many

Churchmen, and it was not until 1527 that their protests were ultimately overborne by the King, who was not until then able actually to put the Concordat into operation.

§ THE TREATIES OF 1516. Meanwhile treaties with the Pope and the Swiss (The 'Perpetual' Peace of 1516) were followed by the Treaty of Noyon, concluded (1516) with Charles I of Spain, and by the Treaty of Cambrai (1517). The Emperor Maximilian and the King of France mutually guaranteed each other's dominions and agreed to a joint expedition against the Turks. Thus the first series of the Italian wars was at last ended. The treaties of 1516-17 did, not however, procure for Europe any prolonged period of repose. The 'Italian' wars (1520-59) were different in character from the first series: they were less frequently fought on Italian soil; they were more far-reaching in scope and significance; they were complicated by the emergence of an ecclesiastical issue; and the stake at issue was no longer the balance of power in Italy, but the balance of power in Europe.

§ FRANCIS I AND CHARLES V. The protagonists were not ill-matched. If the dominions inherited by Francis I were less extensive than those of his rival they were far more homogeneous, compact, and manageable. Moreover, thanks to the policy of his immediate predecessors, to the territorial consolidation and administrative centralization that policy had achieved, Francis was master of all the resources of his kingdom in a degree denied to Charles V. Besides, though in a sense encircled by the Habsburg dominions, France was always fighting (except when she crossed the Alps) on interior lines.

Yet the position of Charles V was undeniably imposing. King of Castile and its dependencies since his grandmother's death in 1504; in possession, since his father's death in 1506, of the rich Burgundian inheritance (the Low Countries and the Free County of Burgundy), and King (after the death of his grandfather, Ferdinand the Catholic) of Aragon and Naples and their respective dependencies, Charles I was thus the first King of a United Spain, not to add Lord of a great Spanish Empire in the new world. In 1519 the death of his other grandfather, Maximilian, gave him possession of all the hereditary dominions of the Habsburg House. It also left vacant the office of Holy Roman Emperor, to which, in opposition to Francis I, Charles was elected in 1519. The renewal of war in 1520 was preceded by meetings between Henry VIII and Francis I on the famous Field of the Cloth of Gold (June 1520), and between Francis and the Emperor Charles V at Gravelines in July.

§ BATTLE OF PAVIA. The first outstanding event of the war of 1520-6 was the crushing defeat of Francis I at Pavia, in the Valley of the Po, by the Imperialists under the traitorous Frenchman the Duc de Bourbon. Francis himself was sent, wounded and a prisoner,

to Madrid. To his mother he wrote: 'Madame, tout est perdu, sauf l'honneur.' Was honour even saved? Francis regained his freedom only by the conclusion of the disastrous Treaty of Madrid (January 1526), by which he surrendered to the Emperor the Duchy of Burgundy, and renounced all his claims on Milan and Naples, Flanders and Artois. But hardly was Francis free before he repudiated the treaty as having been extorted from him under constraint; the Pope released him from his oaths, and before the end of the year the war was renewed. Rome was sacked by the Imperialists and Pope Clement VII was himself taken prisoner in 1527, but after the war had dragged on aimlessly for another year a treaty was negotiated (August 1529) at Cambrai between Louise of Savoy, the Queen-mother of France, and Margaret of Austria, the aunt of Charles V and Governor of the Netherlands. 'La Paix des Dames' left the Emperor completely master of Italy. France renounced all claims upon Flanders and Artois, but recovered the Duchy of Burgundy. The Emperor might have been less willing to make peace with France had he not been beset with anxieties at home. In 1529 the great Turkish Sultan, Sulieman 'the Magnificent', having overrun Hungary, was knocking at the gates of Vienna. Vienna resisted him and the Sultan accepted his repulse as final, but the moment had been critical for Germany and indeed for Christendom.

§ THE REFORMATION. Not less critical was the ecclesiastical situation. Hardly had Charles V been crowned Emperor at Aachen (1520) before he was compelled to deal with the Lutheran movement. Germany was deeply divided on the religious question, and therefore not until 1529 did the Emperor resolve to stamp out the Lutheran heresy by force. In 1531, however, the Protestants formed the League of Schmalkalde to organize resistance, and found an unexpected ally in 'the eldest Son of the Church', Francis I. Nor was it only with the German Protestants that Francis allied himself. He took advantage of the interlude between the second and third Italian wars to conclude alliance with Henry VIII of England, Gustavus Vasa of Sweden, and, in token of his impartiality, both with the Pope Clement VII (1533) and with the great champion of the Prophet the Sultan Sulieman (1535). The alliance between France and the Ottoman Turk continued for more than three centuries to supply one of the most important threads in the fabric of European diplomacy. The alliance with the Pope was sealed by the marriage of the heir to the French Crown with the Pontiff's niece, Catherine de Medici.

The death without an heir of Francesco Sforza, Duke of Milan (October 1535), led to a renewal of the war in Italy. Francis promptly claimed the Milanese for his second son and (in right of his mother, Louise of Savoy, who had died in 1532), Savoy and Piedmont as well. The war was soon over. By the Truce of Nice, concluded through the intervention of the new Pope Paul III in 1538, France kept

Savoy and Nice, invaluable to her alike for purposes of defence and of aggression. The Emperor kept Milan. The Truce of Nice, though concluded for ten years, was broken in less than half that time. But the fourth war (1542-4), though rendered memorable by the bombardment of Nice (the only town left to the Duke of Savoy) by a joint Franco-Turkish squadron, was entirely barren of result, save for the acquisition of Boulogne by Henry VIII, who had joined the Emperor in the attack upon France. Boulogne remained in English hands only until 1550, when it was redeemed by the French for the payment of 400,000 crowns. But neither Henry VIII nor Francis I survived to see the redemption of Boulogne. Both kings died in 1547.

Before the war was renewed (1552) by Henry II, important events had happened. The Treaty of Crespy which had ended the abortive war of 1542-4 provided for a joint effort on the part of the Emperor and the King of France to suppress the Protestant heresy in their respective countries. Both sovereigns did their best to fulfil the terms of the Pact.

§ THE ALBIGENSES. A blasphemous demonstration against the Mass, organized by some Protestants in Paris (1534), gave Francis I an excuse for reprisals which, if deferred, were terribly severe. Ever since the Albigensian Crusade, Provence had been a centre (as some say) of religious enthusiasm (as others call it) of political and ecclesiastical disaffection. To Francis the Albigenses were heretics, and he determined to stamp out the heresy. Twenty-two villages and three towns were levelled with the ground and all the inhabitants massacred in their homes or driven into the woods and mountains, where they mostly died of starvation. Within a circumference of fifteen leagues not a house or a tree remained. The number of victims is variously estimated. Over 600 were certainly sent to the galleys; perhaps 3,000 more were massacred or burned. A year later (1546) sixty-one reformers were arrested at Meaux, and fourteen of them were burnt in Paris. In 1547 a *Chambre Ardente*—(a sort of High Commission Court)—was set up to deal with cases of heresy, as a crime against the State. Nor did it neglect to claim many victims.

§ CROSS-CURRENTS. Meanwhile, after Luther's death (1546), war had broken out between the Catholics and Protestants in Germany. At Mühlberg the Protestants suffered a terrible defeat (1547), but Germans of every creed resented the presence of the Spanish soldiery on German soil. Consequently, Maurice, Duke of Saxony, to whose adhesion the Emperor largely owed his victory at Mühlberg (1547), actually negotiated with Henry II the Treaty of Chambord (1552). Henry II, though the persecutor of Protestants at home, declared himself to be the protector of Protestants in Germany, and in Italy attacked the Emperor's ally the Pope Paul III. Thus was

the policy initiated which France pursued (except under Henry IV) for a century. 'Catholic at home, but Protestant abroad' was an attitude which if ecclesiastically inconsistent brought great advantage politically to France. By the Truce of Vaucelles, which brought the fifth Italian war (1552-6) to an end, France secured the three fortress-bishoprics of Lorraine—Metz, Toul, Verdun. Strasburg successfully resisted capture, but France had established upon the frontier province that firm grip which was not relaxed until 1871. The Emperor Charles V, weary of worldly strife, abdicated in 1556 and spent the remaining years of his life in monastic seclusion at Yuste. The Low Countries, Italy, Old and New Spain he resigned to his son, Philip II; the Austrian dominions had long ago been handed over to his brother, who now also became Emperor as Ferdinand I.

§ THE TREATY OF CÂTEAU-CAMBRÉSIS. Between Philip II and Henry II the last of the Italian wars was fought (1556-9). It was 'Italian' only in so far that it started by an alliance between France and the Pope Paul IV (Caraffa), whose prime object was to expel the Spaniards from Italy. Francis of Guise, to whom the command in Italy was entrusted, was in virtue of his Angevin descent to be King of Naples. In Italy, however, he was outmanœuvred by the Duke of Alva and had to abandon his Italian ambitions in order to conduct the French attack on Calais, which was finally retaken from the English in 1558. The loss of this last English stronghold in France was due to the Spanish alliance contracted by Mary Tudor, and did not lessen English hostility to Spain. An English force had meanwhile contributed to the capture of St. Quentin (1557), the heroic defence of which by Admiral Coligny delayed the Spanish advance on Paris long enough to save the capital. Disappointed in his hope of Paris, and discouraged by the loss of Calais, Philip II was ready to make peace which was concluded at Câteau-Cambrésis (April 3rd, 1559).

This important treaty at long last brought to an end the Italian wars. It left the Spanish Habsburgs in possession of Naples and Lombardy and of nearly 200 fortified towns and castles (some in Spain and more on the north-eastern frontier of France) which had, at some time or another, been held since 1515 by France. 'Sire,' said Guise to Henry II, 'you have in one day surrendered more than you would have lost in thirty years of defeat.' Though it was the soldiers' point of view, that was the blunt truth. France restored Piedmont and Savoy to Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy, but she retained some frontier fortresses that left in her hands the keys of Italy. The recovery of Calais and the acquisition of the Three Bishoprics more than compensated for the loss of Italy, and were some set-off against the surrender of fortresses on the north-eastern frontier. The Treaty of Câteau-Cambrésis was sealed by two marriages. Emmanuel Philibert married Margaret, the sister of Henry II;

Philip II of Spain, a widower for the second time, and rejected by his sister-in-law, Queen Elizabeth of England, had to content himself with a less interesting Elizabeth, the daughter of Henry II and Catherine de Medici. The fêtes which followed the conclusion of peace and the betrothal of the French princesses, were marred by a tragic incident. Henry II was accidentally killed in a tournament, leaving four young sons of whom three, to the misfortune of France, successively wore her crown. Throughout the whole three reigns France was involved in the horrors of the 'Wars of Religion'.

CHAPTER XI

CATHOLICS AND CALVINISTS—THE WARS OF RELIGION (1562-98)

'O France Désolée! O France Sanguinaire!
Non pas terre, mais cendre.'

AGRIPPA D'AUBIGNÉ

TOWARDS the close of the fifteenth century France was for the first time consciously animated by the spirit of nationalism. During the first half of the sixteenth century this new spirit was manifested in the Italian wars waged on Italian soil. In the latter half of the century Frenchmen strove against Frenchmen on French soil. Known to history as the 'Wars of Religion', these wars were in motive almost as much political as ecclesiastical. As a religious force Protestantism was never, in fact, widely influential in France; politically, the Huguenots threatened with disruption the unity so lately achieved.¹

In this, as in other respects, France presents a striking contrast to England. In England Protestantism was implicit in nationalism. In France the two forces were antagonistic. In England the national Church had always been anti-Papal. The King of France was the 'eldest son of the Church'. The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, issued as a Royal Ordinance by Charles VII in 1438, represented, indeed, the anti-Papal spirit of the Council of Basle and had, moreover, an Erastian tendency. It left the election to bishoprics and abbacies to the Chapters, but gave the right of 'recommendaion' to the King. It forbade 'annates', and limited the right of appeal to Rome and the drain of revenues to the Papacy. Though revoked by Louis XI in 1462, it continued to regulate the relations of Church and State until the conclusion in 1516 of the Concordat between Francis I and Leo X. Anxiety for the reform of practical abuses, which from the days of Grosseteste to the days of Colet had inspired reformers in

¹ The most authoritative estimate puts the Huguenots at 1,600,000 out of the total population of some 16,000,000.

England, played little part in France. Nor did the Renaissance. In England the 'New Learning' was primarily utilized by such men as Colet, Grocyn, and Erasmus, as an aid to Biblical exegesis. In France the influence of Italian humanism was, except in isolated cases, such as that of Jacques Lefevre d'Étaples,¹ almost entirely confined to secular learning.

§ JOHN CALVIN. Another and more eminent exception was furnished by John Calvin (1509-64). French by birth, and typically French in temperament and intellectual outlook, Calvin was, as a student of the University of Paris, almost contemporary with Rabelais and Erasmus, and as a scholar was their equal. Suspect by reason of his theological views, he was compelled to flee from France, and ultimately found a home in the city-state of Geneva. Geneva gave him his chance as statesman and reformer.² The essential feature of Calvinism as a form of government, as exemplified in Geneva and in New England,³ was to identify sin with crime. Calvin was a Protestant Pope, an unlimited dictator. A breach of the Mosaic Code brought an offender into conflict with the law. Heresy was treason.

Calvin's great work, *Christianae Religionis Institutio*, published in 1536, was at once a confession of faith and a manual of Church government. Distinguished by the most perfect lucidity of style and arrangement, by close logic and by sweet reasonableness, it supplied the intellectual foundation on which French Protestantism was built. In May 1557 a General Assembly representing the Huguenot congregations in France was held in Paris. A *Confession of Faith* epitomized from Calvin's *Institutes* was drawn up, and the Calvinist Rule was formally adopted. Holy Scripture was accepted as the rule of life and the criterion of Truth. The Protestant Church was also organized: the country was divided ecclesiastically into sixteen provinces, and in each a provincial Synod was periodically to meet. The National Synod was composed of two ministers and two elders representing each provincial synod, and was to meet annually. The government of each local church was vested in a Consistory, the body of ruling elders, who were to provide for church services and call the minister, though a veto on all appointments was reserved to the congregation. The whole system, based upon the rule of Calvin, was eminently democratic, emphasizing the equality of laymen and clergy in Church government, the derivation of all power from the will of the people, and the assertion of that will by representation based upon manhood suffrage. Just a month before the meeting of the Paris Synod, in

¹ Lefevre's *Commentary on the Pauline Epistles* (1512) is worthy of comparison with Colet's Oxford Lectures, his translation of the Bible with that of Tyndale.

² For further details of Calvin and Geneva see Marriott: *Evolution of Modern Europe*, pp. 94 f. and 116 f.

³ See Hawthorne: *Scarlet Letter*.

May 1559, Philip II and Henry II had signed peace at Câteau-Cambrésis in order that they might co-operate in the holy task of extirpating heresy in their respective dominions. Catholicism was now on the high road to recovery after the blows inflicted upon it by Luther, Henry VIII, and Calvin. The Jesuit Order was founded in 1534; the Inquisition was started at Rome by Pope Paul III in 1542; the Council of Trent met in 1545; and in 1547 the German Protestants suffered their decisive defeat at Mühlberg. Francis I, notwithstanding the cruelties practised upon the Vaudois (1540-5), was not on the whole intolerant. His crusading ardour was evidently tempered by the course of events at home and abroad; lowered when he sought to conciliate the German Protestants; inflamed when a handful of Protestant zealots disturbed the peace of his capital. But it cannot be denied that he drove law-abiding citizens into revolution when he announced his intention to put all heretics to death, and personally organized and superintended the infamous Fête of Paris (January 29th, 1535), when, in his presence, a number of heretics were executed. Henry II, who in 1547 succeeded his father, was a bigoted persecutor of Protestants at home, but their consistent and not unrewarded ally in Germany. His first act was to set up a special chamber (*Chambre Ardente*) in the Parlement of Paris to deal with cases of heresy, and its activity is proved by the fact that in three years it passed 430 sentences on heretics, of whom sixty paid the capital penalty. But for the effective opposition of the Parlement of Paris the King would probably have yielded to the wishes of the Pope and set up the Inquisition in France. Failing that, he issued the *Edict of Chateaubriand* (1551), prescribing the most severe measures against Protestants and all who showed them favour, or even mercy, and followed it up by the *Edict of Compiègne* (1557), ordering that against all persons convicted of heresy the death penalty should, without exception, be enforced.

§ THE GUISES AND THE BOURBONS. Henry II was accidentally killed in 1559, and for more than thirty years after his death France was distracted by civil war, and by the struggle for ascendancy between two sections of the French nobility, led for two generations by Guises and Bourbons respectively. Both families were princely. The head of the Bourbon family, Anthony, Duke of Bourbon, the husband of Jeanne D'Albret, Queen of Navarre, was a convinced and ardent Protestant. His younger brother, Louis I, Prince Condé, was not, as a soldier, in the same class as his famous great-grandson, but he was an altogether stronger man than his elder brother. Stronger than either of them were the three Châtillon brothers, of whom the ablest and most famous was the 'Admiral' Coligny, the hero of the defence of St. Quentin, and ranked by a great German historian¹ as the 'Greatest Protestant Statesman of his time.'

¹ Ranke.

Opposed to the Bourbons and Châtillons were the Guises, who reigned in Lorraine as Dukes until in 1735 Lorraine was annexed to France, the Guises receiving Tuscany in exchange.¹ Francis, the head of the younger branch of the family, held the French Duchy of Guise and had won fame as the defender of Metz and the captor of Calais. With his brother, Charles, the Cardinal of Lorraine,² Duke Francis became the leader of the French Catholics, though always regarded with some suspicion as a 'foreigner'. The position of the Guises, both in France and in Europe, was naturally strengthened by the marriage (1558) of their niece, Mary Stuart, to Francis II, whose premature death in 1560 discounted this advantage and threw power into the hands of the Queen-mother.

§ CATHERINE DE MEDICI. For ten years (1560-70) Catherine de Medici was the real ruler of France. Commonly regarded as the typical product of Renaissance Italy, a monster of cruelty and craft, devoid of all moral sense, and intent only on the pursuit of selfish aims and the satisfaction of personal ambition, Catherine has been gravely misjudged. Had circumstances been more favourable she might well have left a more savoury reputation. She did not, indeed, shrink from shedding the blood of heretics, particularly if heresy involved treason; she could look on with satisfaction at the massacre of St. Bartholomew, though more gladly would she have identified herself with the tolerant sentiments of Michel de l'Hospital, for whose appointment as Chancellor (April 1560) she was responsible. About the same time a plot, known as the conspiracy of Amboise, was hatched to seize the persons of the young King Francis II and the Guise brothers. The plot hopelessly miscarried, and served only to give the Guises an excuse for a terrible revenge upon the Huguenots. The sudden death of Francis II temporarily upset the plans of the Guises, and the Queen-mother, acting as regent for the young Charles IX (1560-74), accepted de l'Hospital's advice to summon the States-General.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL OF ORLEANS. To the States-General which met at Orleans (December 10th, 1560) l'Hospital made an appeal for toleration. The Third Estate responded nobly, though they were much more interested in throwing upon Church property the burden of liquidating the national debt. They also demanded internal free-trade, regular meetings of the Estates, and the abolition of the sale of offices. The nobles were more concerned about the confirmation of their privileges; the clergy concentrated on the extermination of heresy. The proceedings at Orleans afford yet another striking illustration of that complete lack of solidarity between the three Orders which hopelessly weakened the States-General as a check upon the Crown. The Ordinance of Orleans, issued in January 1561,

¹ See *infra*, p. 108.

² Another brother was Cardinal of Guise.

corrected various practical abuses among the clergy and also held out some promise of toleration. An edict of January 1562 gave the Huguenots liberty of public worship, except in walled towns, suspended all penalties against heresy, and bade the authorities protect them in the exercise of their religion, so long as they did not disturb the public peace. Unfortunately these concessions, though prompted by l'Hospital's desire for toleration, served to exasperate the Catholics and to encourage the more violent Protestants to outrages upon them. A fracas at Vassy, though seemingly accidental, resulted in the wounding of the Duke of Guise and the killing of some sixty unarmed Protestants.

§ THE WARS OF RELIGION (1562-98). The 'Massacre' of Vassy (March 1562) unloosed the dogs of Civil War. The Guises seized the person of the child-king Charles IX, dismissed the Chancellor, de l'Hospital, and aided by a force of 6,000 Spaniards endeavoured, with the connivance of the Queen-mother, to restore religious unity to France by exterminating heretics. They failed. Anthony of Navarre died of wounds received in the siege of Rouen (October 1562); the Duke of Guise was assassinated before Orleans (February 1563), and a month later a truce (The Peace of Amboise) gave the Huguenots the right to hold their services under strict conditions, in one town in each bailliage. The Huguenots made their headquarters at La Rochelle, where it was hoped help would be able to reach them from the English and Dutch Protestants. There, Condé and Coligny took refuge and were joined by Jeanne d'Albret, the widowed Queen of Navarre, and her son, Prince Henry. But the truce, sporadically observed for several years, was broken in March 1569, when the Huguenots were heavily defeated at Jarnac, where Condé, wounded and a prisoner, was murdered in cold blood. A still heavier defeat was inflicted upon them by the young Henry of Anjou, heir-presumptive to the Crown, at Montcontour (October 3rd). Coligny nevertheless maintained the struggle in the south-west; La Rochelle was untaken; and in August Catherine de Medici came to terms with the Huguenots in the Treaty of St. Germain (August 1570). This treaty which contained promise of most of the concessions made to the Huguenots by the Edict of Nantes might, if honestly carried out, have anticipated that great settlement by a quarter of a century. But though Charles IX himself favoured a new policy suggested by Coligny, the fates were against this happy consummation. Coligny's suggestion was that a united France should turn its arms against the secular enemy, Spain, the King marry a daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II, the friend of the German Protestants, his brother Anjou propose for the hand of Elizabeth of England, and his sister Marguerite marry Henry of Navarre.

§ THE MASSACRE OF ST. BARTHOLOMEW. In June 1572 the

Huguenot nobles flocked into a capital, always bitterly opposed to the Calvinists, for the celebration of Henry's nuptials with the Princess Marguerite. The celebration was marred by the famous 'Massacre' of St. Bartholomew, about the details of which there is still much dispute. But that the assassination of Coligny was its deliberate and primary purpose is certain. It is, moreover, probable that on the first and abortive attempt on Coligny's life the Paris mob, not for the first time nor the last time, got out of hand. The wound was not dangerous. The King expressed his sympathy with Coligny, but the Guises insisted that neither their own lives nor his nor the lives of any Catholics would be safe if any Protestants were left alive in Paris. Reluctantly the King gave way. A second attempt on Coligny's life was only too successful, and was followed by a wholesale massacre. The number of victims in Paris alone has been estimated at 2,000; for the whole of France the number has been variously estimated at 5,000 (Lord Acton) to 70,000. More important than any question of detail were the broad results of the tragedy. The blow inflicted on the Protestants, if not fatal, was terribly severe. But La Rochelle held out against a five months' siege, and by the Edict of La Rochelle (July 1573) the Huguenots were to be freed from persecution, La Rochelle, Nîmes, and Montauban being held by them as a pledge for the fulfilment of the promise. A more permanent result of the St. Bartholomew may be discerned in philosophical works, such as Languet's *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* and Hotman's *Franco-Gallia*, which raised questions as to the ultimate basis of political authority. What right, men asked, has a ruler to dictate the religion of his subjects? From that question it was an easy step to one more fundamental: 'By what right do rulers rule?'¹

§ LES POLITIQUES. More immediately important was the formation of a new middle party, *Les Politiques*, who were described by Tavannes, as men 'who preferred the repose of the kingdom to the salvation of their souls; who would rather that the kingdom remained at peace without God than at war for Him'. But that was the libel of an enemy. In fact, the *Politiques* were neither Roman, Genevan, nor Lutheran, but French. Disgusted by the alliance between the princely Guises and the municipal democracy of Paris, and distressed by the violence alike of fanatical Catholics and fanatical Calvinists, they were ardent supporters of the monarchy. Very strongly they opposed the disintegrating influence of ambitious princes, ultramontane cardinals, and the remnants of a feudal aristocracy, which under the cover of a fight for religious liberty, was more and more clearly revealing itself as primarily concerned to win back feudal independence and privilege. Yet it is clear that the French people, as a whole, never weakened in their loyalty to Catholic doctrine, nor in their reliance upon the consolations afforded by the

¹ Cp. E. Armstrong: *English Historical Review* (1889).

offices of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, the Wars of Religion dragged on, though spasmodically, for many weary years to come. The first pause came with the Treaty of La Rochelle (1573), which conceded liberty of conscience to all, but permitted liberty of worship only in La Rochelle, Nîmes, Montauban, and in the houses of certain Protestant nobles. These concessions were extended by the '*Peace of Monsieur*' which brought the fifth war to a close in 1576.

This peace was brought about by the Duke of Alençon, the youngest of Catherine's sons, who, on the death of Charles IX (1574), became heir-presumptive to his brother, Henry of Anjou (Henry III). An amnesty was promised to all who had borne arms against the King; the Huguenots were to be allowed to garrison eight towns; except in Paris and its neighbourhood, they were to be allowed to hold their services without interference; all cases in which Catholics and Protestants were concerned were to be tried in special mixed Chambers (*Chambres mi-parties*) to be set up in all the Parlements, and a States-General was to be summoned within six months. Henry of Navarre was to be Governor of Guienne and Condé of Picardy.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL OF BLOIS. The States-General which met at Blois in November 1576 was important, and if its demands had been conceded it might have marked a turning-point in the constitutional history of France. Of the 312 Deputies who met at Blois all but one were Catholics. But though Catholics, and anxious to co-operate with the Crown and extirpate heretics, their demands would have gone far towards suspending the royal authority. Acts passed by the three Orders were to be embodied in Ordinances, even without the sanction of the King, and a majority of the Council were to be nominated by the Estates. The money grant voted to the King clearly showed mistrust: it was insufficient to carry on effective war against the Huguenots. But the refusal of the nobles and clergy to act unitedly with the Third Estate frustrated any real constitutional advance. It was the old story.

§ THE CATHOLIC LEAGUE. The '*Peace of Monsieur*' was naturally resented by the Catholics, who resolved to strengthen their organization by consolidating the existing provincial leagues into a Holy League for the kingdom as a whole. Henry, Duke of Guise, was its leader, Philip II of Spain its paymaster, and it was also joined by the King, and by the Duke of Anjou. Though primarily organized to resist the progress of Protestantism, the League inevitably became increasingly political. The Duke of Guise was aiming at the Crown; so was Phillip II; some nobles joined the League in the hope of regaining their feudal franchises, though more perhaps adhered, with similar motives, to the Huguenots; some of the great cities hoped, through the general disintegration of society, to win back municipal independence, and many communes had a parallel motive in supporting

the League. The domestic situation was further complicated by the anxiety of the Dutch Calvinists to get help from France—traditionally 'Protestant abroad'—in their revolt against Philip II. Help had been given to them as far back as 1572. It was renewed in 1581 when the Duke of Anjou, having accepted the Stadholderate of the northern provinces, invaded Cambrai at the head of the French army. Though in 1582 he entered Antwerp in triumph, the citizens withstood the 'French fury', and Anjou had to retire into France, where he died on June 10th, 1584. The death of Anjou raised in an acute form the question of the succession to the throne. Henry of Navarre was indubitably the next heir, but the Catholic League, greatly perturbed by Anjou's death, proclaimed as heir Henry's uncle, the Cardinal of Bourbon, who was to act as a 'warming-pan' for their own leader, Henry of Guise.

Philip II formally joined the Catholic League in 1585, and the Pope Sixtus V issued a Bull declaring that both Henry of Navarre and his cousin the Prince of Condé had forfeited their rights of succession. This Bull, against which the Parlement of Paris stoutly protested, precipitated the last war of religion.

§ THE WAR OF THE THREE HENRIES (1585-9). In the 'War of the three Henries' (Henry III, Henry of Navarre, and Henry, Duke of Guise) Guise, now openly an aspirant to the Crown, was supported by Philip II. Henry of Navarre, diplomatically and financially supported by Queen Elizabeth, borrowed troops from Germany and from the Calvinist cantons of Switzerland. But although Navarre himself won a brilliant engagement at Coutras (1587), he failed to follow it up, and his Swiss and German allies were, in the same year, defeated and dispersed by Guise near La Charité. Henry III, having counted on the defeat both of Navarre and Guise, was placed in a dilemma by their respective victories. The 'King of France' had actually to seek protection from Guise (who had entered the capital in open defiance of his orders) against his own subjects, who looked upon Guise as 'King of Paris'. From Paris the King escaped with a deep but not unnatural grudge against his deliverer. The defeat of Philip's great Armada (1588) encouraged Henry III to strike at Philip's allies in France. He had no moral scruples to restrain him, and on the eve of Christmas (1588) the Duke of Guise and his brother, the Cardinal, were foully assassinated in the King's chamber at Blois by his Gascon guards. A few days later the Queen-mother, who from her death-bed had heard the noise of the tumult, died (January 5th, 1589). In brains she undoubtedly was far superior to any of her sons, in morals she was no worse. The murder of the Guises created an immense sensation throughout France, and in Paris aroused bitter resentment against the King. Both the Sorbonne and the Parlement (the latter after a drastic 'Purge') declared that the King's subjects were released from their

oath of fealty; and Henry III was driven into alliance with Henry of Navarre. Their combined forces defeated the troops of the Paris Leaguers at Senlis (May) and they prepared at the head of 40,000 men to assault the capital (July). But on August 1st Jacques Clément, a young Dominican monk, got access to the King's chamber, and fatally wounded him (August 2nd, 1589). The murderer was immediately slain by the guards. The Valois dynasty thus came to an end in humiliation, if not in ignominy. It had in its day done great things for France: it had expelled the English from France; it had eliminated the disintegrating elements from the body politic; it had put the axe to the roots of feudalism; centralized the administrative system; codified the law, and kept the Church in due subordination to the State. Over all domestic rivals the Valois kings had asserted their predominance; on the European stage they had refused to yield pride of place to the formidable power of the Habsburg Empire.

CHAPTER XII

HENRY OF NAVARRE—THE EDICT OF NANTES— THE 'GREAT DESIGN' (1589-1610)

'Paris vaut bien une messe.'

HENRI IV

'Labourage et Pasturage sont les deux mamelles de la France.'

SULLY

WHY did Protestantism fail to get a hold upon France? To that question the character and career of Henry IV supplies a partial answer. Henry IV was profoundly interested in France—its prosperity and peace; he was not interested in religious dogma, in differences of creeds and forms of worship. In this he reflected the true spirit of France which is political rather than theological, practical rather than speculative.

Despite superficial resemblances between the ecclesiastical policy of Henry IV of France and that of Elizabeth of England, Henry's was not based, like the 'Elizabethan Settlement', on compromise. Born a Protestant, Henry died a Catholic; but he was primarily a politician. Henry had convinced himself that notwithstanding the existence of a minority of convinced Calvinists, and a still smaller section who joined the Huguenot party in the hope of recovering their feudal independence, the mass of the French people was devoted to Catholicism. The fault of the Edict of Nantes was that it did not sufficiently distinguish between the zealous Protestants and the political reactionaries.

§ HENRY IV AND THE LEAGUE. Although the estate to which

Henry IV succeeded was heavily encumbered, his legal right to the throne was indisputable, nor was his succession seriously disputed. The extreme Leaguers, strong in Paris, were indeed willing, preferring a foreigner to a heretic, to violate the Salic Law in favour of the Infante of Spain. The Duke of Mayenne, upon whom the leadership of the party devolved after the murder of his two brothers, aimed at the Crown either for himself or for his nephew, the young Duke of Guise, but he put in as a 'warming-pan' Charles, Cardinal of Bourbon, 'Le Roi de la Ligue'. The Cardinal was proclaimed King in Paris as Charles X, but he never reigned over France, and died in 1590.

To win Paris was Henry's first task. Until he was master of Paris he could not be King of France. Not for five years was that object achieved. In September 1589 Mayenne attacked, unsuccessfully, the King's camp at Arques, near Dieppe. After a fortnight's fighting the Catholics were driven off, and the King, reinforced by 5,000 Englishmen, sent to his assistance by Elizabeth, marched on Paris. But Paris was prepared for him. Henry was not strong enough to take it by assault at once, but inflicted a crushing defeat upon the army of the League at Ivry (March 14th, 1590), and then again marched on Paris. But alarmed by Henry's victories, Philip II sent an army from Flanders under Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma, to relieve the capital. Eight thousand Spaniards were thrown into the French capital. Paris was saved.

Failing Paris, Henry would take Rouen. The story of Paris was repeated. Henry, again on the verge of success, was again baffled by the superior tactics of Parma. But it was for the last time: Parma, wounded outside Rouen, died on December 2nd, 1592.

§ PARIS WORTH A MASS. Meanwhile, Mayenne, at the instance of Philip II, still anxious to secure the Crown for his daughter, had summoned the States-General to meet in Paris. But only 128 Deputies answered the summons (January 1593), and in July Henry announced his conversion, after 'instruction', to the Catholic Faith. On the 25th the King, attended by the great officers of the Crown and a body of princes and nobles, went to the old Church of St. Denis, and there he was 'received' by the Archbishop of Bourges and seven of his suffragan bishops. On February 27th, 1594, the Coronation took place with all the ancient ceremonial, in the presence of the six great vassals, the 'lay peers' of the Crown, and of prelates and people. On March 6th Mayenne left Paris; on the 22nd the King, at long last, amid the enthusiastic plaudits of the populace, entered his capital. Henry IV had triumphed over the combined forces of the Pope, Philip II, and the League. The Parlement of Paris, always a zealous champion of the independence of the Gallican Church, supported the King, but the provincial Parlements were sharply divided.

In consequence of an attempt on the King's life (November 1594)

by Jean Chastel, a pupil of the Jesuits, an order was issued for the expulsion of the Order. The Parlements of Paris, Grenoble, and Rouen favoured expulsion. The Parlements of Rennes, Bordeaux, and Aix not only opposed it, but offered a refuge to the Jesuits.

By his unfailing good temper, combined with the courage and skill he always displayed in the field, not to add lavish largesse, Henry IV gradually won over almost all Frenchmen. One opponent, however, remained implacable. Philip II, if not responsible for the repeated attempts on the King's life, certainly sustained the opposition of the League and retarded the grant of Papal absolution. In September 1595, however, the absolution was at last pronounced. Mayenne, the young Duke of Guise, and other leaders of the League hastened to make their submission. None of them went unrewarded in places, pensions, and hard cash. But Henry was satisfied that the price paid represented not a gamble but an investment. He proved to be right.

§ FRANCE AND SPAIN. There remained Philip II. On Spain Henry declared war in January 1595. The capture of Calais by the Spaniards led to some bargaining between Henry and Queen Elizabeth who (together with the Dutch) concluded an alliance with France in May 1598. But the results were insignificant. Philip, aware that his end was approaching, was not sorry to conclude peace at Vervins on May 2nd, 1598. Calais was restored to France; but although the southern Netherlands had returned to their obedience to Spain in 1592, the northern States carried on the war until by the truce of 1609 their independence was virtually acknowledged.¹ The death of Philip II in 1598 had relieved both the Dutch and Henry IV of all real apprehension, and the latter had anticipated the cessation of external war by his famous act of domestic appeasement.

§ THE EDICT OF NANTES. The Edict of Nantes, consisting of ninety-two general and fifty-six particular articles, was issued on April 13th, 1598. 'Now that God has been pleased to grant us the enjoyment of great peace,' so ran the preamble to this historic document, 'it has seemed to us that we could not employ it better than in providing for His worship by all our subjects, so that, since He has not yet granted that we may worship Him under the same forms, at least we may do so with the same intention, and with such order that it may cause no trouble or tumult.' The Edict consolidated and confirmed the privileges granted to the Huguenots by the previous Edicts of St. Cloud (1589), Mantes (1591 and 1593), and St. Germain (1594). The Huguenots were to enjoy liberty of *conscience* throughout France, but liberty of *worship* only under precise restrictions. All great vassals might hold public service in their own castles, and the same privilege was permitted in two specified places in each province. The lesser nobles might have private services attended

¹ Formal independence was secured by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).

by not more than thirty persons. The Protestant churches were to have a State endowment reckoned as the equivalent of £20,000 a year; individual Protestants were to enjoy complete equality of civil rights, to be eligible for all public offices, to inherit property, to carry on trade and commerce, and to have equal educational opportunities in universities, colleges, and schools. In the Parlement of Paris and in all the provincial Parlements a special Court (*la Chambre de l'Édit*) was set up to deal with all disputes arising out of the Edict. The Protestants were to have the right of assembly in synods, political and ecclesiastical, and for eight years (subsequently prolonged to twelve) to be allowed to occupy 200 fortified towns, the garrisons of which were to be paid by the King. Thus were the 'people of France to be united and the State restored to its former splendour'. Not, however, until February 25th, 1599, did the Parlement of Paris consent to register the Edict. The provincial Parlements proved still more obstructive; only in 1609 did the last of them, the Parlement of Rouen, actually register the Royal Edict.

The significance of the Edict of Nantes has been variously assessed. The treaty—for such in effect it was—did unquestionably bring to an end a period of suffering, humiliation, and exhaustion for France, but it did not enshrine the principle of religious toleration, still less did it put the two creeds in a position of complete equality. Buckle described it as 'unquestionably the most important event that had yet occurred in the history of French civilization'. St. Simon acclaimed it as a 'chef d'œuvre de politique et grand sens'. But was it in fact a masterpiece of statesmanship, or a mere makeshift of political expediency? That the revocation of the Edict by Louis XIV was a criminal blunder is undeniable, but between Louis XIV and Henry IV had intervened the wise rule of Richelieu. Concurrent endowment was plainly equitable, but the occupation of fortified towns, and still more the right of political assembly, gave the Protestants the dangerous position of a State within a State. Their position clearly threatened the new-won unity of France.

§ SULLY'S REFORMS. Henry's immediate task, however, was to heal the wounds of a devastated land. During the century between the departure of the English and the outbreak of the religious wars France had been increasingly prosperous. But thirty years of civil war had left the whole country exhausted. Finance, commerce, industry, and agriculture all required reorganization. To carry out the work of reconstruction Henry gathered round him a group of active and able ministers, the greatest of whom was Maximilian de Béthune, Baron of Rosny, known to history as the Duc de Sully.

Sully (1560–1641) was attached as a child to the Court of the King of Navarre. A convinced Huguenot, he fought on the Protestant side in the civil wars, was seriously wounded at Ivry, and after his patron's accession to the throne he counselled Henry's conversion

to Catholicism, though he himself refused to change his faith. Appointed to the Council of Finance in 1596, he became Superintendent of Finance and the King's chief Minister in 1596. 'Labourage et Pasturage sont les deux mamelles de la France': 'agriculture is more important to her than all the mines of Peru'. Such were the economic maxims of Sully, and he acted up to them. But a sound policy in regard to finance was vital to recovery, both in agriculture and commerce. By a process of conversion Sully paid off a large portion of the vast public debt, and simultaneously reduced taxation. By a better system of accounts and by dismissing a whole army of intermediate agents and 'farmers' of taxes he greatly improved the yield to the Treasury while reducing the burden on the taxpayer. He recovered for the Crown large portions of alienated domain; he prosecuted speculators and suppressed sinecures. Such a policy made many enemies for Sully; it demanded a man above temptation and of iron will. In these respects Sully did not fail. Like Colbert, he encouraged internal free-trade, though as regards external trade he was a rigid protectionist. He discouraged the import, both of food-stuffs and manufactured goods while encouraging the export of wine and corn; he promoted afforestation and carried through a big programme of public works; he constructed canals, bridges, and roads, drained marshes and encouraged Henry in the beautification of Paris. He disapproved the King's encouragement of the home manufacture of luxuries—silks, velvets, tapestries, cloth—formerly imported, and was definitely opposed to Henry's Colonial enterprises in North America. He strengthened, however, the military and naval establishments and as Grand Master of Artillery he greatly improved the frontier defences. But his first and greatest love was agriculture.

§ THE GREAT DESIGN. Untrustworthy as history, Sully's voluminous *Memoirs* prove that his vanity was as colossal as his industry. In particular, grave doubts have been cast upon his account of the genesis of the famous Peace Project known as *The Great Design of Henry IV*. Whether that scheme was or was not in the critical sense 'authentic', there can be no question that it is historically important. Cynical commentators discover in the *Great Design* nothing more than the skeleton of a grand alliance, headed by France, against the Austro-Spanish Habsburgs, smeared over with some empty verbiage, and exalted by the imaginative genius of Sully to the dignity of a project for universal and permanent peace. Be this as it may, the *Great Design* undeniably furnished the first detailed scheme for the elimination of war as an instrument of policy and has supplied the basis for all subsequent Projects of Peace.¹

¹ The text of the *Design* is reprinted in the *Grotius Society Publications* (No. 2) with an admirable introduction by David Ogg. An analysis and critical estimate of it will be found in Marriott's *Commonwealth or Anarchy?* (Oxford and Columbia (N.Y.) University Presses, 1938).

§ THE PAULETTE. Sully's policy in regard to the *Parlement* has incurred much opprobrium. An annual tax of 1/60 on the purchase price of judicial salaries had been already imposed as suggested by M. Paulet. Sully adopted the scheme, regularized it, and developed it into a regular system. *La Paulette* thus became a guarantee for the hereditary character of these judicial offices; the hereditary magistrates became *la noblesse de la robe*, and ultimately proved the most zealous defenders of privilege and the most obstinate opponents of reform. Venality in officials is in any case a vicious principle, but Sully can hardly have foreseen all the consequences of perpetuating it. Meanwhile, he gave unstinted support to Henry in all his projects, matrimonial, diplomatic, and military. In 1600 Henry obtained the long-desired divorce from his first wife, Margu  rite de Valois, who was both faithless and childless, and married Marie de Medici, who bore him an heir and other children.

§ FOREIGN POLICY. Soon after his second marriage, Henry was able to bring to a satisfactory conclusion a long-standing dispute with Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy-Piedmont. This dispute was mainly concerned with the Marquisate of Saluzzo which the Duke of Savoy had occupied during the French civil wars, and despite the stipulations of the Treaty of Vervins had refused to surrender. War ensued, but Savoy could not withstand Sully's new artillery, and a peace was signed on January 17th, 1601. The Duke of Savoy retained Saluzzo, but ceded to France the lands of Bresse, Bugey, Gex, and Valromey, which gave France the command of both banks of the Rh  ne from the source to the delta.

§ THE BIRON CONSPIRACY. Connected with this Savoy dispute was the one formidable domestic conspiracy which Henry IV had to meet. Sully's reforms in local government inevitably curtailed the privileges of the nobles, some of whom, led by Marshal de Biron, the younger, and the Duke de Bouillon, entered into treasonable negotiations with Savoy and Spain for the dismemberment of France. At the leading conspirators Henry struck hard. Biron was tried by the *Parlement* and executed, others fled abroad, some were imprisoned in France; some were pardoned.

The last years of Henry IV were largely concentrated on two objects: the ardent pursuit of a young and lovely mistress, and the formation of a union of European Powers to curb the ambitions of the Austro-Spanish Habsburgs. How far the war which Henry was preparing to launch in 1610 was due to the first, how far to the second motive, has been hotly disputed. Charlotte de Montmorency had been married by Henry to his cousin, the Prince of Cond  , in the hope that Cond   would prove a complaisant husband. On the contrary, he carried his young wife off to the Netherlands and put her under the care of the Austrian Archduke, who refused to surrender

her to Henry. No spectacle can indeed be more pitiful than that of a great statesman stooping to the level of a senile Falstaff. Admirers of Henry must therefore hope that frustrated passion was a negligible incident in a comprehensive and far-seeing design. That design was nothing less than a reversion to the project long ago entertained by Coligny. Certain Powers, embracing France, the United Netherlands, the Protestant princes of Germany and England, were to band together against the Power which, already entrenched in Spain, Austria, Hungary, the Spanish Netherlands, and Italy, hoped, aided by the wealth of South America, to establish a hegemony over Europe. By the absorption of the Spanish Netherlands the frontier of France was to be extended to the Rhine.

Henry was busily engaged on this project when a pretext for war was given by a disputed succession to the border duchies on the lower Rhine—Cleves, Jülich, and Berg (1609). Henry's chief anxiety was to prevent the duchies from falling into the hands of any Catholic prince, and more especially a Habsburg. All his influence was, accordingly, exerted in favour of a Protestant candidate. That policy was strongly opposed by his Catholic counsellors, especially by his Queen, Marie de Medici; but he tried to conciliate them by including Mayenne and other Catholic leaders in the Council which he nominated to assist the Queen in her duties as regent, and by consenting, tardily, to her desire to be anointed and crowned Queen of France. The coronation was celebrated with great splendour on May 13th, 1610. The King was due to leave for the front on the 19th. On the day after the Queen's coronation a crazy fanatic, François Ravailac, worked up into a frenzy by the teaching of the Jesuits, plunged a dagger into the King's heart as he drove through the streets of Paris.

The assassin's knife postponed for nearly a decade the outbreak of the Thirty Years War and removed from the political stage a great statesman and a most lovable personality. Henry IV was intensely human: by no means superior to the frailties common to men, but of a large heart and a generous spirit; without a trace of superiority, yet—even in his pleasures—not forgetful of his dignity; tireless in body and amazingly alert in mind; apt to turn an awkward question with a jest, but serious in his supreme anxiety to serve the best interests of France; a sincere Protestant, though willing to accept the forms of the religion to which the vast majority of his people were devoted; of unsurpassed courage and energy in the field, if no match for a really great soldier like Parma; convinced that an absolute monarchy was essential to good government in France, an orderly administrator, and an ardent supporter of the economic and commercial reforms suggested to him by his great minister Sully. If he was not the author, or perhaps even cognizant, of the *Great Design* he restored peace to France, and was working until his death to establish equilibrium in Europe.

CHAPTER XIII

THE RULE OF THE CARDINALS—RICHELIEU AND MAZARIN (1610-61)

'Le féodalité morcelait l'état et la patrie. La nation tendait à se réunir, la royauté l'assemble. La première condition du succès de son œuvre fut la destruction du système féodal.

ALBERT SOREL

ALBERT SOREL states an indisputable truth. The central interest in the history of medieval France is the contest between the Crown, bent upon the unification of the kingdom, and the centrifugal influence of feudalism. To feudalism as a system of government Richelieu dealt the death-blow. On the death of her husband, Mary de Medici, so lately crowned Queen, at once assumed the Regency, and though Louis XIII attained his legal majority in 1614, she continued to rule France until Richelieu came into power in 1624.

§ CONCINI. The most influential of her advisers was a Florentine, Consino Concini, not inaptly described as 'a kind of French Rizzio'. Clever, but avaricious and self-seeking, Concini supported the pro-Spanish policy of his mistress, which was cemented by the marriage of Louis XIII with Anne of Austria and of Louis's sister Elizabeth with the son of Philip III. To this Spanish policy Sully was so strongly opposed that he withdrew to his governorship in Poitou, where in 1641 he died at the ripe age of eighty-one.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL OF 1614. On the demand of several important princes led by the Prince of Condé the States-General was summoned to Paris in October 1614. Of 464 deputies, 132 represented the nobles, 140 the clergy, and 192 the Third Estate. This meeting vividly illustrated the characteristic weakness of the States-General: lack of solidarity between the several Orders and the consequent sterility of their labours. Yet the *cahiers* presented to the King on February 23rd, 1615, threw valuable light on the questions which were agitating France. Unfortunately there was hopeless division between the nobles, the clergy, and the Third Estate, between Paris and the provinces, between Ultramontanes and Gallicans. The nobles and clergy did agree to demand the abolition of the *paulette* and the resulting emergence of a new *noblesse de la robe*. But the Third Estate, drawn largely from the official and professional classes, while lukewarm about the *paulette*, were very anxious to reduce taxation and get rid of the lavish pensions enjoyed by the great lords. As a result the nobles joined the ultramontane clergy in a demand for the formal acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Trent. This demand was strongly opposed by the Third Estate, whose proposals

in regard to finance and to administration in general anticipated many of the reforms aimed at by Colbert and some even of those of 1791. Though the labours of the States-General of 1614 were mostly barren, their meeting was noteworthy not only because it was their last meeting until 1789 but for the political début of the greatest statesman of the old régime.

§ RICHELIEU. Armand Jean du Plessis de Richelieu was born in 1585, the son of a Poitevin family belonging to the lesser nobility. Though destined originally for the army, Richelieu, for family reasons, abandoned that career for the Church, and at twenty-two was consecrated Bishop of Luçon, a See recently vacated by his brother. As a deputy for the clergy to the States-General of 1614 he attracted attention by a great speech in support of the ultramontane views of his Order. In 1616 he was admitted to the Council of State, and entrusted with the departments of Foreign Affairs and War. These appointments he owed to the favour of the Queen-mother whose temporary exile, following on the assassination of her favourite Concini (1617), he shared. In 1621, however, a reconciliation between the King and the Queen-mother led to the recall of Richelieu, and in 1624 he became First Minister to the King. Until his death in 1642 he ruled France.

The situation which confronted Richelieu on his accession to power was difficult, not to say perilous. He describes it thus in the Preface to his *Testament Politique*.¹ 'When your Majesty gave me a large share in the conduct of your affairs it was literally true that the Huguenots shared with you the government of the State; the great nobles behaved not as subjects but as independent sovereigns; foreign affairs were neglected; private interests were preferred to public; in a word your authority was in tatters. . . . I undertook to devote myself to destroying the Huguenot party, to humbling the pride of the nobles, to reducing all subjects to obedience to the Crown, and to exalting France to her true place among the nations of the world.' Richelieu's pledge was precisely fulfilled. In his eyes the unity, the greatness, even the security of France depended absolutely on the power of the Crown. To the service of the Crown therefore Richelieu devoted all his great gifts, a keen intellect, unflinching courage, an indomitable will.

§ RICHELIEU AND THE HUGUENOTS. Largely drawn from the towns of the south, traditionally jealous of the authority of the King of Paris, closely allied with a feudal nobility, still bent on establishing their independence, flattered and caressed by the external enemies of France, the Huguenots had become practically a federation of self-governing communities, intent upon setting up in the bosom of France a republic on the model of that of the United

¹ Grave doubts exist upon the authenticity of this work but not on its historical value. The Preface was certainly Richelieu's own work.

Provinces. An unauthorized Huguenot Convention at La Rochelle had promulgated in 1620 'the Fundamental Law of the Republic of the Reformed Churches of France and Bearn', under which France was divided into eight districts, each under a military and civil governor, and wherever the Protestants were predominant the property of Catholics was confiscated. Help was then sought from England, the United Provinces, and the German Protestants to render the Huguenots completely independent, to set up an *imperium in imperio*.

Richelieu was determined to deprive the Huguenots of privileges so grossly abused. They gave him in 1625 an opportunity. At a moment when the Cardinal was busied with the affair of the Valteline¹ the Huguenots led by two brothers, the Dukes of Rohan and Soubise, raised the standard of revolt. Early in 1625 Soubise swooped down upon the little port of Blavet in Brittany and carried off four vessels of war designed by Richelieu to form the nucleus of a fleet. With some ships borrowed from England and Holland, together with a few of his own, Richelieu inflicted a crushing defeat on the Huguenots off La Rochelle, but biding his time he granted them easy terms.

In less than two years Richelieu, having made peace with Spain and crushed more than one palace intrigue against himself, was ready to strike the decisive blow. The Huguenots had risen in Languedoc, and despite the failure of Buckingham, the vain and incompetent favourite of Charles I, to 'rescue' them, were holding out in La Rochelle. By October 15th, 1628, however, nearly half the inhabitants of that 'City of Defence' had perished and on the 28th it capitulated. In 1629 Richelieu dictated to the defeated Protestants the terms of the Peace of Alais. The Huguenots were deprived of their political organization, their right of synodical meeting, and their garrisoned towns. But they were still to enjoy liberty of worship, and freedom of conscience was respected. Heretics Richelieu was prepared to tolerate: rebels he ruthlessly crushed. Henceforward the Huguenots were a harmless religious sect and ceased to menace the political unity of France.

Richelieu next dealt with a court intrigue which threatened both his place and his person. The conspiracy was headed by the Queen-mother who was disgusted to find in the Cardinal not a pliant tool but a man who meant to be master. With her was associated not only her daughter-in-law, Anne of Austria, who had little love for her husband, and less for Richelieu, the 'enemy of her country', but the two Vendômes, sons of Henry IV and Gabrielle d'Estrées, the Comte de Chalais, and other courtiers. But the leader of the cabal was Gaston d'Orléans, the contemptible brother of Louis XIII and heir-presumptive to the throne. The conspiracy, whose object was to murder Richelieu, depose the King, and put Orleans on the throne,

¹ *Infra.*, p. 83.

was widespread and influentially supported, but as soon as Richelieu discovered it he struck hard. Chalais expiated many crimes on the scaffold; the Vendômes and some of the ladies were exiled; Orleans, having made an abject submission, was contemptuously, perhaps unwisely, pardoned. The next obstacles in Richelieu's path were the surviving feudal privileges. Having ordered (1626) the demolition of all fortifications alike in castles and cities not required for the defence of the realm, he next proceeded to prohibit duelling and private wars. A powerful noble, François de Montmorency, Comte de Bouteville, was the first to defy the new law, and despite influential intervention was sent to the scaffold. The condign punishment of this popular representative of the highest nobility of France was a warning not to be ignored to all the great nobles,

Richelieu meant to be obeyed and his prompt action struck terror into his enemies. In the autumn of 1630 the King's serious illness roused fresh hope among Richelieu's enemies and they made a last effort to get rid of him. The 'Day of Dupes' gave final proof of their malignity, their impotence, and their folly. Not one of the highly placed conspirators escaped. Marie de Medici—the Queen-mother—fled to Flanders and after eleven years of unhappy exile died in 1643. Gaston of Orleans fled to Lorraine where he married Marguerite, the sister of Duke Charles III, one of the bitterest enemies of France. In 1632 Gaston attempted to raise an insurrection, in conjunction with Henri, Duc de Montmorency, Governor of Languedoc, in that independent and inflammable province. The rising was quashed, Gaston, coward and craven, was again contemptuously pardoned, but no fewer than five dukes and four counts were sent to the scaffold. 'Why should you strike,' said the Cardinal, 'at the little men? Small trees afford no shade; it is the big men you must keep in order.'

§ RICHELIEU'S DICTATORSHIP. Richelieu's rule was undeniably dictatorial. The condition of France called for a Dictatorship. The Parlement was not (in the English sense) a 'constitutional' organ, but it was not without political aspirations. Richelieu, accordingly, forbade the Parlement to intervene in politics or finance and curtailed even its judicial functions. The States-General he never summoned; while the position of the nobles as governors of provinces he undermined by the appointment of *Intendants*. Of the nineteen noble governors of provinces whom Richelieu found in office in 1624 he got rid of no fewer than fifteen, replacing them by royal officials, responsible to himself. Over each of the thirty-two *Généralités* into which France was now divided an *Intendant* was appointed. Justice, Finance, Police—all was vested in the 'Thirty Kings of France' as John Law afterwards described them.

Nor did Richelieu neglect the problem of defence: he reorganized the army and created both the navy and the mercantile marine. He

encouraged foreign trade, and promoted colonization by means of chartered companies. But all this was done primarily in the interests of the Crown, and upon the edifice of absolutism he placed the coping stone by the reorganization of the Privy Council or *Conseil du Roi*. Only in one sphere of administration did Richelieu conspicuously fail. He was no financier. Though he destroyed feudalism as a system of government, he left to the feudal nobles all their fiscal immunities and privileges. In this sense he must be held responsible for the revolution of 1789. For feudalism was tolerable so long only as it was intact. To deprive the nobles of their political functions but to allow their privileges to survive was to invite revolution.

§ FOREIGN POLICY. Having crushed all his domestic enemies, Spanish queens, intriguing courtiers, disruptive Huguenots, unpatriotic nobles, Richelieu could at last act decisively abroad. He has thus defined the object at which he aimed: 'to restore to Gaul the frontiers designed for her by nature: to identify France with Gaul, and wherever the ancient Gaul extended there to re-establish the new', in short, the restoration of the 'Natural Frontiers' of France.

The Thirty Years War had already been raging for seventeen years when France, in 1635, first took part in it as a principal. Richelieu saw that the moment had come for a final reckoning with the Austro-Spanish Habsburgs, for breaking the chain of encirclement, the links of which they held in the Netherlands, Austria, North Italy, and Spain. The first step was to bar the Habsburg right of way between the Austrian Tyrol and North Italy. This he did by securing for the Grisons, a Protestant canton, in the Swiss confederacy, the valley of the Valteline, connecting the Tyrol with Lombardy (Treaty of Monzon, 1626). The matter was reopened three years later by a disputed succession to the Duchies of Mantua and Montferrat. To support the French candidate, the Duc de Nevers, Richelieu twice crossed the Alps, and by the Treaty of Cherasco (1630) not only established him at Mantua, but secured for France Pignerolo, the frontier fortress between France and Piedmont. Pignerolo gave France the keys of one important gate into and out of Italy. To pass beyond the gates was, as Richelieu saw, to repeat the blunder of Charles VIII and Francis I. In Germany, Richelieu had been content to follow the traditional policy of France: to support the Protestant princes in their opposition to the Habsburg Emperor, and give all help, short of direct intervention, to Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. But the death of Gustavus at Lützen (1632) and the defeat of the Protestant League at Nordlingen (1634) impelled Richelieu himself to intervene.

At first things went badly for France. The Spanish army penetrated into Picardy, took Corbie (1635) and threatened Paris. But the great fortress of Breisach, commanding Alsace, was taken by the Protestants under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (1638); a French

garrison was admitted to the town, and Richelieu thus secured a grip upon Alsace which, confirmed by the Treaty of Westphalia, was never until 1870 relaxed.

On another side also the position was improving. The insurrection of the Catalans and the reassertion of Portuguese independence (1640) greatly weakened Spain, and enabled Richelieu to occupy Roussillon, which France thenceforward held. Thus did Richelieu advance towards two of the frontiers which he had defined as the 'Natural' frontiers of France: the Rhine and the Pyrenees. In 1642, however, the great minister passed away, and twelve months later was followed to the grave by his master. The Crown passed to a child-king, and the royal power was again exercised by a Queen-mother. Anne of Austria was, however, wise enough to give her confidence and her heart, if not her hand, to the man trained by Richelieu and bequeathed by him to her. To the surprise of the uninitiated the Regent accepted the bequest.

§ MAZARIN. Both in character and methods Mazarin and his predecessor were strikingly contrasted. Richelieu was a typical French aristocrat, strong, stern, haughty, and overbearing. Giulio Mazarin was a middle-class Italian, a trained lawyer, a pupil of the Jesuit College in Rome, apprenticed to diplomacy in the service of the Papacy, not less determined than Richelieu in pursuit of his ends, but pursuing them by more subtle and pliable methods. Physically a coward, adroit rather than strong, Mazarin first came to France as Papal Nuncio in 1636, but became a naturalized Frenchman in 1639, was taken into Richelieu's service, and on the latter's death succeeded him as Minister. For the first five years of his ministry Mazarin's attention was concentrated on the war. He was fortunate enough to be served in the field by two of the most brilliant soldiers of that age: the young Duc d'Enghien (1621-86) and Marshal Turenne. The former—the 'Great Condé'—was the eldest son of the Prince of Condé. Turenne (1611-86) was of even more illustrious descent: a son of the Duc de Bouillon, a nephew of Maurice of Nassau, and a grandson of William the Silent. Condé's brilliant victory at Rocroi (1643) dealt the death-blow to the military power of Spain, and put the Netherlands at the mercy of France. A great victory won by Condé and Turenne at Nordlingen in 1645 gave France the supremacy in the Upper Rhineland. Beaten to their knees in Germany, in Alsace, and in the Netherlands, with Naples in revolt and Portugal independent, the Habsburgs were ready to make peace, which was concluded by the Treaties of Westphalia on October 24th, 1648. The Thirty Years War was ended. The line then drawn between Catholics and Protestants was permanent; the Holy Roman Empire came virtually to an end; the Swedes were substantially rewarded, but the richest harvest was reaped by the labourer who had gone into the field only at the eleventh hour. France acquired Breisach

and Alsace, and the three Lorraine Bishoprics, Metz, Toul, and Verdun, passed formally into her keeping. She was allowed to garrison Philippsburg, and between that fortress and Basle there were to be no fortifications on the eastern bank of the Rhine. In short, the Rhine, guarded at the source and the mouth by two stout bastions, Switzerland and the Netherlands, ceased to be a German river.

Spain had no part in the Treaties of Westphalia. The Franco-Spanish war dragged on until 1659. Turenne, with the help of 6,000 English Ironsides, captured Mardyke and Dunkirk (1658) and dictated terms of peace to Spain. By the Treaty of the Pyrenees Spain ceded to France Roussillon and Cerdagne on the Pyrenean frontier, and on the north-east frontier Artois and a number of fortresses in Flanders, Hainault, and Luxemburg. Peace was cemented by the marriage of the young King of France, Louis XIV, with Maria Theresa, the elder daughter of Philip IV of Spain. The bride was to renounce for herself and her children all claims on the throne of Spain, but to have a dowry of 500,000 crowns. The dowry was never paid, and the unfulfilled bargain gave rise to great complications.

§ THE FRONDE. Spain would probably have suffered much more severely but for Mazarin's preoccupation with the wars of the Fronde. The wars of the Fronde (1648-53) provided a curious but characteristic episode in the history of Paris. Rarely has there been a more confused medley of grim tragedy, light comedy, transpontine melodrama, and sheer buffoonery. Nor have commentators been lacking. The Fronde, as is often said, owes its significance to the inimitable memoirs of several of the leading actors in the drama: to de Retz¹ and the 'Grande Mademoiselle',² to Mademoiselle de Motteville, to La Rochefoucauld, coiner of epigrams, and others. Yet there were serious elements in the Fronde; for five years the outbreak paralysed the Government of France.

Three main elements in the Fronde may be distinguished: (i) the Parlement of Paris and several provincial Parlements, notably that of Bordeaux—this was the most important element; (ii) the Princes of the Blood, Condé, and his brother Conti, the Duke of Vendôme and his son the Duc de Beaufort, better known as *Le Roi des Halles*, with whom were associated many nobles and several court ladies such as the Condé's unhappy sister, the Duchesse de Longueville, the Duchesse de Montbazan, and Louise d'Orléans, Duchesse de Montpensier, cousin of Louis XIV; (iii) the Parisian mob, whose idols were Pierre de Broussel, Councillor of the Parlement of Paris, and the clerical demagogue Cardinal de Retz.

§ THE OLD FRONDE. In the first phase of the movement, 'the

¹ Paul Gondi—Cardinal de Retz, Bishop-Coadjutor of Paris.

² Duchesse de Montpensier.

Old Fronde' (1648-9), the lead was taken by the Parlement which revolted against the limitations imposed upon its functions by Richelieu, and taking advantage of the supersession of the States-General sought to emulate the political activities of the English Parliament with which it had nothing in common except its name. On July 27th, 1648, the Parlement put forward a long list of grievances and demands including liberty of person for the subject, control of taxation for the Parlement, and, above all, the abolition of the Intendants. The last demand the Regent was momentarily constrained to concede, but Condé's great victory over the Spaniards at Lens (August 20th) put an army at the disposal of the Queen, who was consequently emboldened to arrest the leader of the Parlement. Paris was in an uproar: hundreds of barricades were set up in the streets: the days of the Civil Wars were back again, and the Queen with Mazarin carried off the young King to St. Germain. The leaders of the Parlement learnt with dismay that their aristocratic allies, now taking control of the whole movement, were in treasonable negotiations with the Spanish enemy. Accordingly the Parlement hastily concluded with the Court the Peace of Rueil (April 1st, 1649).

That was the end of the Fronde as a quasi-constitutional movement. Whatever of serious purpose there had been in the parliamentary movement evaporated when control passed into the hands of the princes, the court ladies and their allies the *Petits Maîtres*—the young nobles.

§ THE NEW FRONDE. The New Fronde (January-December 1650) was started by the arrest and imprisonment of Condé, Conti, and their brother-in-law de Longueville (January 1650). Condé's vanity and arrogance had made him as intolerable to the people and Parlement of Paris as he was offensive to Mazarin and the Regent. Turenne, seduced into treason by his passion for the Duchesse de Longueville, had made an alliance with the Spaniards in the summer of 1650, but his defeat at the hands of his own troops at Rethel ended the second phase of the Fronde (December 1650).

§ THE SPANISH FRONDE. The release of Condé and the princes opened a third phase, sometimes distinguished as the 'Spanish' Fronde. The Court and the Parlement now united against Condé, whose insatiable vanity carried him over to the Spaniards. Condé's treason was, however, neutralized by the return of Turenne to his allegiance. In a desperate battle fought between the two great soldiers, outside the Porte St. Antoine (May 1652) Condé and the Spaniards would almost certainly have been annihilated had not la Grande Mademoiselle, at the critical moment, opened the gates to them, and turned the guns of the Bastille on Turenne. But by this time Paris was sick of the princes, their levity, and their complete lack of patriotism. Condé was compelled to flee to Flanders and lent

his sword to Spain; de Retz was imprisoned; Mademoiselle and other fine ladies were sent into exile. Meanwhile the young Louis XIV had entered Paris and been enthusiastically welcomed in his capital. Mazarin was again installed in power; the Intendants were restored to office, and all the political aspirations of both the Parlement and the princes were effectively repudiated.

Any harvest yielded by the Fronde wars was ultimately reaped by the Crown. Thanks to Mazarin's adroitness, Richelieu's work remained intact. The Crown had triumphed over all possible rivals: the Parlement was restricted to its judicial functions; the very existence of the States-General was forgotten. In local government the Intendants, agents of the Crown, superseded the nobles who, deprived of their political functions, left their stewards to collect their revenues. The nobles, ceasing to be governors of provinces, became mere courtiers at Versailles, satellites revolving around the sun of the monarchy.

CHAPTER XIV

THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV—PATERNAL DESPOTISM (1643-1715)

'Be assured that Kings are absolute lords who may freely dispose of all the property in the possession either of Churchmen or of laymen, though they are bound always to employ it as faithful stewards.'

LOUIS XIV

'NEVER let yourself be ruled; be ever master', was the advice given by Louis XIV to his grandson Philip of Anjou, afterwards Philip V of Spain. The practice of Louis XIV coincided with his precept. Born in 1638 he came to the throne in 1643; he was declared to be of age in 1651; his personal rule began with the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661. From that day until his death in 1715 he was 'ever master'.

'Louis XIV,' said Lord Bolingbroke, 'was, if not the greatest King, the best actor of Majesty that ever filled a throne.' That is undeniably true. Louis was 'every inch a King'. It has been truly said that if the word 'majesty' had not been already current it must have been invented to characterize Louis XIV. Contemporaries remarked on his fine presence, his perfect manners, his dignity and courtesy, the affability that never degenerated into familiarity. But Louis had more than good manners. Kingship to Louis XIV was a trade, and to the work of his trade he brought considerable abilities, untiring industry, a knowledge of statecraft rarely surpassed, a definite theory of government, and a high sense of the personal responsibilities of Kingship.

§ A MOI. During the last months of Mazarin's life there had

been much speculation as to his successor, but on the morning after the Cardinal's death, the King announced: 'henceforth I shall be my own First Minister'. Without his orders nothing was to be done; not a document was to be signed except by himself. The Archbishop of Rouen asked to whom he as President of the Assembly of the Clergy should now report? '*À moi*,' replied the King. *À moi* became the formula of the new régime.

In the mechanism of the State there was nothing to compete with the power of the Crown. Some local Estates occasionally met, but the States-General was never summoned. The Parlements continued to sit at Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, Dijon, Rouen, Aix, Rennes, Douai, Pau, Metz, and Nancy, and two more Parlements were set up at Besançon (1674) and Tournai (1686). But the provincial Parlements like the Parlement of Paris itself were restricted to their judicial functions. The administration was purely departmental, and over all the chief councils, except the *Conseil Privé*—the supreme judicial tribunal—the King himself presided.

Local government was entirely in the hands of the *Intendants*, though the nobles were permitted to retain their titles as governors of provinces.

§ COLBERT (1619–83) v. FOUQUET. On Mazarin's death Nicholas Fouquet, the darling of fashionable Paris, and since 1653 the superintendent of Finance, was discovered to be a dishonest scoundrel. The man who detected Fouquet's malversations was Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who had in 1651 become steward of Mazarin's vast establishment. Mazarin, who left a fortune of £5,000,000, formed a high opinion of Colbert's ability and probity, and bequeathed him to Louis XIV. Colbert was accordingly appointed to succeed Fouquet, and in 1665 became Controller-General of Finance. A few years later he took over the administration of the Navy and the Colonies, and became, in all but name, First Minister of the Crown.

His first business was to deal with the whole brood of speculators, with Fouquet at their head. Fouquet was tried by a special Commission and was sentenced to imprisonment for life. To deal with the lesser men Colbert set up a *Chambre Ardente* which, after four years' work, recovered for the State some £16,000,000 of the ill-gotten gains of the speculators.

Having cleansed the Augean stables Colbert proceeded to reorganize public finance. By 'converting' the national debt, by revoking false titles of nobility which had given exemption from the *taille*, and by reforming the wasteful methods of collecting the taxes, Colbert increased the net receipts by 140 per cent (from 32 million to 77 million livres) while increasing the gross receipts by only 23 per cent. He then embarked on an elaborate programme of fiscal and commercial reforms. Sharing the belief of his day in mercantilist

principles he applied them with such vigour that Colbertism and high protection have become convertible terms. He laid a tax of 50 sous per ton on all foreign shipping entering or leaving French ports. This tax, if indefensible in theory (like the English Navigation Act) helped Colbert to build up a Royal Navy and a mercantile marine. Less defensible was his virtually prohibitory tariff on imported commodities. Colbert's object was twofold: to compel foreigners to pay for their imports from France in money; and to encourage domestic manufacturers. He was eminently successful. He purchased for the State the famous Gobelins factories; and factories for weaving silk and cloth, for making carpets, for leather and glassworks, and other commodities were started in several parts of France. Foreign artisans—miners from Sweden, Venetian glass-blowers, Flemish lacemakers, and others—were imported to teach new methods to French workmen, and France became a veritable hive of industry. Subsidies were granted to corporations and individuals, minute regulations were issued to the trade-guilds, and a high standard of workmanship was by severe penalties enforced. Companies for trading with the East Indies, the Levant, and the West Indies were started or reorganized, all under strict State supervision, though with capital subscribed compulsorily by wealthy individuals. To these companies State control ultimately proved fatal: one and all they languished and died. Nor was Colbert more successful in his agricultural policy, the result of which was that inferior land went out of cultivation, home prices soared, and the people starved.

Like his predecessor Sully, Colbert shrank from striking at the root of the fiscal difficulty by abolishing privilege and placing the burden of taxation on shoulders best able to bear it. Nor did he dare to touch the great wealth of the clergy.¹ Yet he made a brave attempt to unify France commercially as Richelieu had unified it politically. The Languedoc Canal, connecting the Atlantic and the Mediterranean was in itself an important contribution to the facilities of internal transport. Hitherto customs barriers erected at the frontier of each of the twenty provinces into which France was divided had prevented the transport of bulky goods. Although Colbert would have thrown down, if he could, all internal customs barriers, he succeeded only in making the '*Five Great Farms*'—the central provinces, or the old 'Royal Domain'—a fiscal unit.

As Minister of Marine Colbert paid special attention to the Navy. When he came into office it consisted of less than thirty small ships, mostly unfit for action. Before he died there were about two hundred vessels of which 139 were ships of the line, while the personnel had risen from a mere handful to 77,852 officers and men. Less

¹ Estimated in the eighteenth century at 200,000,000 francs from tithe and landed property.

successful, because vitiated by his belief in State control, were Colbert's attempts to extend the Colonial Empire of France. Like his commercial companies his colonies wilted under too much coddling.¹ The principle of unification was extended to the administration of civil and criminal justice; the laws were codified; and the arts, science, and literature were encouraged by the State. To the Académie Française, created by Richelieu, Colbert added five new academies, and pensions were granted to Corneille, Racine, and Molière, the historian Mézeray, and many other writers.

Thus did Colbert give distinction to the first phase of the age of Louis XIV. But the Dutch war of 1672—for which indeed the high protective system of Colbert must be held partly responsible—put a stop to his reforming work, and before his death in 1683 his influence had declined. He died unregretted by the master whose wasteful expenditure he had vainly striven to restrain, and execrated by the people upon whom the burden of the King's extravagance so ruinously fell. Of that extravagance the superb palace of Versailles, the vast expenditure on which Colbert stoutly opposed, is an outstanding example.


After the death of Colbert, the Chancellor Le Tellier and his son, the Marquis of Louvois, the War Minister, became the King's chief counsellors. Louvois accentuated all the worst tendencies in his master's character and encouraged him in his most ruinous projects.

§ MADAME DE MAINTENON. A stronger influence over the King was that of the lady whom he secretly married in 1683. Françoise D'Aubigné was the granddaughter of the well-known Huguenot, but at the age of sixteen she embraced Catholicism, married the comic poet Scarron, and on his death fell into dire poverty. Introduced into the royal household as governess to the children of Madame de Montespan, the reigning mistress, she quickly established a remarkable influence over the King. Concealing under a gentle manner an indomitable will, she converted Louis to respectability, repelled all his amatory advances, got her patroness Montespan banished, reconciled Louis to his wife, and, on the latter's death, succeeded to her place.

On the whole Madame de Maintenon's influence over Louis was exercised for good: but in one respect it was disastrous. Religion as enjoined upon Louis XIV by his confessors was reduced, as Sismondi has observed, to two precepts: 'Abstain from adultery; exterminate heretics'. Upon this a cynic has remarked that 'if the King fell short in the first of these duties, he wrought works of supererogation in the second'.

§ THE HUGUENOTS. To Louis XIV the Huguenots were not so much religious sectaries as an ecclesiastical excrescence, a blot upon

¹ Cf. *infra*, Chapter XVIII.



the clean page of absolutism. Down to 1683 he went to work comparatively gently. Much was hoped from the eminently reasonable apologetics of Bossuet (1627–1704), whose *Exposition de la foi catholique* (1670) was indeed so moderate that Bossuet was accused of ‘having fraudulently watered down the Roman doctrines to suit a Protestant taste’. The next expedient was bribery. The King set up the ‘Bank of Conversions’, the capital of which was provided by setting aside one-third of the revenue of all vacant benefices, and the institution of a regular scale for individual conversions. No wonder that the pages of the *Gazette de France* were crowded with lists of ‘miraculous Conversions’ which by 1682 numbered 58,000.

§ RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION. The pace of persecution was already quickening. Under the cruel and comprehensive provisions of a Penal Code promulgated in 1681 by Royal Edict, no Protestant might hold any public office or practise any liberal profession or act as tutor or guardian to a child; any child of the age of seven might abjure the Protestant religion, and any parent opposing such abjuration incurred severe penalties. No mixed marriages were allowed nor might any Protestant woman act as a midwife. Sick Protestants were to be treated in hospitals under the care of Catholic physicians and chaplains. Any Protestant pastor admitting a convert to his congregation was to be punished by banishment and confiscation of goods, and his congregation was to be dispersed. It was reckoned that by 1684 570 out of the 815 Protestant churches had been closed. Converts to Catholicism were, for three years, to enjoy immunity from their creditors, and for two years exemption from the payment of *taille* and from the billeting of soldiers. Their obligations were transferred to the contumacious. Hence the ‘Dragonnades’, which were enforced by an army marched into the heart of the Huguenot country. ‘I hope,’ wrote the Duc de Noailles, commanding the army in the south-east, ‘that before the end of the month not a single Protestant will be left in the Cevennes.’

If there were but one religion *de facto* in France why should there be more than one *de jure*? To revoke the Edict of Nantes was the logical sequel of this argument, and revoked it was on October 18th, 1685. Liberty of conscience was ironically proclaimed, but liberty of worship was forbidden; contumacious Protestant pastors were sent to the galleys for life; those who conformed were handsomely pensioned; all emigrants were ordered to return to France within four months, failing which all their property was confiscated.

The revocation was greeted with a chorus of approval in France: sermons were preached, poems written, pictures painted, medals struck to commemorate the great consummation of the ecclesiastical policy of Louis XIV and his wife. Abroad, even Roman Catholics expressed disapproval, while Protestants were loud in condemnation. Probably not less than a quarter of a million Huguenots escaped

from France and were warmly welcomed in Great Britain, Brandenburg, Holland, and by the Dutch colonists in South Africa and elsewhere. Every country that welcomed the Huguenots was immeasurably enriched not commercially only, but socially, intellectually, and morally. To France, the results were disastrous. Financially the loss to her was enormous. She is said to have lost 20,000,000 livres in specie, and the bank rate in Amsterdam ominously fell from $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 2 per cent. Socially, France lost an important section of the middle class which might well have averted the revolution of 1789. For Huguenotism had changed its character: since Richelieu's day the nobles had largely abandoned the hope of using the Edict of Nantes as a means of recovering political independence, and the majority of Huguenots were peaceful, law-abiding, and valuable middle-class citizens who had ceased to offend their Catholic neighbours, or to menace the unity of the State. Another serious loss to France was that of 12,000 good soldiers and better sailors. Any chance France had of challenging English supremacy at sea was thus lost, as well as the chance of establishing or maintaining an overseas empire. Ecclesiastical unity at home was achieved at the price of world-dominion.

§ THE JANSENISTS. The Huguenots were not the only ecclesiastical dissidents whom an autocrat refused to tolerate.

The Jansenists have been aptly described as the 'Calvinists of Catholicism'. Inspired by a great work *Augustinus* (1640), written by Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres (1585-1638), the Jansenists ardently embraced the doctrines of Justification by Faith and Predestination. But their tenets were not merely doctrinal. Like Calvin they advocated austerity of life and refused to conform to the easy morality permitted by Jesuit confessors. Politically, they supported the Parlement in the Fronde wars, and with the Parlement defended Gallican liberties against the ultramontane and autocratic tendencies of the King and his Jesuit advisers. Mazarin in 1649 had persuaded the Sorbonne to condemn five propositions maintained in Jansen's *Augustinus*, and in 1653 had evoked a similar condemnation from Pope Innocent X who declared the propositions to be heretical. The Jansenists then appealed to the historic Liberties of the Gallican Church, affirmed the independence of the Civil Power from ecclesiastical authority, and attacked the ultramontanic views of the Jesuits.

§ THE KING AND THE POPE. At this critical juncture the Jansenists found a powerful ally in the great Natural Philosopher and mathematician Blaise Pascal (1623-62), who in his *Provincial Letters* (1656-7) made a devastating attack upon the Jesuits. In 1669 a truce was patched up, but in 1673 the quarrel took a new turn. Relying on his alliance with the Jesuits, Louis XIV proposed to

extend the *Regale* (the King's right to the revenues and patronage of all vacant Sees) from the Royal Domain, where it had long been exercised, to the rest of France. Against this extension certain Jansenist bishops protested, and naturally found support from Pope Innocent XI. As the dispute dragged on the King convoked in 1681 a general Assembly of the clerical Order, who agreed to support the King's claim. When the Pope annulled the resolution of the French clergy, Bossuet drafted, and the clergy endorsed, the famous declaration of Gallican Liberties (1682). The State was independent of the ecclesiastical authority; Councils were superior to the Pope; the rules of the Gallican Church were sacred; and the Pope's judgment on doctrinal questions was to be infallible only if he had the support of the Bishops. This Declaration placed the French Church absolutely under the heel of the State, and further accentuated the supremacy of the King over all matters ecclesiastical as well as temporal. Pope Innocent XI naturally refused his assent to the Propositions, and the quarrel was presently intensified by a dispute about the ambassadorial immunities in Rome. The outcome of the quarrel was spectacular; the Pope excommunicated the French Ambassador; Louis seized Avignon, and the Pope joined the League of Augsburg, then in process of formation against France.

The quarrel between the Pope and the 'eldest son of the Church' was thus transferred to a wider stage, and still further complicated the European situation.

CHAPTER XV

FRANCE AND EUROPE (1659-1715)

'France acted very systematically. . . . From the year one thousand six hundred and sixty to the death of King Charles the Second of Spain, she never lost sight of her great object, the succession to the whole Spanish Monarchy.'

LORD BOLINGBROKE

UPON the text supplied by Lord Bolingbroke this chapter is a commentary.

The position of France when in 1661 the young Louis XIV took up the reins of power was in the highest degree enviable. The danger of encirclement by the Austro-Spanish Habsburgs had been dispelled. France had practically attained its 'natural frontiers'. It had nothing to fear from possible rivals. Spain was decadent; the semblance of unity secured to Germany by the Holy Roman Empire was destroyed; neither Prussia nor Russia yet counted as a European Power; still less did Italy or any of the many States therein; Holland, Sweden, and Turkey were the allies of France; neither in Europe nor

in the colonial field was England under the later Stuarts her serious rival. Yet, despite the work of the Cardinals in extending the frontiers of France, there was some rounding-off still to be done. Turenne warned his master that 'so long as the Spaniards were in the valley of the Somme a hostile army could be at Paris in four days'. Franche-Comté, also too near Paris, was still held by Spain as heir to the Burgundian inheritance. Though the Lorraine Bishoprics had been ceded to France, the rest of Lorraine and northern Alsace were still in German hands. So was Strasburg, which guarded the high road from Vienna to Paris; Savoy, so long as it was united with Piedmont, was a Naboth's vineyard to France.

§ THE 'WAR OF DEVOLUTION'. The pivot of French foreign policy was, however, a desire to get the whole Spanish inheritance. The Spanish Empire was at this time of imposing extent, including as it did, besides Spain itself and the Balearic isles, the southern Netherlands (Belgium), Franche-Comté, a great part of Italy including the Milanese (Lombardy), the Two Sicilies, and Sardinia, as well as an Empire in Central and South America. On the death of Philip IV (1665) Louis XIV claimed the greater part of the Spanish Netherlands, Franche-Comté and Luxemburg, in right of his wife Maria Theresa, Philip's elder daughter. Under the *Jus Devolutionis*, a local custom of Brabant, property descended to the daughter of a first marriage in precedence over the son of a second marriage. The Infanta Maria Theresa had on her marriage with Louis XIV renounced for herself and her posterity all claim on the Spanish inheritance, and her renunciation had been formally ratified by the Spanish Cortes. That renunciation Louis XIV ignored in 1667 as he ignored it in the greater issue which arose on the death of Charles II of Spain. Thanks to the two great soldiers who commanded the French armies, the War of Devolution was a promenade. Condé conquered Franche-Comté in three weeks; within three months Turenne was master of the Spanish Netherlands. But the rapid success of the French armies created alarm among neighbours. Holland hastily made peace with England and in 1668 the two Powers combined with Sweden to snatch the fruits of victory from Louis XIV, who concluded with Spain the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1668). After dismantling the fortresses, he restored Franche-Comté to Spain, and retained only the fortresses in Flanders already conquered by Turenne.

§ THE DUTCH WAR (1672-8). Louis XIV was not disposed to forgive the Dutch Republic for thus thwarting his ambitions. Those insolent merchants of Amsterdam should soon suffer the chastisement they deserved. The United Provinces, though immensely prosperous, had long been torn in twain between the House of Orange, which, supported by the nobles, the clergy, and the peasantry, exercised as stadtholders a quasi-monarchical authority,

and the burgher-oligarchy which, dominating the large towns, and led by a great statesman, John de Witt had for twenty years (1653-72) ruled the country.

In 1672 Louis XIV invaded Holland at the head of 120,000 men. The way had been carefully prepared by diplomacy. In 1670 Charles II of England had concluded with his cousin of France the Treaty of Dover, and in return for a pension had agreed to furnish 6,000 men and 50 ships of war for a joint attack on Holland. Sweden was detached from the Triple Alliance by a promise from Louis to defend Swedish Pomerania from the attack of any German Power.


To the armies of Louis the Dutch could offer little resistance, but they were saved, as a French writer has happily said, by revolution, inundation, and coalition. On the outbreak of the war the populace turned upon the burgher oligarchs and accused them of having betrayed the Republic. John de Witt and his brother Cornelius, the famous admiral, were brutally murdered, but William, Prince of Orange, suddenly called to power, could do little to stem the tide of French invasion. The Dutch therefore opened their dykes and the inflowing ocean did what no army could do. On June 7th, an Anglo-French fleet was defeated by de Ruyter in Southwold Bay, but Gelders, Overysse, and Utrecht were overrun by the French. Only the opening of the dykes saved Holland itself.

After inundation, coalition. In 1673 the Emperor Leopold formed a coalition which brought to the aid of Holland, Spain, the Duke of Lorraine, Denmark, and Prussia. In 1674 the English Parliament compelled Charles II to make peace with the Dutch, and in 1677 William of Orange was married to his first cousin, the Princess Mary, elder daughter of the Duke of York,¹ while, in June 1674, Turenne had conquered Franche-Comté and followed up that conquest with brilliant campaigns on the Rhine, and in Alsace. There in July 1675 Turenne was killed, but Condé preserved Alsace for France. By 1678, however, all parties were tired of the war and concluded the Treaty of Nymwegen.

The United Provinces emerged from the war virtually unscathed. Spain had to foot the bill. She had to surrender to France Franche-Comté, together with a long line of strong fortresses extending from Dunkirk to the Meuse, and including Valenciennes, St. Omer, Ypres, and Cambray. Though Spain recovered some fortresses, the general result was greatly to strengthen the north-eastern frontier of France.

¹

Charles I = Henrietta Maria, d. of Henri IV



Equally important, whether for defence or offence, was the acquisition of the Free City of Strasburg. That important fortress, left in an ambiguous position by the Treaty of Westphalia, was assigned to France by the *Chambres des Réunions*, a judicial, though not impartial, tribunal set up by Louis XIV to decide such disputed questions. Casale, a fortress commanding the road from Turin to Milan, was also acquired by France by purchase from the Duc de Montferrat. Luxemburg was seized in 1683.

§ THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG. The purpose of these annexations was ambiguous. Did they indicate a departure from the policy of the Cardinals? Was Louis, not content with security for France, preparing to dominate Europe? Anyway, Europe was becoming so seriously alarmed that in 1686 William of Orange was able to form a coalition to guarantee the maintenance of the *status quo*, and known as the League of Augsburg. Though the core of the coalition was the United Provinces, it was eventually joined by the Emperor, by Saxony, Bavaria, Brandenburg, the Elector Palatine, and other German princes, by the Kings of Spain and Sweden, and later by the Duke of Savoy-Piedmont and even by the Pope, Innocent XI.

§ ENGLISH REVOLUTION OF 1688. A later but still more important adhesion to the League was that of England. Under the later Stuarts England had contributed a very uncertain factor to the European problem. Charles II was the pensioner of Louis XIV. James II, less adroit than his clever brother, had more principle, but his religion predisposed him to an alliance which on national grounds he disliked. By 1688 the cup of James's offences was full, and on June 30th all parties concurred in an invitation to William Prince of Orange, the King's nephew and son-in-law, asking him to bring over an army to secure the liberties of the English people. William had as little love for Parliament as any other Stuart; he accepted, conjointly with his wife, the English throne as a necessary nuisance, since from England only could he get supplies to enable him to carry on his duel with Louis XIV.

§ THE ANGLO-FRENCH DUEL. The first phase of the prolonged conflict between France and England developed on Irish soil. James II, though supported by a French army, was decisively defeated by William in the battle of the Boyne (July 12th, 1689), and James fled back to France. The victory of the Boyne was, however, balanced by the defeat of the British Navy off Beachy Head (July 10th, 1690). Admiral Tourville's great victory gave the French the command of the Channel for two years. In May 1692 the loss was retrieved by Russell's victory at La Hogue, but in 1694 an English expedition against Brest was repulsed with heavy loss.

Meanwhile Louis had concentrated his attack upon the Imperialists

and their allies on the Rhine, and upon Holland. By the end of the year 1688 the French were masters of the greater part of the Palatinate and the left bank of the Rhine. In the Netherlands, thanks to the military genius of Luxemburg, the French went from success to success, until in 1695 William III, undaunted by his defeats at Steinkirk (1692) and Neerwinden (1693) besieged and recaptured Namur (1695). By then Louis XIV was tiring of the war and anxious to have his hands free for the imminent crisis in his diplomatic game. Accordingly, he concluded in 1697 the Treaty of Ryswyck. He recognized William III as King of England, undertook to withdraw his support from the Stuart exiles and to acknowledge the Princess Anne as heiress to the English throne. All conquests made since 1678—except Strasburg—were mutually restored, and the exclusive tariff aimed by Colbert against the Dutch in 1667 was greatly modified.

The Treaty of Ryswyck was no more than a truce. Charles II of Spain could not live long; his death was bound to reopen the whole question of the succession to Spain and its vast Empire.

§ THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. Louis XIV was determined to secure the whole inheritance if not for the Dauphin his own heir, at least for his younger grandson, Philip of Anjou. So great an accession of territory to France, or even to a French prince, was, however, certain to arouse opposition in Europe. Exhausted by recent wars Louis was, therefore, willing to temporize, and concluded with William III in 1698 the First Partition Treaty. The French Dauphin had, apart from renunciations, the strongest claim as the eldest grandson of Philip IV; next after him was that of the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, the eldest great-grandson; the weakest, though his claim was not complicated by any renunciation, was that of the Emperor Leopold I, nephew of Philip IV. The interest of Great Britain in the matter was, apart from the European balance of power, mainly commercial; so, though less exclusively, was that of Holland. In 1698 it was agreed that Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands should go to the Electoral Prince, the Dauphin was to have the two Sicilies, Tuscany, and Guipuscoa; Milan was to form an apanage for the Archduke Charles, the second son of the Emperor. In 1699 the Electoral Prince died, whether from smallpox or by poison is uncertain, and by a Second Partition Treaty, the Dauphin's share was to be enlarged by Lorraine, while the rest of the vast inheritance was to go to the Archduke Charles on condition that the territories of the two branches of the House of Habsburg should never be united (1700).

The Spaniards were deeply perturbed by the idea of partition, and their wretched King Charles II was at last persuaded to leave the undivided inheritance to Philip of Anjou. Charles II died on November 1st, 1700. Louis XIV, after obviously simulated hesitation,

accepted the inheritance for his grandson. To the astonishment and bitter indignation of William III, the English people regarded the succession of a French prince to the Spanish throne as less menacing to the commercial interests of England than the direct domination of a French king in the Mediterranean. Consequently William III was compelled to recognize Philip V as King of Spain. William's popularity was in 1701 (for reasons outside the scope of this narrative) at the nadir, when by two colossal blunders Louis XIV suddenly restored it. Having expelled the Dutch garrisons from the 'Barrier' fortresses of Belgium he occupied them with French troops. Worse still: on the death of James II at St. Germain (September 16th, 1701) Louis recognized the 'Old Pretender' as *de jure* King of England.

The English people were touched on their two tenderest spots. For centuries the independence of the Low Countries had been the traditional pivot of English diplomacy. To that tradition the action of Louis XIV in occupying the fortresses was a direct challenge. Even more unforgivable was his intrusion into English domestic affairs. The reaction in William's favour was instantaneous. One Act was hastily passed for attainting the Pretender, and a second to maintain the Protestant succession. In March 1702 William died more happy than he had lived. To frustrate the ascendancy of France in Europe he had unwillingly accepted the English Crown, and suffered humiliation at the hands of an English Parliament. He died confident in the belief that Parliament and people were at last awake to the danger which had obsessed his own mind, and were resolved to avert it.

§ THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION. The long war between France and the Grand Alliance passed through three phases and was carried on—apart from the sea—in four main theatres, the Netherlands, Lombardy, Germany, and Spain itself. For three years there was practical equilibrium in the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy, but in 1704 Marlborough, the great soldier and great diplomatist who commanded the English and Dutch forces, decided to frustrate the design of Louis XIV by marching to Vienna and there dictating terms of peace. Marlborough's campaign of 1704, culminating in the great victory of Blenheim (August 13th) is one of the most famous in the history of war. That victory cleared the French out of Germany, nor can Englishmen forget that the same year was memorable also for the capture of Gibraltar by Sir George Rooke.

The year 1705 was uneventful. But on May 12th, 1706, Marlborough won another great victory at Ramillies, and Prince Eugene's victory at Turin (September 7th) virtually ended the war, in favour of the allies, in Italy. The war was going equally badly for the French in Spain. In 1705 Barcelona, Cartagena, Majorca, and Minorca were taken by the English (1705-8) who proclaimed the Archduke Charles,

the younger son of the Emperor Leopold I, King in Madrid. Marshal Vendôme had, indeed, done something to restore the tarnished honour of French arms in 1707, but Marlborough inflicted a crushing defeat upon him at Oudenarde in July 1708. A terrible winter (1708-9) inflicted untold suffering upon the people of France, and Louis, in pity for their distress, brought himself to sue for peace. The allies required him not merely to surrender Spain to the Archduke Charles but to join them in evicting his grandson, Philip, from the throne. Terms so humiliating were properly refused by Louis, who threw himself upon the patriotism of his people. Nobly they responded to the King's appeal.

The allies had overreached themselves. Bolingbroke recorded his 'deliberate conviction after more than twenty years of recollection, re-examination and reflexion', that England ought to have made peace in 1708 after Oudenarde, if not in 1706. All the avowed objects of the Grand Alliance had by then been achieved, but in 1707 the English Whigs declared that no peace could be 'safe or honourable' if 'Spain and the Spanish West Indies' were 'suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon'. In 1711, however, there occurred an event which virtually ended the war. In May the Emperor Joseph (who had succeeded his father in 1705) suddenly died, and the Archduke Charles, the Habsburg candidate for the throne of Spain, came into possession of the other Habsburg dominions and was elected Emperor as Charles VI. That the allies should continue the war in order to recreate the empire of Charles V was unthinkable. The Tories who in 1710 had come into power in England opened negotiations for peace on January 1st, 1712, and in 1713 it was signed at Utrecht between France and Spain on the one part, England and Holland and Savoy on the other. The Emperor continued to fight for another year, but after Villars's capture of Landau (August 26th, 1713) and Freiburg (November 17th), he yielded to Prince Eugene's wish to accept the overtures of Louis XIV for peace which was signed at Rastadt on March 7th, 1714.

The Treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt brought notable success, if not complete satisfaction to all the three principal combatants; England obtained from France a guarantee of the Protestant succession, the dismantling of Dunkirk, and the renunciation of French claims on St. Kitts, Acadia (Nova Scotia), Newfoundland, the islands immediately adjacent thereto, and the Hudson's Bay settlement. But the French retained Cape Breton Island and other islands at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, together with valuable fishing rights in Newfoundland. England had taken a first step towards supremacy over the French in North America. The cession of Gibraltar and Minorca assured her supremacy in the Mediterranean. Sicily was, in 'deference to the wishes of Great Britain', ceded by Spain, together with a slice of Lombardy, to the House of Savoy, but the rest of

Lombardy, as well as Naples and Sardinia, went to the Emperor Charles. Austria also obtained the Spanish Netherlands, though saddled with the onerous obligation to pay the Dutch troops who were to garrison a line of fortresses and thus maintain an effective 'barrier' against French invasion. The Hohenzollerns were recognized as Kings of Prussia and obtained Upper Guelderland. Finally, the treaties represented an unmistakable triumph for the lifelong policy of Louis XIV. 'The Pyrenees ceased to exist.' France and Spain were not indeed to be united under a single ruler: Philip V renounced all claims on the French throne; the Dukes of Berri and Orleans similarly renounced any claims on Spain. On the side of Germany, France had to restore Freiburg and other fortresses she had taken on the right bank of the Rhine, but was allowed to retain Strasburg and the rest of Alsace.

In brief: France, having set up the Bourbon dynasty in Spain, herself emerged from a long series of wars internally exhausted but still pre-eminent if not dominant in Europe.

§ A CLOUDED SUNSET. Nevertheless, the sun of Louis XIV went down amid clouds of gloom and depression. 'Trade and industries were fast disappearing,' says a recent writer, 'town and country alike were depopulated; fields were falling out of cultivation, cottages were in ruins'.¹ 'France,' wrote Fénelon, 'n'est plus qu'un grand hôpital, désolé et sans provision.' In the sphere of religion Le Tellier and Madame de Maintenon persuaded the old King that the Jansenists, like the Huguenots, were not merely heretics but rebels. Pope Clement XI issued a Bull against the doctrine of Jansen in 1705: in 1709 Louis ordered Port Royal to be razed to the ground, the unhappy nuns to be imprisoned or dispersed; and in 1713 the Pope, in the hope of getting the Gallican Declaration of 1682 revoked, issued the famous Bull *Unigenitus*. The Bull anathematized 101 propositions from Quesnel's *Moral Reflexions*, a book which had become popular among people of all creeds and had hitherto been regarded as unimpeachably orthodox. Cardinal Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, as well as other Bishops and influential laymen, denounced the Bull, and the Parlement refused to register it. Thereupon the Parlement was suspended, and a whole army of people—nobles, clergy, magistrates and others—were imprisoned by *lettres de cachet*. These wholesale persecutions accentuated the panic caused among the superstitious by a succession of tragedies in the royal family. The sudden death of the Dauphin in 1711 had been quickly followed in 1712 by that of the Duke and Duchess of Burgundy and their eldest son. On Burgundy, the pupil of Fénelon, the hero of *Télémaque*, the hopes of the whole country were centred, and his death was a crushing blow alike to the old King and his subjects. A delicate child, less than

¹ E. C. Lodge: *Sully, Colbert and Turgot*, p. 168.

three years old, thus became heir to the throne of France. Louis XIV himself died in 1715. The curses of a starving and disillusioned people that followed him to the grave pointed the contrast between the brilliant dawn and the overcast sunset of a reign which was the longest and in some respects the greatest in the history of France. If Louis XIV was not truly a great king he was certainly, as Lord Bolingbroke said, 'the best actor of majesty that ever filled a throne.'

CHAPTER XVI

THE ASCENDANCY OF FRANCE—FRENCH LITERATURE AND ART IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

'Dans l'éloquence, dans la poésie, dans la littérature, dans les livres de morale et d'agrément, les Français furent les législateurs de l'Europe.'

VOLTAIRE

'THE age of Louis XIV' meant much more than the military or political achievements of *le Roi Soleil*. In the latter half of the seventeenth century France dominated Europe by tongue, pen, and brush more completely even than by the sword.

The language of France, purified, standardized, and authorized by the protracted labours of the Académie Française, which had been established by Richelieu in 1635, became, for almost the whole of continental Europe, the language of diplomacy and of polite society. To this consummation the Salon, dating as a literary, artistic, and social force from the early years of the seventeenth century, contributed not a little. The Academy contributed much more. In neither case, however, was the contribution an unmixed advantage. The influence of the Academy tended to extreme rigidity. That of the Salon, as Molière so effectively demonstrated in *Les Précieuses Ridicules*, tended to grotesque preciousness. None the less the Salon, notably the famous Hôtel de Rambouillet had, though in much less degree, its place in the cultural history of the seventeenth century.

Nor did the Académie Française, as we have seen, stand alone. It was soon reinforced by more specialized Academies for Painting and Sculpture (1648), Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres (1663), Sciences (1666), Music (1668), and Architecture (1679). To this period also must be assigned the birth of Grand Opera in France, though the cult of music like everything else felt the constricting hands of classicism and autocracy. In every sphere of political and cultural activity the influence of the Court was, indeed, supreme.

§ BAROQUE ARCHITECTURE. Most ostentatiously in that of architecture and sculpture. The Baroque style reached its zenith in this period. Outstanding examples of it can be seen in the royal palaces. In his additions to the Louvre Louis XIV employed Claude

Perrault. The Tuileries, begun for Catherine de Medici by Philibert de l'Orme, was finished by Le Vau and D'Orbay for Louis XIV. The Luxembourg, which now houses the Senate, was built for Marie de Medici. But it is in the great palace which Louis XIV built at Versailles that the Baroque style is seen in all its ornate magnificence. At Versailles as well as at the Louvre, Charles le Brun commanded a whole regiment of sculptors, painters, and decorators whose characteristic work is best exemplified in those palaces. Of the churches built in Paris during this period perhaps the most characteristic are those of the Sorbonne, built at the orders of Richelieu, the vast church of St. Sulpice, built by Le Vau in 1655, and the Jesuit Church of SS. Paul and Louis.

§ PAINTING. The seventeenth century marks an important stage also in the development of the French School of painting. Of portrait painters, especially of the ceremonial order, there was naturally no lack, but it is the landscape painters like Simon Vouet (1590–1649), Nicolas Poussin (1594–1665) and his disciple, Claude Lorraine (Gelée, 1600–82), whose work has become part of the world's permanent inheritance. Of these Poussin is, perhaps, the most typically French, because (as has been truly said) it was he who consistently preserved that 'wise and noble balance between reason and feeling' which in every sphere of life and art has peculiarly distinguished the highly gifted people of France.

§ LITERATURE. That is true, in special degree, of the literary output of this 'Augustan' age. Not unworthy of a place beside Bacon and Leibnitz is René Descartes (1596–1650), who, though himself a strict Catholic, has been acclaimed by a distinguished disciple of Comte as 'not only the most powerful but the most representative intellect of the seventeenth century'. His *Discours de la Méthode* (1637) would alone give him a place among giants, but from him, says a French critic, the Classical French of the seventeenth century derived 'its order and strength', from Montaigne its 'delicacy of diction', from Malesherbes its 'sure and expressive oratorical form'; from all three its 'reasonableness'. These are the qualities which we discern in all the great writers of this period, in the poets, the preachers, the dramatists, and the critics; in Pascal (1623–62), author of the famous *Lettres Provinciales*;¹ in Bossuet (1627–1704), greatest of French pulpit orators; in Fénelon, tutor to the Duke of Burgundy, and still known to every schoolboy as the author of *Les Aventures de Télémaque*; in critics like la Bruyère, Balzac (1597–1654), and Boileau (1636–1711) who for a whole generation was the dictator of the literary taste of France; and in the Duc de la Rochefoucauld who clothed in a multitude of brilliant epigrams one central truth; not least, in the great dramatists who shed lustre on 'the age of

¹ Émile Faguet: cf. C.M.H. V. C. iii.

Louis XIV'. Of the work of Corneille (1606–84), of Molière (1622–73), and Racine (1639–99) it is impossible to write in detail. Nor even for English readers is it necessary to recall the titles of Corneille's famous tetralogy, *Le Cid*, *Horace*, *Cinna*, and *Polyeucte*, though they may need to be reminded that the number of Corneille's dramas based on Roman history was nearly double that of the Chronicle Plays of Shakespeare. Racine's *Andromaque*, *Iphigénie*, *Phèdre*, and, above all, his *Athalie* are not less familiar to English readers than the dramas of Corneille. But of the French dramatists of that period the best known in England is unquestionably Molière. Scenes from *Les Précieuses Ridicules*, *Le Tartuffe*, *Le Misanthrope*, *L'Avare*, *Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme*, and *Le Malade Imaginaire* are as recurrent in the programmes of every school speech-day as passages from Sheridan's *Rivals*, or *School for Scandal*, from one of Burke's *Orations*, or one of Shakespeare's plays. Molière's sparkling wit, his fearless exposure of every form of humbug, hypocrisy, and pedantry has endeared him to every healthy-minded Briton not less than to his own countrymen. Nor should La Fontaine (1621–95) be, in the same connexion, neglected. His *Fables* are probably as well known and popular in both countries as any of Molière's comedies.

Even this catalogue, though merely selective, suffices to illustrate both the fertility and the variety of the contribution to culture made by Frenchmen under Louis XIV. Englishmen may prefer the work of Wren to that of Leveau; they may deem the critical acumen of Dryden superior to that of Boileau, while no impartial critic would put Racine as a tragedian on a level with Shakespeare. But England had no satiric comedy in the seventeenth century to match that of Molière, while England had to wait for a century before it could produce landscape painters fit to compare with Poussin and Claude. Frenchmen, then, may justly claim that in the sphere of culture, no less than in that of politics, France in le Grand Siècle dominated Europe.

CHAPTER XVII

LOUIS XV—THE DECADENCE OF FRANCE (1715–74)

'Après nous le deluge.'

MADAME DE POMPADOUR TO LOUIS XV (1757)

FRANCE had been made by her kings. The accession of Louis XV marked the beginning of the decadence of the monarchy. Paradoxically, however, it was with a feeling of relief that Frenchmen learnt that the King under whom the monarchy had reached its apogee had passed away. Louis XIV, supremely anxious to perpetuate his policy, had provided by will for a Council of Regency

during the minority of his great-grandson, then a sickly child of five. His nephew, Philip, Duke of Orleans, was to be a nominal régent, but Louis XIV intended that real power should be vested in the Duc de Maine, his bastard but recently legitimated son by Madame de Montespan. Orleans had other views. He meant to rule now, and, should the child-king not survive, to succeed to the throne. He found support in the Parlement, which promptly annulled the will of Louis XIV and recognized Orleans as Regent with unlimited powers. The Regent returned the compliment by restoring to the Parlement the right of remonstrance of which Louis XIV had deprived it.

§ THE ANGLO-FRENCH ENTENTE. The interest of the eighteenth century centres on the duel between England and France for world supremacy. But during the Orleans regency the relations between the two countries were exceptionally friendly. For this there were several reasons. The Regent Orleans and King George I had a common interest in holding sacrosanct the Treaty of Utrecht which excluded the Stuarts from the British throne and, by providing for the permanent severance of the Crowns of France and Spain, gave Orleans a chance of the French throne. Cardinal Alberoni, the real ruler of Spain, was on his part equally anxious to set aside the treaty. Anglo-French relations were further improved by the friendship of the Abbé Dubois, the Chief Minister of the Regency, and Earl Stanhope, who until 1721 was responsible for English policy; and their respective successors, Cardinal Fleury and Sir Robert Walpole, were at one in their abhorrence of war.

Changes in the European situation also favoured the *rapprochement*. The decadence of France was coincident, on the one hand, with the diminishing importance of its traditional allies, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, and, on the other, with the entrance of two 'upstart' Powers on to the European stage.

§ RUSSIA. Until the reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) Russia had no contact with the Western world. Peter's supreme object was to Europeanize his country, geographically, politically, and socially. By transferring his capital from Moscow to St. Petersburg in 1702, and by his victories over Charles XII of Sweden (1699–1718), Peter got a firm grip upon the Baltic, and thus opened a 'window to the West'. A 'window to the South' was opened by the capture of Azov from the Turks (1696).

§ PRUSSIA. Not less dramatic than the rise of Russia under the Romanoffs, and still more momentous for France, was the rise of Prussia under the Hohenzollerns. The end of the Thirty Years War (1648) saw Brandenburg-Prussia for the first time moving westwards, establishing itself in the Rhine Duchies of Cleves and Jülich, as well as in the valuable bishoprics of Halberstadt, Camin, Minden, and

part of Magdeburg. By supporting the Emperor Leopold in the Spanish Succession War, Frederick I of Prussia obtained from the Emperor a royal Crown, while his successor, Frederick William I (1713–40) bequeathed to Frederick the Great (1740–86) an army and a civil service that enabled Prussia to challenge the supremacy of Austria in Germany, and to gain a place among the Great Powers of Europe. How closely France was affected by the arrival of these new players in the diplomatic game, the sequel will demonstrate.

§ DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE REGENCY. In domestic no less than in foreign affairs did the Regency register a reaction against the policy of Louis XIV. The *Parlement of Paris* regained its constitutional position, and the ministers of Louis XIV were replaced by seven administrative councils, composed mostly of nobles whom Louis had consistently excluded from all share in government. So incompetent, however, did the new councils prove that the Regent abolished them in 1718.

§ JOHN LAW. In that same year a private bank established in Paris by John Law was converted into a royal bank. Law (1671–1729) was a Scottish financier and economist not without a touch of genius, but a born gambler.

French finances were in desperate confusion when Law, an over-sanguine enthusiast, persuaded the Regent that he possessed a 'System' which would enable the Government to pay off the whole national debt and put public finance on a sound basis. The 'System' was based upon the theory that commercial prosperity depends upon an abundant supply of currency, that the amount of currency is governed by credit, and that credit can be created by the State. In 1716 Law established a private bank for deposit, discounting, and the issue of notes. The notes soon began to circulate, the Treasury agreed to accept them in payment of taxes, and in 1718 Law's private bank was taken over by the Government. Meanwhile, Law had launched his *Compagnie d'Occident*, which gradually absorbed a number of established trading companies. Having out-bidden one or more rival companies for the control of the whole fiscal administration, including the exclusive right of coinage, and having obtained a monopoly of trade in the Mississippi Valley, Law proceeded to amalgamate his company and the bank. That was the undoing of both institutions. A frenzy of speculation seized upon the whole population. The 500-livre shares of the company rose to a grotesque premium; the whole of the national debt was paid off in paper, and private debts, mortgages, and other encumbrances were similarly redeemed. Then came the inevitable crash. A rapid fall took place in the shares. The bank was closed in 1720; Law went into exile; the Government compensated their creditors as far as possible, but could not avert the consequences, nor decline the advantages, of inflation on a vast scale. The Mississippi Company was deprived

of some of its privileges, but was not finally wound up until 1769. The prosperity it promised was not wholly fictitious. Law was not a charlatan, nor does his 'System' lack disciples to-day. The mischief was that the element of truth in the 'System' was hopelessly obscured by the reckless folly of gamblers in the shares. The lesson taught to France by the disaster has been learnt only too well. From that day to this, the people of France have preferred the old stocking to the savings-bank, and have looked askance at investments except in land.

§ FOREIGN AFFAIRS. Between the death of Louis XIV (1715) and the accession of Frederick the Great to the throne of Prussia (1740), the relations of the European Powers were mainly governed by the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese to obtain Italian duchies for her sons, and by the anxiety of the Emperor Charles VI, who had no son, to secure for his daughter, Maria Theresa, the succession by the *Pragmatic Sanction* to the whole of the Habsburg dominions. Elizabeth, known as 'the termagant of Spain', was a daughter of the Duke of Parma, and largely through the influence of Alberoni, himself an Italian, became the second wife of Philip V, whose weak will she entirely dominated. When in 1717 Alberoni attacked the Emperor Charles VI in Sardinia, the Emperor joined France, England, and Holland in a quadruple alliance against Spain. Alberoni retaliated by inciting the Turks to attack the Emperor, by forming a conspiracy (known by the name of the Spanish Ambassador to France, Cellamare) to supersede the Regent Orleans, and by encouraging Sweden to launch a joint attack in the interests of the Stuart Pretender upon England. But on all sides the schemes of Alberoni miscarried. The Cellamare plot was a fiasco; the English Navy, under Admiral Byng, destroyed one Spanish fleet off the coast of Sicily; another, carrying help to the Scottish Jacobites, was dispersed by a storm in the Bay of Biscay. Alberoni, at the instance of France and England, was dismissed, and Spain was compelled in 1720 to accept terms of peace dictated by the Quadruple Allies.

Five years later the Utrecht settlement was again endangered by a change in the means, though not in the ends, of Spanish policy. A new set of actors had by that time come upon the stage. Dubois had died in August 1723, and the Regent Orleans in the following December. Louis XV had come of age in February 1723, and in Spain, Baron Ripperda, the Dutch envoy at the Court of Madrid, had become a naturalized Spaniard and succeeded Alberoni.

The pivot of Ripperda's policy was an alliance with Austria. Elizabeth Farnese hoped, in return for the adhesion of Spain to the *Pragmatic Sanction*, to get the Emperor's help in furthering her maternal ambitions in Italy. Her husband, Philip V, hoped in the same way to turn the English out of Gibraltar and Minorca, and to revenge himself upon Louis XV for his insulting repudiation of the young Spanish Infanta, to whom, by the Peace Treaty of 1720 he

had been affianced. The Spanish princess, who was being educated in Paris for her future rôle, was unceremoniously sent home to Madrid, and Louis XV became engaged to Marie Leczinski, the daughter of an ex-King of Poland, then living on a French pension in Alsace. Marie had neither wealth, brains, nor beauty, but she was pious, and being of marriageable age, was likely to provide an heir to the French throne. The insult to the French prince who reigned at Madrid was almost unforgivable, and war would almost certainly have resulted had there not come at this juncture into power in France a great minister.

§ FLEURY AND WALPOLE. In 1726 Cardinal Fleury, who as tutor to Louis XV had acquired an extraordinary influence over his pupil, became, in fact, though not in name, Prime Minister, and until his death at the age of ninety in 1743 his ascendancy was unquestioned.

Almost coincident with Fleury's ministry in France was that of Sir Robert Walpole (1721-42) in England. Patriots both, the two men sought to restore prosperity to their respective countries by sound methods of finance and the avoidance of war. In this respect Walpole was more fortunate than Fleury. In 1733 the latter was dragged into war in support of the claims of Stanislaus Leczinski, his sovereign's father-in-law, to the throne of Poland. 'Must we,' asked Fleury despairingly, 'ruin the King to aid his father-in-law?' In truth, however, Poland—a debatable land—apart from the dynastic question—was one of the pivotal points of French diplomacy. In Poland, France could make trouble for the Habsburgs and could resist the rising power of the Romanoffs and the Hohenzollerns.

§ THE POLISH SUCCESSION WAR. The war, though known to history as the *Polish Succession War* (1733-8), was actually fought mainly in and for Italy. Before fighting began France and Spain signed the Treaty of the Escurial (November 7th, 1733), the first of the three 'Family Compacts'. This pledged the two Bourbon kings to eternal friendship. Louis XV promised to help Philip V to recover Gibraltar from England and to restrain English encroachments upon Spanish commerce in the Indies.

The actual fighting did not last long. The most important incident in the war was the expulsion of the Austrians from Naples and Sicily, which at the peace were assigned to Elizabeth's son, Don Carlos. In exchange, the Emperor was to have Parma and Piacenza. His son-in-law, Francis Stephen, Duke of Lorraine, was to have the reversion to Tuscany, in exchange for Lorraine, which for the time being went to Stanislaus Leczinski to compensate him for the loss of Poland. On the death of Stanislaus it was to pass to France. That happened in 1766. Meanwhile, France guaranteed the succession of Maria Theresa to the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs, and undertook to support the election of her husband, Francis Stephen,

to the Empire. England, to the disgust of the Emperor, refused to be drawn into the continental quarrels. 'There are fifty thousand men slain in Europe this year, and not one Englishman.' So Walpole boasted in 1734-5. But there were forces at work in world policy beyond the control of Walpole or of any other statesman.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE DUEL FOR EMPIRE (1740-83)

'America has been conquered in Germany.'

LORD CHATHAM

LORD CHATHAM'S epigram, though true, is not self-explanatory. France had anticipated England, both in colonizing North America and in securing ascendancy in India, but had lost her initial advantage by absorption in European affairs. During the critical struggle, known as the Seven Years War (1756-63), the course of events in Europe had brought France into the field on the side of Austria against Frederick the Great of Prussia, who was allied with England. Her absorption in the continental war cost France two overseas Empires. But this is to anticipate events.

It is the fashion to minimize the significance of the 'Family Compacts' which from 1733 to 1783 united the French and Spanish Bourbons. Nevertheless the fact remains that from the moment that a Bourbon became King of Spain the two Bourbon Governments acted, with infrequent intervals, in close co-operation with each other against Great Britain. Committed by William of Orange to a conflict in Europe, England and France were soon involved in war also in India on behalf of their respective commercial companies, as well as in North America, and the Southern Seas. In all three regions their respective nationals, seeking commercial advantages or colonial settlements, were frequently in collision.

§ THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION. By the *Assiento* Treaty—an appendix to the Treaty of Utrecht—English merchants had obtained the right—besides the monopoly of supplying negro slaves—of sending one ship a year to Spanish South America. Under cover of a strictly limited concession, they had developed a large and lucrative but mostly illicit trade. The Spanish *guarda-costas* exercised their right of search high-handedly, and not seldom with brutality. An outrage upon a Captain Jenkins, commanding the *Rebecca*, brought matters to a head, and in 1739 Walpole, peace-lover though he was, was forced into war with Spain. The 'War of Jenkins's Ear' widened out into the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-8).

In the European war England, alone faithful in adherence to the *Pragmatic Sanction*, fought as the champion of Maria Theresa against

Frederick the Great of Prussia, who was supported, from divergent motives, by France, Spain, and Bavaria. From that war France, notwithstanding the brilliant victories of Marshal Saxe, emerged empty-handed. Deservedly. But for her criminal intervention there would have been no general European war.

§ THE EAST INDIES. As between France and England the main theatres of war were in India and America. In India, the French were, relatively to the Portuguese, the Dutch, and even the English, late-comers, and the French East India Companies started in 1604, in 1627, and in 1642 came to nothing. Not, indeed, until Colbert came into power did France make a real start in the colonial field. That great minister had a vision of a great sea-empire, but it was not shared by his compatriots. In 1664, however, he refounded the East India Company, granting it a monopoly of trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan. With its headquarters at Lorient it controlled the French establishments not only in Hindustan but in Madagascar, and the Isles of France and Bourbon. The West Indian Company (1664) enjoyed the monopoly of trade between France and its establishments in North America, Guiana, the Antilles, and Senegal. A Northern Company (1669) and a Levant Company (1670) also owed their foundation to Colbert, but they never became effective.

The East India Company was a State enterprise. The State advanced 3,000,000 francs to the Company, guaranteed it against loss for ten years, and undertook to back it with the whole military and naval power of France. A settlement in Madagascar proved a failure and was soon abandoned. An attempt to effect a French settlement in Ceylon (1672) was repelled by the Dutch, but two years later Pondicherry, destined to become the capital of the French settlements in India, was founded. By the beginning of the eighteenth century the Company was firmly established not only at Pondicherry, Surat, and Masulipatam, but also at Chandernagore in Bengal. Further security was given to the French possessions in India by the occupation of the Isle of France (Mauritius) (1690) and the Isle of Bourbon (1720), to which the few surviving settlers from Madagascar migrated.

With the appointment of M. Dumas to the Governorship of Pondicherry (1738), European enterprise in India entered upon a new phase. The first European official to enter into political relations with the native powers, Dumas created an immense sensation throughout India by his bold defiance of the powerful Maratha Confederacy and his defence of Pondicherry against their attacks. So impressed was the Mogul Emperor that he invested the intrepid Frenchman with the rank and title of Nawab.

§ DUPLEIX. François Dupleix, who succeeded Dumas, was the

most brilliant proconsul who ever served France in India. The English East India Company, founded in 1600, though it had established 'Factories' in Madras, Bombay, and in Bengal, had hitherto played no part in the domestic politics of India. Two things made it impossible to maintain that policy: the political anarchy which ensued upon the break-up of the Mogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurungzeb (1658-1707); and the determination of Dumas and Dupleix to make France the dominant political power in India.

The outbreak of war in Europe between England and France (1744) gave Dupleix his opportunity. He seized it with avidity. In 1746 a French fleet, commanded by La Bourdonnais, the French Governor of Mauritius, appeared off the Coromandel coast and captured Madras. Meanwhile, Dupleix had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the native allies of the English Company near St. Thomé. That victory, combined with Admiral Boscawen's failure to take Pondicherry, enabled Dupleix to boast not only that a small but disciplined French force had proved its superiority to native levies, but that he had repelled the attack of the most powerful English fleet ever seen in Indian waters. Fortunately for England the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was concluded in 1748 between England and France, and, to the disgust of Dupleix, Madras was handed back to his English rivals. That the great fortress of Louisburg on Cape Breton Island was, in exchange, restored to France, was small consolation to the French proconsul in India.¹ Dupleix nevertheless persisted in his policy: he put his puppets on the thrones of Hyderabad and Arcot, and himself ruled, as Governor of Southern India, a country as large as France. In order to proclaim to the Moslem world the changed relations between the French overlords and the native princes, the installation of the new Nizam took place not in his own capital at Hyderabad but in the French capital of Pondicherry.

At the moment when the fortunes of France were at their zenith, and those of the English at the nadir, there appeared on the Indian stage the young Englishman destined to lay the foundations of the British Empire in the East. Robert Clive's capture and subsequent defence of Arcot (1751) proved the turning-point in the Anglo-French duel in India. The spell which Dupleix had laid on the princes and peoples of Southern India was broken. Badly supported from home, Dupleix found that French prestige waned as quickly as it had waxed. He was recalled in 1754 and died ten years later in France, poverty-stricken and cruelly neglected.

Two years after Dupleix's departure the duel in three hemispheres was resumed. Count Lally, sent out to renew the contest in India, at first carried everything before him. But on June 21st, 1760, Colonel Eyre Coote inflicted a crushing defeat on Lally at Wandiwash. A

¹ Macaulay's estimate (*Essay on Clive*) of the position of Dupleix is doubtless greatly exaggerated. *Contra* cf. Cultur's *Dupleix* (pp. 257-8).

year later Pondicherry was compelled to surrender. Coote's victories decided the fate of Southern India as Clive's great victory at Plassey (1757) had decided that of Bengal. At the final peace of 1763 the French recovered Pondicherry, but only as a commercial settlement; military establishments were henceforward forbidden to them. Nevertheless individual Frenchmen ceaselessly strove to restore by diplomacy the dominion lost to France by military defeat. Particularly were French agents active at the Court of Hyder Ali, the brilliant Mohammedan adventurer who had established himself as ruler over the Hindoo State of Mysore. Hyder Ali was encouraged to seize the opportunity afforded by England's embarrassments during the American War of Independence to drive the English out of India. A French fleet under Admiral de Suffren was sent out to co-operate with Hyder Ali, and a considerable force was landed at Pondicherry, but this formidable combination was foiled by the vigour and skill of Warren Hastings and of the veteran Sir Eyre Coote (1780-4).

Hyder Ali's policy of co-operation with France was resumed after his death (1782) by his son, Sultan Tipu, and later on was cordially encouraged by Napoleon. No part of Napoleon's vast designs was nearer to his heart than to turn the English out of India. Frustrated by the brothers Wellesley, Napoleon's vain attempt marked the close of a duel which in the Far East had lasted for three-quarters of a century.

The defeat of France in India was due fundamentally to the contrast between the two Companies. The French Company was the creature of the Government and looked to the State for sustenance. The English Company, the vigorous offspring of private enterprise, was governed by non-official directors and was at first mainly sustained out of profits earned by successful trading. A subsidiary reason may be found in the defective political strategy of Dumas, Dupleix, and their successors. On the plains of Northern India, not in the heel of the peninsula, has the political fate of India always been decided. Dumas and his successors made the fatal mistake of looking for the key of India in Madras; Clive and his successors found it in Bengal.

§ THE WEST INDIES. Colbert had in 1664, established a company of the West to control all the French possessions in Africa, North America, and the West Indies. It was in the West Indies that France was mainly interested. 'The West Indies,' as a French historian has said, 'produced coffee, indigo, and sugar; Canada produced nothing but wheat.' That point of view was typical of the French attitude towards colonial expansion. By the end of the seventeenth century the French had occupied Guadeloupe, St. Lucia, and Grenada; they shared St. Kitts with the English and San Domingo (Hispaniola) with the Spaniards. Cultivation was carried on by semi-servile

labourers recruited from the homeland for a three-year period and known, consequently, as '*les trente-six mois*'. After the introduction of cane-sugar negro slaves were imported in large numbers, and the sugar plantations became a source of great wealth to France. Colour is less of a bar to Frenchmen than to Englishmen, and the consequent commingling of races, though not an unmixed benefit to the French as colonists, has undoubtedly contributed to their notable success in the administration of tropical dependencies.

§ CANADA AND LOUISIANA. As pioneers also, the French have achieved brilliant success. Between 1534 and 1540 Jacques Cartier made three expeditions to North America; visited Newfoundland; set up a wooden cross inscribed with the fleur-de-lys on the peninsula of Gaspé, and sailed up the St. Lawrence as far as Quebec. On his last expedition to 'New France' (as the whole district was renamed), Cartier took out two hundred emigrants in the hope of planting a colony on the banks of the St. Lawrence. Though his first attempt failed, it was more than once renewed. In 1608 Samuel Champlain built some wooden sheds on the northern bank of the St. Lawrence, thus laying the foundations of the great city of Quebec. Some thirty years later Montreal was founded as a refuge for Indians who had been converted to Christianity. In the meantime Champlain had carried out a series of explorations on the Ottawa River and in the region of the Great Lakes. Though his work was temporarily interrupted by an English expedition which in 1629 starved Quebec into surrender, Champlain had found the key to the Far West and had left upon French-speaking Canada an impression that has never been obliterated. It was, however, a Jesuit Father, Marquette, who carried into the barren regions of the Great Lakes and the Ohio Valley the Cross of Christ and the flag of France. His work was carried on by La Salle, a fur-trader who in 1682 traced the course of the Mississippi from the source to the mouth, annexed the region about its delta, and, in honour of his sovereign, named it Louisiana.

§ REVERSAL OF EUROPEAN ALLIANCES. To return to Europe. Between the conclusion of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) and the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756) there took place in Europe a dramatic diplomatic revolution. The Empress Maria Theresa, bent on the recovery of the Silesian duchies from Frederick the Great, made an alliance with her old enemy, France (1756). Frederick the Great was determined to keep the duchies, but anxious also not to let France into Hanover, where alone in Europe France could attack Great Britain, concluded the Treaty of Westminster with his former opponent, England (1756). The essence of the compact was to keep France and Russia out of Germany. If France attacked Hanover, Frederick agreed to help England to defend it. Otherwise, in the Anglo-French duel, he was neutral. The Treaty of


Westminster combined with Frederick's insults to Madame de Pompadour, the reigning mistress of Louis XV, to drive France, albeit unwillingly, into the arms of Austria. Russia, deeply offended by the English Convention with Prussia, also joined Austria, as did Sweden and Poland.

§ THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (1756-63). Frederick's position was, therefore, at the outset of the Seven Years War, exceedingly critical, but a knock-out blow against Saxony compelled her to capitulate and enabled Frederick to incorporate the Saxon army in that of Prussia. At Rosbach Frederick decisively defeated the French and at Leuthen the Austrians (1757), but an Anglo-Hanoverian force, under the Duke of Cumberland, was defeated by the French, and by the Convention of Kloster-Seven, England withdrew from the war and surrendered Brunswick and Hanover to France. Though Frederick repelled a Russian advance into Brandenburg in 1758, the campaigns of 1759, 1760, and 1761 went so badly for Prussia that Berlin itself was occupied by an Austro-Russian force and Frederick more than once contemplated suicide. Meanwhile in 1757 Pitt had come into power in England; the Convention of Kloster-Seven was denounced, and Cumberland was superseded by Frederic of Brunswick, who inflicted a decisive defeat upon the French at Minden (1759). The pressure upon Prussia was further relieved by the succession to the Russian throne of Peter III (1762), who at once withdrew from the Austrian alliance. Frederick thereupon came to terms with Austria and the Peace of Hubertsburg (1763) restored the *status quo* on the Continent. Frederick kept Silesia, having emerged from his terrible ordeal without the loss of an inch of territory and with greatly enhanced prestige. France had to pay a heavy price for the alliance between the Pompadour and Maria Theresa. But it was exacted from her not in Europe, but in India and North America.

§ THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN NORTH AMERICA. The French colonies in North America, though in population much inferior to the British, were strategically well placed. France was firmly established on the two great waterways, the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi, and her Spanish allies held the peninsula of Florida. Besides Newfoundland, the British held the sea-board from Nova Scotia to Georgia, but the French were determined to confine the narrow English hinterland to the east of the Alleghanies. The gap between the Great Lakes on the Canadian frontier and the northern limits of Louisiana was not wide, and the French sought to close it by building a series of forts which, if established and held, would have cut the English off from any advance towards the west. In 1720 the French built a fort at Niagara and another on Lake Champlain subsequently known as Crown Point (1731). During the

Austrian Succession War the English had captured Louisburg (1745), a great fortress known to contemporaries as the 'Dunkirk of North America'. But, as already mentioned, it was, in 1748, exchanged for Madras.

The English colonists in Virginia and in less degree in Pennsylvania tardily awakened to the danger involved in French activity in the



Ohio valley. Between 1748 and 1751 three companies had been formed to promote English settlement and trade in the disputed region. The French retorted by arresting English traders and building more forts, notably Fort Duquesne, in a key position on the Ohio river. In 1754 Dinwiddie, Governor of Virginia, dispatched a force under the command of George Washington to warn the French off. Washington built a fort at Necessity in the Alleghanies, but could not hold it.

Among the advantages enjoyed by the French in the contest with

England the greatest was the unity of command, resulting from the autocratic character of their colonial administration. Between the thirteen English colonies there was little community of interests, while the only political tie was that furnished by common allegiance to the English Crown. Consequently, when danger threatened in the Ohio valley, not a single colony except North Carolina would send help to Virginia.

On all sides the Seven Years War opened auspiciously for France. In the Mediterranean le Galissonnière defeated an English fleet under Admiral Byng off Minorca, and a French army under Marshal de Richelieu captured Port Mahon. The loss of Minorca rankled deeply in the minds of the English, and Byng, a victim to popular indignation, was shot on his quarter-deck. In North America, General Braddock, sent out with a small force to help the Virginians, had fallen into an ambush and with half his army been killed (1755). Lord Loudon, commanding a British force in the Ohio valley, not only failed in his attack on the French but was compelled to surrender the forts of Oswego and St. George to the Marquis of Montcalm. In England itself everything was in confusion until in 1757 William Pitt, detested by the Court but the idol of the populace, coalesced with the Whig leader, the Duke of Newcastle, and infused new vigour and resolution into the conduct of the war.

§ MONTCALM AND WOLFE. With Pitt's advent the tide soon turned. The French fleet continued to win a few isolated combats, but Admiral Boscawen's brilliant victory off Lagos and Hawke's in Quiberon Bay (1759) completely re-established the supremacy of the British Navy, and the whole of the French coast from Dunkirk to Bordeaux was virtually blockaded. In Canada, Fort Duquesne was captured (1758) and rechristened Pittsburg; Cape Breton Island, with the great fortress of Louisburg, surrendered in July of the same year; Ticonderoga and Crown Point were taken in 1759, and Quebec, though defended with splendid courage by Montcalm, fell to the attack delivered by Wolfe on the Heights of Abraham. Both commanders were killed in battle; equally honoured in death as they were equally adored in life. Montreal surrendered on September 8th, 1760. Thus Canada was lost to France. The *Pacte de famille* between the two branches of the House of Bourbon was renewed by Choiseul (1761), but the Spanish Navy came in too late to avert disaster to France. Guadeloupe had been captured by the English in 1759, and Dominique, Martinique, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Tobago, St. Louis in Senegal, and the Isle of Goree were also lost to France. Nor did Spain escape heavy colonial losses.

Preliminaries of peace were arranged in November 1762 and embodied in the Treaty of Paris (February 10th, 1763). The broad result was that France lost all chance of establishing her ascendancy either in India or in North America. She retained her fishing rights

off Newfoundland, and regained Martinique, St. Lucia, Guadeloupe, and Goree; but Canada, Nova Scotia (Acadie), and Cape Breton Island were ceded to England, who also retained Grenada and its dependencies, St. Vincent, Dominique, Tobago, and Senegal. France restored Minorca in exchange for Belle Isle, and gave up Louisiana to Spain, to compensate her for the loss of Florida, which was ceded to England.

§ AMERICAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. Complete as was the victory of England, France had not long to wait for her revenge. There was much misgiving in England about the wisdom of driving the French out of North America; the English sugar merchants would gladly have exchanged Canada for Guadeloupe. With singular precision Vergennes (perhaps the most distinguished diplomatist produced by France in the eighteenth century) predicted that England would 'soon repent of having removed the only check that could keep her colonies in awe. They stand no longer in need of her protection. She will call on them to contribute towards supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence.' That is exactly what happened. Hardly was the Peace of Paris concluded before disputes occurred between the British colonies and the Home Government. In 1775 war actually broke out; in 1776 the colonies adopted a Declaration of Independence, to some extent based on the maxims of French philosophy. 'France,' as a French historian has said, 'hailed with enthusiasm a revolution in which she recognized her influence.'¹ An English pamphleteer warned Louis XVI, who was, indeed, opposed to interference in the American War of Independence, that he was preparing a rod for his own back. 'The legislators of America,' so the pamphlet ran, 'declare themselves disciples of the philosophy of France. . . . Do the French philosophers not aspire to be legislators in their own country? . . . You will be uneasy—too late—when you hear in your own court the vague and plausible maxims that were formulated in the backwoods of America. . . . Where do you hope to find security when the statue of the King of England is broken in pieces in America. . . . England will wreak terrible revenge for your hostile designs; your Government will be judged and condemned on the principles put forward at Philadelphia.'

Despite such warnings, France signed a treaty with the American colonies in February 1778, prepared to invade England, and equipped for immediate action the powerful fleet which, since the last war, Choiseul had created. Choiseul also renewed the alliance with Spain. She declared war on England in 1779, and the combined Bourbon fleets obtained for a time command of the Channel. A descent upon Plymouth was, indeed, averted by a storm, but in 1780 the position of the English in India was gravely endangered by a combination

¹ Duruy, II, p. 288.

between the French Navy and the armies of Hyder Ali. The Sultan of Mysore invaded the Carnatic; Admiral de Suffren recaptured Trincomalee, taken by the English from the Dutch in 1778, and a considerable French force was landed at Pondicherry to effect a junction with the armies of Hyder Ali. Over this powerful combination the veteran Sir Eyre Coote won a great victory at Porto Novo in July 1781; Trincomalee was recovered; Hyder Ali died in 1782, and though the war was carried on with vigour by his successor, Tipu Sultan, it was eventually ended without damage to British ascendancy in India. In Europe, Gibraltar was besieged by France and Spain and was saved only by the heroic defence of General Eliot and the revictualling of the fortress by Admiral Rodney, who in January 1780 won a great victory against the Spaniards off Cape St. Vincent. The Comte de Grasse was, however, winning a series of brilliant victories in the West Indies, and in combination with the French armies under Rochambeau and La Fayette, and that of Washington, forced Lord Cornwallis, who was cooped up with a small force on the peninsula of Yorktown, to surrender. That virtually ended the American War of Independence, but the West Indies was saved by Rodney's brilliant victory over de Grasse off Antigua (April 12th, 1782).

By a peace concluded in 1783, Spain recovered Florida and Minorca—taken from the English in 1782. France recovered Senegal, as well as Pondicherry and four other towns in India; she received Tobago and St. Lucia in exchange for Dominique, and obtained the islands of San Pierre and Miquelon, as well as certain fishing rights off Newfoundland. France thus took a signal revenge upon England, but at the cost of the monarchy, to which she owed her existence as a great Nation-State.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DESCENT TO AVERNUS—LOUIS XVI (1774-93)

'All the symptoms which I have ever met with in history previous to great changes and revolutions in government now exist and daily increase in France.'

LORD CHESTERFIELD

IN more senses than one France has always been more interested in the land than in the sea. The soil of France is the source and basis of French patriotism. Her continental frontiers have concerned her more than the ocean highways. Never was this truth more conspicuously or more disastrously illustrated than in the eighteenth century, when France deliberately sacrificed the possibility of world supremacy to the effort to retain her primacy in Europe.

§ PRESAGES OF REVOLUTION. To revenge herself upon her successful rival she intervened in the War of American Independence. Her intervention was not less disastrous to herself than to England. The Revolution in France followed quickly on the attainment of American Independence. Acute observers both in France and abroad had expected a revolution nearly half a century before it broke out. Felix Rocquain¹ ascribes its postponement to a reaction in favour of the Crown, consequent on a sudden change of policy. In the summer of 1754 the Parlement of Paris was recalled from exile, and it was rumoured that the detested Jesuits were to be expelled. But the acclamations of the Jansenists and of the philosophers were premature. The Government did, indeed, withdraw its ban on the publication of the *Encyclopaedia* (1755); it showed increasing leniency towards the Protestants; there was talk even of a repeal of Louis XIV's revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the Parlement was emboldened to take stronger action against the Jesuits and the ultramontane clergy. But in December 1755 Louis XV attributed to the *Grand Conseil* the position of a Sovereign Court, with a status equal to that of the Parlement.

The challenge thus offered to the Parlement evoked not only a more vociferous assertion of its constitutional position, but still more bitter attacks upon the Jesuits, the ultramontane clergy, and (with some inconsistency) upon the *Philosophes*.

§ SUPPRESSION OF THE JESUITS. An attempt made on the life of Louis XV (January 5th, 1757) caused a momentary reaction in favour of the monarchy which was further strengthened when, in February 1763, the King confirmed the decree of the Parlement pronouncing the dissolution of the Jesuit Order in France. Yet was Voltaire more cynical than accurate when he wrote (1762): 'Les Jansenistes et les Jesuits se déchirent; il faut les écraser l'un par les autres, et que leur ruine soit le marchepied du trône de la vérité.'

In expelling the Jesuits France was, in fact, only in line with other Catholic Powers, the Habsburg Empire, the Spanish Bourbons, the Neapolitan Bourbons, and Portugal. Pope Clement XIV only fulfilled a pledge given to the Catholic sovereigns by suppressing the Order altogether in 1773. By a curious irony it was in Prussia and Russia that the Jesuits found a refuge, and repaid the hospitality they received by preaching to the Catholic Poles submission to a Calvinist King and an Orthodox Empress.

§ CONFLICT WITH THE PARLEMENT. Of the administrative disorder and the ferment of opinion during this period there is no better illustration than the triangular duel between the Crown, the Parlement, and the ultramontane clergy. Though the threads of a tangled situation are not easily unravelled we can say broadly that

¹ *L'Esprit révolutionnaire avant la Révolution.*

the magistrates of the Parlement were stalwart defenders of Jansenism against the ultramontane clergy, of the rights of the Gallican Church against the Papacy, and, above all, of their own privileges against the Crown and the people alike. Again: if on intellectual grounds the Parlement had some sympathy with the philosophers and encyclopaedists, it was bitterly opposed to them on the question of political reform. However 'liberal' in theory, it was in practice almost purely obscurantist and reactionary. To language such as the Parlement now began to use, the ears of French kings were little accustomed: 'By the Constitution of the Kingdom,' ran one of their declarations, 'the Parlements are the Senate of the nation; the Sovereign depository of the laws of the State. . . . Laws are essentially conventions between those who govern and those who are governed.' A 'Senate' in the legislative sense, the Parlements were not; and the Crown and the Council of State were on solid ground in repudiating such claims as 'unconstitutional'. Yet so long as the States-General was in cold storage many people looked upon the Parlements as the sole barrier against the naked autocracy of the Crown. In fact, the magistrates were the most consistent defenders of the monstrous privileges which evoked revolution; the most obstinate opponents of the reforms which could alone have averted it. Alfred Rambaud does not exaggerate when he describes the Parlements as 'foyers d'esprit aristocratique et provincial, citadels des vieux privilèges, corps réfractaires à tout progrès, qui n'auraient pas manqué d'empiéter sur celle du roi, et chez lesquels les réformes nouvelles auraient trouvé les mêmes résistances que les réformes de Turgot, de Malesherbes, de Necker, ou de Calonne.'¹

The Regent Orleans had restored to the Parlement the right of remonstrance against the registration of the Royal Edicts, but owing to their audacious use of this privilege had been compelled to have recourse to *lits de justice* (1718). Under Louis XV the Parlement was frequently in conflict with the Government. In 1753 it had been banished to Pontoise for more than fifteen months, and in 1756 the King had been compelled more than once to hold *lits de justice* in order to enforce the registration of his edicts imposing war taxation. The Duc de Choiseul, though advanced to the post of First Minister (1758) by the favour of the Pompadour, was pre-eminently a man of affairs, not to say an opportunist, and did his best to conciliate the Parlement by supporting its attack on the Jesuits and by selecting some of his ministerial colleagues from the Magistracy. But the conflict broke out again after the Seven Years War had once more emptied the Treasury. In December 1770 Choiseul was dismissed, and Louis XV entrusted the Government to a Triumvirate, the chief member of which was the Chancellor Maupeou. The King then decided on a *coup d'état*. In January 1771 more than one hundred

¹ *Civilisation Française*, II. 612.

magistrates were exiled from Paris under *lettres de cachet*, and in April the Parlements throughout the whole country were suppressed. Once more the outbreak of revolution appeared to be imminent. 'La nation,' wrote Rocquain, 'voyait ses lois, ses institutions foulées aux pieds, et 'un empire despotique' s'élever sur leurs débris.' The royal *coup*, though popularly ascribed to the Jesuits, was in fact the work of Maupeou, who replaced the Parlements by six new Courts of Justice, collectively known as *le Parlement Maupeou*. The purchase of judicial offices was abolished, and justice was administered gratuitously. But though Maupeou's reforms were approved by Voltaire and were indisputably on the right lines, his new courts were purely judicial, without the power or the ambition to play the rôle which the Parlement had, not without popular approval, audaciously usurped. The people did not forget that while the Parlement of Paris had declared that Frenchmen were 'free men and not slaves', the King had retorted: 'We hold our Crown from God alone. The right of making laws belongs only to us; we neither delegate nor share it.' Nor was the King's unpopularity diminished by the so-called *Pacte de famine*, the opprobrious designation applied to Terray's order prohibiting the free circulation of grain, which was alleged to have enabled the minister to corner wheat to his personal advantage. Quite untrue. But so great was the unpopularity of the King and his triumvirate that any tale against them found credence in the capital, though the country was little affected by the gossip of the boulevards.

§ LOUIS XVI. The whole country, however, heard with relief the news of the old King's death, and the accession of his grandson, a young man of twenty, who was believed to be a 'lover of justice, economy, and pure morals'. The belief was not unwarranted. The new King was an amiable, well-intentioned man; he shared the zeal for administrative reform characteristic of the benevolent autocrats of that 'age of enlightenment', and was anxious in every way to promote the welfare of his people. But he was devoid of personal dignity, vacillating in purpose, weak of will, and, though simple in his private tastes and irreproachable in public life, was lacking in intelligence, moral courage, and political initiative. His wife, Marie Antoinette, a daughter of the great Queen Maria Theresa, was a year younger than the King. Though innocent of the charges alleged against her, she was ignorant, extravagant, frivolous, and pleasure-loving, and, from the first, was an object of suspicion to the populace of Paris. Nevertheless, if Louis XVI had been capable of taking a strong line, if he had begun his reign, instead of ending it, by summoning the States-General, there is reason for the belief, commonly expressed, that the Revolution, if not averted, might have followed a much more moderate course.

Instead of summoning the States-General the King suppressed

Maupeou's new judiciary and recalled the Parlements. The recall of the Parlements, though popular, was a capital blunder. To their mischievous and selfish opposition to all reform must be ascribed the downfall of Turgot, the sole remaining hope of preserving, in a greatly amended form, the old Constitution of France.

§ TURGOT. Almost the first act of the young King had been to install as Controller-General of Finance the man uniquely qualified for that exacting and unpopular office.

Born in 1727, Anne Robert Jacques Turgot came of a good old Norman family. Being destined for the priesthood, he was liberally educated, but became by preference a lawyer. The friend and disciple of Quesnay, the famous leader of the *Economists* (or Physiocrats), Turgot ardently espoused their doctrines, and contributed several articles, on lines familiarized to Englishmen by Adam Smith, to the *Encyclopaedia*. Though in 1752 he became a magistrate in the Parlement of Paris, Turgot had no difficulty when it was superseded by the *Parlement Maupeou* (1771) in accepting nomination to the latter.

As Intendant of Limousin, one of the poorest and most backward provinces in France (1761-73), Turgot carried through a wonderful series of reforms. France, as John Law had remarked to D'Argenson, was really governed by thirty Intendants. Among those despots—many of them benevolent—Turgot was pre-eminent. He abolished the worst abuses of the *Taille* and of the *Corvée*; he improved the unpopular conditions of the Militia Service; he introduced better methods of cultivation in agriculture, inculcated the importance of rotation of crops, improved means of transport and started agricultural societies. During the famine of 1770-1 he set up *Ateliers de Charité* to provide work on roads and elsewhere for the unemployed, and persuaded local ladies to supervise the work of women and girls. Before he left his province, Limousin was almost blossoming as the rose.

When appointed *Controller-General* in 1774, Turgot brought to his great office the same zeal and intelligence he had displayed as an Intendant. 'No bankruptcy; no increase of taxation; no borrowing', summarized the programme which he submitted to the King, who cordially assented to the programme and loyally supported its author during his brief tenure of office. But, confronted by the opposition of the nobles, the higher clergy, and the magistrates, Turgot found himself powerless to carry through his projected reforms. Believing, as a consistent physiocrat, that all wealth was derived from the land, he would have raised the whole revenue by a single tax on land. But that was beyond his powers. He did something to equalize the burden of taxation, and to reform fiscal abuses; restored national credit; broke down many of the barriers on internal trade; established free trade in labour by the abolition of guilds (*jurandes*); abolished

forced labour (*corvées*). Even these measures had to be forced through Parlement by *lits de justice*, and the opposition ultimately proved too strong for the reforming minister. Led by the Queen, the courtiers joined the ranks of his enemies, and in May 1776 Turgot was forced to resign. In 1781 he died. 'Turgot,' said his colleague Malesherbes, 'has the brain of Bacon and the heart of l'Hôpital.' Like Voltaire, he believed in a benevolent autocrat as the best instrument of reform. On hearing of his disciple's resignation, Voltaire wrote: 'I am as one dashed to the ground. Never can we console ourselves for having seen the golden age dawn and perish. My eyes see only death in front of me now that M. Turgot is gone.'

Did Turgot, in his anxiety to inaugurate the golden age, in fact precipitate the Revolution? Though all his measures were immediately repealed, most of them were subsequently re-enacted by the Constituent Assembly. If Turgot did precipitate the Revolution, it was only because, as Albert Sorel says, 'he exposed the need for reform and also the powerlessness of the monarchy to effect it'.

§ NECKER. As Finance Minister, Turgot was succeeded by Jacques Necker (1732-1804), a native of Geneva, a Calvinist in creed, an admirable man of business, and a shrewd financier. But he was perhaps most famous as the father of Madame de Staël. Madame Necker's *salon* was a favourite resort of the Philosophers, and one of the most select in Paris, nor did her husband's great wealth and his generous use of it tend to diminish his popularity. Less of a statesman than Turgot, he was not inferior to him in probity and in genuine anxiety to promote the well-being of the people. Like Turgot, he was the enemy of the Parlement, and a believer in the monarchy. His main defect as a minister was his belief that financial reform could by itself redeem a situation which demanded a drastic change in the whole system of government. Necker did, indeed, make a beginning in the reform of provincial administration: he enforced economy on officials and even on the Court itself; he simplified administration; he published the accounts in an intelligible form; and he attempted to fund the debt and distribute taxation more equitably. The number of Farmers-General and Receivers-General of Finance was drastically cut down; the last remnants of serfdom were, amid great applause, abolished throughout the royal domain. But the seigneurs and clergy refused to follow the King's example, and the Parlement, while registering the edict, expressly reserved the rights of seigneurs. Gradually, Necker's popularity evaporated, and opposition to his measures was intensified. The publication of his famous *Compte Rendu* in 1781, revealing for the first time the whole truth about the financial situation, aroused general alarm, and, in some quarters, bitter resentment. Further proposals for the abolition of the Intendants and for the restriction of the Parlement to its purely judicial functions aroused such feeling that in 1781 the King

was forced to accept Necker's resignation. A panic on the Bourse attested the general consternation. The birth of a Dauphin (October 1781) evoked momentary popularity for the Queen, but the public rejoicings were quickly quenched in the grief felt for the defeat of de Grasse by Rodney off Antigua.

§ CALONNE. The conclusion of peace with England (1783) and the new policy adopted by Calonne, who in the same year was appointed Controller-General, did something to ease the situation. But only for the moment. Calonne hoped to sustain public credit, to diffuse a feeling of prosperity, and to postpone, if not avert, a crisis by extravagant expenditure. Nor did the device wholly fail. The year immediately preceding the Revolution illustrated the truth that private prosperity may co-exist with public bankruptcy. But Nemesis comes swiftly on the heels of unproductive expenditure. Loans raised at ruinous rates of interest may provide ready money, but by 1786 Calonne was at the end of his tether. He advised the King that the only hope was to revert to Turgot's system, establish free trade in corn, set up representative Assemblies in the provinces, abolish the corvée and all fiscal exemptions, and summon the notables in order to obtain their assent to the curtailment of their privileges.

§ THE ASSEMBLY OF NOTABLES. The Assembly met in February 1787, a purely nominated body. It promptly refused to surrender the privileges of the respective Orders of Notables, and, by adroitly turning the tables on the minister, evoked popular enthusiasm in its own favour. Calonne, a man who hardly deserved the ill-repute into which his memory has fallen, was dismissed at the instance of the Queen. For one great service to French trade Calonne must have full credit. By the Commercial Treaty concluded with England in 1786 Calonne anticipated the Cobden Treaty of 1860 and made some approach towards a policy of free trade. Custom duties were reduced on English cotton and other fabrics and reciprocally on French wines—to the indignation of English brewers and French cotton manufacturers.¹

In succession to Calonne the Queen procured the appointment as Chief Minister of Loménie de Brienne, Archbishop of Toulouse. Vergennes, the greatest Foreign Minister of the century, had passed away in February 1787, happily before the downfall of the monarchy he had served so faithfully. Loménie, though as a Notable he had opposed the reforms demanded by Calonne, could do no other than persist in them, and the Assembly, still refusing to assent to taxation, was dissolved.

§ THE PARLEMENTS. The Parlement consented to register the Edicts establishing free trade in corn, setting up Provincial Assemblies

¹ Cf. Dumas: *Le Traité de Commerce de 1786*. Paris, 1884-6.

and commuting the corvée for a money tax, but refused to agree to a stamp duty. The King imposed his will by a *lit de justice*; the Parlement thereupon put forward the revolutionary proposition that only the States-General could authorize permanent taxation, and was rewarded for its audacity by being exiled to Troyes. But the exile was not prolonged. The King gave way; and before the end of September (1787) the Parlement was back in Paris, loudly welcomed by the fickle populace.

In May 1788 the King announced the supersession of the Parlement by a *Cour Plénière*, but the provincial Parlements supported the Parlement of Paris in their demand for the meeting of the States-General and the provincial Estates. Accordingly the King agreed to summon the States-General. Almost simultaneously national bankruptcy was announced; Loménie resigned; Necker was recalled. The situation was accurately summarized by Thomas Carlyle: 'It is spiritual bankruptcy long tolerated; verging now towards economical bankruptcy, and become intolerable.' It was; but, blame should rest upon the right shoulders. The French Parlement, reckless of consequences, had initiated revolution rather than accept any reforms which would infringe their privileges. The King, well-intentioned but weak, insisting on fiscal equality as the one hope of avoiding bankruptcy, attempted to impose his will on the Parlement—and failed. His failure opened the door to revolution.

CHAPTER XX

THE REVOLUTION (1789-92)

'Les révolutions qui arrivent dans les plus grands états ne sont point un effet du hasard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien ne révolte les grands d'un royaume comme un Gouvernement faible et dérangé. Pour la populace ce n'est jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle se soulève, mais par impatience de souffrir.'

SULLY

§ CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTION. Sully's generalization, if somewhat too wide, is profoundly true. The Revolution initiated by the States-General of 1789 was no fortuitous event; but neither was it due wholly to the suffering of the people. The keyword of the Revolution is, 'Contradiction'. Though long foreseen, the actual course of the Revolution took every one by surprise. Due to causes which had long been operative, the Revolution broke out at a moment when things had taken a turn for the better. Louis XVI was no tyrant, but a kindly if rather stupid man, inspired only by good intentions towards his subjects. He chose for his ministers men who were zealous for reform; the general condition of the people in

France was not worse than it was elsewhere; at least one-third of the land was owned by the cultivating peasantry; there was not more feudalism in France than in other continental countries, but less; of actual serfdom there survived practically nothing.

§ THE NOBLES. Why, then, did revolution break out in France? De Tocqueville's explanation, though paradoxical, is probably true. Revolution generally comes when conditions are improving and reforms have begun. Reform, so far from averting revolution, tends to precipitate it. Serfs feel the yoke of feudalism less acutely than peasants who, though owners of the soil, are still subject to many exasperating 'rights' exercised by lords who, having ceased to be landlords, could still compel their vassals to grind their corn only at the lord's mill, to press their grapes only at his winepress, to bake their bread only in his ovens; and to pay heavily for the use of these amenities; to pay also innumerable tolls and dues, and to submit to social customs, of which some were degrading and all were obsolete. Privileges were intelligible and defensible so long as the privileged nobles governed the country and protected their vassals. But Richelieu and Louis XIV had deprived the nobles of duties while leaving them their privileges. The result was to render more odious the remnants of the system, once coherent but now fragmentary, that still survived.

§ THE CHURCH. More contradictory even than the position of the nobles was that of the Church. *Ecrasez l'infâme* was Voltaire's cry. To the *illuminés* the infamy of the Church consisted in its censorship on printing, in the restrictions it imposed on freedom of thought and expression. By the mass of the people the higher ecclesiastics were detested because they shared the privileges of the noble caste from which they were mostly drawn, and in addition enjoyed their clerical rights—notably the right to *tithe*, one of the most unpopular of many unpopular burdens on land. The *curés*, or parish priests, enjoyed, on the contrary, the affection of the flocks to whom with exemplary devotion they ministered. Mostly of peasant stock, the *curés* shared the poverty and hardships of their people, and when the Revolution came, they made common cause with the *Tiers État*.

§ THE BOURGEOISIE. The bourgeoisie who supplied the bulk of the delegates sent to the States-General smarted under social and still more under fiscal inequalities. Excluded from any social intercourse with the nobles, they had to share with the peasants practically the whole burden of taxation. Only if they entered the profession of the law and attained the position of magistrates could they escape taxation. Since the sixteenth century the *noblesse de la robe* had been not merely a privileged but an hereditary body; consequently a 'career' in the Parlement was as little open to the talented

son of a merchant as was any other hereditary title—in practice less open. As a whole, the bourgeoisie were rapidly becoming wealthier, better educated, and more influential among their fellows, but were still excluded from any share whatsoever in government.

How far the commercial system was unpopular with the commercial classes it is difficult to say. In the eighteenth century France was still not one country, but at least three: the 'Five Great Farms', 'the reputed foreign provinces' and the 'foreign provinces'. Despite the formation of a Zollverein between the twelve provinces¹ included in the 'Five Great Farms'; despite, too, the efforts of Sully, Colbert, and Turgot to break down the fiscal barriers between the three categories they were still formidable. Trade was still wrapped in the swaddling clothes appropriate to infancy. Production was still hampered by the survival of guilds and corporations (*jurandes*), but despite official prohibition of 'associations' of workmen they were not infrequent in the eighteenth century.

§ THE CROWN. D'Argenson had written as long ago as 1757: 'the opinion gains ground that absolute monarchy is the worst conceivable form of government'. Nevertheless, the Crown still supplied the corner-stone to the political and social structure. Nor was the King, though an autocrat, personally unpopular. But autocracy can be justified only by efficiency. The monarchy had, in the eighteenth century, demonstrated its incompetence. Consequently both among the bourgeoisie and the peasants there was a general demand for a 'constitution'.

§ THE PHILOSOPHERS. Into a soil thus well prepared the philosophers sowed their seed broadcast. Their influence was, however, mostly indirect. Voltaire (1694–1778), though neither a revolutionary nor a republican, contributed to the revolution by undermining the respect for authority by persistent attacks directed not against religion but against a Church, which, while tenacious of its privileges, grossly neglected its duties.

Montesquieu (1689–1755) wrote primarily for philosophers, though his *Esprit des Lois* (1748) has probably done more than any single book to inspire the actual artificers of Constitutions. In particular his doctrine of the *Separation of Powers* was accepted as gospel by the men responsible for the successive Constitutions adopted in Revolutionary France. Diderot (1715–84) made a monumental contribution to knowledge by the *Encyclopaedia* (1751–65). Unlike Voltaire's, his attitude towards religion was wholly iconoclastic, but his appeal was exclusively to the *cognoscenti* and his influence on public opinion was indirect. So also, in a sense, was that of Quesnay (1694–1774) and the Physiocrats. But the influence of all these men was negligible as compared with that of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). Rousseau's

¹ Isle de France, Normandy, Picardy, Champagne, Burgundy, Orléannais, Berry, Bourbonnais, Touraine, Maine, Poitou, and Aunis.

teaching has perhaps been misunderstood and misinterpreted. But the significance of prophets, more widely quoted than critically studied, consists less in what they meant than in what their less critical disciples have understood them to mean.

Rousseau, we are now taught, was no communist. None the less the publication of his *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes* (1754) announced the birth of modern communism. His *Contrat Social* (1762) may have been primarily intended to enforce the Aristotelian dogma that 'man is by nature a political being', that morality and justice are possible only in the State. But Voltaire saw in the *Contrat Social* 'a code of anarchy'. Napoleon declared that if Rousseau had never lived 'there would have been no Revolution'. 'Man is born free and is everywhere in chains.' The unforgettable words with which the *Contrat Social* opens were in every one's mouth. If the deeper philosophy of the *Contrat Social* was addressed admittedly to the few, Rousseau's language was interpreted by the many who were credulous in temper, unlettered, and inexperienced in affairs. To masses of men who felt themselves to be socially restricted and financially oppressed by the outworn remnants of a feudal system which had lost its justification, Rousseau proclaimed the gospel of equality and liberty. The mischief was that in France, in striking contrast with England, the men of letters were wholly divorced from practical affairs; Bolingbroke and Burke were statesmen as well as philosophers; Voltaire and Rousseau were merely theorists and their speculations were *a priori*.

§ THE REVOLUTION. Yet the occasions of Revolution must, as Aristotle taught, be carefully distinguished from its causes. The causes of the Revolution in France will be found in the history of preceding centuries: the 'occasion' was provided by three circumstances. The first was the revolt of the American Colonies which not only added fresh fuel to the fire lit by the French philosophers but incited France to intervene in a war which finally reduced her to bankruptcy. A second was the demand put forward by the Parlement—itsself the home and incarnation of privilege—for the summoning of the States-General. The last straw was supplied by famine. During the winter of 1788-9 the whole economic life of France was dislocated by a crisis of unprecedented severity. The elections to the States-General took place at a moment when thousands of people were starving; it met when Paris was thronged by destitute and workless crowds.

§ THE GENERALELECTION. The immense excitement generated by the election of the States-General was intensified by uncertainty as to procedure. For 175 years there had been no general election. How were the deputies to be elected? Was their election to be direct or indirect? Who was entitled to vote? In particular, as the Abbé

Siéyès asked in a famous pamphlet, *Qu'est-ce-que le Tiers État?* In the event, no fewer than 1,214 deputies were elected. Of these 265 were nobles *de l'épée* and 20 were nobles *de la robe*. Of 308 clergymen two-thirds were *curés*. The representation of the Third Estates having been doubled by royal decree, their deputies numbered 621, or more than the two other Orders combined.

§ THE CAHIERS. During the election, each of the three Orders in every electoral district drew up a *cahier des plaintes et doléances*. These documents, with all their variations in detail, are sufficiently concordant to prove that all classes looked for radical reform. All classes demanded a *Constitution*, and looked to regular meetings of the States-General to secure it. The readjustment of taxation, the abolition of privileges and exemptions, the removal of feudal burdens, were the chief demands of the Tiers État. Liberty of person (no more *lettres de cachet*), of conscience, of the Press, and reform in the administration of justice were also demanded. The lower clergy complained of the excessive power of the Bishops; some clamoured for their election, and more for the ending of the *Concordat* and less interference from Rome. But the remarkable fact that emerges from a study of the *Cahiers* is that all classes agreed that privilege was doomed; all men were henceforward to be equal before the law.

§ THE STATES-GENERAL. The States-General, opened by the King with magnificent ceremonial on May 5th, 1789, heard from the throne a speech curiously compounded of promises of reform and assertion of royal autocracy. Six weeks were then spent on debating the question of cardinal importance in view of the doubled representation of the *Tiers État*—whether the deputies were to vote as a single body (*par tête*) or *par ordre*. On June 17th the Commons cut the Gordian knot by declaring themselves the 'National Assembly of France' and inviting the other two Orders to join them. The King's rejoinder to this *coup d'état* was to exclude the Commons (June 20th) from the Hall of Assembly. Thereupon the deputies adjourned to the adjacent tennis-court and registered an oath not to separate until they had given France a Constitution.

On June 23rd the King held a Royal Session. Announcing a large programme of reform, but refusing to recognize the 'National Assembly', he enjoined the several Orders to sit each in its separate chamber. The King then retired, followed by the nobles and some of the clergy. The bulk of the clergy and all the Commons remained in their seats. When the Commons were again ordered by a Court official to withdraw, a loud voice was heard: 'Tell your master that we are here by the authority of the people, and we shall not stir save at the bayonet's point.' The voice was Mirabeau's, who, rejected by his own Order, had been elected by the *Tiers État* and sat for Aix. The King surrendered: 'Well, then, let them stay.' The nobles and

higher clergy then joined the Commons. So the curtain fell on the first act of the Revolution.

§ FALL OF THE BASTILLE. Two misunderstandings completed the breach between the Court and the Assembly. On July 11th it was announced that the King had dismissed Necker and was massing troops on Paris. Necker's dismissal was interpreted as a sop to the reactionaries. The massing of troops, though really necessitated by the prevalence of disorder in the capital, was resented as a threat to the Assembly. Riots had already broken out in Paris. Bailly, already President of the Assembly, was installed at the Hôtel de Ville as 'mayor' of Paris, by an unofficial 'Committee of Election'.¹ A *National Guard* was enrolled, the King was persuaded to nominate Lafayette as its Commander, and arms were distributed. But the mob was already out of hand. On July 14th it attacked and, after a spirited defence of five hours, captured the Bastille, and murdered the Governor, de Launey. The Bastille was an old fortress, mainly dismantled, and contained less than a dozen prisoners; but it symbolized the judicial tyrannies and abuses of the old régime. It was the negation of the rule of law. Its capture, therefore, was a blow struck for personal liberty. 'How much it is the greatest event that ever happened in the world, and how much the best,' was the comment of Charles James Fox. Burke, on the contrary, was confirmed in his opinion that 'the French have shown themselves the ablest architects of ruin that have existed in the world'. Louis XVI on hearing of the capture of the Bastille remarked: 'Mais c'est une révolte.' 'Non, Sire,' retorted the Duc de Liancourt, 'c'est une révolution.'

The epidemic of disorder quickly spread from the capital to the provinces: châteaux were burnt, monasteries were ransacked, anarchy reigned supreme. When the frenzy reached Versailles the Assembly, in a fever of self-renunciation, adopted, on the historic August 4th, a series of drastic decrees. The few remaining traces of personal servitude—forced labour, customary services, and all similar incidents were abolished, as were all exclusive sporting rights, all tithes, annates, and pluralities; guilds and corporations were dissolved; Labour was henceforth to be free; all men were to be equal before the law; offices were to be open to all. Justice was to be administered gratuitously and impartially. Mirabeau at one time described the work of August 4th as an 'orgy'; at another he declared it to be a 'just expiation for ten centuries of delirium'. 'Cette nuit,' wrote Mignet, 'qu'un ennemi de la révolution appella la Saint-Barthélemy des propriétés ne fut que la Saint-Barthélemy des abus.' Whichever description be preferred, there can be no question that the work, if

¹ This Committee was appointed by the Primary Assemblies formed for the election of the States-General. The King approved Bailly's appointment as 'mayor'.

it asserted rights now universally acknowledged and vindicated, was too sweeping, too hasty, and lacking in fairness and discrimination.

§ THE 'MARCH OF THE MAENADS.' A Committee had been appointed on July 6th, 1789, to 'make' a new Constitution, as though, says Arthur Young with insular scorn, 'a Constitution were a pudding to be made from a receipt'. 'Spontaneous anarchy' is Taine's description of the situation. About the anarchy there is no doubt; how far it was 'spontaneous' is questionable. In Paris, as Bailly complained, 'all wished to command, none was willing to obey'. The anger of the mob was aroused by the news that some of the princely and noble *émigrés* were planning a counter-revolution, that the King was going to Metz and that Paris was to be overawed by faithful troops. Consequently, on October 5th a frenzied mob, armed with guns and pikes, and mainly composed of market-women, harlots, and the dregs of the populace, marched from Paris to Versailles. The mob burst into the palace, and carried off the King, the Queen, and the royal family to Paris, where they were virtually imprisoned in the Tuileries. The Assembly accompanied the Court to Paris. Thus in effect the 'march of the Maenads' (to use Carlyle's picturesque phrase) meant the subordination of the representatives of France to the Parisian mob. Executive control passed to a club, which, consisting originally of some Breton deputies, was joined in Paris by Mirabeau, Robespierre, Siéyès, and others, and began to meet regularly in the Convent of the Jacobins, in the rue Saint-Honoré. The Jacobin Club thenceforward stood to the Assembly in much the same relation as the executive of the Communist party in Russia now stands to the Congress of Soviets. Hardly less important than the Jacobin Club was that which, meeting in the Convent of the Cordeliers, was dominated by Danton.

§ THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791. Despite the increasing influence of the political clubs and the Parisian mob, the Constituent Assembly (as it had now become) steadily pursued the task of Constitution-making. Before leaving Versailles, the Assembly had drafted a manifesto (ultimately prefixed to the new Constitution), declaring the 'natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man'. Among these rights were: 'liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression'. All men—not Frenchmen only—were to enjoy freedom of person and of conscience, and security of property. This famous declaration was published on August 27th, 1789.

In September two important points were decided: the future legislature was to consist of a single popularly elected chamber; and upon its projects the King was to have only a suspensive veto. Against these decisions Mirabeau, the one real statesman in the Assembly, and an evident admirer of the English Constitution, vehemently but vainly protested. Mistakenly supposing that the

English King possessed an absolute veto, Mirabeau declared that without such a veto he would rather live in Constantinople than in France.

§ MIRABEAU. Failing to carry his point with the Assembly, Mirabeau entered into secret correspondence with the King. Louis, despite his natural repugnance to Mirabeau's character, would have been wise to make him his minister. Undeterred by the King's rejection of his services, Mirabeau continued to give sound advice to the sovereign. He advised him to encourage a moderate party in the Assembly and in the Press, and spend freely on maintaining it; to appoint a strong ministry including Lafayette and Necker; to keep an eye on the clubs and organize a strong police force; above all, to leave Paris for Rouen or some other provincial town—not near the frontier—and summon the Assembly to follow.¹

§ LOCAL GOVERNMENT. The Assembly, meanwhile, continued its work. The whole system of local government was reorganized (December 1789–February 1790): the old Provinces and the Intendants were abolished, and the country was symmetrically mapped out into eighty-three Departments. Each Department was subdivided into Districts (*Arrondissements*), Cantons, and Communes. The last numbered 44,000. In every division of local government there was an elected council with executive officers.

§ THE JUDICIARY. Most unwisely the principle of election was extended to the Judiciary. The old *Parlements* and *Courts* were abolished. In every Department there was to be a Criminal Court and trial by jury; in every District a Civil Court; and besides these, numberless courts of summary jurisdiction under *juges de paix*. At Paris there was to be a Court of Appeal. Many abuses incidental to the old administration of justice, such as arbitrary imprisonment and excessive punishments, were swept away, but the new system was vitiated by the mania for elections which is apt—as experience has proved—to lead to a denial of justice.

The military system was also drastically reformed. The army and navy were brought under the control of the Assembly by making the vote for their maintenance an annual one. The number of highly paid officers was reduced; the pay of the private was improved and all ranks were made eligible for promotion. Revolutionary enthusiasm was in the meantime sustained by a demonstration—the *Fête de Fédérations*—held on the *Champ de Mars*, on the anniversary of the capture of the Bastille. Talleyrand, still Bishop of Autun, said Mass, assisted by four hundred priests. The king, with weak amiability, swore allegiance to the new Constitution. Although the King and Queen were enthusiastically acclaimed, the spectacle was far from edifying.

¹ For Mirabeau's 'Notes' to the King—fifty in number—cf. Mirabeau: *Correspondence avec La Marck* (Ed. Bacourt).

§ CHURCH AND STATE. As steps towards 'equality' the Assembly simultaneously suppressed hereditary titles, and emancipated the slaves of San Domingo. More important, alike in its immediate and permanent effects, was the ecclesiastical revolution embodied in the *Civil Constitution of the Clergy*. The Church was disendowed but not disestablished. On the contrary, the Catholic Church became a Department of the State: the bishops and *curés* became its stipendiaries. Tithes were abolished, the religious Houses were suppressed, and all Church property was appropriated by the State. Every Department was to have its Bishop, and every District its *curé* (in each case elected by their flocks), and the Papal veto on elections was abolished. Gross inequalities in incomes were redressed, but any possible advantage to religion was neutralized by an act of egregious folly. Although most of the *curés*, and even some higher ecclesiastics, were well affected to the Revolution, the Assembly deemed it wise to require every clergyman to take an oath of allegiance to the new Constitution, and thus imposed upon the conscience of good Catholics an intolerable strain. More than half the clergy and all the bishops save four, refused to take the oath; the Church of France was rent in twain, and thousands of good men who were prepared also to become good citizens were converted into implacable opponents of the new régime. The King, a sincere Catholic, was anguished when, despite the refusal of the Pope to agree, he was impelled to assent to the new Constitution (December 26th). From that moment he began to contemplate flight.

§ MIRABEAU AND THE EXECUTIVE. Two other points in the new Constitution demand notice. In deference to the precepts of Montesquieu, the Assembly resolved that no member of the legislature should hold office under the Crown. Mirabeau strongly opposed this doctrinaire 'separation of powers'. But despite his opposition he was in December elected President of the Jacobin Club, and in January 1791 of the Assembly, but on April 2nd, prematurely worn out by his excesses, he died. Carlyle asserted dogmatically that had Mirabeau lived another year, 'the history of France and of the world had been different'. That statement may be over-confident. Yet nobody will dispute the truth of what Mirabeau said of himself: 'When I am gone they will know what the value of me was. I carry in my heart the death dirge of the French monarchy: the dead remains of it will now be the sport of factions.'

What precisely did this great man stand for? 'I am for the restoration of order but not for the restoration of the old Order. . . . I am what I have always been, the defender of monarchical power regulated by law, and the apostle of liberty guaranteed by monarchical power. . . . There can be no liberty without obedience to the law, no law without public force, and no public force without a strong

Executive. . . . Pygmies can destroy, but it needs great men to build.' Thus Mirabeau summarized his political creed. Robespierre was hardly a pygmy; still less was Danton; but the chance of reconstruction died with Mirabeau. Nemesis overtook him in mid-career; for Mirabeau's misspent years, France—nay all Europe—had to pay a tremendous penalty.

§ THE FLIGHT TO VARENNES. After Mirabeau's death the King realized that his position was well-nigh desperate. On April 18th, 1791, the King and Queen, when driving to make their Communion at St. Cloud, were turned back by a suspicious mob. On June 20th they left Paris with their family, hoping to reach Metz. Owing to treachery or gross inefficiency the attempt miscarried. At Varennes the King's coach was stopped, and with the Queen and their children he was carried back a prisoner to Paris.

Danton and Robespierre would at once have deposed the King, but they could get only thirty votes in the Assembly in favour of their proposal. The Parisian mob, resenting the delay, got out of hand. Bailly, as Mayor of Paris, and Lafayette, as Commander of the National Guard, did their best to maintain order, but the mob refused to disperse; the soldiers opened fire, perhaps a dozen people were killed and many wounded. This collision, described with characteristic exaggeration as the *Massacre of the Champ de Mars*, further widened the breach between the Assembly and the populace. But on September 14th the new Constitution received the assent of the King, who after a brief suspension was reinstated in office. On the 30th the Constituent Assembly was dissolved.

That Marie Antoinette should describe its work as a 'tissue of absurdities' was natural. English critics also, from Arthur Young and Edmund Burke downwards, have been apt to pour scorn upon the work of 'the men of theory'. Their constructive work was undeniably full of flaws: the Constitution, so meticulously elaborated, survived for less than twelve months. Their destructive work on the contrary has stood the test of time: the worst abuses of the *ancien régime* were finally abolished. Why was their constructive work so flimsy? No one has penetrated more deeply into the causes of their failure than de Tocqueville: 'The French Revolution was carried on precisely in that same spirit which has caused so many abstract books to be written on government. There was the same attraction towards general theories, complete systems of legislation, and exact symmetry in the laws—the same contempt of existing facts—the same reliance upon theory . . . the same desire to reconstruct, all at once, the entire Constitution by the rules of logic, and upon a single plan, rather than seek to amend it in its parts.'

Perhaps, however, the shrewdest and most far-sighted estimate of the work of the Constituent Assembly was that of Mirabeau: 'Compare the new state of affairs with the old rule; there is the ground

for comfort and hope. One part of the acts of the National Assembly, and that the more considerable part, is evidently favourable to monarchical government. . . . The idea of forming a single class of all the citizens would have pleased Richelieu; this equality of the surface facilitated the exercise of power. Several successive reigns of an absolute monarchy would not have done as much for the royal authority as this one year of revolution.' Mirabeau was right. The Emperor Napoleon exercising greater power than that of the old monarchy reaped the harvest sown by the Revolution.

CHAPTER XXI

THE FIRST REPUBLIC—THE FALL OF THE MONARCHY—FRANCE AND EUROPE (1792-5)

'Tyrants beset us without our borders; the friends of tyranny conspire within. In such a crisis the principle of our policy must be this: To govern the people by Reason and the enemies of the people by Terror; Terror is only justice more prompt, more vigorous, more inexorable, and therefore Virtue's child.'

ROBESPIERRE

BEFORE the Constituent Assembly was dissolved the Revolution had already entered upon a new phase. That it should have been confined to France was inherently impossible. The principles proclaimed in the Declaration of the Rights of Man were, if valid, universally applicable; Gentile and Jew, Englishmen, Germans, and Italians were entitled no less than Frenchmen to liberty and equality. The Gospel according to Rousseau was preached, like the Gospel of Karl Marx, to all mankind.

§ THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY. The 'Législative' met on October 1st, 1791. Consisting of a single Chamber of 745 members elected indirectly on a narrow franchise further restricted by the violent intimidation of voters, the Législative was neither frankly democratic nor even reasonably representative. By a crowning act of folly the Constituent had decreed that none of its members should be eligible for election to the Législative. The result of this self-denying decree was that the new Chamber consisted of men wholly without political experience, mostly young lawyers and journalists, who dreamt of reproducing the antique virtues of Republican Rome in a France which was still nominally a monarchy. Nor need the life of the Monarch have been sacrificed had there been less windy rhetoric and more practical wisdom in the new Legislature.

The Executive still remained in the hands of the King and Ministers appointed by him: but excluded from the Legislature they could exercise no influence upon it. In the Législative parties soon defined

themselves. The *Right* consisted of some 250 *Feuillants*, who posed as defenders of the Constitution and maintained friendly relations with the Court. Their weakness was that the leaders of the Right—men like Barnave and Dupont—were members neither of the Executive nor of the Legislature, but exercised their influence through the Feuillant Club. They relied for support on the bourgeoisie, on the National Guard, and on Lafayette. The extreme Left, definitely republican, was divided into two sections: the Jacobins who relied mainly on the clubs and the Parisian populace, and the Girondins who drew their support from the provinces and in particular from the Department which gave them their name. The most distinguished group in the Assembly, and at first the most influential, they became as Von Sybel has said, 'the darlings of those patriots for whom the Cordeliers (where Danton reigned supreme) were too dirty, and the Feuillants too lukewarm'. Republican in principle, they were strongly opposed to, and not groundlessly suspicious of, the Queen and her 'Austrian Committee', but in March 1792 the King appointed a Girondist Ministry, including Roland, (known as the husband of the brilliant and beautiful woman whose *salon* was the rendezvous of the party) and Dumouriez, a good soldier but an unprincipled man, disloyal both to the monarchy and to the Republic. In the Assembly the Girondist party found its leaders in Vergniaud, the most brilliant of their many orators, the Marquis de Condorcet, famous as man of science and philosopher, and Brissot, the editor of the *Patriote*, who had some knowledge of foreign affairs. The Girondins were bent on war with the German Powers. Not otherwise could they, as Picard said, 'make all tyrants tremble on their thrones of clay' nor complete the Revolution and establish a Republic at home.

§ AUSTRIA, PRUSSIA, AND RUSSIA. The situation in Europe favoured their design. The emigrant princes had established at Coblenz a miniature Court over which the King's brothers, the Count of Provence (afterwards Louis XVIII) and the Count of Artois (afterwards Charles X) presided, and had organized an army wherewith it was hoped to crush the Revolution. From Coblenz the *émigrés* made piteous appeals to Austria and Prussia to save the French royal family and to ward off the infection of revolution from their own countries. The Emperor Leopold, though not insensible to the danger which threatened his sister and her husband, was averse from intervention, wisely perceiving that it would only seal their fate. Unfortunately that sagacious statesman died on March 1st, 1792, and was succeeded by Francis II, a far weaker man, destined to be the last to wear the Crown of the Holy Roman Empire. Frederick William II of Prussia, though less interested in the fate of France than the Emperor, was more anxious for war, hoping that Prussia might gain fresh territory either at the expense of France

or of his hereditary enemy the Habsburg. Even more sinister were the motives of the Tsarina (Catherine II) of Russia, who encouraged the German sovereigns to fight France in the hope that their pre-occupation would permit Russia to complete the annihilation of Poland, and to advance further on the road towards Constantinople.

§ THE DECLARATION OF PILNITZ. In August 1791 the Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia issued a Declaration from Pilnitz. Though they rejected the appeal of the *émigrés* for intervention, they maintained that the position of the King in France was a matter of concern to all sovereigns; they demanded that France should reinstate the Princes of the Empire in their feudal rights in Alsace, and declared their intention (if other Powers concurred) to compel France, by force of arms if necessary, to make restitution. This foolish Declaration, though in fact an empty threat, so far from intimidating the war party in France, brought the anti-war Jacobins into line with the Girondins, and lashed both into frenzy. Still further was their anger increased against the King when he vetoed a number of decrees deliberately designed to provoke the veto. One decree required all *émigrés* to return to France on pain of death; another required all priests to take the oath of allegiance within a week; a third authorized the formation of an armed camp of 20,000 provincial volunteers—the *fédérés*—under the walls of the capital. Notwithstanding the King's veto the *fédérés* arrived in Paris from Marseilles at the end of July singing the new national hymn, henceforward famous as the 'Marseillaise'.

§ OUTBREAK OF WAR. The King's gestures of independence were combined with feebleness in action. On April 20th, 1792 he gave way to the Girondins and declared war on Austria.

The initial campaign, opening with an attack upon the Austrian Netherlands, was a complete fiasco. The French troops fled in panic and murdered their own generals. 'You marched out like madmen,' said Dumouriez, 'and you ran home like fools.' Inflamed by this disaster an angry mob armed with pikes burst into the Tuileries and the lives of the King and Queen were saved only by their own courage and dignity.

This outrage created a transitory reaction in favour of the monarchy but on July 11th the Assembly, after a speech from Vergniaud characteristic of the fervid but flatulent oratory of the Girondins, declared that 'the country was in danger'. If the country was in danger it must be saved, not by speeches, however eloquent, but by stern action and by a man not afraid to take it.

The man was there. Of the revolutionary leaders Danton was incomparably the greatest. With all his faults Danton was cast in an heroic mould. He responded at once to the call made upon all patriots by the outbreak of war. If the country was in danger only

one thing could save it from enemies without and traitors within. 'The way to stop the enemy,' said Danton, 'is to make the royalists fear.' 'Il faut de l'audace, encore de l'audace, toujours de l'audace et la France est sauvée.' The country was undoubtedly in danger. On July 25th the King of Prussia, master of the greatest army in Europe, declared war. On August 3rd a manifesto issued from Coblenz by the Prussian Commander, the Duke of Brunswick, called upon all Frenchmen to submit to their lawful sovereign, and threatening that if any outrage were committed upon the King or his family Paris would be demolished. The effect of the manifesto was electrical. 'This fiery and impolitic manifesto,' wrote Mignet, 'which disguised neither the designs of the *émigrés* nor those of Europe, which treated a great people in a tone of command and of contempt . . . excited a national upheaval. More than anything else it hastened the fall of the throne.'

August 10th was Danton's answer to the Duke of Brunswick.

§ AUGUST 10TH. On August 9th a new *Commune* was set up; Mandat, the Commander of the National Guard, was murdered; the Swiss Guard, bravely defending the King and Queen in the Tuileries, were massacred, the palace was sacked, the King and his family took refuge in the Assembly. In the Assembly a handful of deputies in fear of the mob resolved on the suspension of the monarchy; the King and his family were sent as prisoners to the Temple; and a provisional Government was set up with Danton as Minister of Justice. A National Convention, to be elected by universal suffrage, was summoned to meet immediately. The events of August 10th marked a victory for the Jacobin Club, the Commune, and the populace of Paris—not least for Danton.

On August 19th the allied army crossed the Rhine and on the same day Lafayette, shocked by the events of August 10th, surrendered himself as a prisoner to the Austrians, and was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Dumouriez. Longwy fell on August 27th, and Verdun on September 2nd. The road to Paris was open; but on September 20th Brunswick's leisurely advance on Paris was checked by the Cannonade of Valmy.

§ THE SEPTEMBER MASSACRE. Valmy saved Paris from the allies, but not from its own frenzied and panic-stricken citizens. 'Terror,' said Robespierre, 'is only justice more prompt, more vigorous, more inexorable, and therefore Virtue's child.' Danton's image was more vivid: 'A nation in revolution is like the bronze boiling, and foaming, and purifying itself in the cauldron. Fiercely boils the metal; have an eye on the furnace, or the flame will surely scorch you.' Not a few people were more than scorched. When the news of the surrender of Verdun reached Paris, Hell broke loose. The prisons were crammed with priests, aristocrats, and royalists,

who issued from prison only to die by the guillotine. The number of victims innocent of anything worse than loyalty is variously estimated at 1,089 to 10,000.

§ EXECUTION OF THE KING. The Convention, consisting of 782 members, met on September 21st. Dominated like the Législative by a minority—the *enragés* responsible for the September massacre—it immediately resolved by acclamation that monarchy was from that day abolished in France and that the Convention itself should act as a tribunal for the trial of the King. The conscience-stricken Girondins attempted to interpose delays, but their attempt served only to inflame the mob who surrounded the Convention demanding the immediate execution of the tyrant (January 14th, 1793). Two days later the King was, by a narrow majority, sentenced to death. On January 21st, 1793, he was sent to the guillotine. 'Louis must die because the country must live.' Robespierre's ridiculous dilemma was accepted by the Convention as conclusive. 'A most revolting act of cruelty and injustice.' The comment of Charles James Fox anticipated the judgment of impartial history.

§ THE WAR. The murder of the King could not even be justified by political necessity. The country was no longer in danger. Before the end of October France had been cleared of the invader. On November 6th Dumouriez had won a brilliant victory at Jemappes on the Belgian frontier and had at once assumed the offensive. Before the winter of 1792-3 closed in, the armies of France were everywhere triumphant. Mons, Brussels, and Antwerp surrendered in turn and the whole of the Austrian Netherlands was in the hands of the French Republic. Upon the middle Rhine also France had established a firm grip. In Mainz, Speier, Würms, Frankfort, and Coblenz, as well as in Savoy and Nice, the French were welcomed as liberators.

§ THE PROPAGANDIST DECREES. Small wonder that the French Republicans were intoxicated by success, and resolved to extend the blessing of liberty to all peoples groaning under the heels of tyrants. On November 11th, 1792, one decree had been issued promising help and protection to all peoples struggling to be free, followed by a second (December 15th) declaring that all peoples, whether they wished it or not, must get rid of their 'crowned usurpers', on pain of being regarded as enemies of the French Republic. Burke was clearly right. No Government, monarchical or republican, could be safe while France was in this mood. Nor was official England ready to accept the dictation of the French Republicans. On December 81st Lord Grenville issued a solemn warning: 'England will never consent that France should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure . . . the political system of Europe, established by solemn treaties. . . . If France is really desirous of maintaining friendship and

peace with England, she must renounce her views of aggression and aggrandizement.'

§ GREAT BRITAIN AND THE REVOLUTION. Until the autumn of 1792 Great Britain had manifested no hostility towards the Revolution. By some Englishmen it was welcomed as likely to keep France quiet; by others as a flattering attempt at political imitation. But as the year 1792 drew to a close opinion definitely veered round. The Government was alarmed by the spread of revolutionary agitation at home, and still more by the French occupation of the Austrian Netherlands, and the threatened attack on Holland.

Burke's *Reflections*, published in November 1790, had produced a tremendous effect upon English opinion. 'This evil in the heart of Europe must,' he passionately declared, 'be extirpated from that centre, or no part of the circumference can be free from the mischief which radiates from it.' The only cure for the highly contagious disease was to stamp it out.

Burke was carried away by his sympathy for innocent suffering: there was some force in Tom Paine's criticism: 'He pitied the plumage but forgot the dying bird.' Pitt struggled to circumscribe the limits of the conflagration. But in vain. On February 1st, 1793, the French Republic declared war upon Great Britain and Holland, and about a month later upon Spain. Except for a short interlude between 1802 and 1803 Great Britain and France were, thenceforward, continuously at war for twenty-one years.

The entry of England into the war secured for the allies six months of unbroken military success. A great victory won by the Austrians against Dumouriez at Neerwinden (March 18th, 1793) compelled the French to evacuate the Netherlands and enabled the Austrians to invade France and threaten Paris. Another Austrian army invaded Alsace; the Prussians captured Mainz (July 23rd) and drove the French from the middle Rhine; Admiral Hood occupied Toulon on August 28th.

Reverses to French arms were coincident with domestic complications. Though the Republicans could command Paris, France was far from unanimous in their support. Toulon had surrendered to the English without a blow; Marseilles and Lyons were both in revolt against Paris, but the most serious rising in favour of the Old Régime was that of the nobles, priests, and peasants, of La Vendée. Not until 1796 was that loyal population, which had repeatedly refused to yield to the Terror, finally pacified by the wise toleration and statesmanship of General Hoche. The defection of Dumouriez (April 1793), the ablest of the Revolutionary soldiers, was another serious blow to the Republic.

§ THE TERROR. Reverses served only to quicken the pace of the Revolution. The Republic armed itself with new weapons. In

March 1793 the Convention sent out *Représentants en Mission* in order to keep the provinces and the armies up to the pitch of enthusiasm prevailing in the capital, and in particular to promote the fresh levy of 300,000 men decreed by the Convention in February.

An extraordinary Criminal Tribunal was set up in the same month, and in April the first Committee of Public Safety was appointed. If the country was again in danger it was plainly imperative to secure unity in its councils. To this end the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary were all to be purged of lukewarm adherents, still more of suspected reactionaries. 'Beware,' Vergniaud warned the Convention, 'lest a Revolution, like Saturn, devour its own children one by one, and then give birth to a despot and to all calamities that follow in a despot's train.' The warning was not otiose, nor did the implicit prophecy lack prompt fulfilment. To the voracious appetite of the Revolution one party after another—Girondins, Hébertists, Dantonists, and finally Jacobins, with Robespierre himself—was successively sacrificed. Marat, the publisher of *L'ami du Peuple*, though acquitted by the Republican Tribunal, was assassinated by Charlotte Corday in July. The death of this bloodthirsty ruffian relieved his friends of an embarrassing colleague, but added to the unpopularity of his Girondist opponents. To an act of avenging justice his murderess owes her niche in the Temple of Fame.

Vengeance alone demanded the judicial murder of a much more distinguished victim. On October 14th, 1793, the Queen, Marie Antoinette, was brought to trial, and two days later she went to the scaffold with a courage and dignity worthy of the daughter of the Empress Maria Theresa. The Queen was followed to the guillotine by twenty-two of the Girondist leaders, including Vergniaud, Madame Roland, and Brissot, Bailly, the first Mayor of Paris, and Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, the unworthy renegade who had sought safety as 'Égalité'.

If the war which the Girondins invoked saved the Revolution it did not save their own skins. Gifted and amiable enthusiasts, they were not bloodthirsty. 'Nous voulons fonder la République par sa sagesse plutôt que par le sang,' said Madame Roland. Unfortunately wisdom was not in this instance justified of her children: the Girondins, as a political party, consistently exhibited their futility. On March 8th, 1793, Danton proposed to allow members of the Convention to become Ministers. Had the Girondins supported him he might conceivably have become Prime Minister in a 'Constitutional' Republic. It was not to be. Whether from sensitive aversion from grasping a bloodstained hand or from selfish fear lest an ally might prove a master, the Girondins declined Danton's advances and signed their own political death-warrant. Perhaps Danton's also. In May 1793 the Girondins, with the half-hearted support of the Convention, made a last effort to assert their authority against the

Terrorists, who relied on the Commune and the clubs. But the effort, which included the arrest of Hébert, whose *Le Père Duchesne* touched the lowest depths of revolutionary journalism, recoiled on themselves. They were compelled to release Hébert, and on June 2nd, 1793, an armed mob invaded the Convention and twenty-nine deputies including the Girondin leaders were suspended. Danton, rejected by the Girondins, was thrown back upon the extremists. But his influence was waning. From the re-elected Committee of Public Safety he was excluded (July 10th), and for the next twelve months Robespierre's supremacy was unshaken.

§ ROBESPIERRE. For Robespierre's complete if brief ascendancy it is not easy to account. Like Danton, of bourgeois origin, he was, like him, a lawyer by profession. Though elected to the States-General of 1789 as a deputy, Robespierre's power rested on the position he acquired in the Jacobin Club. How did he acquire it? Fastidious in dress, relatively austere in morals, he gained the reputation of being personally incorruptible in a peculiarly corrupt society. Though not an orator of the type of Vergniaud or Danton he dominated the Assemblies and Committees of which he was a member by an air of superior wisdom and cool disdain, not less than by his amazing dialectical skill. His ascendancy over rough colleagues in council may have been something like that of Parnell over the Biggars of the Irish party. Mirabeau, his colleague in the National Assembly, predicted his success: 'That man will go far, for he believes every word he says.' That his abilities were mediocre, his vanity colossal, and his courage deficient, is certain. Yet his contemporaries must have recognized force in a man who could destroy in turn the Girondins, the Hébertists, and the great Danton himself and, surviving them all, could, for a time, rule France.

'To be safe,' said Hébert, 'you must kill everybody.' A systematic attempt was made to carry out the prescription. Hébert himself was sent to the scaffold with his friends in March 1794. Within a fortnight came the turn of Danton and his friends.

Danton was undeniably a statesman and a patriot. The Terror was, indeed, largely his work; but if he shed blood remorselessly it was not to serve personal ends, but to save a *patrie* that he sincerely believed to be in danger.

§ THE REPUBLIC TRIUMPHANT. Carnot shared Danton's opinion. Admitted in August 1793 to the Committee of Public Safety (reorganized in July), he demanded a *levée en masse*, overhauled the whole military machine, and inspired the new armies he raised with his own fiery enthusiasm. The effect was soon apparent. Before the end of the year, 1793, the Republic had triumphed all along the line. The English were defeated at Hondschoote (September 8th) and compelled to raise the siege of Dunkirk; the Austrians were

beaten at Wattignies (October 6th) and Neerwinden was thus avenged; Alsace was cleared; the allies were forced back across the Rhine, and the English and Spaniards were compelled to evacuate Toulon (December). Domestic insurrections were also suppressed. The inhabitants of Lyons were practically exterminated, the rising in La Vendée was crushed, whole provinces were handed over to military execution in the hope of wiping out provincials who refused to submit to the tyranny of Paris.

In Paris various bodies—the Convention, the Committee of Public Safety, and the Commune—by no means mutually harmonious, were playing their different rôles. In June 1793 the Convention voted a new and ultra-democratic Constitution. But this Constitution was still-born, being presently superseded by the Constitution of the year III (adopted in August 1795) which brought the Government of the Directory into being. The *Law of the Maximum* fixed maximum prices for food, raw materials, and manufactured goods. By the *Law of the Suspect* (September 1793) the Revolutionary Committees, both in Paris and in the provinces, were empowered to imprison not only all relations of *émigrés* or other nobles, but all who by word, act, or writing showed sympathy with the fallen monarchy and the *ancien régime*, or were lukewarm in support of the Republic. The prisons were filled only to be periodically emptied by the daily procession to the Place de la Révolution, where, as Carlyle graphically put it, 'the guillotine, by its speed of going, will give index of the general velocity of the Republic'.

After Danton's death Robespierre's ascendancy was complete. He had struck down all his enemies and rivals. But what then? Was he aiming at a dictatorship? Robespierre lacked courage for the part. Did he cling to power simply for power's sake, or to save a coward's skin? Did this pedant dream of countering the atheism of the Hébertists by teaching the doctrine of immortality, and proclaiming himself the High Priest of a new religion which recognized the existence of a Supreme Being, and ordered all men to worship Him? The enigma persists; but two facts may be recorded. The grotesque *Fête de l'Être Suprême* at which on June 8th Robespierre presided was a laughable fiasco. Two days later the *Law of 22nd Prarial* (June 10th) was promulgated. This terrible decree struck terror not only into the Convention, whose members it deprived of their immunity from arrest, but into the Terrorists themselves. From henceforth no man's life was safe for an hour. Robespierre had at last overreached himself. For a month the various groups, lacking cohesion, each suspicious of the other, though all threatened by the new decree, still hesitated to strike at a tyrant, feared and detested by them all. On July 26th Robespierre made a supreme effort in the Convention to put fear into his enemies and quell the growing opposition. But it miscarried. On July 27th the Convention ordered

Robespierre's arrest, and he took refuge at the Hôtel de Ville, the headquarters of the Commune. That night the Hôtel de Ville was attacked, and next morning Robespierre, still bleeding from a wound, perhaps self-inflicted, was dragged off to the Place de la Révolution, and there, on 10th Thermidor (July 28th), with his brother, his devoted disciples Couthon and Saint-Just, and about a score of his followers, he paid the penalty he had exacted from so many of his victims.

'Oui, il y a un Dieu.' So a Paris workman had remarked as he gazed on the bleeding body of the arch-terrorist. He expressed the relief and satisfaction felt by the vast majority of Frenchmen.

CHAPTER XXII

REACTION—THE THERMIDOR—THE DIRECTORY— NAPOLEON BONAPARTE (1795-9)

'The French Revolution never got further than the emancipation of the individual. That is why, after having embodied its idea in a "Declaration of the Rights of Man"—of the individual, it could only end in a man—in Napoleon.'

MAZZINI

THE death of Robespierre marked the end of the Terror and of the Revolution proper. The character of the Thermidorian reaction was manifested by a series of measures rapidly taken and unmistakably significant. The Commune of Paris was abolished; the Committee of Public Safety was reconstructed; Billaud-Varennes, Collot D'Herbois, and Barère, the arch-terrorists, at once withdrew from the Committee, and were presently brought to trial and deported; the revolutionary tribunal was suspended; the Law of the 22nd of Prairial repealed, and the suspects gradually released; the Press recovered a measure of liberty; the Jacobin Club was closed (November 11th); the National Guard reorganized; the seventy-three deputies expelled from the Convention after June 2nd were reinstated (December 9th); the powers of the *Représentants en Mission* were curtailed and the surviving Girondist deputies were recalled (March 8th, 1795). The repeal of the *Law of the Maximum* (December 23rd, 1794), though a concession to public opinion and to economic orthodoxy, served to intensify the distress and confusion caused by the rapid fall in the value of the *assignats*, which by the end of the year 1795 were worth only 1 per cent of their nominal value. One hundred assignats would barely purchase a plate of soup: thousands of people were faced literally by starvation.

§ THE DIRECTORIAL CONSTITUTION. Meanwhile a Committee of the Convention had drafted the *Constitution of the Year III*—

popularly known as the Directorial Constitution (1795). Great efforts were made to avoid the blunders of the Constitutions successively adopted since 1792. The unicameral system, like the similar experiments tried in England under the Commonwealth,¹ was abjured, and the legislative authority was vested in a *Corps Législatif*, consisting of the *Conseil des Anciens* and the *Conseil des Cinq-Cents*. The *Cinq-Cents* only could initiate legislation; the *Anciens* could suspend it for a year. The *Anciens*, 250 in number, were to be married men or widowers elected from and by the entire *Corps Législatif*. The *Cinq-Cents* were to be indirectly elected, by resident taxpayers. One-third of each council was to retire annually, but of the first councils, two-thirds were by a most unpopular provision to be selected from the members of the outgoing Convention.

The composition of the Executive respected the principle of 'division of powers' consecrated by Montesquieu's philosophy, and rigidly adhered to in all the successive Constitutions since 1789. A Directory of five members was to be selected by the *Anciens* out of a list of fifty presented by the *Cinq-Cents*. The Directors were to appoint and control the ministers, who in fact became little more than clerks; the Directors were not to sit in the *Corps Législatif*, nor to control finance or to command troops. They could not dissolve the *Corps Législatif*, nor could the latter dismiss them. Thus, the Directors, removable only by impeachment, were responsible neither to the Legislature nor to the people. One Director, chosen by lot, was to retire each year. In Mignet's judgment the authors of the new Constitution deserved, though they could not command, success:

'If any Constitution could have become firmly established it was the Directorial Constitution. . . . But it did not last longer than the others, because it could not establish legal order in spite of parties. . . . When parties do not wish to terminate a Revolution, and those who do not dominate never wish to terminate it, a Constitution, however excellent it may be, cannot accomplish it.'

Mignet states the simple truth; M. Thiers penetrates more deeply into the philosophy of the matter:

'Constitutional Government is a chimera at the conclusion of a Revolution such as that of France. It is not under shelter of legal authority that parties whose passions have been so violently excited can arrange themselves and repose; a more vigorous power is required to restrain them, to fuse their still burning elements, and protect them against foreign violence. That power is the Empire of the sword.'

The sword did not long remain in the scabbard. Even before the Directory was established the army had to come to the aid of the civil power. The 'Perpetuation' Decrees of Fructidor (August 1795) were so exceedingly unpopular that an insurrection broke out in

¹ For details see Marriott: *Second Chambers* (Oxford, 1927), Chapter III, and Marriott: *The Crisis of English Liberty* (Oxford, 1930), Chapter XIV.

October when the extreme democrats made common cause with the Royalists, who had recently suffered several blows. In June death at last ended the cruel sufferings and bitter humiliations of the Dauphin (Louis XVII), and some 3,600 French *émigrés* who had landed under the protection of a British fleet at Quiberon were annihilated by General Hoche and the survivors were brutally massacred.

§ THE 'WHIFF OF GRAPESHOT'. The Republic was saved; but in protest against the 'Perpetuation Decree' some 30,000 of the National Guards joined in an attack upon the Convention. The defence was entrusted to Barras, who in 1793 had shown skill and energy in checking the spread of the anti-Republican revolt in the south. He summoned to his aid a young gunner who had lately distinguished himself in the defence of Toulon. A few guns skilfully posted sufficed for the job. Napoleon's 'whiff of grapeshot' dispersed the insurgents; the Convention completed its labours in peace; on October 26th it dissolved itself; on October 30th the five Directors were nominated; on November 3rd the new Government was installed.

The Directorial Constitution lasted for just four years (November 1795–November 1799). The only really great man among the Directors was Carnot, a man of outstanding probity and patriotism, justly famed as the organizer of the armies that had saved the Republic and brought triumph to France. But the Republic could not survive the triumph of its armies; the General who led them to victory inevitably became the master of the State. Burke, at the outset of the Revolution, had ventured on a prophecy: 'The army will remain for some time mutinous and full of faction until some popular general who understands the art of conciliating the soldiery, and who possesses the true spirit of command, shall draw the eyes of all men upon himself . . . but the moment in which that event shall happen, the person who really commands the army is your master; the master (that is little) of your king, the master of your Assembly, the master of your whole republic.'

Burke's prediction was as accurate as it was astute. But even before the advent of Napoleon, Republican France had already triumphed over domestic disaffection and foreign enemies.

§ PROGRESS OF THE WAR. The adhesion of Great Britain, Spain, and Holland, had secured six months' success for the allies in 1793. But Carnot, admitted to the Committee of Public Safety in August 1793, had brought new vigour to the conduct of the war. The results of the *levée en masse* and the opening of a career to talent were soon manifested. The Royalist risings in Lyons and La Vendée were suppressed, and the great arsenal of Toulon was recaptured from the English. An Anglo-Hanoverian force was defeated at Hondschoote (September 8th, 1793); and Jourdan won a notable

victory over Coburg at Wattignies (October 1793). In November, Lazare Hoche, who had started life as a groom in the royal stables, was appointed, at the age of twenty-five, to the command of the army of the Moselle. At the end of December 1793, he defeated the Austrian army under Wurmser at Weissenburg and relieved Landau. By January 1794 the whole of the Palatinate was in the hands of the French.

In the spring of 1794 Jourdan, lately appointed by Carnot to the command of the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse, crossed the Meuse, captured Charleroi (May), inflicted a decisive defeat on Coburg at Fleurus (June 25th), and before the end of the year occupied Cologne, Andernach, Coblenz, and Mannheim. Even more significant was General Pichegru's progress. Having reconquered the Austrian Netherlands, he invaded (December 1794) the United Provinces, which submitted to France and in May 1795 was reconstituted as a vassal State of France under the style of the 'Batavian Republic'. Luxemburg capitulated in June; Spain concluded peace with the French Republic in July; the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) was definitely incorporated with France in October.

§ THE TREATY OF BASLE. These events followed quickly on a still more important achievement for French diplomacy. On April 5th, 1795, Prussia, faithless to her allies, and completely indifferent even to the interests of Germany, concluded with France the Treaty of Basle. Prussia surrendered to France her own provinces to the west of the Rhine and gave France a free hand in regard to other German territory on the left bank; in return France agreed to compensate Prussia by concessions east of the Rhine which would virtually have made her dominant in North Germany.

England, Austria, and Sardinia (which had already lost Savoy) were now left alone to confront a France which had extended her territories to those 'natural frontiers' which Richelieu and Louis XIV had vainly endeavoured to secure for her.

§ NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. Still greater triumphs were, however, in store for France. The signal service rendered by Napoleon Bonaparte to the Republic on the 13th Vendémiaire was rewarded by his appointment to the command of the army of Italy. Born in 1769 at Ajaccio in Corsica, of Italian stock, Napoleon was educated in France at the military schools of Brienne and Paris, and after completing his studies, was posted to a regiment of artillery. Posing as a Jacobin, he attached himself to Robespierre, who sent him to Toulon. Having greatly contributed to the recovery of Toulon from the English, he was employed by Barras, one of the Directors, to quell the threatened insurrection of the 13th Vendémiaire. The 'whiff of grapeshot' saved the Government and made Napoleon.

Some months earlier Napoleon had drawn up a plan for an Italian

campaign. Carnot, greatly impressed by it, advised that its author should be entrusted with its execution, and on March 2nd Napoleon was appointed to the command of the army of Italy. In Paris, he had fallen madly in love with a beautiful creole lady Josephine, widow of the Vicomte de Beauharnais, a victim of the terror. On March 9th, after a brief and tempestuous wooing, he was married to her. He scorned the notion, circulated by jealous comrades, that he owed his rapid promotion to patronage, male or female. 'Do they think that I need patronage to succeed?' he said to Josephine. 'They will be only too happy for me to grant them mine. My sword is at my side and with it I shall go far.' On March 27th he joined the army he was to lead to victory. The words he addressed to his troops were characteristic: 'You are badly fed and all but naked. I am about to lead you into the most fertile plains in the world. Before you are great cities and rich provinces; there you shall find honour, glory, and riches.'

About the wealth of the Italian cities there was no question, but much of it was destined to fill not the pockets of the soldiers, who were to win it by blood and sweat, but to replenish the empty coffers of the Directory. 'Leave nothing in Italy which you can, without detriment to the political situation, carry away, and which will be useful to us.' Such were the instructions issued by the Directory to their General. Nor did Napoleon disappoint his employers.

§ THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN. The Italian campaign was, however, directed primarily not against the Italian States, but against Austria. Of the ten Italian States only one—Lombardy (the Milanese) was directly ruled by Austria, but the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and many of the smaller States were ruled by Habsburg Cadets. One Spanish Bourbon sat on the throne of Naples and Sicily; another was Duke of Parma and Piacenza. Central Italy lay benumbed under the hand of the Papacy. Venice and Genoa retained the form of republics, but without the vigour which had distinguished them in the Middle Ages. Only in Piedmont, ruled by the House of Savoy with the title of Kings of Sardinia, was there a sign of active political life.¹

Into Italy Napoleon descended as a deliverer. 'I know,' he said, 'how to use the talismanic words "liberty" and "national independence".' It may well be that, even in 1796, Napoleon foresaw the unification of Italy. He not only foresaw it; he did much to achieve it. He created a Kingdom of Italy; he trampled underfoot the prejudices and jealousies of the smaller States; many of them he eliminated altogether; he built bridges and made roads; he unified the law and the administration; above all, he taught the Italian people to fight, and to fight not as Lombards, Tuscans, or Neapolitans, but as Italians.

¹ For further details cf. Marriott: *The Makers of Modern Italy* (Oxford, 1931).

Napoleon's plan of campaign was based upon a threefold advance on Vienna. Jourdan, in command of the army which had lately won distinction in the Netherlands, was to advance by the valley of the Main; Moreau by the Danube; Napoleon himself was to attack in North Italy and to take the Austrians in flank. The plan, though brilliant in conception, presupposed a degree of co-operation between three armies too widely separated to achieve it. Jourdan penetrated into the Palatinate, but defeated by the Archduke Charles at Amberg (August 24th) and at Würzburg (September 3rd), was glad to regain French territory without further disaster. Moreau got as far as Munich, but as his left was uncovered by the defeat of Jourdan, he had no option but to fall back before the victorious Archduke.

All the more splendid by contrast was Napoleon's success in North Italy. His first object was to drive in a wedge between the Austrians and their Sardinian allies. That was accomplished in a fortnight (April 11th–28th): on April 28th Napoleon granted to the Sardinians the armistice of Cherasco, the terms of which were embodied in a definitive peace (May 15th). The old King of Sardinia was reluctantly compelled to renounce the Austrian alliance—very dearly bought—to cede Savoy and Nice to France, and to allow Napoleon to occupy the fortresses of Tortona, Valenza, and Coni. The possession of Coni secured Napoleon's communications with Nice.

Napoleon having put the Piedmontese out of action, then turned upon the Austrians, forced the passage of the Adda, after a fiercely contested fight at the bridge of Lodi (May 10th), and on the 16th entered Milan. In Milan, as in other Italian cities, the ground had been well prepared for the advent of the French republicans. Jacobin clubs, heavily subsidized from Paris, had been established; Napoleon was consequently welcomed as a liberator: there were 'Quislings' even in those days. Austrian troops, however, still held the citadel.

Alarmed by the rapid and brilliant successes of Napoleon, other Italian princes, including the Dukes of Parma and Modena and the Pope, hastened to come to terms with him. By the peace of Tolentino (February 1797) the Pope agreed to close his ports to English ships, to renounce all claim to Avignon, to cede Ancona, Bologna, and Ferrara to France, to pay a large indemnity and to hand over valuable manuscripts, pictures, and statues. Money and art treasures were similarly extorted from all the other Italian cities and princes with whom Napoleon made peace. By the Treaty of San Ildefonso (August 19th, 1796) Spain became the ally of France. In October she declared war against Great Britain, and the latter thought it prudent to withdraw her fleet from the Mediterranean. Spain, however, soon had to pay a heavy price for her adhesion to France in the loss of Trinidad and the annihilation of her navy at Cape St. Vincent (February 1797).

In North Italy, Napoleon went from strength to strength. By a

secret treaty concluded (May 27th, 1796) with the Venetian Republic, whose territory he had already violated, Napoleon obtained permission to march through the territory of the Republic and to besiege Venetian fortresses garrisoned by Austrian troops. He was compelled temporarily to raise the siege of Mantua (July 31st), but in August one Austrian general, Wurmser, was defeated at Brescia and Castiglione; another, Alvintzi, was routed after three days fierce fighting at Arcola (November 15th–17th, 1796), and again at Rivoli (January 14th, 1797). On February 2nd Mantua, the most important strategical point in North Italy, finally surrendered to Napoleon.

The fall of Mantua opened the road to Vienna, but when Napoleon was within eighty miles of that city preliminaries of peace were arranged at Leoben (April). After six months' hard bargaining a definitive peace was concluded between the French Republic and the Austrian Emperor¹ at Campo Formio (October 17th, 1797).

§ THE TREATY OF CAMPO FORMIO. Neither the conduct of the war nor the protracted negotiations for peace were allowed to monopolize Napoleon's attention. He was already planning the reorganization of Italy and considering the next moves in the political game in France. Before the end of 1796 Lombardy had been transformed into the Transpadane Republic, while Bologna and Ferrara, Modena and Reggio were united in a Cispadane Republic. Six months later these two republics were combined to form the Cisalpine Republic, and to it were subsequently added the Valteline, Venetia west of the Adige, and other strips of territory.

While negotiations with Austria were proceeding, Napoleon picked a quarrel with Venice, and having, in the sacred name of 'liberty', deposed the ruling oligarchy, had occupied the city of the lagoons and the Venetian islands in the Adriatic. Genoa was converted into a client Republic of France under the name of the Ligurian Republic. Throughout the negotiations with Austria Napoleon comported himself not as the servant of a tottering republic, but as an independent conqueror.

'Do you suppose,' he said to Mellito de Miot in May 1797, 'that I triumph in Italy for the glory of the lawyers of the Directory, a Carnot or a Barras? Do you suppose that I mean to found a Republic? . . . The nation wants a chief, a chief covered with glory, not theories of government, phrases, ideological essays that the French do not understand. They want some playthings; that will be enough; they will play with them and let themselves be led, always supposing they are cleverly prevented from seeing the goal towards which they are moving.'

In accord with the status he had thus already assumed, Napoleon signed the Treaty of Campo Formio (October 17th, 1797). Austria definitely accepted the annexation of the Austrian Netherlands

¹ Not until 1804 was Francis II proclaimed Emperor of Austria.

(Belgium) to France; she recognized the Cisalpine Republic and agreed to compensate the Duke of Modena with Breisgau; she obtained continental Venice east of the Adige together with Istria and Dalmatia. Venetia west of the Adige was added to the Cisalpine Republic. The secret terms of the treaty were a counterpart of those made with Prussia at Basle. The Princes of the Empire dispossessed on the west of the Rhine were to be indemnified by other German lands. Austria cared as little as did Prussia about Germany or the Empire. For herself, the acquisition of Salzburg, a slice of Bavaria, and the Venetian territories, giving her access to the Adriatic, more than compensated for the loss of the Belgian Netherlands which she had long wished to 'exchange'. France too was satisfied. She had reached her 'natural frontier' on the Rhine, and the annihilation of the ancient republics of Venice and Genoa were steps towards the formation of the Italian Kingdom, which Napoleon was already looking forward to, and the Ionian Isles. 'Corfu, Zante, and Cephalonia were,' as he wrote (August 11th, 1797), 'more important to France than the whole of Italy.'

For the young General who had conquered Italy was looking ahead. To him England was *the* enemy: India was the glittering prize which should reward the conqueror of England. But the conquest of England was to be effected not in Europe, but in Egypt! 'Really to ruin England, we must make ourselves masters of Egypt.' Might not the Ionian Isles serve as stepping-stones to Egypt? Was not Egypt a stepping-stone to India? Talleyrand represented Napoleon's views to the Directory: 'Our war with England represents the most favourable opportunity for the invasion of Egypt. Threatened by an imminent landing on her own shores, she will not desert her coasts to prevent our enterprise. This offers us the further chance of driving the English out of India by sending thither 15,000 troops from Cairo via Suez.'¹ But for the moment Napoleon's task was to surround France with client Republics. The United Provinces had already been, in 1795, transformed into the Batavian Republic. Disturbances in Rome gave France an excuse for occupying that city; the Pope was expelled, and the Roman Republic established (1798). In the same year Switzerland, unwillingly involved in the continental turmoil, was conquered and reconstructed as the Helvetic Republic.

§ 18TH FRUCTIDOR. While Napoleon was thus winning victories for the Republic abroad, things were going badly for it at home. From the outset the *Constitution of the year III* would not work. There was no cohesion among parties in the Legislature: even in the Executive there were divisions: between the *Corps Législatif* and the Directory there was no correspondence nor did either represent the public opinion of France. The vast majority of Frenchmen wanted

¹ Jonquière: *L'Expédition de l'Égypte*, i, 161.

a settled and stable Government: of persecution and proscriptions they had had more than enough. Had there been a suitable candidate for the throne they would gladly have seen the monarchy restored. If the emigrant nobles would have frankly acquiesced in the redistribution of landed property and in the loss of their privileges, there would have been no obstacle to their return to France. Still more did the French desire the restoration of the churches to their rightful uses. There was in fact some modification in the laws against the *émigrés*; by 1797 no fewer than forty-one churches had been reopened in Paris alone, and religious services had been resumed in more than 30,000 communes. But three out of five Directors, terrified lest they might lose their unlimited opportunities for 'graft', deemed it prudent to summon to their support against 'royalism' the conqueror of Italy. Napoleon, realizing that 'the pear was not ripe', declined the summons, but sent to Paris Augereau, a lieutenant well fitted to do any rough work. With Augereau's aid the *coup d'état* of 18th Fructidor (September 4th, 1797) was effected. The Corps Législatif was 'purged'. Fifty-three members of the Council, including Pichegru, who had won great renown as commander successively of the armies of the Rhine and of the North, were arrested and exiled. Carnot and Barthélemy, the two minority Directors, escaped a like fate by flight. Thus was the authority of the Directors temporarily restored, though the ultimate advantage accrued solely to Napoleon. Shortly after the *coup d'état* of Fructidor, Napoleon was appointed to the command of the 'army of England' with a view of attempting an immediate invasion. But after a careful inspection of the Channel coast he decided that invasion was not then practicable.

§ THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION. Napoleon had, in fact, other views. 'This little Europe,' he said to Bourrienne, 'offers too contracted a field. One must go to the East to gain power and greatness. Europe is a mere mole-hill; it is only in the East where there are 600,000,000 human beings that there have ever been vast Empires and mighty revolutions. . . . If, as I fear, the success of a landing in England should appear doubtful, I shall make my army of England the army of the East and go to Egypt.'¹ Napoleon's instructions (doubtless drafted by himself) were to seize Egypt, to chase the English from all their possessions within his reach, to destroy all their trading stations on the Red Sea, to cut a canal through the isthmus of Suez, and to take all necessary steps to secure for the French Republic 'the free and exclusive possession of the Red Sea'.

'You are one of the wings of the Army of England.' So said Napoleon to his army at Toulon. On May 19th, 1798, he sailed from that port in command of an expedition elaborately equipped, supplied with experts, engineers, archaeologists, business men, and so forth,

¹ I combine two separate conversations with Bourrienne, but without altering the sense or language.

and with 35,000 troops on board. Having taken Malta with little opposition from the Knights of St. John (June 10th), Napoleon landed his troops in Egypt (July 1st), took Alexandria on the 2nd, fought and won the battle of the Pyramids against the Mamelukes on the 21st, and on the following day occupied Cairo. He then proceeded to reorganize the country as a dependency of France. He carried out a systematic survey of the land, employed scientific experts to analyse the soils and devise schemes for irrigation; established at Cairo a Cultural Institution, and incorporated the chief European traders in a commercial company. He improved sanitary conditions in Cairo, established tanneries and munition factories, and, warned by a serious rising of the mixed population of Cairo, built a series of forts to suppress any recurrence of disorder.

His position in Egypt was, however, rendered precarious by the presence of a powerful British squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson, in the Eastern Mediterranean. In May 1798 Nelson had been sent to watch Napoleon's movements. Twice during the voyage from Toulon the French flotilla narrowly escaped him, but on August 1st he caught it in Aboukir Bay and by a manœuvre conceived with great skill and executed with superb courage completely annihilated it. An expert has said that the 'Battle of the Nile was really the decisive naval engagement of the whole struggle with France from 1793 to 1815'.¹ It was, indeed, undeniably important. Napoleon cut off from his base and deprived of his fleet, boldly took the offensive in Syria. The Sultan of Turkey had declared war on the invader of his Egyptian dependency (September 11th), and a few months later joined the second coalition against France. On March 7th, 1799, Napoleon occupied Jaffa, and on the 19th laid siege to Acre, but Acre, succoured by an English fleet commanded by Sir Sidney Smith, held out until on May 21st the siege was raised. Napoleon, after inflicting a terrible defeat on the Turks at Mount Tabor (April 16th), then withdrew to Egypt, from which the Turks were determined to dislodge him. But on July 11th a second Turkish army, having disembarked at Aboukir Bay, was driven into the sea by Napoleon (July 25th). Napoleon's victory was barren. News from Paris convinced him that 'the pear was ripe'. Accordingly, leaving his troops in Egypt under the command of Kléber, Napoleon, with a small band of his most devoted lieutenants, embarked at Alexandria on August 25th, and, although the Mediterranean was carefully patrolled by the British fleet, he managed to evade it, and landing at St. Raphael, near Fréjus, reached Paris on October 16th.

§ BREAKDOWN OF THE DIRECTORY. Paris, not to say all France, was in confusion. The successful *coup d'état* of Vendémiaire

¹ H. W. Wilson, ap. C.M.H., viii, 629.

had only postponed the inevitable crisis. The whole situation, financial, political, and social, was precarious in the extreme. Throughout provincial France disorder was sporadic. 'Everywhere there were crowds of functionaries, but nowhere was there effective administration. The Justices of the Peace were elected and served the faction to which they owed their promotion; the courts were too much frightened to be fair; the Mayors were for the most part illiterate; the police failed to pursue crime; and in local, no less than in central, government fiscal disorder reigned supreme. Thus all the functions of government were negligently performed. An ambitious educational scheme existed on paper, but there was no education . . . all public works shared the general decay . . . there was no political liberty, with a legislature twice mutilated, with elections persistently controlled by government, and with a Press supervised by the police. . . . Amid the disorder, the misery, and the vices of the time, there was one all-pervading passion—the craving for peace abroad and methodical government at home. Every one was disgusted with the Revolution; but no one save the priest and the *émigré* wished to recall the *ancien régime*.'¹ To improve upon H. A. L. Fisher's summary, at once succinct and sufficient, would be impossible.

The partial re-election of the Councils in May 1799 had further weakened the Directory, and highly significant was the appointment (July 20th) of Joseph Fouché as Minister of Police. Unscrupulous, ruthless, but highly efficient, Fouché was destined to play a very important part in public affairs during the years immediately ahead.

§ THE 18TH BRUMAIRE. Napoleon's arrival in Paris was perfectly timed. After a careful but unobtrusive survey of the ground he decided on an alliance with the Abbé Siéyès. Siéyès, in confederacy with Talleyrand, Fouché, Ducos, and Lucien Bonaparte, had already drafted a plan of procedure. On the 18th Brumaire (November 9th) it was put into operation.

The *Anciens*, all unsuspecting, were induced to vote three decrees, transferring the seat of Government to St. Cloud, calling upon the Directors to resign, and appointing Napoleon to the command of the troops in Paris. But when Napoleon himself, escorted by four grenadiers, burst into the Assembly he was assailed with cries of 'Down with the Dictator!', 'Outlaw him!' A scene of wild confusion followed: blows were exchanged; troops rushed in to rescue their General, who was carried half-fainting from the hall. But Lucien Bonaparte, President of the *Cinq-Cents*, promptly closed the sitting and called in the troops to clear the building. Then was the 'bauble' removed by Lucien at St. Cloud in 1799 as effectively as Cromwell had removed it from Westminster in 1653. The *Anciens*, informed by Lucien of the proceedings in the *Cinq-Cents*, did his bidding: abolished the

¹ C.M.H., viii, p. 667.

Directory and entrusted the provisional government to Napoleon Bonaparte, Siéyès, and Ducos.

Without the shedding of a drop of blood the *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire had been accomplished. The first French Republic had perished. Since 1789 a series of constitutional experiments had been tried. A limited monarchy, a republic with unicameral legislature, the Directory with a bicameral legislature—each, in turn, had failed. There remained nothing for it but to resort to absolute government. The Royal House had no candidate for the office. Burke's prediction was fulfilled: the victorious General ruled France.

CHAPTER XXIII

CONSULATE AND EMPIRE—THE CONCORDAT AND THE CODES (1799-1803)

'We have done with the Romance of the Revolution; we must now begin its History.'

NAPOLEON

TO regard Napoleon merely as a great soldier—perhaps the greatest of all time—is to ignore the permanent impress which he made upon the face of Europe. United Germany and United Italy testify to the thoroughness of Napoleon's work, both destructive and reconstructive. Modern France, embodying all that was most valuable in the work of the Revolution, and reanimated by Napoleon's genius, is his most enduring monument. But before the new order could be established the military situation had to be cleared up.

§ THE WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION. In 1798-9 Pitt built up the second Coalition, which was joined by Austria, Russia, Turkey, Naples, and Portugal. Prussia remained obstinately aloof.

In the autumn of 1798 Ferdinand IV of Naples temporarily restored the Papal States to the Pope, but was himself compelled to take refuge in his island kingdom of Sicily. Charles Emmanuel of Piedmont had to abdicate and quit Turin for Sardinia; while the Roman Republic was also quickly re-established by a force hurriedly dispatched from France by the Directors. Southern Italy was reorganized as the Parthenopean Republic (January 1799).

The tide turned in 1799. The Archduke Charles of Austria inflicted a series of defeats upon Jourdan and Masséna in South Germany; in North Italy the Austrian General, Kray, drove the French back on Milan, and before the autumn the brilliant tactics of Count Alexander Suvaroff, the Russian commander, completed their discomfiture. The whole of Lombardy and Piedmont was thus lost to France; the Cisalpine Republic was overthrown as well as the Roman and Parthenopean Republics.

The success of the allies was, however, evanescent. The jealousy between the Russian and Austrian commanders ruined any chance of successful combination in North Italy and Southern Germany. A joint Anglo-Russian descent, in the interests of the Orange Party, upon the Batavian Republic also failed for lack of concert between the allies.

The Russians proved themselves equally unsatisfactory allies in the Mediterranean. Instead of co-operating with the British fleet to prevent Napoleon's escape from Egypt, they devoted themselves to the Ionian Isles and Malta. The Ionian Isles they seized only to restore them in 1807 to Napoleon. Malta had been captured by Napoleon in June 1798, whereupon the Knights of St. John had elected as their Grand Master the Tsar Paul I, who was romantically interested in their Order. But in September 1800 the island surrendered to the British fleet.

§ ENGLAND AND EGYPT. Left in command of the French army, Kléber at once entered into negotiations for peace, but rather than surrender himself and his army as prisoners of war, with all their ships and stores, to Great Britain, he broke off negotiations. Three months later Kléber was assassinated. The reinforcements dispatched to Egypt by Napoleon failed to elude the British fleet; and in 1801 a British force under Sir Ralph Abercrombie compelled the French garrisons in Alexandria and Cairo to surrender. Egypt was restored to the Turks. Napoleon's Egyptian adventure had completely failed. But the dream that had inspired it never faded. After Tilsit, when the world was at his feet, India again beckoned to the Conqueror of Europe. In 1801, however, there was work nearer to hand. Though the Tsar Paul had withdrawn from the Coalition Austria and Great Britain were still in the field.

In May 1800 Napoleon himself, at the head of fresh troops, crossed the St. Gothard, and by the beginning of June was again in Milan and master of Lombardy. At Marengo, Napoleon not only retrieved an initial defeat, but dealt a crushing if costly blow at the Austrians (June 14th). On June 19th Moreau defeated the Austrian General Kray at Hochstadt and occupied Munich. After Marengo and Hochstadt an armistice was arranged, but after fruitless discussions hostilities were, at the end of November, resumed. At Hohenlinden, on December 2nd, Moreau completely routed the Austrian army, under its new commander, the Archduke John, and advanced to within seventy miles of Vienna. On Christmas Day he signed an armistice, leaving the French in possession of Bavaria and the Tyrol, and ready to strike at Vienna itself.

In Italy the triumph of French arms was similarly complete. On January 16th, 1801, an armistice was concluded with the Austrians, leaving the French in occupation of the line of the Adige with the fortresses of Verona, Peschiera, and Legnano. In South Italy

Ferdinand IV of Naples was also compelled to sign an armistice, leaving a French garrison in occupation of Taranto. Thus all Italy was again under the heel of Napoleon; Austria was at his mercy, and on February 9th, 1801, signed the Treaty of Lunéville.

§ THE TREATY OF LUNÉVILLE. The terms of the Treaty of Campo Formio were confirmed. In Italy, France was in occupation of Piedmont; the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics, now recognized by the Emperor, were under her protection; the Austrian boundary was definitely fixed at the Adige; Tuscany, to be converted into the Kingdom of Etruria, was surrendered to the son of the Bourbon Duke of Parma. Elsewhere, the Emperor recognized the Batavian and Helvetic Republics and acquiesced in the annexation of Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Rhine frontier, by France. By a treaty concluded in March, Ferdinand IV of Naples agreed to exclude British and Turkish vessels from his harbours, to maintain a French garrison at Taranto, and to surrender to France the maritime districts of Tuscany (the *Stato dei Presidii*) for the augmentation of the future Kingdom of Etruria. At the same time Spain ceded Louisiana to France, from whom it was subsequently (1803) purchased by the United States. In June, Charles IV of Spain also came to an agreement with his son-in-law the King of Portugal, whose dominions he had been reluctantly compelled by Napoleon to invade. By the Treaty of Badajoz (June 6th, 1801) Portugal undertook to pay an indemnity to France and, though reluctantly, to close its ports against English shipping, to the grievous detriment of Portuguese commerce and the revenues of its king.

Great Britain once more stood alone confronting France. Upon the destruction of English shipping and sea-power Napoleon was resolved. Nor was England's naval supremacy more acceptable to other Powers, whether hostile or nominally friendly. The Armed Neutrality had been formed during the American War of Independence (1780) to undermine it. In 1800, partly from annoyance with England, partly in adoration of Napoleon, the Tsar Paul I, Catherine's crazy successor, revived the scheme. Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia adhered to it, and Napoleon announced that the French Government, 'having principally at heart to oppose the invasion of the seas', would not treat for peace with England until she 'shall have acknowledged that the sea belongs to all nations'. But two things then happened: the Tsar Paul was on March 24th, 1801, assassinated, and in the same month the Danes closed Danish and North German ports to British shipping, Nelson was accordingly sent with a fleet into the Baltic, and on April 2nd inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Danish fleet off Copenhagen and seized the city.

§ THE PEACE OF AMIENS. The tables were thus turned on Napoleon. He was aware that though dazzled by his triumphant

progress on the Continent, the great mass of the French people longed for peace. Addington, Pitt's successor in England, was, like most of the English people, equally anxious for peace. Accordingly, the Treaty of Amiens was concluded between Great Britain, on the one side, and, on the other, France, Spain, and the Batavian Republic. France undertook to evacuate the Papal States and Taranto, to restore Egypt to the Porte, and to acknowledge the independence of the Ionian Isles. Great Britain restored to France and her allies all the colonial conquests (including Cape Colony) taken since 1792, except Ceylon (captured from the Dutch in 1796) and Trinidad (taken from Spain in 1797); she agreed that Malta should be restored to the Knights of St. John, and tacitly accepted the continental settlement as defined in the Treaties of Basle (1795), Campo Formio (1797), and Lunéville (1801).

The Treaty of Amiens caused profound disappointment in England, and was justly stigmatized in Parliament as not merely incommensurate with the great exertions and sacrifices we had made, but as unsafe and dishonourable and gravely detrimental to our interests, commercial and political. For Napoleon the treaty was unquestionably a triumph. It left France in possession of Belgium, the Rhine frontier, Nice, Savoy, and Piedmont, and virtually mistress of Holland, Switzerland, and the greater part of Italy. But neither to France nor to England did the actual terms of the agreement greatly matter. To both it gave breathing-time—greatly needed—to prepare for the greater struggle ahead.

§ THE CONSULATE CONSTITUTION. In France the *coup d'état* of 18th Brumaire had given satisfaction to all parties. The Royalists hoped that Napoleon would play the part of General Monk and restore the monarchy; the moderate constitutionalists looked to him to consolidate the constructive work of the Revolution, to preserve liberty while restoring order; the mass of the people ardently hoped that it would bring to France repose and security.

The immediate task of the Provisional Government, set up after the fall of the Directory (November 11th–December 25th), was to draft a new Constitution. The scheme, which emanated from the fertile brain of the Abbé Siéyès, was primarily designed, by a balance of authorities and the dispersion of powers, to guard against usurpation from within or without. 'Crude democracy' was to Siéyès 'an absurdity.' Consequently, though lip homage was paid to it, and the suffrage was to be universal, election was so elaborately indirect that popular representation was virtually extinguished. Legislative power was vested in three bodies (though only the Government could initiate legislation): (i) a *Senate* consisting (ultimately) of eighty members for life, and enjoying a salary of 25,000 francs, was appointed to nominate the Consuls, to select from a list of 5,000 (*Listes de Notabilité*) sent up by the Departments, the members of the two other

bodies, and to veto any unconstitutional laws passed by them; (ii) a *Tribunate* of 100 members who could discuss laws but not vote upon them; and (iii) a *Corps Législatif* of 300 members who could vote upon *projets de loi* without debate. The Executive was vested in a Grand Elector and two Consuls, but the former, having nominated the Consuls and a Council of State, was to vanish phantom-like into thin air. So Siéyès proposed. Not so did Napoleon dispose. He swept away the Grand Elector and the 'house of shadows', abolished the Tribunate, and concentrated power in himself as First Consul with two subordinate colleagues. To the First Consul, henceforth master of France, was to belong the right of appointing the ministers and all the chief officials; of initiating legislation, and nominating the Senators. The first two Senators were Siéyès himself and Roger Ducos, their places as Consuls being filled by Jean Jacques Roger de Cambacères and Charles François Lebrun. Lebrun, a man of over sixty, of Norman origin, and supposed to have leanings towards legitimate monarchy, never wavered in loyalty to Napoleon. He became Arch-Treasurer of the Empire in 1804, was rewarded with the Duchy of Piacenza when Italy was reorganized in 1806, and became Lieutenant-Governor of Holland when Napoleon incorporated it in France (1810). Cambacères more than any other man enjoyed and deserved the confidence of Napoleon. A very able lawyer from the south, he returned to his old office as Minister of Justice, which he had held under the Directory. He became Second Consul in 1800, and as President of the Senate was the first to salute Napoleon as Emperor in 1804. Arch-Chancellor of the Empire, created Duke of Parma in 1806, Cambacères frequently acted as Napoleon's deputy when the latter went to the front, and was selected by the Emperor to be the confidential adviser of the Empress Marie Louise, in the event of a regency becoming necessary in 1813. He had a large part in compiling the Criminal Code, as well as in the episode of the Hundred Days.

The Council of State, nominated by the First Consul and responsible to him alone, was to consist of forty members raised (in 1802) to fifty, though in practice never exceeding forty-five. Its functions were administrative, legislative, and judicial: it drafted laws, ordinances, and decrees; settled administrative questions, and exercised appellate jurisdiction. After 1802 all the principal ministers attended its meetings, and with generals, admirals, and lawyers took part in its deliberations. Like an English Cabinet, it initiated legislation, but unlike the Cabinet it was not connected with the Legislature, nor had its members any collective responsibility. The principle of counterpoise, duality, and balance, so conspicuous in the composition of the Legislature, was applied by Napoleon also to the Executive. Thus to the Minister of the Interior he assigned as a colleague the Minister of Police, to the Minister of Finance a Minister of the Public Treasury,

the first to deal with income, the second with expenditure; in addition, he attached to each of the principal ministries an Advisory Committee, generally composed of Councillors of State. Local government was also reorganized on autocratic lines. The elective system established in 1790 had resulted in administrative chaos. The elected Councils were, therefore, reduced to impotence. Each *Department* was placed under a prefect; each district or *Arrondissement* under a sub-prefect, and each of the 40,000 communes under a Mayor—in all cases appointed by, and responsible to, the central government. Similarly, the levying of taxation was taken out of the hands of local bodies and entrusted to controllers appointed from Paris. The taxpayer and the exchequer alike benefited from the change. The peasant paid less; the State got more. The establishment of the Bank of France (1800) also tended to restore confidence and introduce order into a chaotic currency. Nor was the Napoleonic organization of local government ephemeral. From that day to this provincial France has been governed on the lines laid down by Napoleon.

§ THE EMPIRE. Little change was required to transform the life-consulate into an hereditary Empire. But to facilitate the transformation it was desirable, if not essential, to stage an abortive conspiracy against the Consul.

Even under the Republic conspiracies were not unknown. Communism was not less anathema to the Republic than to the ancient monarchy, but in 1796 Caius Gracchus Baboeuf took advantage of the suffering of the people to raise a communist insurrection and paid for its failure by his life (1797).

More serious was the Georges Cadoudal conspiracy in 1804. Disappointed in the hope that after Brumaire Napoleon might play the part of Monk, the Royalists began to plot against the 'Usurper'. The leader of the conspiracy was Georges Cadoudal, an ardent Breton Royalist. With him were associated the republican generals Pichegru and Moreau; the British Government was also privy to the plot. Thanks to the untiring vigilance of Fouché, Napoleon had from the first all the threads of the conspiracy in his hands. Some of them were spun by him. The weaving of the others he patiently awaited. When at the end of January 1804 the moment came, he acted suddenly and effectively. The leaders were all arrested. Moreau, after less than two years' imprisonment, was pardoned and made his way to America. Pichegru, after being put to the torture in prison, died there on April 16th, 1804, whether by his own hand or by violence is not known. Cadoudal was one of the few who ultimately suffered the death penalty.

In the meantime Napoleon had flown at higher game. His designs would fail of their purpose unless some member of the Royal House could be involved in the conspiracy. Neither the Count of Provence nor the Count d'Artois could be enticed from their safe refuge: with

criminal callousness, therefore, it was decided to offer up the young Duc d'Enghien upon the altar of Napoleon's ambition.

§ MURDER OF D'ENGHIEN. Son of the Duc de Bourbon, and grandson of the Prince of Condé, this unsuspecting and inoffensive princeling was living quietly at Ettenheim, in Baden. From this retreat the Prince was dragged (March 14th), carried to Vincennes, and after a perfunctory trial by a special military commission, was shot (March 21st). There was no pretence that the Prince was guilty; the sacrifice of an admittedly innocent victim was justified on the ground of political expediency. 'I had to choose,' said Napoleon, 'between continuous persecution and one decisive blow. My decision was not doubtful. I have silenced for ever both Royalists and Jacobins. Only the Republicans remain—mere dreamers who imagine that a republic can be made out of an old monarchy.'

The real motive of the crime was soon revealed. One month after the murder of the Duc d'Enghien a motion was proposed in the Tribune that Napoleon should be declared Emperor. Carried with a single dissentient—Carnot—the motion was communicated to the Senate, and on May 18th, 1804, the Consulate was converted into an hereditary Empire.

The Imperial title was by *Senatus Consultum* conferred upon Napoleon, the succession was declared to be hereditary, and the Emperor was empowered, failing direct male heirs, to nominate a member of his family. At the same time the limit on the number of Senators was removed and the Senate was thus rendered even more dependent upon the Emperor. The *Senatus Consultum* was then submitted for ratification by popular vote. The device of the plebiscite was a new weapon in the armoury of autocracy. The establishment of the Consulate had been approved (December 1799 to January 1800) by 3,011,007 votes against 1,526; the assumption of the Consulate for life (1802) by 3,568,885 to 8,374—a significant increase in the minority—by now (1804) the minority against the Empire had dropped to 2,569, while the majority (3,572,329) had slightly increased. On December 2nd the Coronation was celebrated with great magnificence in Notre-Dame. Pope Pius VII, who had come to Paris for the occasion, was present, but the new Charlemagne preferred himself to place the crown upon his head, and, having done so, to crown the Empress Josephine.

§ THE CONCORDAT. The presence of the Pope in Paris testified to the relations newly established between Napoleon, the French Church, and the Papacy. Napoleon was even more of an adiaphorist than Elizabeth of England. But like that great ruler he appreciated the place of religion in the life of the individual and the place of the Church in the well-ordered State. 'My policy,' he said, 'is to govern men as the greater number wish to be governed.' The vast majority

of Frenchmen were deeply attached to the religion of their fathers. They wished to have free access to the offices of their Church. For his part, Napoleon was, on principle, inclined to an ecclesiastical establishment. 'No society,' he declared, 'can exist without morals, and there is no sound morality without religion. It is religion alone that gives the State a firm and enduring prop. A society without religion is like a ship without a compass.' Ever since 1790 the Church in France had been rent in twain by the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, and the people had been deprived of the consolations of religion by the fanatical intolerance of a group of doctrinaire secularists who dominated the successive governments of the Republic. The problem as it presented itself to Napoleon, as to all autocrats, indeed to all governments, was how to reconcile the authority of the Civil Power with the claims of an institution whose function and privilege it was to interpret to man the will of God. Napoleon held that so long as the citizen did not refuse to give to Caesar the things that were Caesar's, the Christian should be free to give to God the things that are God's. To work out the principle in practice, especially after all that had happened in France since 1789, was, however, no easy task. The attempt was embodied in the *Concordat*, which after much manœuvring on both sides was concluded between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII on July 15th, 1801, and was passed by the Imperial Legislature on April 8th, 1802.

Concurrently with the *Concordat* was passed a law authorizing the *Articles Organiques* by which the supremacy of the State over the Church was asserted in terms worthy of an English Tudor. No Papal legate or Papal Bull was to be received in France without the permission of the Government; the clergy were to take an oath of allegiance to the constitution, and, having acquiesced in the alienation of Church lands, were to become the salaried officials of the State. The spiritual rights and functions of the Church were, however, reaffirmed, the churches were reopened, and though civil marriage was made obligatory, it might, when desired, be confirmed by a religious ceremony. Difficulties arising from the reorganization of the diocesan system were ultimately adjusted by the temporary resignation of all the bishops, forty-four of whom refused to accept the new order, and non-jurors among the clergy survived until 1893. In respect of patronage the provisions of the *Concordat* of 1516 were reissued. The State was to nominate bishops, the Pope to institute them; the bishops were to renominate and reinstate the parish priests; cathedral chapters were re-established, but unauthorized Congregations were suppressed, though pious benefactors were again permitted to establish religious foundations. Liberty of conscience was affirmed and the position of Calvinists and Lutherans was regularized.

As between State and Church in France the settlement of 1802

lasted for a century; as between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII it was short-lived.

§ EDUCATION. The schools, like the Church, ought, in Napoleon's view, to contribute to social and political stability. 'Unless,' he said, 'people are taught from childhood whether they are to be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or Infidels, the State will not be a nation: it will rest upon unstable foundations, and be constantly exposed to change and disturbance.' The scheme based upon these principles survived in broad outline until our own day. A single university was set up under officials appointed by Napoleon, and this Imperial university was to control the whole educational machine—higher, secondary and technical and primary. Hierarchical in structure, a State institution, yet internally self-governing, the university was exclusively charged with the work of public instruction throughout the Empire. No one could open a school or teach in public unless he was a graduate of one of the five faculties of the university. At the head of the hierarchy was a Grand Master, appointed and dismissible by the Emperor, and he was responsible for the curriculum and for the appointment and promotion of all officials. In each Appeal Court District there was to be at least one *Lycée*, a State institution providing higher education in humane letters and science; the secondary schools were supplied by the Communes or by private enterprise; technical schools provided instruction in applied science and practical arts for entrants into the higher civil service, and (at Saint Cyr) for military officers.

§ THE CODE NAPOLEON (1800-10). Characteristic and significant as was Napoleon's educational system, a more enduring monument to his memory is the *Code Napoléon*. The five Codes it included, though not, of course, the work of one man or of a single Commission, owed an immense debt to Napoleon and bear throughout the impress of his genius. Out of eighty-seven sessions devoted to the Civil Code he presided in person at thirty-five.

Successive revolutionary assemblies had been recklessly extravagant in legislation. The Codes pruned the over-luxuriant growth, and defined much that was incoherent. The Civil Code regularized and safeguarded civil marriage and divorce, the practice of adoption and the position of natural children. Laying great stress upon domestic discipline and the cohesion of the family, it exaggerated the authority of the husband over the wife, and the father over the children. In depressing the status of women it revealed Napoleon's personal prejudices. His influence is perceptible also in the regulation of testamentary dispositions. Though the excessive subdivision of land was discouraged as inimical to good husbandry, the accumulation of great estates was equally deprecated. Entail, though permitted, was strictly limited. Mortgages were to be registered and the rate

line of descent

of interest fixed. The registration of births, marriages, and deaths was entrusted to civil officials.

If the Civil Code was marked by cautious advance, the Code of Civil Procedure (1806), though it contained a few useful innovations designed to simplify, accelerate, and cheapen procedure, was conservative to the point of reaction. The Code of Criminal Procedure (1808), in combination with the complementary Penal Code (1810) substantially circumscribed the guarantees of personal liberty and put terribly effective weapons into the hands of the Executive. Many precautions against arbitrary detention provided by the Constituent Assembly were swept away. The Grand Jury (*Jury d'accusation*) was suppressed, though the Petty Jury was retained. The jurors were to be nominated by the Prefect and the verdict of a majority to be accepted. Certain important cases were, however, reserved for special tribunals, and tried without a jury. Criminal trials were, as a rule, to be in public; the accused was to be allowed to employ counsel, to call witnesses, and to be heard in his own defence. On the whole, however, the Penal Code was harsh and reactionary, perhaps because the Emperor had by 1810 become not unreasonably apprehensive lest the proverbial corrective of despotism might be directed against himself.

Recent developments in foreign and internal trade necessitated amendments in commercial law. Accordingly the new Commercial Code dealt with bankruptcy examinations and the laws relating to negotiable instruments.

Taken as a whole the Codes have no claim to finality. Yet they remain as a remarkable monument to the ingenuity of a lawgiver bent upon reconciling the fundamental principles affirmed by the Revolution with social order and administrative efficiency.

Nor must it be forgotten that all this work of domestic reconstruction was accomplished while the attention of Napoleon was concentrated, except during a brief period, upon the conduct of a great war.

CHAPTER XXIV

NAPOLEON AND ENGLAND—TRAFALGAR AND TILSIT (1802-7)

'Trafalgar forced (Napoleon) to impose his yoke upon all Europe or to abandon the hope of conquering Great Britain.'

C. A. FYFFE

THE Treaty of Lunéville secured a cessation of hostilities between France and Austria for more than four years: only for fourteen months did the Treaty of Amiens give unrestful peace to France and

England. But Napoleon took advantage of the interlude to consolidate his conquests in Switzerland, Holland, and Italy.

§ THE HELVETIC REPUBLIC. After the occupation by France in 1798, Switzerland had been reconstituted as a unitary republic, but the new constitution was entirely alien to Swiss tradition and the resulting disputes between the Cantons gave Napoleon a fresh pretext for intervention. In 1803 he dictated a new scheme of government (the *Act of Mediation*) which, in many respects anticipated the federal Constitution adopted by Switzerland in 1848. For the time being, however, the 'Helvetic Republic' was virtually a dependency of the Napoleonic Empire, and though Great Britain demanded the restoration of its independence Napoleon would never abandon the control of a country essential to his strategy.

§ HOLLAND. In Holland as in Switzerland internal dissensions gave Napoleon an excuse for intervention. By the Treaty of Amiens all the Dutch Colonies captured by England were (except Ceylon) restored to her. The Dutch also hoped that the treaty might release them from French domination. On the contrary, Napoleon refusing on the demand of England to evacuate Holland, erected it into a kingdom for his brother Louis in 1806, and in 1810 incorporated it in France.

§ ITALY. Equally arbitrary was Napoleon's treatment of Italy. The Cisalpine Republic was transformed into the 'Italian Republic' under the personal presidency of Napoleon (1802) and Piedmont and Genoa were incorporated in the French Empire.

§ HANOVER. Of more immediate concern to England than Napoleon's creation of these 'client' republics was his treatment of Hanover. Having himself occupied it in May 1803 he bestowed it in 1806 as an unwelcome and fatal gift upon Prussia.

§ EGYPT. Not less fatal to the maintenance of peace were the continued activities of Napoleon in Egypt and the Levant. In 1802 he sent a trusted agent, Colonel Sebastiani, on a mission, avowedly commercial, to Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Isles. Sebastiani's report, published in the *Moniteur Officiel* for January 30th, 1803, declared that in view of the hostility between the Turks and the Mamelukes, 6,000 French troops would suffice for the reconquest of Egypt, and that the Ionian Isles only awaited a favourable moment to declare for France. The publication of Sebastiani's report was undoubtedly intended to goad Great Britain into a declaration of war. It succeeded. Napoleon on his side was deeply angered by the personal attacks upon him in the English Press, and still more by England's refusal, in accordance with the Treaty of Amiens, to evacuate Malta. England declared that she would restore the island to the Knights of St. John, but not until she could guarantee it against seizure by Napoleon.

§ THE WAR OF THE THIRD COALITION. In May 1803 England declared war on Napoleon who for the next two years had to fight Great Britain only. Moreover, after December 1804, when Spain at his bidding declared war on England, he had the help of the Spanish Navy and the use of Spanish ports. The English, however, took advantage of their superiority at sea to capture Tobago, Santa Lucia, Demerara, and Guiana. Napoleon occupied Hanover and Naples.

The murder of the Duc d'Enghien, a prince of the blood royal, and Napoleon's assumption of the Crown of France, and still more that of the Iron Crown of Lombardy (May 1805) gave dire offence to the autocrats of Austria and Russia. With them and with Sweden Pitt was consequently able to form in 1805 a third Coalition. No insults could, however, stir Frederick William of Prussia to intervene, and the rulers of Baden, Bavaria, Würtemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt definitely joined France.

§ TRAFALGAR. Napoleon now decided that the time had come to bring England to her knees by invasion. Of his intentions the British Government was well aware and took measures to repel the attack. At Boulogne Napoleon had assembled an army of 170,000 men and a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats to transport the army across the channel. Squadrons of the French fleet were also kept ready for sea in the harbours of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. Over the Toulon fleet commanded by Villeneuve, Nelson kept watch; Collingwood kept watch on Missiessy off Rochefort; Cornwallis on Gantheaume off Brest.

Napoleon's plan was roughly as follows: Villeneuve was to slip out of Toulon, evade Nelson, and sail for the West Indies, drawing the English Admiral in pursuit of him; Missiessy, having eluded Collingwood, was to join Villeneuve at Martinique where the two French Admirals were to effect a junction with Gantheaume and the fleet from Brest. The combined squadron was then, leaving Nelson in the West Indies, to make all sail for the English Channel, appearing off Boulogne in June to cover the invasion of England.

Villeneuve succeeded in slipping out of Toulon unseen by Nelson on January 18th, 1805, but, delayed by a severe storm, could not finally put to sea until March 30th. Nelson, supposing that the enemy was making for Egypt, sailed to Alexandria, but, discovering his mistake, and correctly guessing what had happened, made all sail for the West Indies and reached Barbados on June 4th. At Trinidad (June 12th) he learnt that Villeneuve had again eluded him, and, at once realizing the game, dispatched a swift brig—the *Curieux*—to warn the Admiralty at home. On receiving the news on July 8th the Admiralty ordered Cornwallis to reinforce the British fleet which was under the command of Sir Robert Calder, off Ferrol. Calder, ordered to intercept Villeneuve, sighted him off Cape Finisterre on

July 22nd and in foggy weather fought an engagement which, though tactically confusing and technically adjudged to be 'indecisive', had the practical effect of ruining Napoleon's scheme.

On August 15th Nelson, having got back to Europe in July, effected a junction with Cornwallis off Brest. On October 19th Villeneuve, ordered to take the fleet round to Toulon, crept out of Cadiz. Nelson, however, in the *Victory*, having joined Collingwood off Cadiz, engaged the combined fleets of France and Spain and inflicted on them a crushing defeat at Trafalgar (October 21st). In the battle Nelson fell. *Felix opportunitate mortis*. His life work was accomplished. Trafalgar not only established for a century the naval ascendancy of Great Britain; it drove Napoleon to employ the last weapon in his armoury. The 'Continental System'—the last desperate plunge of a gambler—ultimately proved his ruin.

§ AUSTERLITZ. Meanwhile much had happened on the Continent. No sooner had Villeneuve failed to elude Calder off Cape Finisterre than Napoleon abandoned the project of invasion and the Boulogne army was on the march for Vienna (August 26th–28th). Augsburg was occupied on October 10th, and Mack, the Austrian General, finding himself surrounded at Ulm (October 21st) was compelled to capitulate. The road to Vienna was now open. Murat and his cavalry occupied the Austrian capital on November 13th, but the junction of the Russian army, under the Tsar, with the Austrians, rendered Napoleon's position during the next few weeks somewhat critical. On December 2nd, however, Napoleon inflicted a crushing defeat upon the combined armies at Austerlitz.

Austerlitz broke up the third Coalition. Prussia, just on the point of tardy intervention, was compelled to accept from Napoleon, as the price of temporary peace, the humiliating and embarrassing gift of Hanover, to exclude English ships from her harbours, and to cede Anspach to Napoleon's ally Bavaria (November 15th). On December 24th Napoleon dictated to Austria the terms of the Treaty of Presburg. At Campo Formio and at Lunéville Austria had been treated with some consideration. Napoleon was now determined to crush the Power which had formed the continental backbone of three coalitions. Austria handed over Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia, to the Kingdom of Italy, and recognized Napoleon as its king. To Bavaria, now raised by Napoleon to the dignity of a kingdom, Austria ceded the whole of the Tyrol, the Vorarlberg, and several rich bishoprics and minor principalities. To Würtemberg (also raised to a kingdom), and to Baden, she ceded her outlying provinces in Western Germany. Austria thus lost 3,000,000 subjects and large revenues, and, cut off from Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhine, was reduced to the rank of a third-rate Power.

§ NAPOLEON AND GERMANY. The moment had now come for

the conqueror to complete the reconstitution of Germany. At the Congress of Rastatt, Napoleon had perceived the invincible jealousy of the two leading German Powers, their concentration upon their own dynastic interests, and their callous indifference to those of the Empire. He recognized also the selfish particularism of the lesser princes and the inclination of many of them towards France. As a result almost the whole of the left bank of the Rhine with about 3,500,000 inhabitants was formally handed over to France.

A further step towards the reconstitution of Germany was taken by the Act of Mediatization (1803). Previous to 1803 the Empire had contained some 360 sovereign States. Of these less than half were permitted by Napoleon to survive. The Imperial cities were reduced from fifty-one to six, and all the ecclesiastical States, except one, were suppressed. Bavaria, which it was Napoleon's policy to aggrandize, was enlarged by the acquisition of 6,000 square miles in the heart of South Germany, though it was compelled at the same time to surrender 4,000 square miles to the west of the Rhine. Baden was also enlarged; but the greatest gainer was Prussia. To compensate for the loss of about 1,000 square miles to the west of the Rhine she gained nearly 5,000 to the east of it.

After Austerlitz and the resulting Treaty of Presburg Napoleon took two further steps in the reconstitution of Germany. On July 17th, 1806, the Treaty of the Confederation of the Rhine was signed in Paris. The Kings of Bavaria and Würtemberg, the Grand Dukes of Baden, of Berg, and of Hesse-Darmstadt and the Archbishop of Regensburg (to which see the electoral dignity formerly enjoyed by the Archbishop of Mainz had been in 1803 transferred) were, together with nine minor princes, formally separated from the Empire and accepted the Presidency of Napoleon. A population of 8,000,000 people thus became for all practical purposes an integral part of the French Empire. Their rulers pledged themselves to support the President with an army of 63,000 men. The armies of the Confederation were organized by French officers; the frontiers were fortified by French engineers; foreign policy was dictated from Paris.

On August 1st the Emperor of the French took an even more dramatic, if less practically important step. He formally announced to the Diet of the Empire that 'he no longer recognized the existence of the Germanic Constitution'. Accordingly, on August 6th, the Emperor Francis formally renounced the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Thus, after a chequered existence of just one thousand years, an historic institution which, in Voltaire's cynical phrase, had long since ceased to be either Holy, Roman, or an Empire, came to an inglorious if not untimely end. But the new Charlemagne had arrived; the seat of sovereignty had been transferred to Paris.

Two years before the dissolution of the Roman Empire the

Emperor Francis had with an intelligent anticipation of events provided himself with a new Imperial title, and to the great confusion of historical students the Archduke of Austria assumed the style of Emperor of Austria (1804).

§ PRUSSIA. Ever since striking her bargain in the Treaty of Basle (1795) Prussia, despite humiliating caresses bestowed upon her by Napoleon, had persisted in a shameful neutrality. But at long last the Prussian worm had turned. Early in October 1805 Frederick William III, roused by the news that Marshal Bernadotte in his march to Bavaria had violated the Prussian territory of Anspach, had sent off an angry ultimatum to Napoleon, then at Brunn. Napoleon deferred an answer until, having won the battle of Austerlitz, he could impose on Prussia the humiliating terms of the Treaty of Schönbrunn (December 1805). Thus did Frederick William III descend to the position of a receiver of stolen goods. Nor was that the end of his humiliation. In August 1806 he learnt that Napoleon had offered to England the restoration of Hanover, and had executed a Nuremberg bookseller named Palm for having sold copies of a patriotic pamphlet, *Germany in her Deep Humiliation*. Roused at last to a sense of her degradation Prussia in October 1806 declared war on France. Her intervention was now as precipitate as it had hitherto been procrastinating. Nothing could, indeed, have been more ill-timed. Russia was not ready to resume fighting. England could give no immediate help. Napoleon could therefore concentrate his whole force against Prussia, whose army—the army of Frederick the Great—hopelessly out of date in organization, drill, and tactics, and led by old, incompetent, and conceited generals—was completely annihilated at Jena and Auerstadt (October 14th). The Prussian fortresses, though strongly garrisoned, one after another opened their gates to the French armies, and on October 27th the Emperor of the French made a triumphant entry into Berlin.

In Berlin Napoleon behaved like the vulgar conqueror he was. With his own hands he desecrated the tomb of Frederick the Great at Potsdam; he scored obscene insults to Queen Luise on the walls of her own palace; demolished the obelisk on the battlefield of Rossbach; carried off to Paris the figure of Victory from the Brandenburg Gate, and drove the Prussian Guards like cattle down the Unter den Linden—a spectacle for the burghers to mock at. But he did not devote all his attention to spectacular effects. From Berlin he issued the famous decree (November 21st) which was formally to inaugurate the Continental System and bring Great Britain to her knees. Dealing leniently with Saxony, Prussia's ally, he raised its Elector to kingly rank, while Saxony itself and the smaller Saxon duchies were drawn into the *Rheinbund*. Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and the Hohenzollern dominions west of the Elbe went to form the new Kingdom of Westphalia for Jerome Bonaparte (1807).

Another brother, Joseph, had already (1806) been proclaimed King of Naples and Sicily, the Batavian Republic had been converted into the Kingdom of Holland for a third brother, Louis Bonaparte, and the Duchies of Cleves and Berg had been conferred upon Joachim Murat, the husband of Caroline Bonaparte.

To return to Berlin. Its occupation did not end the war. The Russian army was still in the field beyond the Vistula. With his exhausted though victorious troops Napoleon marched to the attack, and though severely checked by the Russians under Bennigsen at Eylau (February 7th, 1807) he captured the great fortress of Danzig (May 24th) and on June 14th completely defeated the Russians at Friedland. When the Russians applied for an armistice, Napoleon with characteristic rapidity decided upon a complete change of policy, and, in order to effect it, at once arranged a meeting with the Tsar.

§ THE TREATY OF TILSIT. To ensure complete secrecy the two Emperors met in a floating pavilion moored in the middle of the Niemen. The bargain was soon struck. Prussia was to be dismembered; England to be ruined; and Napoleon and Alexander to divide the world. The details were embodied in the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7th, 1807). The Vistula was to be the western boundary of Russia, who was to recognize the Confederation of the Rhine and the Napoleonic Kingdoms of Naples, Holland, and Westphalia, and Danzig was to be a Free City. Polish Prussia was offered to the Tsar, but when he declined it the whole of the territory acquired by Prussia in the second and third partitions of Poland was erected into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and bestowed upon the King of Saxony. By secret articles it was further provided that Russia should cede the Ionian Isles—ever of supreme interest to Napoleon—and in return get Finland from Sweden and Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey. She was also to make common cause with Napoleon against Great Britain if the latter refused to come to terms by November 1st. Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal were to be forced into the Continental System and to declare war on England. Only in deference to Russia did Napoleon refrain from wiping the Hohenzollern dominions off the map altogether, thus making the Vistula the boundary between the French and Russian Empires. The Tsar preferred a buffer and perhaps had some tenderness for his recent ally. A remnant of territory was therefore left to the Hohenzollerns, but all their possessions west of the Elbe went to the new Kingdom of Westphalia. Prussia was also condemned to pay a huge war indemnity to France, to cut down her army to 42,000 men, to recognize all the new Napoleonic kingdoms, and to keep her ports hermetically sealed against English ships and trade.

At Tilsit Napoleon reached the pinnacle of power. It was a

dangerously dizzy height. The Treaties of Presburg and Tilsit unquestionably registered a great triumph for Napoleon. To contemporaries Austerlitz and Jena might well seem to be more than ample compensation for Trafalgar. But history, more accurately assessing comparative values, can perceive that Trafalgar was the beginning of the end.

CHAPTER XXV

BONAPARTISM AND NATIONALISM—THE PENINSULAR WAR—THE CONTINENTAL SYSTEM (1807-12)

I saw the expectant nations stand,
To catch the coming flame in turn;
I saw, from ready hand to hand,
The clear, though struggling glory burn.
And oh, their joy, as it came near,
'Twas, in itself, a joy to see;
While Fancy whisper'd in my ear,
'That torch they pass is Liberty!'

THOMAS MOORE

AFTER Tilsit the situation was tangled: the military supremacy of Napoleon on the Continent was at its zenith; the naval power of England was unbroken. Thus the 'whale' found itself confronted by the 'elephant', but neither could make contact with the other. But to ruin England was still Napoleon's most cherished ambition. In order to attain it he had induced the Tsar to agree (conditionally) that Sweden, Denmark, and Portugal should be forced to accept the Continental System and make war on England.

Canning and Castlereagh, Pitt's two most eminent disciples, got wind of that agreement and acted promptly. On July 19th, less than a fortnight after the bargain was sealed at Tilsit, a powerful fleet under Admiral Gambier with an army of 27,000 men under Lord Cathcart left the Solent for the Baltic. Denmark was required to hand over her fleet to England on safe deposit for the duration of the war. The Danes naturally declined, and England was compelled to bombard Copenhagen and take the Danish fleet by force into her keeping (September 2nd, 1807). The action of England, admittedly high-handed, was severely criticized in Parliament, and abroad was universally condemned. The dilemma presented to the Danes was undeniably painful. Their fleet had to be surrendered either to Napoleon or to England. England could offer a better security for the safe keeping and return of the ships, and the Danes might have been wise to prefer that alternative. But they were not the less outraged by the bombardment of their capital, which led also to a rupture with Russia. England, consequently, had to maintain a fleet in the Baltic which kept watch on the Russian fleet until 1812.

§ THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. Napoleon had long been interested in Spain, which ever since the failure of Charles III and Aranda to effect reform (1759–88) had been hopelessly decadent. Since the Treaty of Basle (1795) Spain had been nothing but the vassal of France. Charles IV had obediently registered the edicts issued from Paris, declaring war, concluding peace, again making war, at the bidding of France, and invariably to his own hurt. Still, despicable as was the position of Spain, Napoleon was uneasy: '*Un Bourbon sur le trône d'Espagne, c'est un voisin trop dangereux*', he had long ago declared. Accordingly, after Tilsit, Napoleon determined to expel the effete Bourbon dynasty from the throne and to make Spain a dependent kingdom under one of his brothers. But the immediate victim was Portugal. Portugal, though the constant friend and ally of Great Britain, was obliged to purchase (1804) from Napoleon a formal recognition of neutrality. But after Tilsit, Napoleon would suffer no neutrals. On October 27th, 1807, he concluded with Spain the Treaty of Fontainebleau: Spain was to join France in an attack on Portugal.

A large French army had already assembled at Bayonne under the command of Junot who, on October 19th, crossed the Bidassoa and attacked Portugal. On December 1st he entered Lisbon and immediately issued Napoleon's proclamation that 'the House of Braganza has ceased to reign'. But Junot, despite the urgent injunctions of his master, was a day and a half too late. When Junot with his depleted and wearied troops arrived at Lisbon (November 30th) it was to find that the Prince Regent, with the State archives and treasure, and accompanied by his ministers had sailed that day from the Tagus for Brazil under the protection of a British fleet commanded by Sir Sidney Smith. For the second time Sir Sidney had foiled Napoleon. The Portuguese fleet was saved from Napoleon's clutches; the House of Braganza still reigned though its throne stood in a distant dependency. For the next seven years Portugal was the base of British operations on the Continent.

§ THE SPANISH ULCER. In April 1808 the Spanish King Charles IV, the Queen, and the heir-apparent had, by a series of unblushing intrigues, been separately decoyed to Bayonne and compelled to renounce all claim to the Crown of Spain. Joachim Murat, who had acted as a warming-pan at Madrid, was rewarded by the throne of Naples, Joseph Bonaparte being transferred to Spain. In July 1808 Joseph was ceremoniously crowned at Madrid. But the Spaniards were devoted to their despicable dynasty, and to the Catholic Church, and their patriotism, though provincial rather than national, was genuine. Napoleon soon discovered that to impose a foreign yoke upon a people so loosely knit and inured to the guerrilla fighting agreeable to their temper and traditions was no easy task. Committees, or *Juntas*, were speedily organized in province after

province; more than one repulse was inflicted upon the French armies, composed mostly of raw levies with only a stiffening of veteran troops, by the patriotic peasants of Spain. On July 19th, 1808, the Spaniards won a resounding victory: General Dupont, in command of the larger of the French columns operating in Spain, was compelled to surrender with his whole army at Baylen. On August 1st Joseph fled from Madrid.

On the same day Sir Arthur Wellesley, already famous as the man who had broken the power of the great Mahratha Confederacy on the field of Assaye,¹ landed at the head of a British Expeditionary Force in Portugal. Three weeks later (August 21st), Wellesley won a brilliant victory over Junot at Vimiero, but was prevented from following it up by the orders of a superior officer. The latter was himself superseded by Sir Hew Dalrymple who on August 30th concluded with Junot the Convention of Cintra. This Convention was highly advantageous to France. Even though Junot was obliged to evacuate Portugal, all his army stores and the rich spoils obtained by the plunder of Portuguese churches, palaces, and museums, were obligingly carried for him to France in English ships. After the surrender at Baylen, Napoleon at once collected a large army of veterans; led them into Spain; annihilated a Spanish army near Burgos (November 10th); advanced on Madrid, and restored his brother Joseph to the throne (December 9th). The command of the English forces in Spain had devolved after Cintra on Sir John Moore, but having fought a series of masterly rearguard actions Moore was killed at the moment of a brilliant victory won under the walls of Corunna (January 16th, 1809). His army embarked for England in miserable plight, but his campaign had wrecked Napoleon's plan for the conquest of Spain and Portugal.

In March 1809 Marshal Soult advanced into Portugal and scattered or slaughtered a Portuguese force in front of Oporto, but there, before marching on Lisbon, he halted. Wellesley, who had returned to Portugal in supreme command of the British force in April, drove Marshal Soult out of Portugal and advancing on Madrid won a great victory at Talavera (July 27th-28th, 1809). After Talavera Wellesley was obliged to retreat on Portugal, but for five long years he kept brilliantly alight, through fortune good and bad, the torch of national insurrection in the Peninsula.

The importance of that insurrection cannot be exaggerated. It gave England a base of operations on the Continent; it taught Europe that Napoleon, if still immensely strong, was not invincible; above all it gave a powerful impulse to the national movement in Germany. As Southey sang:

'From Spain the living spark went forth;
The flame hath caught, the flame hath spread.' . . .

¹ See Marriott: *The English in India*, Chapter VII.

§ THE AUSTRIAN RISING. Nowhere was the effect of the Spanish rising more strikingly demonstrated than in Austria. Again and again Austrian armies had been beaten in the field. Again and again Austrian diplomatists had been compelled to accept from Napoleon terms ever increasingly rigorous. But ever since her humiliation at Presburg, Austria had been waiting for the opportunity of revenge. In 1809 it seemed that the moment had come. Three hundred thousand French troops were shut up in Spain; a new spirit had been stirred in Germany by the patriotic appeal of Schiller's *William Tell* (1804) and Fichte's *Addresses to the German Nation* (1808); and, best of all, the brave peasants of the Tyrol, incorporated since 1805 in Napoleon's mushroom Kingdom of Bavaria, were eagerly seeking a chance to throw off the hateful yoke. Everything seemed propitious.

Austria declared war on France on April 15th, 1809. But Napoleon's strategy once more proved irresistible. The Tyrolese fought with splendid courage, but after a week's campaign (April 15th-22nd), the Archduke Charles was forced back upon Vienna; the city offered a feeble resistance, and on May 13th the Emperor of the French rode into the Austrian capital. Yet for the next two months Napoleon's position was really critical, and on May 21st-22nd he was severely repulsed on the Danube below Vienna, with the loss of 27,000 men in the great battle of Aspern-Essling.

But though the news of the Austrian victory won at Aspern was received with a thrill throughout Germany, if not throughout Europe, enthusiasm unfortunately evaporated in a series of spirited but isolated and unfruitful risings. Already a general revolt had taken place, in Hesse, where the rule of King Jerome Bonaparte was hated and contemned, but had been suppressed with great bloodshed (April). In May a small force under a Prussian officer, Major Von Schill, succeeded in taking Stralsund (May 28th), but three days later his gallant force was cut to pieces and its heroic commander was killed. Another force of volunteers, raised in Bohemia and commanded by Duke Frederick William of Brunswick, invaded Saxony, occupied Dresden, and compelled a force of Saxons and Westphalians under the command of King Jerome to retreat. But this success, too, was transient.

§ THE WALCHEREN EXPEDITION. Finally, when all was over, a fine English army of 40,000 men commanded by Lord Chatham and escorted by an adequate fleet under Sir Richard Strahan landed on the island of Walcheren with the object of taking Antwerp. Unfortunately the naval and military commanders could not agree on the plan of campaign, the army was decimated by malaria, and in December the remnant of it returned to England, having effected nothing. A well-known epigram epitomized the reasons for the failure:

Lord Chatham with his sword drawn,
Was waiting for Sir Richard Strahan;
Sir Richard eager to be at 'em,
Was waiting too. For whom? Lord Chatham.¹

Meanwhile, Napoleon had brilliantly retrieved the repulse at

CENTRAL EUROPE in 1810



Aspern by a victory at Wagram, which, though not a second Austerlitz, was sufficiently decisive to compel Austria to acquiesce in the Treaty of Vienna (October 10th, 1809). Austria had to surrender Western Galicia to enlarge the Grand Duchy of Warsaw for the

¹ For details of the Walcheren Expedition see Marriott: *Castlereagh*, pp. 144f.

benefit of Napoleon's protégé, the King of Saxony; to give up Eastern Galicia to Napoleon's ally, the Tsar Alexander, and to a third ally, Bavaria, the Tyrol, and the Vorarlberg, together with Salzburg and a strip of Upper Austria. For himself, Napoleon consolidated his position in the Adriatic by taking the important ports of Trieste and Fiume together with Carniola, Croatia, and the greater part of Carinthia. Austria lost 4,500,000 subjects; she had to pay an indemnity of £3,400,000, to cut down her army to 150,000 men, and to promise strict adherence to the Continental System.

§ THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL. For the fourth time Austria, the greatest and most persistent of his continental enemies, had been defeated by Napoleon. Only Great Britain was still unbeaten. Nor did there remain in Napoleon's armoury any weapon he could use against her except one which was manifestly double-edged. Napoleon indeed declared, not without reason, that his Berlin Decree was a reprisal against England's Maritime Code. In April and May 1806 England, though respecting, as far as possible, the rights of neutrals, had declared certain parts of the North German and French coasts to be in a state of blockade. The decree issued from Berlin (November 21st, 1806) declared the British Isles to be in a state of blockade; interdicted all trade with England; ordered all British merchandise, wherever found, to be confiscated, and all British subjects to be made prisoners of war; and forbade the reception in French or allied ports of any ship coming from Great Britain or her colonies. The boycott of English goods was further extended by decrees issued from Warsaw on January 25th, 1807, and from Milan on December 17th. In the meantime the British Government had issued a series of *Orders in Council* (January–November 1807), declaring all ports from which the British flag was excluded to be in a state of blockade, prohibiting all trade in the products of enemy countries or colonies; forbidding any ship to enter a French or allied port, and declaring all ships proceeding to such ports to be, with their cargoes, good prize unless the ship had touched at a British port. Both the *Orders in Council* and the Napoleonic Decrees have been subjected to criticism, not least severe in the two countries respectively responsible. Against the Orders it is argued that, besides alienating neutrals, they served to enforce the Decrees and so to increase the damage they inflicted. But the main burden of unpopularity fell naturally on Napoleon who was compelled, if his policy was to effect its purpose, to enforce it rigorously and universally.

§ NAPOLEON AND THE PAPACY. Not even the Pope could claim exemption. After he had assumed the Iron Crown of Lombardy and declared himself King of Italy (1805), Napoleon had nominated his stepson Eugène de Beauharnais as Viceroy, and then bestowed upon his 'people of Italy' a uniform and enlightened administration,

based largely on French models but cleverly adapted to the needs of a more backward people. That Napoleon's policy permanently benefited Italy, and contributed to subsequent unification is indisputable. None the less immediately unpopular was his annexation of Venice (1806), Etruria, the Papal States (1808), Dalmatia (1809), and the Italian Tyrol (1810). Of these annexations incomparably the most impolitic was that of the Papal States.

The relations between Napoleon and Pope Pius VII had for some time past become steadily worse. The Concordat with France had been followed in (1803) by a Concordat with the Italian Republic, but though its terms were more favourable to the Pope than the French Concordat, it failed to establish harmony. The occupation of Ancona by Napoleon on the eve of the Austerlitz campaign (1805) was particularly resented in Rome, as was the nomination of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne of Naples, claimed by the Pope as a Papal fief. But it was the Pope's refusal to adhere to the Continental System that caused the final breach between the Pope and the new Charlemagne. It has been argued that Napoleon's conduct in this matter betrayed 'an extraordinary lapse of judgment'. Yet had he any alternative? Unless the whole continent was hermetically sealed against English commerce the blockade must be ineffective and the experiment abandoned. Nevertheless, Napoleon's subsequent conduct was amazingly impolitic. On May 17th, 1809, he issued an Imperial Decree revoking 'the donation of Charlemagne, our august predecessor', and annexing the Papal States, including Rome itself. The Pope thereupon issued a Bull excommunicating those who had despoiled the Church. Napoleon's retort was to reduce the Pope to the rank of a bishop and to carry him off a prisoner to Fontainebleau. A reconciliation was indeed attempted in January 1813, but it broke down, and not until the allies entered France in January 1814 was the five years' captivity of the aged Pontiff at last ended.

Napoleon's attack upon the Papacy was one step towards his final overthrow. The rupture of the Russian alliance was another. The Tsar Alexander was deeply offended when Napoleon, having reluctantly divorced Josephine (who had borne him no children), married (April 1st, 1810) while negotiations were actually pending for a Russian alliance, the arch-duchess Marie Louise, a niece of Marie Antoinette. The birth of a son and heir announced to the world as King of Rome (1811), though strengthening Napoleon's dynastic position, failed to improve the marital relations of the parents.

Apart from the Austrian marriage the Tsar had other causes of offence against Napoleon. The Danubian Principalities were still in the hands of the Turk, Sweden was still in possession of Finland, while Napoleon was ominously extending his Empire along the coasts of the North Sea. In June 1810 Louis, King of Holland, finding the yoke of the Continental System intolerable, abdicated, and

Holland was annexed to the French Empire. The island of Walcheren had already been annexed, and before the end of the year the Free Cities of Lübeck, Hamburg, and other Hanseatic towns, together with the Duchy of Oldenburg, half Jerome's Kingdom of Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Berg were also added to Napoleon's realm. The seizure of Oldenburg gave special offence to the Tsar, whose brother-in-law was its Duke. But the simple fact was that Napoleon could not allow the claims of friendship or of kinship to infringe the integrity of the continental blockade, the severity of which was now increased by the imposition of the 'Trianon Tariff' on France and its subject States, and by the publication of the Fontainebleau Decree.

What wonder if, under the hardships inflicted by this system, peoples and their rulers became increasingly restive. Even General Bernadotte, who in 1810 had been chosen as their Crown Prince by the Swedish Estates, began to turn against his patron. In November 1810 Sweden had been compelled by Napoleon to declare war on England. The Emperor's letter announcing his decision is indicative both of his imperious temper and of his increasing embarrassment: 'You tell me that you wish to remain at peace with France, but I say, let me have proofs of this disposition. Foreign commerce is the present *cheval de bataille* of all nations. I can immediately cause you to be attacked by the Danes and Russians; and I will instantly do so if within fifteen days you are not at war with England. . . . On the fifteenth day from this, war must be declared, or my ambassador has orders to demand his passports. Open war, or a sincere alliance. These are my last words.' (November 11th, 1810.) England did not greatly resent the action taken by Sweden under *force majeure* and came to terms with her in July 1812.

With Russia England had in the previous dispute concluded the Treaty of Abö. Less compliant than Bernadotte the Tsar had refused, despite Napoleon's insistence, to confiscate neutral ships carrying colonial produce to Russian ports. On every side, then, there were signs of revolt against Napoleon's tyranny. He could not ignore them. 'I shall have war with Russia,' he said to Metternich in the autumn of 1810, 'on grounds beyond human control, because they are rooted in the case itself.' Napoleon clearly recognized that he was confronted by an inescapable dilemma.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE FALL OF NAPOLEON—THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN AND THE GERMAN WAR OF LIBERATION (1812-14)

‘Choose between cannon-shot against the English vessels which approach your coasts, and the confiscation of their merchandise, or an immediate war with France.’ NAPOLEON TO SWEDEN—AND OTHERS

✓ § NAPOLEON AND ALEXANDER. The Russian campaign has often been represented as the most gratuitous and causeless of all Napoleon’s military expeditions. It was in fact the unavoidable consequence of insistence upon the only expedient open to Napoleon after Trafalgar for the subjugation of England. But even the integrity of his Continental System was with Napoleon only a means to the supreme end. ‘People,’ he said, ‘will want to know where we are going. We are going to make an end of Europe, and then to throw ourselves on other robbers more daring than ourselves and to become mistress of India.’

The Tsar Alexander had made preparations for defence and had protected his flanks by concluding with Turkey the Treaty of Bucharest (May 28th, 1812), and with Sweden the Treaty of Abö (April 4th, 1812). By the latter, Russia undertook, in return for the co-operation of Sweden, and as compensation for the loss of Finland, to secure Norway for her at the conclusion of peace. Russia also concluded arrangements with England and Spain (July). Austria on the other hand, promised to provide 30,000 men to guard Napoleon’s right flank.

But what about Napoleon’s left flank? Owing to the defection of Sweden only Prussia could protect that. If Russia was menaced by the extension of the Napoleonic Empire in North Germany, still more was Prussia. And Prussia was no longer the Prussia which had maintained for ten years a shameful neutrality, which had blundered into war in 1806, had been defeated at Jena and despoiled at Tilsit.

§ REFORM IN PRUSSIA. ‘We have fallen asleep upon the laurels of Frederick the Great,’ exclaimed Queen Luise after Jena. But from her sleep Prussia was awakened by a group of enlightened statesmen—Stein and Hardenberg, Humboldt, Gneisenau, and Scharnhorst. Between 1807 and 1812 these men carried through a series of reforms which transformed Prussia not less completely, though with less violence to individuals and institutions, than the Constituent Assembly in France.

It was, then, a new Prussia with which Napoleon had to deal in 1812. But Prussia was faced with a dilemma. Neutrality would not

have been permitted to her by either of the protagonists. On which side did her interests lie? To join Napoleon meant giving a free passage to French troops; it meant also a mortal affront to the Tsar and exposure to his vengeance if Napoleon's attack on Russia should fail. To side with Russia would have called down upon Prussia instant and terrible vengeance at the hands of Napoleon. Accordingly on February 24th, 1812, Prussia signed a treaty with France. Prussia was to allow a free passage to the 'Grand Army'; to permit the French to requisition food and forage; to provide 20,000 troops for offensive and defensive operations, and 20,000 more for garrison duty; and, of course, to adhere strictly to the Continental System. On his part Napoleon merely guaranteed the maintenance of Prussia's mutilated kingdom *in statu quo*.

§ THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN. Napoleon, having made both his flanks secure, crossed the Niemen at the head of the greatest army Europe had ever seen (June 24th, 1812). Of 680,000 men, some 230,000 were French; about 200,000 were Germans, 9,000 were Poles, and conscripts from Italy, Spain, Holland, etc., made up the balance. Napoleon advanced on Moscow on a wide front extending from Vilna to Smolensk. The Russians retreating 'without demoralization or decomposition,' evacuated Smolensk on August 17th, but stood and fought a great battle on the Borodino on September 7th. Masses of men were sacrificed on both sides, but the result was indecisive. By the 15th Napoleon was in Moscow, but for days a conflagration raged in a great city deserted by its inhabitants. Nevertheless, the French Emperor tarried for over a month, awaiting there the submission that never came. Churches were desecrated, palaces were pillaged—mainly by Poles and Germans; the occupying army was decimated by disease, and even the remnant of it could with difficulty be fed.

At last Napoleon decided to withdraw. The retreat began on October 19th. Very skilfully the Russians organized guerrilla attacks upon the retreating army. Perpetually harassed by the main Russian army under Kutusov the retreat became a rout; after the battle of Krasnoi (November 15th) it became a flight; after the passage of the Beresina (November 26th–28th) the Grand Army degenerated into a rabble. Against the terrible Russian winter even Napoleon could no longer fight. He left his army on December 5th, and a week later a ragged remnant, perhaps numbering 100,000 men, recrossed the Niemen and took refuge with their Saxon allies in Leipsig.

Not less than half a million men had been sacrificed in the disastrous campaign in Russia. What was the effect of the catastrophe upon Napoleon's position, personal, political, and military? The common assumption that the Moscow campaign inevitably ruined Napoleon cannot be maintained. The loyalty of France remained unbroken; within three months Napoleon had, with superb energy,

raised a fresh army; the Rhenish Confederation showed no sign of defection; the Austrian Emperor refused to join Russia; Frederick William of Prussia hesitated to break with Napoleon. The Tsar himself was undecided whether to seize Poland and revenge himself at once upon Prussia and Saxony, or to pursue the French into Germany, rouse the Germans to fight for their own redemption, and pose as the liberator of the whole continent of Europe.

The hesitation of the Russian and Prussian sovereigns was dissipated by Stein, then an exile at the Tsar's court, and by the statesmanlike soldier Count von Yorck, who commanded the Prussian auxiliaries in Napoleon's Grand Army. These two men virtually assumed the reins of Government, forced their own master's hand, and persuaded the Tsar to take the bolder and more generous alternative. Yorck, on his own authority, concluded with the Tsar the Convention of Tauroggen (December 30th), and though Frederick William repudiated it, the Tsar crossed the Niemen on January 13th, 1813. After that the Prussian King hesitated no longer, and in March declared war on France.

§ THE WAR OF GERMAN LIBERATION. From March to June the ensuing war represented a national movement in Germany under the leadership of Prussia. The King of Saxony, however, remained faithful to Napoleon, and before the end of April the Russo-Prussian allies had occupied his capital. But on May 2nd Napoleon forced them back across the Elbe, and on May 14th himself occupied Dresden. On May 20th-21st a fiercely contested battle was fought at Bautzen, and though Napoleon emerged victorious, the allies were by no means routed, and on June 4th Napoleon offered, and the allies accepted, an armistice at Pläswitz.

Napoleon wanted time to bring up his Italian army into Carniola, in order to keep Austria quiet, to reorganize and re-equip his severely tried forces, and possibly to divide the allies. But the armistice was, nevertheless, a grave blunder. 'I felt the reins slipping from my hands.' So Napoleon confessed at St. Helena. They were. The armistice enabled the allies to win over Bernadotte, to get further subsidies from England, and to wring from Austria a promise to declare war if Napoleon did not by July 20th accept the terms offered by the allies. The terms were that Napoleon should restore the Illyrian provinces to Austria, restore his annexations in North Germany, replace Prussia *in statu quo ante* 1805, and suppress the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. For the rest the *Treaty of Reichenbach* (as it was termed) left the Napoleonic Empire intact. Napoleon unwisely neglected this great opportunity. On August 12th Austria declared war.

The adhesion of Austria altered the character of the 'War of Liberation'. Inspired by Stein, that war had hitherto represented liberal and nationalist sentiment; dominated by Prince Metternich

it became dynastic. Nevertheless, Austria brought to the allies a most welcome accession of military strength. Napoleon, now at Dresden with an army of 440,000 men, planned a triple attack on the allies who, with 300,000 men in reserve, had three great armies in the field: the main army of 250,000 Austrians, Prussians, and Russians, in Bohemia, under Prince Karl von Schwarzenberg; 100,000 Prussians and Russians under Marshal Blücher in Silesia; and in North Germany another 100,000 Prussians, Russians, and Swedes under Bernadotte. Soult, with the flower of the French army, had, meanwhile, been summoned to Germany from the Peninsula, though after Napoleon's victory at Dresden Soult was sent back to Spain to reorganize the French army, broken to pieces after Wellington's great victory at Vittoria (June 21st). Napoleon had defeated Schwarzenberg at Dresden on August 26th-27th; but almost simultaneously Blücher won a victory over Macdonald in Silesia, only a day or two after Bernadotte and Count von Bülow had repulsed Oudinot's advance upon Berlin. On September 6th Ney and Oudinot were routed by Bülow at Dennewitz.

Napoleon's plan of a triple attack upon the allies was thus entirely frustrated. In the first week of October the allies took the offensive. Blücher crossed the Elbe and marched on Leipzig, where on October 16th-19th, 1813, one of the decisive battles of the world was fought. After three days terrific conflict the French were compelled to retreat in confusion. Leipzig broke the military power of Napoleon. A fortnight later, with the remnant of his great army, the Emperor crossed the Rhine.

§ THE PENINSULAR WAR. Nor was defeat in Germany retrieved by success in Spain. Napoleon, when comparatively clear of complications elsewhere, had in 1810 concentrated his efforts on the Peninsula, where he assembled 370,000 French troops. One great army under Marshal Soult having captured Seville (January 31st, 1810), overran Andalusia; later in the same year, Masséna, with an even stronger force, invaded Portugal.

Wellington had spent the winter of 1809-10 in constructing the lines of Torres Vedras, behind which he was almost impregnable. The stout resistance offered by Ciudad Rodrigo to the attacks of Ney had compelled Masséna to postpone his advance in Portugal, but on July 10th that great stronghold surrendered; Almeida the fortress protecting north-eastern Portugal was taken by Masséna on August 27th, but on September 27th, in an attack on Wellington at Busaco, he was badly beaten and lost five generals and over 4,000 men.

Wellington then retired behind the lines of Torres Vedras. All the country around had been stripped of everything that could sustain life, and Masséna, having lost 30,000 men from sickness and vainly attempted to pierce Wellington's lines, was compelled in March 1811

to retire. Wellington then took the offensive, defeated Masséna at Fuentes d'Onoro (May 3-5), and on the 11th the walls of Almeida were blown up by Brennier, who with his garrison cut his way through to Masséna's camp. But the French could neither conquer Spain nor drive the English into the sea, nor could the Spaniards expel the French from Spain.

In 1812, however, the recall of 30,000 French troops greatly weakened the French in Spain. Wellington was at last able to re-take Ciudad Rodrigo (January 19th, 1812): he stormed Badajoz successfully (April 6th) and routed Marmont at Salamanca (July 22nd). The French then evacuated the south of Spain, King Joseph fled from Madrid, and on August 12th Wellington entered the capital in triumph. But he could not hold it. The French reoccupied Madrid and Toledo, and Wellington, pursued by Soult, reached Ciudad Rodrigo in a pitiable condition on November 18th.

The recall of Soult and his best troops to Germany in 1813 gave Wellington another chance. Nor did he fail to take it. He threw himself across the only great military road between Madrid and the Pyrenees. King Joseph hastily left Madrid and made for Burgos, where he blew up the citadel (June 13th) and stood to face Wellington at Vittoria, when he was heavily defeated (June 21st). Fleeing in hot haste over the mountain road, Joseph got back into France on June 26th, leaving his whole equipment, guns, and stores, and nearly £1,000,000 in the hands of the English. Soult was sent back from Germany to obstruct Wellington's advance into France, but San Sebastian surrendered on August 30th and Pampeluna on October 31st, and four months later Wellington entered France. Soult, leaving Bayonne to its fate, retreated along the foothills of the Pyrenees on Toulouse, which he evacuated on April 14th.

Thus ended Napoleon's adventure in Spain. It had cost him dear. The troops which he had been compelled to keep in the Peninsula would have been invaluable to him on the Elbe, even if they could not have saved him in his great campaign on the eastern rivers of France in the spring of 1814. Though he derided the Spanish struggle as a 'war of priests and monks', he admitted that it acted as a 'running sore'. It drained his vital energies, and before Soult had evacuated Toulouse Napoleon had abdicated.

§ THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814. Hardly had Napoleon recrossed the Rhine (November 2nd) before the whole Napoleonic structure in Germany collapsed. The princes and cities of the *Rheinbund* hastened, with the exception of Saxony, to throw in their lot with the allies; all the great fortresses garrisoned by French troops surrendered; King Jerome fled from Westphalia, and the princes ejected to make room for him were restored; William of Orange was recalled to Holland. But Austria was not anxious to push matters to extremities, and Metternich persuaded the allied sovereigns (November 9th) to

offer to the man they had defeated at Leipsig terms which would more than have satisfied Louis XIV. France, retaining Savoy, Nice, Belgium, and the Rhenish Provinces, was thus to be left in possession of the 'natural frontiers' defined by Richelieu. Nevertheless, Napoleon, though allowed to retain the Crown of France, hesitated to accept the terms. The offer, therefore, lapsed, and at the end of December the allies, 400,000 strong, entered France.

Napoleon, though faced by three armies, each stronger than his own, held them all at bay by his incomparable strategy for nine weeks. Experts reckon this short campaign, based upon the Seine and its tributaries the Marne and the Aube, to be perhaps the most skilful in Napoleon's whole career. Twice during this period he might have had peace on terms which would have left him in possession of the Crown and France in possession of the frontiers of 1791, but Napoleon dared not go back to Paris and confess the loss of Belgium, Savoy, and the Rhenish Provinces. He attempted, therefore, by private negotiations with his father-in-law, the Emperor Francis, to obtain the terms he had failed to accept in November. The lost opportunity did not recur. In March 1814 England and the three autocrats concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, cementing a twenty years' alliance and pledging each ally not to enter into separate negotiations.

On March 9th-10th Blücher and the Prussians won a great victory at Laon, and Napoleon, instead of retiring upon Paris, marched eastwards in the hope of cutting the enemy communications. He failed; the allies marched on Paris, which surrendered on March 30th. Napoleon had meanwhile retired to Fontainebleau.

§ THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU. From Fontainebleau Napoleon proposed a Regency. But as the allied sovereigns refused to treat, and his own generals insisted on surrender, Napoleon, perforce accepted the Treaty of Fontainebleau. He was compelled to renounce all rights on France for himself and his family, but allowed to keep Elba in full sovereignty with a pension of 2,000,000 francs for himself and 2,500,000 for the other members of his family; and the Duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla for the Empress Marie. On the 31st the Tsar Alexander and the King of Prussia made a triumphal entry into the French capital.

§ TALLEYRAND. The master of the situation was not, however, Alexander, still less the feeble Frederick William III, but the Frenchman, ex-ecclesiastic and most astute of diplomatists, whose level-headed advice would have abated the increasing arrogance of Napoleon and saved him from the worst blunders of his career after Tilsit. It was as Talleyrand's guest that Alexander took up his residence in Paris, and by that shrewd politician the policy of the allies was inspired.

On Talleyrand's advice the allies pledged themselves not to treat with Napoleon, his consort, or any member of his family. At his dictation the French Senate, supported by the Chamber and the Law Courts, deposed the Emperor, and set up a provisional Government under Talleyrand himself.¹

§ THE RESTORATIONS. The fate of France had still to be decided. For a moment Bernadotte, whose ambition was equal to any position, was considered as a possible king, and even Eugène Beauharnais. The Tsar favoured a Regency under the Empress Marie Louise. At last the allies accepted at Talleyrand's suggestion the principle of 'legitimacy', and recalled the Bourbons to the throne of France. Accordingly, on May 3rd Louis XVIII, an old gentleman, too corpulent and gouty to mount a horse, drove into Paris, which he had not seen for three-and-twenty years, and shortly afterwards granted a Charter which guaranteed to France a Constitution framed on English models. Restorations became the order of the day. Ferdinand VII was restored to the throne of Spain, Victor Emmanuel recovered Piedmont, and on May 24th Pope Pius VII made a solemn re-entry into Rome.

§ THE FIRST TREATY OF PARIS. The first Treaty of Paris was concluded on April 30th. France was treated with extraordinary, perhaps politic, generosity: she was not made to suffer for the sins of the usurping Emperor, not even for those of the usurping republicans. With her legitimate King she recovered the frontiers of 1792, with the addition of Avignon, and strips of territory on her eastern frontier and of Savoy. No war indemnity was imposed on her; she was not even required to disgorge (with a few notable exceptions) the art treasures stolen from almost every capital on the Continent. She had, of course, to recognize the independence of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the various German and Italian States which had so long accepted Napoleon's control. England retained Malta and agreed to purchase from Holland Cape Colony, which she had twice conquered, but restored all the French colonies taken in the war except Mauritius, St. Lucia, the Seychelles and Tobago. France engaged not to fortify any places in the East Indies and to join with England in an effort to abolish the slave trade.

The resettlement of Europe and particular questions arising therefrom (on some of which the four great Powers had already reached private agreements) were referred to a Congress which was to meet in the autumn at Vienna. For the moment soldiers and statesmen were anxious for a rest. It was well earned.

¹ For Talleyrand cf. Mr. Duff Cooper's admirable *Life of Talleyrand*.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE HUNDRED DAYS—THE TREATY OF VIENNA (1815)

‘Revolutionary France is more likely to distress the world than France, however strong in her frontier, under a regular government; and that is the situation in which we ought to place her.’

WELLINGTON

§ THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA. One of the greatest of European Congresses opened at Vienna on November 1st, 1814.¹ Brilliant in environment, imposing in personnel, the Congress and its decisions had a profound influence upon the future of Europe and of the world. Naturally, its decisions were not reached without dissensions, so acute that at one time war between Russia and Prussia, on the one side, and Great Britain, Austria, and the smaller German princes on the other, seemed imminent. Talleyrand, moreover, having gained admission to the Congress with consummate diplomatic aplomb, was ever on the watch to turn the dissensions of the allies to the advantage of his country. Nor did he watch in vain. But on March 6th, 1815, news reached Vienna that immediately put a stop to quarrelling. Napoleon, tiring of his constricted sovereignty, had escaped from Elba, and on March 1st had landed at Antibes. He was welcomed with frantic enthusiasm; towns opened their gates; his old army, generals and privates alike, flocked to his standard; the Bourbons fled; on March 30th Napoleon entered Paris, and, despite some resistance in Provence, and later on in La Vendée, was again master of France. Most of the Ministers of the Empire were re-appointed: Coulaincourt to the Foreign Office, Carnot as Minister of the Interior, and Fouché, ready to serve any Government, as Minister of Police.

The Powers acted promptly. They renewed the Treaty of Chaumont, and each of the signatories agreed to keep 150,000 men in the field until ‘Bonaparte should have been rendered incapable of stirring up further trouble’. Already the ex-Emperor had been declared an outlaw; and as ‘the enemy and disturber of the peace of the world’ was given up to ‘the vengeance of Europe’.

§ THE RESTORED BOURBONS. What was the position in France? Louis XVIII was not an heroic figure, but he had already proved that a corpulent habit did not necessarily imply a lack of political acumen, and that gout was not incompatible with good-humour. He knew that France wanted peace: he wanted peace himself. But, though not personally a bigot or an obscurantist, he allowed power

¹ For further details cf. Webster: *Congress of Vienna*, H.M.S.O. (1920).

to fall into the hands of his brother, the Count of Artois. The Count, a fanatical reactionary, was the centre of a party, mostly priests and *émigrés*, who, more rabid than himself, were resolved to wipe out every trace of the work of the last twenty years. They forgot that since 1789 a new France had come into being which, though it mocked at Fraternity and had never known the meaning of true Liberty, was passionately attached to the idea of Equality. But the root cause of the failure of the returning Bourbons was that they failed to conciliate the army. As the Duke of Wellington truly observed: 'The King of France without the army is no King.'

§ THE HUNDRED DAYS. Napoleon, though strong precisely where the Bourbons were weak, did not rely exclusively on the devotion of the army. He at once put out a manifesto cleverly calculated to win the widest possible measure of support in France and to reassure the rulers and the peoples of Europe. 'He had come,' he declared, 'to save France from the outrages of the returning nobles; to secure to the peasant the possession of his land; to uphold the rights won in 1789 against a minority which sought to re-establish the privileges of caste and the feudal burdens of the last century. France had made trial of the Bourbons; it had done well to do so; but the experiment had failed; the Bourbon monarchy had proved incapable of detaching itself from its worst supporters, the priests and nobles; only the dynasty which owed its throne to the Revolution could maintain the social work of the Revolution. . . . He renounced war and conquest . . . he would govern henceforth as a constitutional sovereign and seek to bequeath a constitutional Crown to his son.'

If a Bourbon autocrat could grant a *Charter*, an Emperor might pose as a Constitutional Sovereign. The *Acte Additionel* was accordingly issued as a supplement to the Imperial Constitution. France was to have a legislature of two Houses—a Chamber of Peers, nominated by the Emperor, and a Chamber of Representatives, indirectly elected by small boards of electors, nominated by the primary constituencies. As in the Charter the Ministry was to be—to some extent at least—responsible to the Chamber, and the Press was to be free. Approved by a plebiscite, in which few people troubled to vote, the Constitution outlined in the *Acte Additionel* was proclaimed at a well-staged ceremony—the *Champ de Mai*—on June 1st.

§ THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN. More immediately was Napoleon concerned to recruit and equip an army to repel the forces which under the command of Wellington and Blücher were assembling in Belgium. Wellington commanded a miscellaneous army of about 100,000 men, described by the Duke as the 'worst equipped army with the worst staff ever brought together'. One-fifth had to garrison the Belgian fortresses. Of the rest, little more than a fourth were

English and Hanoverians, the rest were Belgians, Dutch, and Germans. Blücher had about 117,000 Prussians under his command at Namur.

Before Napoleon's new army was ready Joachim Murat, his brother-in-law, had called upon the Italians to revolt against their restored sovereigns and had occupied Rome, Bologna, and Florence. But his wretched Neapolitans were badly defeated by the Austrians, who occupied Naples (May 23rd); Murat himself fled to Toulon, and ultimately paid for his double treachery with his life.¹ No help, then, could Napoleon look for from Italy. He had to confront Wellington and Blücher without allies. On June 15th he crossed the Belgian frontier at the head of an army of 125,000 men, and by that night was in possession of Charleroi and the bridges over the Sambre. Next morning (the 16th) Napoleon attacked Blücher at Ligny and ordered Marshal Ney to clear Wellington out of Quatre Bras, and then attack Blücher's right flank at Ligny. But the plan miscarried. Ney, pushed back by Wellington, never made contact with Blücher. This was the first critical point in the campaign. Napoleon himself defeated Blücher at Ligny, but so indecisively that after the battle he lost touch with the enemy. Blücher, instead of retiring eastwards on Liège, as Napoleon expected, wisely made for Wavre, in order to keep in touch with Wellington. Consequently, Grouchy, dispatched in pursuit of Blücher with 30,000 men, never found him. This was the second critical point. On the 17th Napoleon, making an unaccountably late start, advanced so slowly on Brussels that it was too late that day to attack Wellington.

Only on the 18th was the battle joined. At 1.30 p.m. the French attack on Wellington's small force began, but for three hours Wellington successfully resisted it. At about 4 p.m. the Prussians began to come up. Soon after seven o'clock Napoleon delivered his last blow. The French Guard wavered; Wellington threw in his cavalry and reserves; the French were driven down the hill, and throughout the night Napoleon's army, in full flight, was pursued by the Prussian cavalry. Napoleon lost 30,000 men in killed and wounded, and all his guns. Wellington lost 13,000, of whom 7,000 were British. The Prussians lost 6,000.

Waterloo was decisive. The road to Paris was open; and on the 7th of July the allies for the second time made a triumphal entry into the French capital. On the following day Louis XVIII was for a second time restored to his throne.

Napoleon had reached Paris on June 21st. Faced with the alternative of deposition or abdication, he abdicated on the 22nd, in favour of his son, and on the 25th retired to Malmaison. On the 20th he fled from Malmaison to Rochefort, seemingly with the intention of taking ship for the United States. But Rochefort was watched

¹ See Marriott: *Makers of Modern Italy* (Oxford 1931), p. 39 f.

by an English fleet, and on July 13th, Napoleon surrendered to H.M.S. *Bellerophon* in the hope of being received by generous enemies, like so many royal exiles before (and after) him. He was not even allowed to touch English soil, but was deported to St. Helena, where, in honourable if tedious captivity, he died in 1821.

§ NAPOLEON'S WORK. Napoleon's work invites assessment, and many learned specialists have responded to the invitation. In Europe Napoleon's monument, though not immediately erected, stands in a United Germany and a Unified Italy, and many other countries owe much to his Codes. Territorially, France owes him nothing, and to its constitutional evolution his contribution was equally meagre. But socially and legally he left an impress upon modern France that has never been effaced. In a sense he was the heir of the Revolution, and codified and stabilized its results. No one has summarized those results better than M. Mignet:

'The revolution substituted law in the place of arbitrary will, equality in that of privilege; delivered men from the class distinctions, the land from provincial barriers, trade from the shackles of corporations and associations, agriculture from feudal bondage and the oppression of tithes, property from the impediment of entails, and made one State, one system of law, one people.'

The catchwords of the Revolution Napoleon derided. Nothing would convince him that the French people really desired 'equality'. He established in 1802 the Legion of Honour. In 1808 he set about creating a new nobility with a hierarchy of Princes, Dukes, Counts, and Barons, but the old nobility were not restored. Yet Napoleon was by no means unappreciative of the charm of the old society which the Revolution had destroyed, nor did he underrate the importance of an hereditary nobility as a buttress to an hereditary Crown. His hope was that in time the blood of the new nobility might mingle with that of the old, and that the social tradition might in this way be revived and transmitted. In political liberalism of the English type Napoleon had as little belief as in economic socialism. The keynote of his administrative system was efficiency based on centralized institutions. His Ecclesiastical Settlement, intended to establish the authority of the State over the Church, actually threw the priests into the arms of the Papacy, and was responsible for the increasingly ultramontane tendency in the French Church of the nineteenth century. Personally incorruptible, Napoleon purified a corrupt administration and legislature. The spirit of his Codes has not merely survived in France but still pervades a great part of continental Europe. Perhaps the greatest soldier of all time, Napoleon must also be counted among the greatest lawgivers of the modern world.

§ THE SETTLEMENT OF EUROPE. The episode of the Hundred

Days had not interrupted the work of the diplomatists at Vienna; but the sheaf of treaties which issued from the Congress were, except in one particular, of less concern to France than the Peace Treaties concluded in Paris in 1814 and 1815. To the good sense of Wellington France owed the retention of Alsace-Lorraine. The German Powers (Prussia in particular) insisted that France ought to be content with her 'true line of defence with the Vosges and her double line of fortresses from the Meuse to the sea'. 'Let us not,' urged Hardenberg (the chief Prussian representative), 'lose the opportunity of establishing a durable and safe peace.' To this end 'France must give back to her neighbours the line of defence she has taken from them. . . . If we let the opportunity slip streams of blood will flow to effect this object.' Hardenberg's forecast was justified in 1870, but in 1815 Wellington's argument prevailed. 'All these years you have been fighting not France but the spirit of Revolution, your immediate concern is peace and stability; with a restless and embittered France you will get neither. . . . Are you going to associate the restoration of the Bourbons with the loss of provinces so precious to France?' Such was the argument by which France retained Alsace and Lorraine, to lose them again in 1871, to regain them in 1918, and again to lose them in 1940. Another Englishman, Castlereagh, endeavoured, by securing the union of Belgium and Holland, to lay the foundations of a strong Middle Kingdom which should serve as a barrier between France and Germany. Yet at the same time Prussia was thoughtlessly endowed with a great province—afterwards known as Rhenish Prussia—on both sides of the Rhine. The absorption of the Ecclesiastical Electorates of Cologne, Trèves, and Aix-la-Chapelle brought a great military Power into immediate contact with France and tempted it to absorb also the intervening German States (in 1866), and to establish its territorial continuity from the Rhine to the Baltic.

Yet Prussia was disappointed. What she wanted was not the Rhine but the Vistula. The bulk of Poland went, however, to the Tsar Alexander, to the disappointment of France, who ardently desired to see her eastern outpost restored in its integrity. That was not to be; though Talleyrand almost succeeded in provoking war between the allies about Saxony, which in default of Poland the Prussians wanted. Saxony had remained faithful to Napoleon to the end, but it was condemned in 1815 to lose to Prussia only a part of its territory. In Northern Europe Russia redeemed her pledge to Bernadotte by taking Norway from Denmark and bestowing it on Sweden. Austria, having gladly surrendered Belgium, was rewarded with Venice, and for thirty years dominated Italy. The Pope recovered the Papal States; the Bourbons recovered Naples; the House of Savoy not only recovered Nice and Savoy, but was immensely strengthened by the acquisition of Genoa. Great Britain, by the retention of Malta and the acquisition of the Ionian Isles, became

dominant in the Mediterranean and got all she wanted in the colonial sphere. The future Constitution of Germany was referred to a German Committee which eventually decided, to the disgust of Prussia, to form a loose Confederation of thirty-nine States under the presidency of Austria, who acquired also the Illyrian provinces and all she had lost in the course of the wars to Bavaria.

Such in rough outline was the Viennese settlement of 1815.¹ After Waterloo, however, France had to be dealt with afresh. By the Second Treaty of Paris (November 20th, 1815) she had to pay something for the escapades of the 'Hundred Days', though for the sake of the restored monarchy the payment was as light as possible. France was required to give up most of Savoy and the other territorial acquisitions retained in 1814; to restore to their owners the art treasures stolen by Napoleon; to pay an indemnity of 700,000,000 francs, and to leave eighteen of the fortresses on her eastern and northern frontiers in the occupation of the allies for five years. The period of occupation was terminated in 1818 and the indemnity reduced, mainly by the good will again exercised in favour of France by Wellington.

The treatment of France, if dictated by enlightened self-interest, was admittedly generous. The governing motive of the allies was, while relieving Europe from the fears that had long disturbed its peace, to give to the principle of 'legitimacy' a chance of making good in France.

CHAPTER XXVIII

LEGITIMACY ON TRIAL (1815-30)

'The King is Legitimacy. Legitimacy is Order and Security. These can be maintained only by moderation and a virtue derived from ethics by politics.'

ROYER COLLARD

§ THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH REVOLUTIONS. Historical parallels are apt to contain pitfalls. Yet to compare the English Revolution of the seventeenth century and the Revolutions of France between 1789 and 1848 has become a commonplace of historical criticism. The English Revolution was initiated and carried through by Puritans in creed and conduct. The leaders of the first French Revolution from Mirabeau to Robespierre were hostile to the Church, not only because it was a wealthy and privileged corporation, but because its teaching misled, in their opinion, the common folk. The English Revolution issued, like the French, in a military dictatorship. But Cromwell was a deeply religious man, reluctantly called to high

¹ Greater detail will be found in Marriott: *History of Europe, 1815-1932*, and in Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia*, Chapter II.

place by what he believed to be the voice of God. Napoleon was fired by personal ambition and lusted after power for its own sake. Cromwell, though the champion of Protestantism abroad and inheriting the temper of the Elizabethan crusaders, had no aggressive designs upon his neighbours.

Napoleon aspired to be a new Charlemagne and to absorb into his empire all the lands from the Vistula to the Ebro, from the English Channel to India. But Napoleon was also a great lawgiver; his handiwork survives in modern France. Cromwell left no permanent mark upon the English Constitution: his death was followed by a restoration of the hereditary monarchy, though Pym's constitutional ideas were ultimately vindicated by the Revolution of 1688 and the establishment of Parliamentary Government. Napoleon's downfall also was followed by a restoration of hereditary monarchy, but, unlike the Stuarts, who were recalled to the throne by the voice of the people, the Bourbons were restored by a foreign army. Louis XVIII was, indeed, as shrewd and easy-going as Charles II, but to him, as to the English King, there succeeded a brother whose reactionary fanaticism provoked revolution. The French Revolution of 1830, like the English Revolution of 1688, put a younger branch of the reigning family on the throne, and initiated the experiment of 'Constitutional Monarchy'. But in France the extraneous experiment was shortlived; in England it was a native product, the outcome of a prolonged evolutionary process, and it has consequently endured.

§ THE CHARTER. The principle of legitimacy, suggested by Talleyrand and accepted by the allies, did not imply absolutism. The Bourbon restoration was not unconditional. The Senate had 'summoned freely to the Crown Louis-Stanislas-Xavier, brother to the late King', but stipulated that he could be proclaimed King only after swearing to fulfil the Charter. But before entering Paris Louis assumed the royal title and issued a declaration which, while promising constitutional rule, safeguarded the legitimist principle, and transformed a contractual Charter into a royal concession. He spoke of 'linking again the chain of tradition which had been broken during the period of nefarious crimes', and dated his Charter in 'the nineteenth year of our reign'. Nevertheless, he frankly accepted the social work of the Revolution, and the Charter issued on June 4th, though amended, was definitely liberal in its terms. At the head of the State stood the King, inviolable in person; in him was vested the power of making all appointments, issuing Ordinances 'necessary for the execution of laws and the security of the State', concluding all treaties, initiating and sanctioning laws, and commanding the army and navy. The King was also to have a Civil List for Life. The Legislature was to consist of two Chambers: a Chamber of Peers, nominated by the King either for life or as hereditary members, and unlimited in numbers; and a Chamber of Deputies. The Peers were

to sit in secret, to share legislative functions with the King and the Lower Chamber, and also to act as a High Court of Justice, and in particular to try Ministers impeached by the Chamber of Deputies. The Deputies were elected for five years, one-fifth of them retiring annually. The Chambers were to meet every year, and though the Crown alone could initiate legislation, either Chamber might petition the King to introduce legislation on a particular subject. Ministers were to be admissible to the Legislature. Catholicism was to be the State religion, but all creeds were to enjoy freedom of worship. The Napoleonic nobility was to be confirmed in its titles and officially to be placed on a social equality with the old *noblesse*. The Press was to be free and the maintenance of the revolutionary land settlement was to be guaranteed. The Judicial Bench was to be independent and the Jury system to be retained. Finally, the eligibility of all classes for employment under the State was to form part of the public law of France.

This Charter might well have provided a fair basis for the establishment of 'Constitutional government', even though it lacked the device regarded in England as indispensable to Parliamentary democracy. But in the sphere of government 'importations' are of doubtful utility, and it may well be that the fault of the Charter was not its divergence from, but too close a resemblance to, an English prototype.

§ THE 'WHITE TERROR' AND THE CHAMBRE INTROUVABLE. The first general election under the Charter unfortunately took place (August 1815) at a moment when a violent reaction was in progress. Hardly had Napoleon fled the country before the 'ultras' began to give rein to passions long suppressed. At Marseilles, a Royalist mob attacked the Bonapartists and killed about a score of them. At Nîmes the Catholics attacked the Protestants, and disturbances occurred also at Toulouse and Avignon. The outrages and murders, though on a limited scale, were sufficiently alarming to earn for the movement the name of the 'White Terror', and the Government, lacking a military force of its own, was compelled to accept the aid of an Austrian force in restoring order.

The result of the election was the return of a Chamber much more royalist than the King, who named it the *Chambre Introuvable*, since he had never dreamt that he could have found such a Chamber. Another symptom of reaction was the dismissal of Talleyrand and Fouché, who had done so much to smooth the path for the legitimist restoration.

§ THE DUC DE RICHELIEU. They were replaced by the Duc de Richelieu and the Duc Decazes. Richelieu was an old man who for twenty-four years had been an *émigré*. Though an aristocrat, he was not an 'ultra', and as the Minister of Louis XVIII he quickly

proved himself both prudent and efficient. His principal lieutenant, Decazes, was equally inclined to moderation and conciliation. As Prefect of Police Decazes had already shown his energy and ability, and was destined, later on, to prove an enlightened and broad-minded statesman. 'To royalize France and to nationalize the monarchy,' was, as Decazes pithily expressed it, the problem before the new Ministers. The King and the Chamber of Peers were entirely in accord with the views of the Ministers. The Lower Chamber, on the contrary, composed mainly of country gentlemen, followed the Count of Artois in a vociferous demand for vengeance upon their enemies; and when the Government proposed a limited amnesty, insisted upon wholesale proscription. Marshal Ney, one of the most popular heroes of Napoleonic France, was shot as a traitor; some 7,000 Bonapartists were imprisoned or deported; a few persons were executed, and many more were dismissed from the posts they had filled under Republic, Consulate, or Empire. But in 1817 the *Chambre Introuvable* was dissolved, and the ensuing election gave the Richelieu Ministry a good working majority of 40-50. They were thus enabled to carry an electoral reform Bill, which defined the parliamentary suffrage until the eve of the Revolution of 1848. In the following year the prestige of Richelieu was enhanced by a great triumph in the field of diplomacy.

§ THE CONGRESS OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE (1818). For some years after Waterloo continental Europe was dominated by the Holy Alliance, an association of monarchs, pledged to regulate their policy, foreign and domestic, by the precepts of the Christian religion. Initiated by the Tsar Alexander in 1815, the Alliance was joined at once by the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, and subsequently by other rulers. Metternich dismissed the Tsar's project as 'mere verbiage'; Castlereagh had doubts about the sanity of the Tsar; Canning questioned his sincerity. Yet Alexander was undoubtedly sincere in his desire for peace, and in his anxiety to prevent the recrudescence of revolution in France or elsewhere.

Those anxieties Great Britain shared; and though the Regent could not join a League of Monarchs England did—almost simultaneously (November 20th, 1815)—join a Quadruple Alliance designed to maintain the policy defined by the four Great Powers in the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1st, 1814). The Quadruple allies pledged themselves to exclude from France the House of Bonaparte, and to meet periodically in conference to 'discuss their common interests and to examine such measures as they shall judge most salutary for the prosperity of the nations and the peace of Europe'. France was at first excluded from the Quadruple Alliance, though to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (October 1818) Richelieu was admitted.

The question of evacuating France was, indeed, the first business on the agenda. It was agreed (largely by the influence of Wellington,

who commanded the allied army of occupation) that France should on payment of the balance of the indemnity (largely reduced) be immediately relieved of the presence of foreign troops.¹ At the same time France was readmitted to the polite society of Europe, and joined what now became the 'Moral Pentarchy'.

All this was rightly regarded in France as a great triumph for Richelieu. The autocrats, however, while publicly declaring in favour of the union of the Powers in a 'Christian brotherhood devoted to the preservation of Peace and respect for Treaties', secretly agreed to watch France closely, and avert any tendency to 'revolution'.

§ REACTION AND REVOLUTION. The Tsar's suspicions did not entirely lack justification. Reaction was apt to breed revolution. Even in France there was, despite the triumph of Richelieu's diplomacy, a movement towards the 'Left'. The (partial) election of October 1818 increased the strength of the Liberals in the Chamber, and in December Richelieu resigned in favour of a Liberal Ministry.

§ MURDER OF THE DUC DE BERRI. The Liberal movement was, however, arrested not only by the outbreak of revolution in Spain, Italy, and Greece,² but by a terrible domestic tragedy. The murder in Paris on February 13th, 1820, of the Duc de Berri, second son of the Count of Artois and heir-presumptive to the throne, caused widespread grief in France, and profound horror at the courts of the Holy Allies. Alexander, already eager to interfere on behalf of Ferdinand VII in Spain, proposed that the committee of the Allies should be re-established in Paris to watch events. Castlereagh, however, was adamant against intervention. Metternich, increasingly suspicious of the Tsar's ulterior aims, supported Castlereagh and the project was dropped. Nevertheless, the murder of the Duc de Berri led to the downfall of the Liberal Ministry in France.

Richelieu, recalled to office, did his best, with the help of Count Hercule de Serre, to steer a middle course between the *Ultras* and the Left. But as the revolutionary movements in Spain, Italy, and Greece became more and more menacing he laboured with diminishing success. His Ministry did, however, succeed, after several attempts, in amending the Electoral Law in favour of landholders. But the new law pleased neither the 'Ultras' nor the Liberals. Both parties were similarly disappointed by the details of the law making concessions to the religious houses and providing for the creation of eighteen additional bishoprics. They revenged themselves by combining in December 1821 to turn Richelieu out. When Richelieu complained to the King about the conduct of the Count of Artois—the

¹ Payment was made with the assistance of the great financial houses of Baring of London and Hope of Amsterdam, an assistance obtained through the good offices of Wellington.

² For these see Marriott: *History of Europe* (1815-1933), Chapter IV, and *The Eastern Question*, Chapter VIII.

real leader of the 'Ultras'—the shrewd and cynical old man replied: 'What else can you expect? He conspired against Louis XVI; he has conspired against me; he will end by conspiring against himself.' He did. Meanwhile Richelieu was succeeded by the Comte de Villèle, who, though acceptable to the 'Ultras', was himself opposed to violent reaction, and directed French policy with wisdom, caution, and moderation for the next six years.

§ FRANCE AND SPAIN. From the outset of the Spanish Revolution (1820) the 'Ultras' had been clamouring for intervention on behalf of 'Legitimacy' in Spain. Before Villèle came into power the French Government had mobilized 100,000 men on the Spanish frontier on the pretext that a *Cordon Sanitaire* was necessary to prevent the yellow fever, then raging in Spain, from spreading into France. In October 1822 a European Congress met at Verona, following on similar conferences at Troppau and Laibach. The Tsar Alexander was anxious to send a Russian army into Spain, to crush the revolution, though no other Power favoured intervention. In January 1823, however, Louis XVIII, in response to the entreaties of King Ferdinand, and urged to compliance by the French 'Ultras', declared war on the Spanish rebels. On April 7th an army of 95,000 men, commanded by a prince of the blood, the Duc d'Angoulême, invaded Spain, recaptured Madrid, and restored the absolute monarchy.

§ VILLÈLE AND CHATEAUBRIAND. No sooner had the French army invaded Spain than Villèle dismissed his Foreign Secretary, the Vicomte Chateaubriand—as the latter complained—'like a lackey'. Highly gifted, but wholly unbalanced, Chateaubriand was, at the moment, the apostle of autocracy. A brilliant writer, he was still more conspicuous for political instability and personal vanity. At once the 'disciple' of Rousseau and the devotee of the Holy Alliance, Chateaubriand was as amorous as he was ambitious, as eager to obtain power as he was incompetent to wield it, as lacking in principle as he was devoid of consistency. Villèle was well rid of him.

Villèle himself was the embodiment of common sense, and, while essentially a man of principle, did not disdain the arts of the astute politician. To mitigate ministerial instability, ever the curse of parliamentary government in France, Villèle persuaded Louis XVIII to create a batch of peers sufficient in number to sustain the Ministry, and (December 1823) enable him to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies. His tactics were justified. The new Chamber contained an overwhelming Royalist majority, and in April 1824 both Chambers, by passing a Septennial Act, relieved the Ministry from anxiety as to the results of the annual (partial) renewals of the Chamber. Villèle also hoped, by a strict enforcement of economy and a conversion of the national debt, to obtain funds wherewith to compensate the still

clamorous *émigrés*. But the Chamber of Peers, on Chateaubriand's advice, threw out the Bill. It was for this disloyal conduct that Chateaubriand had been summarily and properly dismissed. Frustrated in his effort to get compensation for the *émigrés*, Villèle was no more successful in an attempt to re-establish convents in France, and in 1824 he lost the wise and kindly master he had served so well. On September 15th, 1824, Louis XVIII died and was succeeded by his brother, hitherto known as the Count of Artois.

§ CHARLES X. Bigoted, ignorant, and superstitious, the comrade of the *émigrés* and the tool of the Jesuits, Charles X plunged headlong down the hill of reaction. But he had the qualities of his defects. A man of principle and sincerely religious, he at once announced his intention to 'prostrate himself at the steps of the altar where Clovis had received the sacred unction'. The last of the 'legitimate' Kings of France was accordingly crowned at Reims on May 29th, 1825.

The new King pushed Villèle farther towards the Right, and during the next two years a series of measures gave great satisfaction to their friends. Villèle's ingenious but abandoned scheme for linking restitution to the *émigrés* with conversion of the national debt was revived, and 30,000,000 francs a year was provided for the *émigrés* at the expense of the stockholders. The Law of Succession to real property was amended in favour of eldest sons; entail was again permitted: convents were reopened, the control of education and of marriage was restored to the Church, and Jesuits were permitted to return to France and teach in the State seminaries. A proposal to re-establish the censorship of the Press had to be withdrawn in the face of parliamentary opposition (December 1826), but six months later was legalized by Royal Ordinance. In April 1827 the *Garde Nationale* was disbanded. Villèle's course, however, was nearly run. In order to overcome the parliamentary opposition Villèle (November 1827) advised the King to create seventy-six new Peers and to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies before the end of its septennial term. But the electors, though now further limited in numbers, returned a 'moderate' majority, and in December Villèle resigned. Although due immediately to a combination of 'Ultras' and republicans, his overthrow was accelerated by what Wellington described as the 'untoward event' of Navarino.

§ NAVARINO. The battle of Navarino was the turning-point in the Greek War of Independence. For three years (1822-5) the Greeks had been holding their own against the Turks, but in 1824 the Sultan had called to his aid Ibrahim Pasha, the son and heir of his vassal Mehemet Ali of Egypt. The atrocities committed by Ibrahim upon the inhabitants of the Morea impelled France and England to reluctant intervention. From both countries volunteers had already gone in their thousands to the help of the Greeks. But neither Villèle nor

Wellington (then Prime Minister of England) was anxious to assist or even to countenance insurrection against a lawful sovereign. The Tsar Nicholas of Russia, who in 1825 had succeeded his brother Alexander, had no such scruples, if intervention could serve Russian interests in the Near East. Ibrahim's barbarities forced the hands of the Powers. Their admirals attacked a Turco-Egyptian squadron in Navarino Bay and before sundown on October 20th, 1827, all the Turco-Egyptian ships had disappeared; the bay of Navarino was covered with their wrecks.¹ The repercussion of Navarino was widely felt. In France it gave an impulse to the rising tide of Liberalism which engulfed the Comte de Villèle.

§ THE REVOLUTION OF JULY. Villèle's successor was the Vicomte de Martignac, a Liberal Royalist, who belonged to neither of the groups which had combined to defeat Villèle. Though a man of great personal charm and a most graceful orator, Martignac found it difficult to win to the support of a reactionary and obstinate monarch the increasingly powerful party in the Chambers, which though liberal was not revolutionary. To conciliate this party Martignac issued a Royal Ordinance forbidding any religious body to teach without authority from the State, and restoring to the University a monopoly in the education of the middle classes. He abolished the censorship of the Press, though retaining certain safeguards against their abuse of liberty. He deprived the Prefects of their control over the registration of electors, invariably exercised in the interests of the Government, and gave voters the right of appeal to the Courts or to the Council of State. The Liberals, disappointed in their hopes of a large measure of parliamentary reform, revenged themselves upon Martignac by throwing out a more modest measure for giving the local councils a more representative character. Thus he conciliated neither Liberals, Ultras, nor Republicans. Least of all did he please the King. The King, indeed, complained that Martignac was 'meeting the Revolution half-way with his cowardice'. Though unfair to a Minister honestly attempting to steer a middle course, there was enough truth in the accusation to give the King an excuse for dismissing him (August 1829). All attempts at conciliation were then abandoned: a policy of undisguised reaction was adopted.

§ PRINCE PAUL DE POLIGNAC. Prince Paul de Polignac was summoned from the London Embassy to take Martignac's place, and with him were associated Count la Bourdonnais, a prominent White Terrorist, and Marshal de Bourmont, who, though notorious as a deserter from the Bonapartist cause on the eve of Waterloo, became Minister of War. The appointment of these extreme reactionaries was taken to indicate an impending attack on the Charter.

¹ For details cf. Marriott: *The Eastern Question* (Oxford 1939), Chapter VIII.

The Chambers convened for April 1830 promptly took up the challenge. On March 18th an address was presented to the King, who was bluntly reproached with resistance to the wishes of the people by the appointment of Ministers who did not possess the confidence of the Chambers. That had been the pith of John Pym's *Grand Remonstrance* of 1641. In France, as previously in England, the question was: Were Ministers to be responsible to the Legislature or to the Crown?

The answer of the King was unequivocal: he immediately dissolved the Chamber of Deputies. The rejoinder of the electors was to reinforce the Liberal opposition. In the new Chamber the Government could command only a hundred supporters.

§ THE ORDINANCES OF ST. CLOUD. The King and Polignac were then forced to play their last card. Before the Chambers met there issued from St. Cloud (July 26th) three *Ordinances*, which constituted nothing less than a Royalist *coup d'état*. The recently elected but not yet convened Chamber was again dissolved; a system of double election was devised to control the electors, whose qualification was still further raised; a rigid censorship was imposed on the Press; a number of 'Ultras' were admitted to the Council; and a new Parliament to be elected under the restricted franchise was summoned for September. Paris was momentarily stunned. The Press was the first to recover. M. Thiers, a young journalist who had lately come to Paris from Marseilles, and under the secret patronage of Talleyrand had started *Le National*, now embarked on the political rôle which he was to fill with such distinction for more than forty years. The journalists entered an emphatic protest against the *Ordinances* and called on the nation to resist them. On July 27th Polignac entrusted the defence of the capital to Marshal Marmont; barricades hastily erected were quickly demolished; some citizens were killed or wounded in street fighting, and on the 28th the mob once more surged through the streets, raised the tricolour, and seized the Hôtel de Ville. On the 29th the troops mutinied, and the mob, led by Bonapartist officers, burst into the Tuileries and the Louvre. The parliamentarians under the leadership of Guizot and Casimir Périer, alarmed at the prospect of revolution, then offered their submission to the Crown conditionally on the revocation of the *Ordinances*.

The offer was too late. Thiers, Talleyrand, and their friends had prepared their plans. Inspired by the precedent of the English Revolution of 1688, they proposed to keep the Bourbons, though represented by the younger branch, upon the throne, and to establish a parliamentary monarchy. During the night of July 30th-31st, they placarded Paris with a proclamation in favour of Philip, Duke of Orleans, the son of the 'Égalité' Orleans who had played so unworthy a part in the Revolution of 1789. The parliamentarians then

made one more effort to save the 'legitimate' monarchy and offered to Orleans the office of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. The Duke accepted it. On August 2nd Charles X, who had retired from St. Cloud to Rambouillet, abdicated in favour of his grandson, Henri, Duc de Bordeaux, best known to the world as the Comte de Chambord, but to the legitimists as Henri V. At the same time the King appointed Orleans Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. The concession came too late. Or was Orleans too ambitious? The Chambers, assuming constituent authority, offered the Crown itself to the Duke who on August 9th was proclaimed King, not of France but of the French, under the style of Louis Philippe. A week later Charles X, his family, and his courtiers, embarked at Cherbourg for England.¹ Such was the issue of the 'glorious days of July': thus did a young journalist 'dispose of the French Crown by a handbill, and overthrow the dynasty by a placard'.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE MONARCHY OF JULY (1830-45)

'The King must reign but not rule.'

THIERS

✓ 'They may do what they like, but they shall not prevent me from driving my own coach.'

LOUIS PHILIPPE

'THE Charter has placed the liberties of France under the guarantee of the rights of the Crown. These rights are sacred, and it is my duty to hand them over intact to my successor.' In those provocative tones Charles X had addressed his last Parliament. In the duty, so conceived, he failed. The rights of the 'legitimate' monarchy were not handed on to Louis Philippe. In France, in 1830, as in England in 1688, the divergence from the hereditary principle was the least compatible with the liberties of the people; but the figment of Divine Right had gone for ever. The contractual theory of monarchy, as enunciated by John Locke, though possessing even less historical validity than the theory of *Jure Divino*, supplied a valuable working hypothesis for what came to be known as 'Constitutional' monarchy.

From the outset there were in the July monarchy elements of weakness which even a superman could hardly have overcome. Louis Philippe, though not without qualifications for the task he had undertaken, was no superman. He had never fought against France; on the contrary, he had fought in the Republican army at Jemappes. Nevertheless, he was included in the proscription of the Bourbons.

¹ He died in Austria in 1836.

and during his exile he had maintained himself as a tutor in Switzerland. After the restoration he had acquired popularity by living the life, despite the recovery of the vast family estates, of a modest citizen, without ostentation or insistence on his rank. Thus he was well qualified for the rôle of a 'bourgeois King': he was affable and accessible: he divested himself of the symbols of the legitimate monarchy; the Crown and the Sceptre were laid aside; a white hat and a green umbrella better became the chosen representative of the middle classes.

§ EUROPEAN REPERCUSSIONS. The Orleans monarchy was pledged to a peaceful régime at home and abroad, to the maintenance of order and the avoidance of extremes, to economic development and non-intervention. Nevertheless, the July Revolution had important repercussions in other continental countries. In the 'Congress Kingdom' of Poland the rising of the Poles against the Tsar Alexander was described by an enthusiastic young Frenchman as 'like a Second Revolution of July': but the rising was abortive.¹

In Italy the insurrectionary movement of 1830 centred in the Papal States, whence it spread to Piedmont, Parma, and Modena. Metternich gladly sent help to his puppets, but France, increasingly jealous of Austrian supremacy in Italy, sent a force (1832) to occupy Ancona. For six years (1832-8) Austrian and French troops continued to confront each other in the Papal States.²

In Germany the excitement caused by events in Paris led to ferment and even rioting, both in the Liberal States of the south and in Brunswick, Cassel, and Saxony. But the movement, though Radical in tendency, was nowhere anti-monarchical.

Switzerland showed itself, not for the first time, peculiarly susceptible to French influence, and in 1832 the Federal Union was threatened by the *Siebener Konkordat*, formed by the progressive cantons to preserve their Liberal constitutions. The English Whigs, too, were encouraged in their fight for parliamentary reform, though the impulse given to that movement by the July Revolution is apt to be exaggerated by French historians.³

§ BELGIUM. Far the most important repercussion of the July Revolution was, however, felt in the Low Countries.

Castlereagh's statesmanlike scheme for the union of Holland and Belgium in a Kingdom of the Netherlands had already proved a failure. Perhaps the differences, linguistic, racial, and religious, were too deeply rooted to permit success, but the treatment of the Belgians by the Dutch was undeniably tactless, not to say oppressive. Consequently, in August 1830 an insurrection broke out in Brussels and the Belgians demanded independence. The Powers, when

¹ Cf. Marriott: *The European Commonwealth*, pp. 237 f.

² Cf. Marriott: *Makers of Modern Italy*, p. 58.

³ Cf. e.g. Halévy: *Histoire du peuple Anglaise au 19me. Siècle*.

appealed to, were unwilling to break up the kingdom, but Lord Palmerston, the English Foreign Secretary, strongly favoured the Belgian cause, and obtained the assent of the Powers to the neutralization and independence of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers. When, however, the Belgians offered their Crown to the Duc de Nemours, second son of Louis Philippe, Palmerston interposed his veto and ultimately (June 1831) secured the election to the throne of the anglicized Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, who tactfully smoothed the ruffled feelings of Louis Philippe by marrying (*en secondes nocces*) the Princess Louise, the French King's eldest daughter.

§ THE CONSTITUTION OF 1830. The Revolution of 1830 necessarily involved a revision of the Charter of 1814. The monarchical preamble was deleted and replaced by an assertion of the principle of popular sovereignty. Louis Philippe was to be King; not of 'France', by Divine Right, but 'of the French by the "Grace of God and the will of the people"'; the Chamber of Peers ceased to be hereditary, and became practically a Council of Officials nominated from certain specified categories for life by the King. Either Chamber was to have a right to initiate legislation; the property qualification and the age-limit were reduced both for electors and deputies; and the right of the King to make Ordinances was, in view of its misuse by Charles X, relinquished. Roman Catholicism, though it ceased to be the religion of the State, continued to be recognized as 'the form of worship practised by the majority of the French people'. Secondary education was placed under State control, and Government censorship over the Press was abolished. Finally, the National Guard was re-established with the right to elect its own officers. Unfortunately one point of cardinal importance still remained ambiguous. Was Louis Philippe to be, in the classic phrase of M. Thiers, a King who 'reigned but did not govern'? Were the ministers to be in fact, as in name, his 'servants', or responsible to the Legislature?

The ambiguity in the position of the ministry accentuated other embarrassments inherent in the Orleans monarchy. That monarchy rested on a dangerously narrow base. Deliberately self-deprived of the Divine Right of monarchy, it made no appeal to the Divine Right of democracy: unblessed by the priests, it failed to conciliate the people; it rested entirely upon the suffrages of the middle classes, and attempted a constitutional experiment opposed to the traditions and alien to the genius of France.

But Louis Philippe, if a 'Citizen King', was still a Bourbon: he was resolved not to be a *pourceau à l'engrais*: 'They may do what they like,' he said, 'but they shall not prevent me from driving my own coach.' He proved to be an indifferent whip. Nor was the road smooth. The difficulties were in part diplomatic, in part parliamentary, and most of all economic and industrial.

§ THE 'JUSTE MILIEU'. Fundamentally, the difficulty of the new régime arose from the fact that although the parliamentarians and journalists who had deposed the legitimist King genuinely wanted to establish Parliamentary Government, they did not know how to work it, nor did France as a whole greatly care whether they worked it or not.

The history of parties under the July monarchy is consequently confused. Successive parliaments were in favour of moderation—the *juste milieu*—but the centre party was divided into the 'Party of Resistance', whom we may call Conservatives, and the more liberal 'Party of Movement'. Outside these were two other parties, the party of personal government represented by Count Molé, the '*homme de château*', and the republicans. But Molé was in office only for a few years (1836–9) and, taken as a whole, the reign was, as regards party ascendancy, divided unequally between the two sections of the 'moderates', represented by Guizot and Thiers respectively. The first months of the reign were disturbed by a rising of the excitable populace of Paris, who demanded the heads of Polignac and the other ministers who had advised the 'Ordinances of St. Cloud'. But the King successfully resisted that demand, though in November 1830 he admitted to office the 'Party of Movement'. Lafitte, the new Prime Minister, like his Foreign Minister, General Sebastian, was anxious to gratify the republican party by intervention in Belgium and by encouraging the insurrectionary movements in Poland and Italy. The King, however, did not want a rupture with England about Belgium, nor with Russia about Poland, nor with Metternich about Italy. Frustrated in their wish to pursue a spirited foreign policy, the Lafitte Ministry resigned in March 1831 and the Party of Resistance came into power under Casimir Périer.

Casimir Périer was a strong and able man who was determined to give the experiment of 'constitutional' monarchy a fair chance by strict adherence to the *juste milieu* at home and abroad. Restless republicans, disgruntled 'legitimists', and the socialistic silk weavers of Lyons were with equal firmness suppressed. Unfortunately Casimir Périer, whose moderate policy was in May 1831 decisively approved by the electorate, fell a victim to cholera in 1832 and Louis Philippe, impatient of the ascendancy of a 'First Minister', personally assumed the Presidency of the Council and appointed nonentities to the other offices. The experiment was not successful. Extremists on both flanks were encouraged to revolt. The Legitimists, led by the widowed Duchesse de Berri, raised an abortive insurrection in the South. The Republicans seized the opportunity of the funeral of General la Marque, a prominent republican, to raise an insurrection in Paris. The Government, therefore, proclaimed a 'state of siege', it prosecuted some fanatical followers of Saint-Simon, and in October the King abandoned his unfortunate experiment.

He then appointed a 'ministry of all the talents' under Marshal Soult (Duke of Dalmatia), whose principal colleagues were Guizot (Education), Thiers (Interior), and the Duc de Broglie (Foreign). About the same time the Bonapartists suffered a severe blow by the death in Vienna of Napoleon's son and heir, the Duke of Reichstadt (July 22nd, 1832).

Relieved of apprehensions on the side of the Legitimists and of the Bonapartists, the Conservative Ministry deemed that the opportunity had come for crushing both republicanism and incipient socialism. Republican risings were suppressed not only in Paris but in Marseilles, Belfort, and other towns. In Lyons and Caen and le Mans the insurrections were due less to political than to economic causes. In both cases the Government had to employ the military, but order was eventually restored. A general election in May 1834 reinforced the moderate majority and in July 1835 their position was further strengthened by an attempt, happily unsuccessful, on the life of the King and his sons. The attempted assassination evoked profound horror among all parties and facilitated legislation curtailing the liberty of the Press and the right of trial before a jury (September 1835).

§ EDUCATIONAL REFORM. Guizot had, meanwhile, been doing excellent work at the Ministry of Education. By a law passed in June 1833 a solid foundation was laid for a system of education, national in scope, gratuitous, and at once 'liberal' and fundamentally religious. Religious education afforded, in Guizot's opinion, 'the best means of arresting moral degeneration and the dangers to which by reason of demands put forward to promote class interests, the classes concerned as well as society as a whole were exposed'. If, however, much was conceded to the Church in elementary education, the Church left to the University the entire control over secondary, technical, and higher education. The compromise was statesmanlike, and if the Third Republic had been as wise as the ministers of the Citizen Monarchy many difficulties would have been avoided.

§ COMMERCIAL PROSPERITY. While Guizot proved his wisdom at the Ministry of Education, his colleagues, notably Thiers, were doing their part in promoting commercial prosperity. A beginning was made in establishing railways; public credit was expanded; public works were started; and agricultural methods were, with encouraging results, notably improved.

§ FOREIGN POLICY. But one thing was lacking. Ministers failed to satisfy the insatiable passion of Frenchmen for *la gloire*. Guizot was a sincere Anglophil, a great admirer of English institutions, and on terms of intimate friendship with several English statesmen. Unfortunately, however, for an Anglo-French *entente* English foreign policy was inspired throughout almost the whole

period of the July Monarchy by the masterful personality of Lord Palmerston. Palmerston, who profoundly mistrusted Louis Philippe, had won an easy victory over him in regard to Belgium. Equally successful was he in the fresh crisis which in 1831 occurred in the immemorial, yet ever-changing problem of the Near East.

§ THE EASTERN QUESTION. Mehemet Ali, the ambitious Albanian adventurer who ruled Egypt as the vassal of the Sultan, proceeded to assert his independence by attacking Syria which, like Egypt, was under Turkish suzerainty. France co-operated with England to compel the Sultan to buy off the hostility of Mehemet Ali by ceding Syria to him and confirming him in the possession of Crete. Russia, who alone had sent help to the Sultan when attacked by Mehemet Ali in 1831, was rewarded in the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (1833) which virtually established a Russian protectorate over Turkey. In 1839 the whole question was again reopened by the attempt of the Sultan to reconquer Syria. Once more Mehemet Ali achieved a brilliant success against his suzerain; Constantinople itself was threatened, and the Porte was again compelled to appeal to the Powers. Equally jealous of Russian influence at Constantinople and French influence at Cairo, Lord Palmerston concluded with Russia, Austria, and Prussia the Treaty of London (July 15th, 1840) by which the four Powers agreed to coerce Mehemet Ali into submission. France was thus completely isolated. When Louis Philippe threatened England with war, Palmerston calmly informed Thiers 'in the most friendly and inoffensive manner that if France threw down the gauntlet, England would not refuse to pick it up'. Louis Philippe at once drew back. The pacific Guizot replaced the fiery Thiers; Mehemet Ali lost not only Syria but Crete, and had to content himself with the hereditary pashalik of Egypt. Finally, by another Treaty of London (July 13th, 1841), to which France adhered, the Straits were closed, under the guarantee of the five Powers, to the ships of war of all nations. Unkiar-Skelessi was torn up; the Black Sea was no longer a Russian lake.

§ ALGERIA. The whole episode was regarded in France as humiliating for Louis Philippe. Nor was his prestige redeemed by the conquest and organization of Algeria (1830-47). That this was achieved in face of the persistent if unobtruded opposition of England should not have diminished its significance in the eyes of the average Frenchman, even though he was less interested in colonial development than in European diplomacy. By 1839 the conquest of Algeria had, after some vicissitudes, been completed, and to Marshal Valée was entrusted the task of developing the province which his brilliant victory at Constantine (1837) had secured for France. . . . 'I shall go slowly,' he declared, 'but I will never retreat. Wherever, at my

bidding, France sets her foot, I shall form permanent settlements.'¹ Algeria has, in fact, proved one of the most valued of French possessions, though its value was, at first, imperfectly appreciated by its possessors.

§ THE SPANISH MARRIAGE. In his Algerian enterprise Louis Philippe was always more or less apprehensive of the opposition of England; in the Iberian peninsula he could count, at first, on her co-operation.

Both in Spain and Portugal the situation was exceedingly complicated. In both countries civil war raged between the Liberals and the Absolutists, but each party had its champions in the reigning Houses. In both countries France and England backed the Liberal candidates for the respective thrones. France, however, was gradually becoming restless at playing second fiddle to Palmerston, and Louis Philippe realized that something must be done to re-establish his prestige abroad. To this end he adopted the means most calculated to endanger his position at home. Thwarted by Palmerston in several quarters he gravitated towards the absolutist Powers. Worse still, in order to improve his dynastic position, he embarked upon an intrigue in Spain which involved a breach of faith with England and brought deserved discredit upon himself.

In 1845 the question arose of providing the young Queen Isabella of Spain, now in her sixteenth year, with a husband. Louis Philippe, following the traditional policy of the Bourbons, would gladly have seen his sons married to the young Spanish Queen and her sister. The ex-Regent Christina was on her part quite willing that her elder daughter Queen Isabella should marry the Duc d'Aumâle and that the younger princess—the Infanta Maria—should marry the Duc de Montpensier.

To this double marriage alliance Great Britain took strong objection; it was therefore ultimately arranged that Queen Isabella should marry her cousin, the Duke of Cadiz, and that as an additional guarantee of French good faith the Duc d'Aumâle should marry Princess Caroline, daughter of the Prince of Palermo. After a friendly interchange of visits between the French and English Courts Queen Victoria was, however, persuaded to agree to the engagement of the Duc de Montpensier to the Infanta Maria, on condition that the marriage should not take place until after the birth of an heir to Queen Isabella. That condition Louis Philippe shamelessly repudiated. On October 10th, 1846, the marriages of the two Spanish princesses were simultaneously celebrated at Madrid. The Duke of Cadiz, the new Prince Consort of Spain, was a man notoriously unfit for marriage, and the news of the simultaneous weddings in Madrid aroused great indignation in England. Nor did it evoke any corresponding elation in France, where the Spanish

¹ Quoted by E. Bourgeois, C.M.H., x, 505.

marriage was taken to illustrate Louis Philippe's preference for dynastic over national interests. Moreover, the rupture with England threw Louis Philippe into the arms of Metternich, who astutely seized the opportunity to extinguish the independence of Cracow, the last remnant of free Poland, a region where France had traditional interests.

In Switzerland also the traditional policy of France was sacrificed to the desire to conciliate the good will of Metternich. The Swiss Confederation was threatened between 1830 and 1848 with disruption. In the war between the progressive Cantons, or adherents of the *Siebener Konkordat*, and the *Sonderbund*, or League of the Roman Catholic Cantons, France joined the autocratic governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia in support of the *Sonderbund*. Great Britain encouraged their successful opponents, the progressive Cantons.

That France thus lost prestige abroad cannot be denied. Where, as in Belgium and the Near East, French interests were deeply concerned, Louis Philippe was foiled by the opposition of Lord Palmerston. In Spain, Louis Philippe scored a victory, but at the expense of French honour and English friendship. Thus France, always avid of glory, and peculiarly sensitive to any loss of prestige, found herself alternatively humiliated by the failures and shamed by the successes of her citizen King.

CHAPTER XXX

THE REVOLUTION OF 1848—FALL OF THE ORLEANS MONARCHY (1845-8)

'La France s'ennuyait.'

LAMARTINE

§ CORRUPTION. Louis Philippe's conduct of domestic affairs did not compensate for tarnished reputation abroad. The Orleanist régime was based not on democracy but on oligarchy. The parliamentary franchise was confined to some 250,000 electors; a high property qualification was demanded of the elected deputies. Oligarchy, as usual, engendered corruption. In order to maintain Government majorities, dozens of sinecure offices were created, and distributed with lavish hands among the supporters of the Ministry of the day. Before 1848 not less than one-third of the Chamber had become place-holders.

Corruption was not confined to the Chamber; it infected every branch of administration. Several gross scandals—concessions, contracts, and the like—were brought to light in the last years of the

July Monarchy; and for every one that was exposed, scores were not. Corruption and speculation go hand in hand. The ruling classes in France, denied the satisfaction of *la gloire*, found excitement in financial speculation, which, as usual, brought ruin to the many and wealth to the few. The unenfranchised peasant began to look back with regret to the glory of the Napoleonic Empire and at the same time the Napoleonic cult was stimulated by the adventures of Louis Napoleon, the surviving son of the King of Holland.

§ LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. Recognized after the death of his cousin 'Napoleon II' (1832) as the heir to the Bonapartist claim, Louis Napoleon attempted to raise Strasburg in 1836. Louis Philippe, though secretly perturbed, wisely rendered the fiasco ridiculous by refusing to treat it seriously. The Prince was merely deported to the United States. His comrades, though brought to trial, were acquitted, and the verdict was greeted with a popular enthusiasm not without significance. Recalled to his mother's death-bed in Switzerland, Prince Louis again became an object of suspicion to the French Government, who demanded his expulsion. He took refuge in London, whence, in 1839, he published *Des Idées Napoléoniennes*, which obtained a wide circulation and did much to sustain Bonapartist enthusiasm. Nor was enthusiasm cooled by the failure of the Boulogne expedition of 1840. This was a melodramatic repetition of the Strasburg affair, and was equally unsuccessful. Arrested and arraigned before the Court of Peers in Paris, Prince Louis made a brilliant speech in his own defence. The peroration opened thus: 'Un dernier mot, messieurs. Je représente devant vous un principe, une cause, une défaite; le principe, c'est la souveraineté du peuple; la cause, c'est l'Empire; la défaite, Waterloo. Le principe vous l'avez reconnu; la cause, vous l'avez servi; la défaite, vous voulez la venger.' This was not war, it might not be peace, but it was magnificent. Immured for nearly six years in the fortress of Ham, the Prince effected his escape therefrom, and again took refuge in England, where he awaited his 'destiny'. He had not long to wait. The Napoleonic legend worked most powerfully among the peasants. The unenfranchised artisans, more dissatisfied and less devoted to Bonapartism, looked for inspiration to the teaching of Louis Blanc.

§ SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM. Socialism, tracing its descent as a theory from Rousseau, had never before made itself felt as a political force in France. The revolution of 1789, inspired by Rousseau's *Contrat Social*, had ignored his *Discourse sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes*. But socialism, though a popular topic of academic discussion, did not until the 'forties come down into the streets. The true genesis of socialism must be sought in the industrial revolution, in the coming of the machine, the supersession of the hand-worker, the transference of the artisan from the cottage to the

factory, the aggregation of population in great towns. This Industrial Revolution came a full generation later in France than in England, and was never so complete. But changes in the structure of industry began to obtrude themselves in France during the Orleanist régime.

Communism, as distinct from socialism, had been preached in the late eighteenth century by Morelly, Mably, and Babeuf, and was made fashionable after the Restoration by St. Simon (1760-1825) and Fourier (1772-1837), who published his *Nouveau Monde Industriel* in 1820. Many communities on Fourierite principles were started in France, England, and America during the next few years, but none of them survived later than 1855.

Modern socialism starts from a different point and aims at a different goal. The first of its prophets in France was Louis Blanc (1811-82), whose *Organisation du Travail*¹ was first published in 1839. This epoch-making work has a twofold significance: it contained an analysis of the economic position of France during the course of the Industrial Revolution; and it supplied the driving power for the February Revolution. Blanc clearly perceived that the Industrial Revolution, in its earlier phases, inflicted upon the manual workers much suffering, not always patiently borne. Violent oscillations between good trade and bad bewildered workmen accustomed to the stability of the 'domestic system', and gave rise to the problem of recurrent unemployment. The artisan frequently found himself, amid the apparent prosperity and even luxury of the employers, without work and without bread. What was 'Liberty' to starving men? How were the principles of 'Fraternity' and 'Equality' realized under the rule of *laissez-faire*? 'We starve, we freeze, give us shelter and food, or we rise and kill or are killed.' Such was the threat uttered by the factory workers against the 'Bourgeois' Monarchy and the capitalists who sustained it. At Lyons the silk-weavers adopted the gloomy device: '*Vivre en travaillant ou mourir combattant*'. 'No,' said Louis Blanc, 'you shall not die fighting; the State shall see to it that you "live by labour".' That was the text on which he preached in his *Organisation du Travail*; that was the germ of the experiment which took shape, though Blanc was at pains to disown his legitimate offspring, in the *Ateliers Nationaux*.²

§ GUIZOT'S POLICY. Other causes besides industrial dislocation and its repercussion on Economic Theory contributed to the collapse of the Orleanist régime. If the Orleanists failed to excite enthusiasm, they did not provoke much active opposition; they did something

¹ The text of the *Organisation du Travail* together with Émile Thomas's *Histoire des Ateliers Nationaux* and a critical and historical introduction will be found in Marriott's *The Economic History of the French Revolution of 1848*, two vols., Oxford, 1912.

² See especially Blanc: *Historical Revelations*, pp. 156, 193, 196.

worse: *La France s'ennuyait* said Lamartine. France was frankly bored. The position of the monarchy was seriously shaken by the results of the general election in March 1839, and for some months there was a ministerial interregnum. But after a succession of short-lived ministries Guizot came back to office and for eight years succeeded in retaining it.

Yet Guizot's position was never really secure. He was suspected of undue subservience to the Jesuits and the unauthorized Congregations; nor did the *Entente Cordiale* with England—the keystone of his foreign policy—diminish his unpopularity. If he hoped to neutralize it by his cheap score over *le perfide Albion* in the affair of the Spanish marriage he was disappointed.

Meanwhile the dynastic position of the Orleanists had been seriously weakened by the untimely death, from an accident, of the heir to the throne, the Duke of Orleans (July 13th, 1842). The Duke's death revealed grave differences of opinion as to the succession. The Conservatives suspected the Duchess of Orleans of Radical leanings, and after prolonged and bitter discussions she was passed over in favour of the Duc de Nemours.

§ PARLIAMENTARY REFORM. About the same time a question of still greater significance began to loom on the political horizon. In 1832 Great Britain had, by timely reform, averted revolution. As '48 approached the absolutist Courts of Germany and Italy were, by refusing reform, laying a train of revolution. In which camp would France be found? Thiers was inclined, perhaps half-heartedly, towards parliamentary reform, and in December 1845 concluded an alliance with Odilon Barrot and the moderate republicans who, though opposed to Ledru Rollin's scheme of universal suffrage, were in favour of a large and generous measure of reform.

A more ominous symptom of unrest was the reception given (1845) to Lamartine's *Histoire des Girondins*, a work which, apart from any question as to its historical validity, was most effective republican propaganda. No fewer than six thousand persons attended a banquet avowedly given to celebrate Lamartine's literary triumph but which was in effect a demonstration in favour of reform, if not of revolution. Despite all this, when the Chambers met in December 1847 the King complacently declared that the constitutional monarchy sufficed for the promotion of 'all the moral and material interests of our dear country', and refused to consider reform. The dynastic Liberals, reinforced by a small knot of republicans, were out-voted, on an amendment to the address, by ministers and their solid phalanx of place-men. The struggle was consequently transferred from the Chamber to the country, and a match accidentally dropped on inflammable material resulted on February 22nd, 1848, in an unexpected demonstration.

§ THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION. Down to that hour no one

supposed that the monarchy was seriously threatened. 'Reform' banquets were being organized all over the country. The electors of the arrondissements of Paris decided to arrange one. The Prefect of Police prohibited it. Although some of the opposition leaders announced their intention to attend, it was agreed between them and the ministers that the Government should be content with a formal prohibition, the Opposition with a formal protest.

The agreement came too late. A large mob was already swarming in the Place de la Madeleine and the Rue Royale, and the streets re-echoed to shouts of *Vive la réforme! A bas Guizot!* Collisions took place between the mob and the police; barricades were erected only to be torn down by the police. Yet, oddly enough, no one seems to have anticipated anything serious.

The first serious symptom was the attitude clearly manifested on February 23rd of the National Guard. The Guards not only burst into the Chamber with petitions in favour of reform, but prevented the regulars from forcibly dispersing the mob. The defection of a body hitherto so faithful to the Citizen Monarchy convinced the King that he could no longer resist the demand for reform and for the dismissal of his favourite minister. Guizot's resignation was accordingly announced to the Chamber at 3 p.m. on the 23rd. Count Molé then attempted to effect a coalition with the Right Centre but was intimidated into abandoning the attempt by a general rising in Paris.¹ At midnight the King at last called on Thiers to form a Government. Thiers accepted the commission on condition that Odilon Barrot should be associated with him and that the King would withdraw his opposition to reform and immediately appeal to the electors.

The conditions were accepted. The latest of many similar crises seemed to have been successfully surmounted. The parliamentary opposition was satisfied by the sacrifice of Guizot; the Parisian bourgeoisie and the National Guard congratulated each other on their victory; the boulevards were brilliantly illuminated to celebrate it.

But if the comfortable classes were satisfied, the workmen were not. The succession of Thiers to Guizot meant to them nothing but the substitution of one set of greedy place-hunters for another. They wanted something different. A crowd collected before Guizot's hotel; a pistol-shot killed the officer in command of the troops guarding the Foreign Office; the troops fired; some eighty people were killed or wounded; and, in a trice, the bleeding corpses were placed on tumbrels and paraded through the streets of Paris. The provision of tumbrels was highly suspicious. The pistol-shot was obviously prearranged to provoke reprisals and to generate the excitement hitherto lacking among the crowd.

¹ Cf. Barrot: *Memoires*, pp. 520-2; Ducamp: *Souvenirs*, p. 71.

The pistol-shot disposed of the Orleans monarchy. The mob marched on the Tuileries. Thiers and Barrot signalized their accession to power by withdrawing the regular troops. At 1 p.m. Louis Philippe announced his abdication in favour of his young grandson, the Comte de Paris, and withdrew to St. Cloud, leaving the Tuileries in possession of the mob.

Alone of the royal family the Duchess of Orleans exhibited at this crisis any trace of courage. With her two boys she went down to the Chamber and appealed for its protection. The deputies could not afford it. The mob burst into the Chamber and demanded the appointment of a Provisional Government, which was immediately set up. Besides Lamartine it included Ledru-Rollin, Flocon, editor of *La Réforme*, Marrast of *Le National*, a *soi-disant ouvrier* named Albert, and Louis Blanc.

Lamartine by his eloquence more than once saved the situation for the moderates whom he represented, but control had for the moment passed to Louis Blanc and his socialist colleagues. On February 26th the Republic was formally proclaimed. The Municipal Guard was abolished; the protection of the capital was confided to the National Guard; the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, and that of the Peers abolished; political prisoners were released, and the restoration of monarchy under any dynasty was solemnly prohibited. Some days later a question was asked by one of the members of the Government: 'A propos, messieurs, qu'est devenu Louis-Philippe?'

The ex-King and Queen had, in fact, already escaped to the coast, and on March 2nd they crossed to Newhaven where they landed with passports made out in the names of Mr. and Mrs. William Smith. Queen Victoria extended to them a most sympathetic welcome, and at Claremont, placed at their disposal by their son-in-law King Leopold of the Belgians, the old King ended in 1850 his tempestuous life.¹

In Paris, shoals of proclamations were, in the meantime, issued from the Hôtel de Ville, the headquarters of the Republican Government. The real significance of the events of February 1848 was revealed in two of them: 'The Provisional Government guarantees work to every citizen. It decrees the establishment of National Workshops.'

¹ Cf. the somewhat disengenuous account of the events in Louis Blanc: *Revelations*, p. 66; and for the true version of the King's escape from France, ap. *Queen Victoria, Letters*, II, p. 148.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE SECOND REPUBLIC—THE NATIONAL WORKSHOPS—THE *COUP D'ÉTAT* (1849-52)

'The Provisional Government engage themselves to guarantee work to every citizen . . . it decrees the establishment of National Workshops.'

Decree of 25th February 1848

'To promise what is impossible is to deceive the people.'

THIERS

THE doctrines of *Le Droit au Travail* had come home to roost. Louis Blanc was installed at the Palace of the Luxembourg as President of a Commission charged 'to examine the claims of labour and to ensure the well-being of the working class'. The Labour Parliament at the Luxembourg (for such in effect it was) soon became the rival of the Hôtel de Ville; it attempted more than once to supersede the Provisional Government and to establish a Committee of Public Safety. But Lamartine and the moderates, despite several *émeutes* on the part of the Parisian mob, held their ground against the Socialists, and were greatly strengthened by the result of the general election of April 23rd-24th.

The provinces showed greater sanity than Paris, and even Paris showed its preference for the 'moderates'. Lamartine, besides being elected in nine other departments, headed the poll in Paris with 259,800 votes: Louis Blanc, twenty-seventh on the list, got only 121,140.

The new Chamber, elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, contained no fewer than 130 avowed legitimists in addition to 100 Orleanists. Of its 840 members the great majority were men of moderate opinions, and on the Executive Committee, elected by the Chamber, neither Blanc nor Albert found places.

§ THE ATELIERS NATIONAUX. The new Government was, however, burdened with the incubus of the *Ateliers Nationaux*, set up to fulfil the promise of February 25th. Unemployed workmen flocked into Paris from other towns, and before the end of May there were 120,000 applicants for work. But workshops there were none. Jobs were ultimately found for some 6,000 navvies, and it was derisively suggested that the rest should be employed to bottle off the Seine! The inevitable happened; in lieu of work, the disappointed applicants were to have thirty sous a day, as against forty sous for those employed. The number of applicants naturally rose with appalling rapidity. The situation had been temporarily retrieved by the appointment, as *Directeur des Ateliers Nationaux*, of a young chemist, Émile Thomas. Thomas could not provide work, but he

evolved some sort of order out of chaos; opened Labour Exchanges, and gave to the mass of unemployed a quasi-military organization under trustworthy officers.

Yet the situation became steadily worse. The mob attempted, on May 15th, to overturn the Government, but the attempt was repelled by the prompt action of Lamartine and Ledru-Rollin, and their victory encouraged them to prepare quietly for the struggle which they now saw to be inevitable. General Cavaignac, recalled from his command in Africa, was appointed Minister of War; troops were unostentatiously drafted into Paris, and drastic changes were made in the administration of the *Ateliers Nationaux*. The most drastic was, perhaps, an order that the young men, if unmarried, must choose between immediate dismissal and enlistment in the regular army.¹

The orders were published in the *Moniteur* on June 20th. Delegates from the *Ateliers* fraternized with members of the Luxembourg Commission; the cry was raised: 'Down with the Executive Commission': great crowds collected in the streets; everything pointed to renewed insurrection.

§ THE DAYS OF JUNE. The event was far more terrible than the anticipation. The whole city was in tumult before nightfall of June 23rd; the barricades, erected as if by magic, were stoutly defended, and for four days the streets ran with blood. The Archbishop of Paris (Mgr. Affre), a kindly and popular prelate, when attempting to mediate between the mob and the troops, was killed by a chance shot. The regular army was supported by the National Guard and the Garde Mobile, and Cavaignac slowly made himself master of street after street, barricade after barricade, house after house. By noon of the 26th he was able to announce to the Chamber that order had been restored. But it had been a bloody business. Lord Normanby, the British Ambassador in Paris, put the total loss in killed and wounded at 16,000,² and 12,000 of the insurgents were taken prisoner. The events of 1848 have never been forgotten; not even the Commune effaced the memory of the 'days of June'.

The Republic won a decisive victory over socialism; but in destroying socialism, the Republic destroyed itself.

Two days after his victory, General Cavaignac resigned his dictatorial powers, but a grateful Assembly appointed him President of the Executive Council, and until the election of a President of the Republic in December Cavaignac remained virtually the ruler of France.

Cavaignac was entirely loyal to the Republic. His object was to save it from Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists on the one

¹ Thomas: *Ateliers Nationaux*, III, 271, reprinted with Blanc's *Droit au Travail*, with an introduction by J. A. R. Marriott, 2 vols., Oxford, 1913.

² Normanby: *A Year of Revolution in Paris*, II, 95.

hand, and from communists on the other. The 'National Workshops' were abolished; some of the more mischievous clubs were closed; certain journals were suppressed, and the command of the National Guard was committed to the trustworthy hands of General Changarnier. Louis Blanc went into voluntary exile; thousands of his dupes were deported.

§ THE CONSTITUTION OF 1848. A new Constitution was adopted after prolonged and even violent discussion on October 23rd. Its chief features were: a single Chamber legislature of 750 paid members elected by direct adult suffrage by the Departments and Colonies, and subject to triennial dissolution; a Council of State to be elected by the Assembly to draft Bills. But the crucial question was the position of the Executive. On this, Lamartine's eloquence persuaded the Assembly to make a fatal decision. The Executive was vested in a President to be elected directly by adult suffrage, to have a suspensive veto on legislation, and to appoint the ministers, though the latter, like the President, were to be responsible to the Assembly and answerable to a High Court of Justice. In opposition to Lamartine, M. Jules Grévy proposed that the President should be the head of a Council of Ministers and equally with them should be elected and removable by the Legislative Assembly. Only too accurately did Grévy foresee the danger inherent in Lamartine's alternative solution. 'Are you sure,' he said, 'that an ambitious man will not be tempted to perpetuate his power? And if this man be a scion of one of those families that have reigned over France, will you answer for it that this man of ambition will not end by overthrowing the Republic?' If dates were not conclusive it would be difficult to imagine that M. Grévy's apprehensions were not apocryphal. Yet they could not prevail against the rhetoric of Lamartine whose proposal was carried by a majority of 500. That vote gave the death-blow to the Republic of 1848.

§ LOUIS BONAPARTE. Louis Bonaparte had astutely kept his name before the French people, partly by his political writings,¹ partly by the melodramatic adventures at Strasburg and Boulogne. The nephew of the Emperor Napoleon and the grandson of the Empress Josephine he had many friends, political and personal, in Paris. On the collapse of the Orleanists he offered his services and his sword to the public. Both were declined, and the heir to the Bonapartist dynasty who had hurried to France was ordered to quit the country within twenty-four hours. Under protest he obeyed, and did not stand for the Assembly at the election in April. But between April and June things moved fast. In June Prince Louis was elected in absence for four out of the twenty-three Departments

¹ E.g. *Des idées Napoléoniennes* (1839), *Fragments Historiques* (1841) and *Revue de l'Empire* (1844).

in which by-elections took place. Panic-stricken by this demonstration, the Assembly issued a warrant for the Prince's arrest if he should attempt to land in France, but in twenty-four hours revoked the warrant and agreed to allow him to take his seat.

Playing his cards with consummate skill the Prince then wrote to the Assembly to disavow those who ascribed to him ambitions which were far from his thoughts. 'My name,' he said, 'is the symbol of order, nationality, and glory, and it would be a great grief to me to see it used to increase the troubles which are rending our country.' Rather than that he would remain an exile. Nevertheless, the letter contained a broad hint. 'Should the people impose duties on me I should know how to fulfil them.' The Assembly, divided between derision and alarm, was frankly puzzled. How was it to deal with this inscrutable conspirator? Napoleon solved its difficulties and shamed his opponents by resigning his seat.

The 'days of June' followed. In September thirteen seats were vacated. Napoleon was elected for five of them. On September 26th he took his seat. He had accomplished the first stage of his difficult journey.

The second was reached in the election of a President in December. When the Constitution was under discussion it had been proposed to exclude from candidature all members of families which had reigned in France. Against this the Prince successfully protested, but in a speech so halting—perhaps designedly—that the Assembly was deluded into the belief that the speaker was harmless. 'I thought this man was dangerous,' said the proposer of the amendment, 'after hearing him I perceive I was wrong and I withdraw my amendment.' He was wrong again. Lamartine, when insisting that the election of President should be direct, had intended to exclude Cavaignac and to ensure his own election. The device did exclude Cavaignac, but it was Napoleon not Lamartine who profited by it. Cavaignac, the hero of June, on whose behalf all the influence of the Government was exerted, received 1,448,107 votes. Lamartine, the hero of February, obtained only 17,910. The aggregate votes polled by the four republican candidates amounted to less than 2,000,000. A fifth candidate, known only as the leading actor in two melodramatic scenes, but the bearer of a magic name, polled no fewer than 5,434,226 votes. The second ridge in the ascent had been successfully, nay triumphantly, surmounted.

The third stage, though less difficult, was not easy. Under the Constitution the term of the Presidency was limited to four years, and not until after an interval of four years was an ex-President re-eligible for election. That did not suit the heir of a Consul who had speedily obtained a life tenure. But the situation called for most cautious and tactful handling. The first step was to make it clear that the Ministers were to be the servants of the President, not

of the Legislature. From the President's first Ministry Republicans were markedly excluded. Odilon Barrot became First Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, an experienced diplomatist, was appointed to the Foreign Office, and almost all their colleagues were Orleanists except Falloux, who became Minister of Education.

Falloux was a devoted Catholic, closely associated with Montalembert, Lacordaire, and Bishop Dupanloup, and significantly took office in order to establish 'religious liberty in France' and to secure the safety of the Pope in Rome.

§ THE YEAR OF REVOLUTION (1848-9). The Revolution of 1848 was not confined to France. In Poland, in Prussia, in the composite Empire of the Habsburgs, and not least in Italy, it assumed a violent character. Everywhere it marked a reaction against the repressive policy of the autocrats of 1815, and was based on the ideas of 'liberty', 'independence', and 'nationality'.¹ Upon none of these movements could French republicans look unmoved, but it was with the insurrections in the several States of Italy that France was particularly concerned, most of all with the dramatic events in Rome.

§ LOUIS NAPOLEON AND THE PAPACY. Pius IX, elected to the Papal Chair in 1846, began his régime by much needed reform. But the pace set by the republicans soon became too hot for him. His reforming minister, Count Rossi, was brutally murdered in November 1848; the Pope fled to Gaëta, and in February 1849 a Republic, destined to a short but brilliant life, was proclaimed.²

From the outset to the close of his career, events in Rome had a special significance for Louis Napoleon. Personally inclined to champion the cause of Italian independence, the French President saw in Pio Nono's plight his chance. Louis Philippe had alienated the Army and the Church. By one stroke Prince Louis hoped to win the affections of both these powerful parties. A French expedition was promptly dispatched to Rome to effect the restoration of Pio Nono. On April 25th General Oudinot landed with 8,000 men at Civita Vecchia, and though repulsed by the republicans in his first attempt to assault the city, took it by storm on July 3rd. Pio Nono re-entered the Holy City in triumph and recovered his Temporal Dominions.

§ THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. The position of the President in France was, however, precarious. The Chamber elected in May 1849 contained only a handful of Bonapartists. Of its 750 members, 500 were monarchists: perhaps 200 Legitimists, and 300 Orleanists. The minority were mostly republican. By its insistence

¹ For details of these movements see generally Marriott: *Europe from 1815-1937*, Chapter IX; Marriott and Robertson: *Prussia*, Chapter X; Marriott: *Italy*.

² Cf. Trevelyan's fine work: *Garibaldi and the Defence of the Roman Republic*, and Marriott: *Italy*, Chapter V.

on a reactionary policy the Assembly played into the hands of the President. It prohibited public meetings; muzzled the Press; by the *Loi Falloux* it restored the control of the priests and the Religious Orders over education, primary, secondary, and higher; and, though the by-elections of 1850 strengthened the republican minority, the majority was still strong enough, with the fear of February and the terror of June before their eyes, to pass a law disfranchising no fewer than 3,000,000 out of 10,000,000 electors.

All parties were, indeed, preparing for the next development in an evidently unstable situation. Thiers and Broglie visited Claremont; the Legitimists gathered round 'Henri V' at Wiesbaden; the President himself left Paris to the Assembly and made tour after tour in the provinces. He held a series of splendid military reviews; he flattered the army; encouraged the peasants, and by modesty of mien and generosity of hand he steadily won his way to the hearts of the people of France. Even the urban socialists came to look with hopeful expectation to the author of *The Extinction of Pauperism*. Paris remained sullen, but the provinces welcomed the presence of the President with ever-increasing cordiality.

In the autumn of 1849 the ministry of Odilon Barrot had been replaced by a Cabinet of personal supporters of the President, men like De Morny¹ and Persigny, under the effective control of the President himself, who now began to agitate for a revision of the Constitution in order to legalize a prolongation of his tenure. But the Chamber when it reassembled in November 1850 declared open war upon the President. The President retorted by dismissing General Changarnier, the avowed champion of the Legislature, from the dual post of Commander of the Paris Garrison and the National Guard (January 1851).

The situation, though critical, was also grotesque. France, as a detached observer wrote, 'is filled with monarchists who cannot establish a monarchy, and who groan under the weight of a Republic which has no Republicans to defend it. In the midst of this confusion only two personages remain standing, Louis Napoleon and the Mountain. Only two things are possible—a new Revolution or a Dictatorship. Force must, it is evident to me, bring about a solution.'² The diagnosis did not err.

A deadlock ensued: the Chamber forced the Ministry to resign; the President refused to nominate a parliamentary Cabinet, and reappointed the Cabinet dismissed by the Chamber; the Chamber, having refused to increase the President's salary, the President pressed for a revision of the Constitution; the Chamber refused to approve it by the requisite two-thirds majority. The Departments

¹ Son of Hortense the ex-Queen of Holland by the Count de Flahaut, and so the illegitimate half-brother of Prince Louis Napoleon.

² Quoted by Dickinson: *Revolution and Reaction in Modern France*, p. 5.

were, however, ahead of their representatives. Out of 85 no fewer than 79 petitioned in favour of revision. The President was now ready to act. His secret was shared with only six persons—De Morny, Persigny, Flahaut, Saint Arnaud, Maupas, and his confidential secretary, Mocquard. On October 26th the Ministry was reconstituted, and all the threads of the administration were in the hands of these men. Saint Arnaud became Minister of War, Maupas Prefect of Police. When the Chambers met on November 4th, the President proposed a return to adult suffrage. This astute move was narrowly defeated. The Assembly then tried to get control of the army: its failure gave the signal for the *coup d'état*.

At midnight of December 1st–2nd, the *coup d'état* was carried out. The plan devised with skill was executed with absolute precision. On the morning of December 2nd, Paris awoke to find the city placarded with proclamations¹ cunningly framed to secure the support of the army and the people respectively. The Chamber was dissolved; adult suffrage was restored, and a plebiscite promised for December 14th.

The workmen read the proclamations, and with a shrug of their shoulders went quietly to their work: *il a bien fait; c'est le vrai neveu de son oncle*. Not a shop put up its shutters; not a bank, a café, or a theatre was closed. Seventy-eight leaders of the Opposition, including Thiers, General Cavaignac, and General Lamoricière had been arrested in their beds. Next morning warrants were issued for the arrest of some seventy journalists. The doors of the Chamber were barred to the returning deputies and some two hundred of them, attempting to meet elsewhere, were arrested, but to their chagrin were quickly released as harmless.

Not a drop of blood had so far been shed; but on the 3rd and 4th collisions occurred between the soldiers and the civilians and 500–600 of them were killed or wounded. Baudin, the President of the Chamber, was among the killed, but as compared with the days of June the loss of life was almost insignificant.

§ THE PLEBISCITE. Most elaborate and unscrupulous precautions were taken to secure a favourable vote on the plebiscite taken from December 14th to 21st. Local officials of doubtful 'loyalty' were replaced; newspapers were suppressed or rigidly censored, and 'reds' were arrested, to the number (ultimately) of perhaps 100,000, and after trial by Courts specially erected (*Commissions mixtes*) were deported, or placed under police supervision.²

Only in the south, notably at Toulon, was there serious disorder. Even Paris acquiesced. The draft Constitution was approved by nearly 7½ million votes: the minority barely reached 650,000. 'The

¹ All the details should be read in Lord Kerry's *Coup d'État* (London, 1924), where the proclamations are reproduced in facsimile, p. 123.

² A. Thomas, ap. C.M.H., x, I, puts the convictions at 26,884.

country has the Government it prefers; the bourgeoisie the Government it deserves,' was de Broglie's neat and cynical comment. Proudhon's (a year or two later) was more precise. 'Napoléon III est l'expression légitime, authentique, des masses bourgeoises et prolétaires. S'il n'est pas précisément le produit de la volonté nationale à coup sûr il l'est de la permission nationale.' Napoleon's own plea has become the commonplace of dictators: 'Je n'étais sorti de la légalité que pour rentrer dans le droit.'

On the conclusion of the plebiscite *Te Deums* were sung in Notre-Dame and in the churches throughout the country. The President transferred his residence to the Tuileries, and from there promulgated (January 14th, 1852) a revised Constitution. It was in fact the Consulate Constitution as amended by his uncle.

The President, confirmed in office for ten years, was to initiate and sanction laws and decrees; ministers were to be responsible solely and individually to him. He was to nominate a Council of State which was to draft laws. The Legislature was to consist of two Houses: a Senate composed of the *Generals, Admirals, and Cardinals, ex officio*, and 150 other members nominated by the President; and a *Corps Législatif* of 261 members elected (nominally) by universal suffrage but almost entirely on the nomination of the Government. The *Corps Législatif* could vote, but could not initiate or amend projects of law nor interpellate ministers.

The final stage in Napoleon's ascent was soon reached. In November 1852 a second plebiscite by a majority even larger than the first (7,824,129 against 253,149) approved the transformation of the President into an hereditary Emperor.

On December 2nd, 1852, the new Emperor was proclaimed under the style of Napoleon III.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE SECOND EMPIRE: ITS RISE—THE CRIMEAN WAR—THE WAR OF ITALIAN INDEPENDENCE (1852-63)

L'Empire, c'est la Paix.

so Louis Napoleon referred in 1852 to the tradition of the First Empire and announced the programme of the Second. In 1854 he embarked on war with Russia; in 1859 on war with Austria; in 1863 he was at war in Mexico; in 1867 he fought the Garibaldians in Italy in defence of the Pope; in 1870 his Empire crashed in the Franco-Prussian war.

Yet, to dwell exclusively on the falsification of his predictions would be to distort the historical perspective. To himself Napoleon III was the 'Man of Destiny'. He genuinely believed himself to be

entrusted with a mission to reconcile order with liberty, to establish popular rights without impairing the principle of authority.

§ THE EMPRESS EUGÉNIE. His first anxiety was to establish his dynasty. To that end a good marriage was essential. During his sojourn in England the Prince diversified his many social engagements by the sedulous and businesslike pursuit of English heiresses. Among them were Miss (afterwards the Baroness) Burdett-Coutts and Miss Rowles, of Camden Place, Chislehurst (a house destined to afford the pursuer his last earthly refuge). But both these ladies and several others eluded the pursuer. After the *coup d'état* Napoleon sought a bride in more than one reigning house, but the well-established monarchs looked upon him as an adventurer with a doubtful tenure, and in 1853 the Emperor married Eugénie, Comtesse de Téba, a Spanish lady of great charm and beauty. But the *amour-propre* of his subjects was hurt by their Emperor's failure to obtain the hand of a royal princess, and the personal qualities of the Empress did not atone for her lack of royal blood. Despite her grace and beauty, despite the splendour of the court over which she presided, the Empress never became popular in Paris and still less in the provinces. Her charities were munificent, but her heart was cold. Except among the ultramontanes she had few real friends in France, and by the more thoughtful of observers it was soon recognized that her political influence over her husband was almost uniformly exercised to his own discomfiture and to the detriment of the fortunes of the dynasty. After the downfall of the Empire the ex-Empress showed courage in adversity, and was received in England with great kindness by Queen Victoria, who in happier days had been captivated by her charm. In 1879 the Prince Imperial, whose birth in 1856 had given promise of stability to the Napoleonic dynasty, was killed fighting for England in the Zulu War. Queen Victoria was hardly less grief-stricken than the widowed mother who survived her son by no less than forty-one years.

§ THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION. The Presidential Constitution of 1852 required but little amendment to adapt it to the Empire. All effective power was already concentrated in the hands of one individual. From him all authority alike central and local emanated. The Emperor had command of the forces by land and sea; he alone could make peace and war and conclude all treaties, political and commercial; his was the prerogative of pardon; he alone could initiate legislation and promulgate laws and decrees; he defined the functions of the Senate and the Corps Législatif, and though the Chamber voted the total budget the Emperor settled the appropriation; he ostentatiously proclaimed his responsibility to the nation but he only could initiate a plebiscite and determine the terms of reference.

The Ministers, ten in number, were excluded from the Legislature; and though individually responsible to the Emperor, they, like the American 'Cabinet', had no corporate or mutual responsibility. Almost daily they reported on their departments to the Emperor; from him they received their orders. The Council of State and its President was nominated by him as were the Presidents of both Chambers.

The Senate also was nominated by the Emperor. The Chamber was nominally elected by manhood suffrage, but the constituencies were gerrymandered, and the elections were so conducted as to ensure the return of none but the official candidates.

Local Government, similarly controlled by a single will, was administered in the Departments by Prefects, in the Communes by Mayors and Deputy-Mayors, all of whom were the nominees and creatures of the Central Government. To the Prefects the appointment of teachers in the primary schools was in 1854 transferred, though denominational education gradually gained ground through the power given (1850) to the Communes to appoint Congregationist teachers. The supremacy of the Church in every grade of education was paradoxically strengthened by the control exercised by the State over the University, the chief Council of Public Instruction, the Academic Councils, and the teachers in the *lycées*. The Catholics were indeed far from satisfied by the patronage extended by the State to the various activities of the Church at home and in the mission field, though the Emperor went a long way towards fulfilling the expectations held out by him as President in his Bordeaux speech. After renouncing war, he had proceeded: 'Yet I confess that I, like the Emperor, have many conquests to make. . . . I wish to conquer to religion, to morality, to prosperity, that part of the population, still so large, which, in the midst of a country of faith and belief, are scarcely acquainted with the precepts of Christ, which in the bosom of the most fertile country in the world can scarcely procure for themselves the necessaries of life. We have immense tracts of waste land to bring into cultivation; roads to open, harbours to deepen, canals to complete, rivers to render navigable, a network of railways to link up. . . . such are the conquests I contemplate.'

§ DOMESTIC REFORM. During the first decade of the Empire many such conquests were made: social order was restored; industry, commerce, and agriculture, were developed; means of communication were improved; roads, canals, and harbours were constructed, and, by an ingenious combination of State control and private enterprise, the railway system of France, hitherto inchoate, was completed from north to south, from west to east. Transatlantic shipping companies were established; an immense programme of public works was carried through; the credit resources of the country were mobilized to finance public works and to support private

enterprise; two great central banks, the *Crédit Foncier* and the *Crédit Mobilier*, were established. The *Monts-de-piété* were reformed; liquidation in bankruptcy was facilitated; the patent law was amended; the postal and telegraph systems were improved, and Paris became a serious rival to London as the financial capital of the world. Commerce and industry responded rapidly to this stimulus. In twenty years industrial production doubled; especially notable being the progress in textiles, iron, steel, coal, and shipbuilding. Agriculture, the main source of French prosperity, also flourished: new agricultural societies were started, land-banks were set up; horse-breeding was encouraged, and more and more land was, by draining the marshes, brought into cultivation. Paris was largely rebuilt. Under the direction of Baron Haussman, who was appointed Prefect of the *Seine*, spacious boulevards were constructed and the whole city was made more sanitary, and, if not more beautiful, more splendid, and, in particular, more defensible against insurrections. The interests of the working classes were not neglected: artisans dwellings were built; insurance was provided against old age and accidents; labour associations were legalized; co-operation was encouraged; saving and benefit societies were started. A great exhibition organized in 1855 testified to the industrial progress of France, and advertised to the world the achievements of an Emperor devoted to the arts of peace.

§ FREE TRADE. Still more striking was the conclusion of the Cobden Treaty. Napoleon had personally observed in England the strides made by English manufacturers under the tariff policy of Peel and the successful crusade of Bright and Cobden against the Corn Laws. Accordingly, he concluded with Richard Cobden, acting under instructions from the British Government, a commercial treaty. France undertook to reduce the duties on British manufactures in return for the reduction of British duties on French wines and spirits. Though unquestionably advantageous to the aggregate prosperity of both countries, the treaty was alien to the financial and commercial traditions of France, and evoked the hostility of all classes except the vine growers and the wine and spirit trade.

By 1860 the Emperor had already passed the meridian of his popularity. His achievements in the sphere of domestic administration could not be denied; but the price paid for them was the sacrifice of personal liberty. The army reforms of 1855 and 1858 also tended to strengthen the Executive. By adjusting the terms of conscription, and in particular by allowing conscripts to obtain exemption from service by contributing to a fund known as the *Caisse de dotation de l'armée*, the Government was enabled to pay an army of professional soldiers selected for their loyalty to the Empire. Similar precautions had already been taken in regard to the police. In 1853 they were again placed under the Minister of the Interior, who provided a body

of Commissaries of Police, ready for service in Paris or in the provinces. Though there was only one insurrection (1855) during the whole period of the Second Empire, several attempts were made on the life of the Emperor. The most serious in its international repercussions was that of Orsini, whose plot was actually hatched in London.

§ THE ORSINI PLOT. Orsini's bombs killed 10 and injured 150 people who were awaiting Napoleon's arrival (January 14th, 1858) at the Opera House. The Emperor was untouched, but unnerved. Though Orsini was an Italian 'patriot', and his action was taken in revenge for Napoleon's alleged treachery to the Italian cause, good relations between Napoleon and Cavour were hardly interrupted. Against England, on the contrary, the Emperor's anger blazed out fiercely. His army demanded to be led against the 'den of assassins'. Count Walewski, his Foreign Minister, insisted to Lord Palmerston that France had a right to expect 'from an ally' that she would take more effectual guarantees against a repetition of such outrages. To Walewski's angry dispatch Palmerston returned no answer, though he did introduce a Bill to amend the law in regard to conspiracy to murder, but the Government, being defeated on it, resigned.

In France, the Orsini outrage naturally tended to strengthen the personal position of the Emperor, whose prestige the Crimean War and the Peace Conference in Paris had already enhanced.

§ THE CRIMEAN WAR. Thiers spoke of the Crimean War as 'a war to give a few wretched monks the key of a grotto'. But that is a superficial view. A. W. Kinglake made the Emperor Napoleon the villain of his *Invasion of the Crimea*. In that brilliant romance Kinglake took his revenge upon his successful rival in an early love-affair, and his mordant pen was mainly responsible for the view that England was the innocent tool of an unscrupulous adventurer anxious to establish a throne unrighteously attained by provoking an unjustifiable war. Kinglake's thesis cannot be maintained. The occasion of the Crimean War was, indeed, provided by the quarrels between the Greek and Latin monks about the Holy Places in Palestine. Napoleon, anxious to secure the support of the clericals, and glad to repay the affront put upon him by the Tsar Nicholas, had zealously supported the Latins. But the causes of the Crimean War went much deeper than the occasion of it.

The demands made by Napoleon on behalf of the Latin monks were supported by all the other Catholic Powers, and in 1853 their demands were, in substance, conceded by the Sultan of Turkey, to whom Palestine belonged.

These concessions aroused the resentment of the Tsar Nicholas, who demanded not only their immediate withdrawal, but also a virtual acknowledgment of his protectorate over all the Orthodox

subjects of the Porte. The Sultan thus found himself between the upper and the nether millstone. On the question of the Holy Places the Sultan, however, satisfied the Tsar. His larger demand he refused, and when Russia consequently occupied the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, Turkey declared war (October 23rd, 1853).

France supported Turkey, as did England, who ever since 1833 had been increasingly suspicious of Russia. On the refusal of the Tsar to evacuate the principalities, the two Western Powers declared war on Russia.

The Crimean War had begun. The sufferings of the allied forces during the terrible 'Crimean Winter' of 1854-5; the siege of Sebastopol; the fruitless victories of Balacava and Inkerman; the adhesion of Sardinia to the cause of the allies (January 1855); the important contribution made by the Italians to the victory on the Tchernaya; (May 15th-16th); the death of the Tsar Nicholas (March 2nd, 1855); the fall of Sebastopol (September 9th) after a siege of 349 days; the capture of Kars by the Russians (November 28th); the efforts of Austria to detach Napoleon from his alliance with England; the acceptance by the new Tsar Alexander II of the 'Four Points' presented to him through the intermediation of the Emperor Francis Joseph (January 16th, 1856); the Peace Conference at Paris, and the signature of the definitive Peace of Paris (March 30th, 1856)—all this belongs to European rather than to French history, and the details must be read elsewhere.¹

Only the broad results of the war can here be chronicled. The Peace of Paris meant a definite setback to the ambitions of Russia and a new lease of life to the Ottoman Empire. To the Sultan was given a chance to put his house in order, though he did not seize it. France, Great Britain, and Austria agreed to guarantee severally and jointly the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and thus assumed responsibility for the good government of the Christian subjects of the Porte. The Black Sea was neutralized to the satisfaction of England, but to the chagrin of Russia, who took the opportunity (with Bismarck's good will) of the Franco-German War to repudiate the Black Sea clauses of the treaty. Thus England gained little by the war.

If France did not gain much more, Napoleon did. The Congress of Paris, over which he presided in 1856, wiped out the painful memories of the Vienna Congress and the humiliations of the Second Treaty of Paris. Unlike Louis Philippe in 1840-1, Napoleon was not constrained to play second fiddle to England, and could claim to be the liberator of the Principalities and their union as Rumania (1859). The creation of this 'îlot latin au milieu de l'océan slave', may, indeed, be credited to the Crimean War, without which, in the mature

¹ E.g. in Marriott's *The Eastern Question*, Chapter X.

judgment of Lord Cromer, 'the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved'.

§ **NAPOLEON AND ITALY.** Even greater is the debt which United Italy owes to that war. Never, in the history of modern diplomacy, was there a more courageous or more astute move than Cavour's when he decided to send a Sardinian contingent to join the Western allies in the Crimea.¹ 'What can I do for Italy?' Napoleon asked Cavour. Cavour's answer was given when in the summer of 1858 he met Napoleon (by arrangement) at Plombières, a quiet watering-place in the Vosges. At Plombières the astute Italian threw his net over Napoleon, just as Bismarck did at Biarritz in 1865. Terms were quickly arranged. Austria was to be expelled from the peninsula; northern and central Italy were to be united under the House of Savoy. In return France was to regain Savoy, and perhaps to get Nice as well, and Victor Emmanuel was to give his daughter, the Princess Clothilde, in marriage to the Emperor's elderly and not too reputable cousin, Prince Napoleon, son of the ex-King Jerome. Perhaps the Emperor had also in mind the creation of a central Italian kingdom, with his cousin as King. For the Emperor's brain was teeming with schemes, often completely contradictory. That he had, nevertheless, a genuine sentiment for Italy, cannot be doubted.

§ **THE ITALIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE.** In January 1859 Napoleon startled Europe by his words to the Austrian Ambassador at his New Year's reception. 'Je regrette que les relations entre nous soient si mauvaises.' It was a bolt from the blue. Was there to be, less than three years after the Peace of Paris, another European war? Victor Emmanuel's speech at the opening of Parliament at Turin (January 10th) left no doubt about it. On April 23rd, moreover, Austria clarified the position by calling upon Sardinia to disarm. Cavour immediately accepted the challenge. Three weeks later (May 13th) Victor Emmanuel welcomed at Genoa the 'magnanimous ally' who had come to 'liberate Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic'. From Genoa to the front in Lombardy it was 'roses, roses all the way'. Napoleon and his army were greeted with immense enthusiasm. But exactly nine weeks after his landing at Genoa Napoleon started home again. 'Thank God he's gone!' ejaculated Victor Emmanuel after bidding his 'ally' farewell.

The exclamation must be explained. For a month the allies had appeared to carry all before them: on June 4th the French, having crossed the Ticino at Turbigo, won the battle of Magenta; on the 8th they entered Milan. Lombardy was free. Advancing towards the Mincio, the allies won a great battle against the Austrians at Solferino (June 24th); but the victory was won at a terrible cost of life; Napoleon was horrified by the carnage, and after his victory,

¹ Cf. Marriott: *Makers of Modern Italy* (Oxford 1931), Chapter VII.

suddenly stopped short, and without the concurrence of Victor Emmanuel at once opened negotiations for an armistice. At Villagrancia the two Emperors met on July 11th and terms already agreed were ratified. Italy was to be free—but only up to the Mincio; Austria was to retain Venetia and the great Quadrilateral; Piedmont was to annex Lombardy; the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, and Modena were to be restored; the Papacy to regain the Romagna; and all the Italian States were to be federated under the Presidency of the Pope.

§ THE TREATY OF VILLAGRANCA. To the Italian States the armistice came as a terrible shock: to Cavour it seemed to be deliberate treachery; to Garibaldi Napoleon was no better than a 'vulpine knave'. Victor Emmanuel was as bitterly disappointed as his minister, but with more sober judgment he saw that Villagrancia meant a real advance towards Italian unity. Napoleon's motives for concluding the armistice have been endlessly canvassed. 'He was tired; the weather was hot.' Cavour's cynical comment was true, but there were more substantial reasons. The Austrians, though driven back behind the Mincio, were not really beaten; in France the financiers were grumbling about the cost of the war; the politicians saw no adequate recompense in sight; the Empress and the clericals were dismayed that Napoleon should be abetting the Italian 'revolution' and endangering the position of the Pope. Moreover, the international situation had become increasingly menacing. The Courts of England and Belgium regarded Napoleon's Italian adventure with suspicion; Prussia was actually mobilizing and preparing to offer 'mediation', if not to march on the Rhine. Austria was not less alarmed than France by the Prussian move. 'The gist of the matter is,' wrote Moltke to his brother, 'that Austria would rather give up Lombardy than see Prussia at the head of Germany.' France would much rather abandon Italy than fight Prussia on the Rhine.

Hence the Armistice of Villagrancia. Napoleon's own explanation, given on his return to Paris, was terse and perhaps true: 'To secure Italian independence I made war against the wish of Europe: directly the fortunes of my own country seemed to be endangered I made peace.' And the peace was not unfruitful. 'Plon-plon' had already got his bride; Savoy and Nice were, after a carefully organized plebiscite, ceded to France. It was a painful and humiliating sacrifice for Victor Emmanuel at once to lose his daughter and the 'cradle of his race', but Napoleon's account, though heavy, could not be disputed.

For Napoleon himself the Italian adventure was the grand climactic. By 1860 the beginning of the downfall of the Second Empire might already dimly be discerned.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE SECOND EMPIRE: DECLINE AND FALL (1862-70)

'It is France that has been conquered at Sadowa.'

MARSHAL RADON

THE decline of the Second Empire began with the Italian adventure of Napoleon III. Napoleon was an apostle of the doctrine of Nationality. Once his career of conquest had reached its term he desired to see Europe stabilized on that basis. Thus, indirectly in Germany and directly in Italy, he inherited and carried on his uncle's work. But Mentana extinguished any remnants of gratitude that survived the 'betrayal' of Villafranca. Thus United Italy remembers Napoleon III less as the ally of Cavour than as the opponent of Garibaldi. For the dupe of Bismarck United Germany never felt anything but cynical contempt.

§ DOMESTIC REPERCUSSIONS. In France itself the Italian expedition caused the Emperor profound embarrassment. The Catholics were alienated from the man who had robbed the Papacy of the Romagna, and had helped Victor Emmanuel and the new Italian kingdom on the way to Rome itself. Liberals were as bitter against the 'betrayal' of the Italian cause as were the clericals against the enemy of the Pope. Nor did the campaign in Lombardy gain him any credit with the army. Business men were, by 1860, not only sore about the 'Cobden Treaty' with England, but were becoming very anxious about the increase in yearly expenditure, and still more about the growth of the public debt, for which the Emperor was almost solely responsible. The country as a whole, though gratified by the acquisition of Savoy and Nice, grudged the price paid for them in blood and treasure.

§ CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. On every side, then, discontent was accumulating. The Emperor wisely determined to take time by the forelock. In 1859 he proclaimed a complete and unconditional amnesty for all political offences. This brought back to France many Republicans and Orleanist Liberals, who might prove a useful counterpoise to the malcontent clericals. In 1860 he informed Rouher that he meant 'to liberalize the institutions of the Empire'. 'How,' he asked him, 'can you expect my Government to go on?' The Empress is a Legitimist; Morny is an Orleanist; Prince Napoleon is a Republican; I am a Socialist. Only Persigny is an Imperialist—and he is mad.' Plainly, then, the Empire must be liberalized.

Liberalized the Empire was. A Decree was issued (November 24th, 1860) for a large 'revision of the constitution'. The Senate and the Legislative Body were to be allowed to debate, and vote an annual

address in the reply to the speech from the throne, and so get an opportunity of criticizing the policy of the Executive. By the publication of verbatim reports of parliamentary debates the public were to be kept informed of the attitude taken up by parties and individual politicians towards the Government. Above all, though the Executive was still vested solely in the Emperor and his servants, the Legislature was to be kept informed of the policy of the Government by ministers 'without portfolio'.

This Decree was a definite step towards 'Constitutional Government' in the English sense, though the cardinal feature of the English constitution—a body of ministers individually and collectively responsible to Parliament—was still lacking. The Emperor took a further step in 1861, by conceding to the Legislature the right to vote the Budget in sections, thereby accepting, at least in theory, the vital principle of appropriation of supply.

But these measures failed to satisfy. *L'appetit vient en mangeant*. At the general election of 1863 the Opposition swept Paris: Thiers, Jules Ferry, and Jules Simon were among the members returned and joined 'les cinq', including Ollivier, Jules Favre, and Picard, in opposition to the Government. The provincial constituencies, again readjusted in the interests of Government candidates, and under pressure from the prefects, gave the Government a large majority. But, nevertheless, the feature of the election was the very substantial poll of the Opposition and the return of no fewer than thirty-five members to support *les cinq*. The Emperor so far recognized the significance of the election by dismissing Persigny, an incompetent reactionary compared by his enemies with Polignac, and appointing Duruy, once described by a great English educationist as 'the greatest education minister of the century', to the Ministry of Public Instruction. The Emperor appointed his *fidus Achates*, M. Eugène Rouher, as Minister of State, specifically charged with the duty of representing the Government and defending its policy in the Assembly (October 1863).

From the general election of 1863 onwards the question became increasingly insistent: could the situation be redeemed, could the Bonapartist Empire be reconciled with representative democracy? Two men, Thiers and Ollivier, widely differing in traditions and working from different angles, made sincere efforts to reconcile it. In 1864 Thiers formulated the liberal programme in a demand for certain 'indispensable liberties'. In that same year the Duc de Morny, closest to the Emperor in blood and whole-heartedly devoted to his interests, died, and was succeeded as President of the Chamber by Count Walewski. Walewski's appointment was specially significant because of his well-known friendship for Émile Ollivier. In 1866 nearly fifty Imperialist Deputies seceded from the Right and combined with Ollivier and his immediate friends to form the 'Third

Party' (as it became known), with the specific object of promoting the policy of a Liberal Empire. Such a compromise was opposed to the tradition of France, but, as Ollivier sagaciously observed: '*Mieux vaut vivre dans une constitution illogique que de mourir pour la logique.*'

In 1867 the Emperor announced the 'crowning of the edifice erected by the will of the nation'. The 'edifice' consisted of no more than a façade. The Press censorship was relaxed; a limited right of public meeting was conceded; and ministers were allowed to attend the Legislature in order to answer questions and debate public policy. The 'Third Party' continued to press for full responsible Government. But Rouher, now almost (but not quite) Prime Minister, retorted that the principle of representative Government was logically incompatible with the direct democracy on which by plebiscite the Empire was based. Rouher's political logic was unassailable, but the general election of 1869 broke down all the barriers of logic. Ollivier's party came back 115 strong. Still more significant was the election of Henri Rochefort, who in 1868 had started *La Lanterne* as a socialist organ to advocate the principles of the *International*. Though compelled to fly to Belgium, he stood for Parliament in 1869; his election announced the birth of socialism as a parliamentary force in France.

§ L'EMPIRE LIBERAL. The election of 1869 announced not only the birth of socialism, but the death of autocracy. The Emperor capitulated: Rouher was dismissed; Ollivier became a real Prime Minister in a real Cabinet; the Cabinet was to be responsible to Parliament; Parliament was to enjoy complete freedom of debate, to control finance, and to legislate without any restriction.

The Emperor opened the new Parliament on November 29th, 1869. In the Speech from the Throne he referred to the recent manifestation of subversive passions, but declared with assurance that 'France evidently desired liberty, but liberty combined with order'. 'I will answer for order,' he added, 'assist me, gentlemen, to save liberty.' With that purpose in view the Emperor outlined a programme of reforms: authority was to be decentralized; local councils (except in Paris) were to be popularly elected, and mayors selected therefrom; primary education was to be improved and provided gratuitously; law costs to be reduced; child labour in factories regulated; savings-banks extended to rural districts, and other measures of social and economic amelioration introduced. These reforms, together with a measure for the modification of the powers of the Senate, passed through Parliament and on a plebiscite were approved by 7,257,379 votes to 1,530,000. Very ominous, however, was the number of abstentions—300,000; and still more ominous the composition of the minority, which included 50,000 soldiers. The Opposition were actually successful in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, Nantes, Bordeaux, and some other considerable towns. The plebiscite was taken in

May. Exactly four months later the Empire collapsed; the Republic was proclaimed.

§ FOREIGN AFFAIRS. The fall of the Empire was due immediately to the defeat of the Emperor at Sédan. But Sédan was only the military culmination of a series of diplomatic defeats. For all those defeats Bismarck was responsible. As Prussian Ambassador in Paris in 1862, the Prussian Junker had taken the measure of the Emperor Napoleon: he appeared to Bismarck to be half dreamer and half trickster.

§ POLAND. The insurrection of the Russian Poles in 1863 gave Bismarck the opportunity of cementing the alliance between Prussia and Russia. Nor did he fail to seize it. It also gave Napoleon his opportunity. He missed it. Intervention on behalf of Poland in 1863 would have rallied all parties, Catholics, Republicans, and Conservatives, to the support of the Emperor. He did address strong remonstrances to Russia, but the Tsar, strong in Bismarck's support, ignored them. Napoleon then suggested a European Congress to consider the Polish and other questions. But to base his suggestion on the ground that the treaties of 1815 had 'ceased to exist' was to give mortal affront to Palmerston, who hotly denied that the treaties—sacrosanct to England—had been torn up. That was the end of the Anglo-French entente.

§ SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN. Poland was not the only sufferer by the rupture between France and England. The death in 1863, without male heirs, of Frederick VII of Denmark dissolved the union between the Danish Crown and the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. To the duchies there were several claimants. Bismarck, perceiving the importance of Kiel, was determined to get them for Prussia, which had no claim whatever upon them.¹ After the Danish-Prussian War of 1848-9 France had joined with Great Britain and other Powers, in the Treaty of London of 1852, to guarantee the integrity of the Danish dominions as then united under Frederick. In 1864 all the signatories failed to honour their bond. Napoleon, deeply annoyed by Palmerston's refusal to participate in a Congress on the Polish question, declined to support England in sustaining the claims of Denmark to the duchies.

Napoleon's failure to act in the Schleswig-Holstein affair was, to France a bitter if less acute disappointment than the 'desertion' of Poland. But the Emperor had other reasons besides England's half-heartedness for his hesitation to challenge the whole of Germany, temporarily united in support of Bismarck.

§ THE MEXICAN ADVENTURE. Among those reasons perhaps the strongest was the miscarriage of his Mexican adventure. For

¹ Marriott and Robertson: *Evolution of Prussia*, and see Marriott: *European Commonwealth*, pp. 238 f.

some years civil war had raged in Mexico between the Republicans and the Monarchical Clericals. Defeated by the Republicans, the Monarchists appealed for help to the great Catholic Powers in Europe. In this appeal Napoleon's vivid and fantastic imagination perceived an opportunity for killing several birds with one stone. Mexico having defaulted on its foreign debt, France, in 1863, joined England and Spain in an attempt to enforce by arms the claims of the creditors. But England and Spain, on discovering the ulterior designs of Napoleon, immediately withdrew their contingents. The French remained in Mexico. They had to face alone a very dangerous situation. Forty thousand French troops were poured into Mexico; the republican party was crushed; the French army entered Mexico City (June 1863), and in July an assembly of Mexico notables was induced to elect as Emperor of Mexico a Habsburg prince, the Archduke Maximilian. The Archduke, if Napoleon's nominee, had been selected with great acumen. Brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph, he was the husband of the Princess Charlotte, daughter of King Leopold of the Belgians. Maximilian's promotion to an Imperial throne might, then, be expected to gratify Habsburgs, Saxe-Coburgs, and Orleanists, and thus to soothe susceptibilities ruffled by Napoleon's recent diplomacy. Moreover, French Catholics would surely acclaim with enthusiasm an adventure conceived in the spirit of a crusade; the Empress Eugénie and her Spanish compatriots would welcome a Catholic and monarchical triumph in Mexico; English and Spanish commercial interests could not fail to be served by the restoration of order and the payment of debts.

In May 1864 Maximilian arrived in Mexico. It soon became plain that his throne and person would be safe only so long as they were surrounded by French bayonets. In 1865 the bayonets were withdrawn. The United States freed in 1865 from the embarrassment of the Civil War, refused to recognize Maximilian, and 'requested' Napoleon to evacuate Mexico. The request, hardly distinguishable from an order, was obeyed. Maximilian, deserted by his patron, was left to confront his subjects. After a short but most courageous struggle he was taken prisoner and shot. His wife, the Princess Charlotte, besought Napoleon to make an effort to save her husband, and on his refusal completely lost her reason. The Mexican tragedy was felt as a national humiliation in France, and Napoleon's loss of prestige contributed undoubtedly to the downfall of the Second Empire, but Napoleon had even more imminent difficulties to face nearer home.

§ THE SEVEN WEEKS WAR. Bismarck had made war on Denmark in 1864 partly to get the Danish duchies—including Kiel—for Prussia, and partly to fix a quarrel upon Austria, his co-partner in crime. The time had, in his judgment, come for transferring the hegemony of Germany from Vienna to Berlin, as well as for a

'settlement with France'. The diplomatic situation was favourable. Russian friendship was, after 1863, assured. Napoleon had been won over to approval of Bismarck's plans at a personal interview at Biarritz in October 1865. Smarting under a sense of his recent failures, Napoleon fell an easy prey to the astute bluntness of Bismarck. The whole plan against Austria was seemingly disclosed. Italy, in return for armed assistance to Prussia, was to receive Venetia, snatched from Austria, as a gift from Napoleon. After Prussia and Austria were mutually exhausted, Napoleon, having abstained from intervention, was to step in as mediator, and in acknowledgment of his good offices was to accept, as a *pourboire*, perhaps the Palatinate and the Rhine frontier, perhaps Luxemburg, perhaps part of Belgium or Switzerland. Bismarck was prolific in hints, but chary of promises; above all, he left no scraps of paper behind at Biarritz to embitter the recollections of a pleasant and not unfruitful holiday.

By 1866 everything was ready. On June 15th Bismarck declared war upon Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse, and three days later upon all the other members of the Germanic Confederation, including Austria.

The campaign was short and sharp. A fortnight's campaign culminated in the crushing defeat of the Austrian forces at Königgrätz (Sadowa—July 3rd). And France? 'It is France which has been conquered at Sadowa.' So said Field-Marshal Radon. 'The French Empire was imperilled as much as the Austrian by the war of 1866,' said Lord Acton. The French soldier and the British historian were right. Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, at once reminded Bismarck of Biarritz and demanded Mainz and the Bavarian Palatinate. Bismarck had no recollection of Biarritz! He laughed in Benedetti's face and sent on the suggestion to Bavaria. Bavaria's help in a war against France was assured. Failing the Palatinate, Benedetti pressed the claims of France to Belgium. A *Projet de Traité* thereupon was put on paper. France was to agree to recognize a federal union between all the German States except Austria. Bismarck, in return, was to facilitate the purchase of Luxemburg by France from the King of the Netherlands, and, if Napoleon should be 'drawn by circumstances to send troops into Belgium or to conquer it', Prussia was to assist him against any Power which should declare war upon him. On July 25th, 1870, the *Projet de Traité* appeared in *The Times*, to which Bismarck had sent it. Napoleon and Benedetti at once declared that the 'Treaty' was dictated to Benedetti by Bismarck and that Napoleon, on receiving it, had immediately refused to consider it. But the mischief had been done. England, always susceptible to any threat against Belgium, was confirmed in her suspicion of Napoleon.

By 1870 Bismarck was ready for the culminating stroke. After the defeat of Austria a war with France seemed to him to 'lie in the

logic of history'. But it was essential to his purpose that France should appear as the aggressor. Bismarck could bide his time; Napoleon could not. Every day made his position *vis-à-vis* Germany worse. He was himself a sick man, suffering from an agonizing disease that might soon prove fatal; the French birthrate was falling, that of Germany was rising; Germany was, year by year, getting 58,000 more recruits than France. After Bismarck's rebuff to Benedetti the French Emperor tried to persuade himself and his friends that no 'compensation' was really called for, and that Germany had been weakened rather than strengthened by the events of 1866-7. The formation of the North German Confederation (1867), the military and commercial *rapprochement* between Prussia and the southern States exposed the hollowness of such professions. Feverishly Napoleon set out to get allies. But Russia was already engaged to Prussia; for Italy and Austria the Papacy was still the stumbling block. In June 1870, however, Napoleon reached an understanding with Austria. France was to march into Bavaria and proclaim the liberation of South Germany from the yoke of Prussia; the French Navy was to threaten Lübeck and Stettin and detain a Prussian army in the north; then, three weeks after France had taken the field, Austria was to come in and put 80,000 men on the Bohemian frontier. Such was the plan; no treaty was, however, concluded; when the storm burst France was still without a single ally.

§ THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. The French Emperor shrank from war. So did Émile Ollivier. The Empress and the Duc de Grammont, the Foreign Minister, believing that successful war could alone save the Empire for the Prince Imperial, were anxious to promote war.

Bismarck obligingly, and not without design, supplied them with a pretext. He put forward as candidate for the vacant Spanish throne Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. France at once intimated that the accession of any Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain would be regarded by her as a *casus belli*. On the advice of King William of Prussia, who was strongly opposed to war, his kinsman's acceptance of the throne was withdrawn. Bismarck, in despair, wanted to resign. But his luck did not desert him. France, having defeated Prussia in diplomacy, was now determined to add to defeat humiliation. Renunciation was not enough. King William must pledge himself never to allow his kinsman to renew his candidature. The King, conscious of honesty and stung by the insult, refused, and from Ems telegraphed to Bismarck an account of the incident.

Bismarck, on the point of resignation, saw his chance. A greatly shortened version of the Ems telegram was published. Bismarck had cleverly converted acquiescence into defiance. 'Now,' said Moltke, 'it will have the effect of a red rag upon the Gallic bull.'

It had. 'A Berlin' was the excited response of Paris. The Emperor was still opposed to war. In the Cabinet there was hesitation, and only by a majority of one did it decide to declare war.

On July 19th the declaration of war reached Berlin. The one chance for France would have been a dash into South Germany which might have brought Austria in. On July 20th Bavaria decided to join Prussia; the back door into Germany that had admitted Napoleon I so often was slammed in the face of Napoleon III.¹ On August 2nd the war began; precisely a month later the first phase of the war ended at Sedan. The French soldiers fought with all their wonted gallantry, but generalship, commissariat, equipment, transport—all were lacking. Three German armies, all perfectly equipped, marched into France, and fought with the precision of a machine. The issue was never in doubt. The French 'Army of the Rhine', under the personal command of the Emperor, was driven back on Metz. The Emperor then resigned the command to Marshal Bazaine, and joined the army of Alsace commanded by MacMahon. Bazaine, with 180,000 picked troops, allowed himself to be shut up in Metz, and MacMahon, advancing to his relief, was caught and surrounded by the Crown Prince of Prussia at Sedan. After desperate fighting he was compelled to surrender with 80,000 Frenchmen; the Emperor became a prisoner of war.

§ THE THIRD REPUBLIC. Sedan brought the Second Empire with a crash to the ground. The Empress fled with the Prince Imperial to England; the Emperor was deposed; on September 4th the Republic was proclaimed; and a 'Government of National Defence' was formed under the Presidency of Trochu, the Military Governor of Paris. The Government included Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, and Gambetta, a brilliant young lawyer of advanced republican views who six weeks earlier had in the Assembly voted with Thiers and six others against the war. The Paris socialists promised their support. On September 12th Thiers set off on a mission to the neutral Powers to persuade them to mediate on behalf of France. Though this mission met with no success, it alarmed Bismarck, who, on September 19th, gave Jules Favre an interview. Bismarck was insensible to Favre's impassioned oratory, and refused to grant an armistice unless France would immediately surrender Alsace and part of Lorraine. 'Not an inch of French soil, nor one stone of a French fortress would France yield,' so Favre declared. The interview was fruitless. The war went on. Invested by the Crown Prince on September 19th, Paris held out for four months. On October 7th Gambetta escaped from the besieged city in a balloon, and with superb courage and energy organized the national defence. The German attack was, however, irresistible. On October 11th the Germans

¹ For details of the war, cf. Chuguet: *Précis de la Guerre franco-allemande*, and e.g. in Moltke: *History of the Franco-German War*.

defeated the army of the Loire and captured Orleans. On the eastern front, Strasburg, after an heroic resistance, had surrendered on September 28th, and a month later the great fortress of Metz, with 150,000 men and immense stores was delivered into the hands of the enemy by the shameful pusillanimity, if not the actual treachery, of Marshal Bazaine.

These disasters served only to redouble the energy of Gambetta, and to reinvigorate the determination of France. Orleans was recovered on November 9th, and though the Germans re-took it a few weeks later, the army of the Loire made an heroic effort to relieve Paris. The stranglehold of the Crown Prince was, however, too strong; on January 28th, 1871, Paris was compelled to capitulate. An armistice was then arranged to permit the election of a National Assembly, which met on February 12th at Bordeaux.

A dramatic scene had, while the siege of Paris was in progress, been enacted at Versailles. In the Hall of Mirrors in the great palace of Louis XIV, William I, King of Prussia, accepted from his brother sovereigns in Germany the title of 'Kaiser in Deutschland', and by that title was proclaimed on January 18, 1871. On June 28, 1919, in the same *salle des glaces* the German plenipotentiaries signed the Treaty of Versailles.

§ ALSACE AND LORRAINE. On February 26th Thiers and Bismarck agreed on the preliminaries of peace. As to Alsace there could be no question. 'Strasburg', said Bismarck, 'is the key to our house and we must have it.' Ultimately France agreed to cede the whole of Alsace except Belfort to Germany, and in order to retain Belfort Thiers had to agree to the triumphal entry of the German army into Paris. Belfort was worth the humiliating price paid for it. To support their claim to Alsace, the Germans advanced the specious argument of language, race, and history. Whatever be the truth about Alsace, Lorraine was in all essentials French. If Strasburg is the sally port for a French attack on Germany, Metz is the sally port for German attack on France. Moltke, however, insisted on its retention and Germany acquired the whole of eastern Lorraine, including Metz. France also agreed to pay within three years an indemnity of five milliards of francs and to allow German troops to remain in occupation of certain defined districts until the indemnity was paid. The terms agreed in February were ratified by the French Assembly on March 1st, and embodied in a definitive treaty signed at Frankfort on May 10th, 1871.

Against the cession of Alsace and Lorraine the representatives of the two provinces, comprising the whole or parts of five French departments, had on March 1st entered a solemn protest; affirming the 'wish and right' of the inhabitants to remain French, declaring a treaty disposing of them without their own consent to be null and void, and concluding with these words: 'Your brethren of Alsace

and Lorraine, torn for the moment from the bosom of the common family, will always preserve for France, absent from their hearths, a filial affection, till the day of reunion dawns.'

That declaration touched the real point. Even if Alsace and Lorraine were by origin, blood, or speech German, the assimilative genius of France, her sympathetic and considerate administration had made the inhabitants into 'good Frenchmen'. Nearly half a century of German tactlessness (1871-1918) completed the process.¹ Throughout that period both provinces, it has been truly said, showed themselves 'spiritually invincible'. In 1914 the day of deliverance dawned.

Besides making peace, the Assembly of Bordeaux had to decide upon the future form of government for France. The provinces were still unquestionably monarchist if not Bonapartist; out of 750 members of the Assembly at least 400 were either Legitimists or Orleanists, with a sprinkling of Bonapartists. The laws which condemned to exile the Bourbon princes—of both branches—were repealed, and the Assembly refused to proclaim a Republic. No reconciliation could, however, be effected between the Comte de Chambord, representing the elder, and the Comte de Paris, the younger line. Consequently, without prejudice to the ultimate form of government, the Assembly elected Jules Grévy, a moderate republican, President of the Assembly, and Thiers 'Chief of the Executive Power of the French Republic'.

§ THE PARIS COMMUNE. Before the preliminaries of peace had been ratified Paris had broken out into insurrection. The Hôtel de Ville was seized by a mob consisting in part of fanatical patriots, but chiefly of the Parisian *canaille*. The regular troops fraternized with the National Guard and shot their officers; the Provisional Government withdrew to Versailles, and Paris was left to the tender mercies of an insurrectionary 'Council of the Commune' elected on March 26th.

A curious triangular situation then ensued. The German flag still waved over St. Denis; the tricolour of the Republic over Marseilles; the red flag of the Commune over Paris. While the Germans were unconcernedly looking on, France had to reconquer its own capital. For more than six weeks (April 2nd-May 21st) Paris suffered a second siege far more horrible and destructive than the first. Terrible atrocities were committed on both sides, and when, on May 21st, Marshal MacMahon, at the head of the Government forces, effected an entry into Paris, he found the city ablaze and in ruins. For seven days there ensued fierce fighting in the streets. The insurgents massacred their hostages, including the Archbishop Darboy and many priests; they burnt to the ground the Tuileries, the Hôtel de

¹ For the problem of Alsace-Lorraine, cf. Ruth Putnam: *Alsace-Lorraine*; F. Y. Eccles (Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-15); Foreign Office Handbooks (1919)

Ville, the Palais de Justice, and some of the finest buildings in the city. Terrible were the reprisals: some 20,000 people were put to the sword; nearly 40,000 were arrested. Courts martial were at once set up, but not until 1876 did they finish their grim task. More than 18,000 people were convicted; 270 were condemned to death and 7,500 to transportation. But France was saved.

The precise character of the Commune still remains something of an enigma. In origin a patriotic movement initiated to protest against the pusillanimity, or perhaps the treachery, of the 'bourgeois republic', it came more and more under the control of fanatical revolutionaries. Of these some traced back to the '48; others anticipated the doctrines and the policy of the Russian Communists of 1917. Some of the larger cities set up short-lived communes of their own. France as a whole was strongly opposed to them. Fortunately Paris could be almost completely isolated: the Communist infection did not spread. But the germs of the disease, though sterilized, were not completely eliminated, and the physicians were haunted by fears of a recurrence of the attack. The fears proved groundless. In August a Provisional Constitution was adopted: the Head of the Executive was to take the title of 'President of the French Republic', and along with ministers appointed and dismissable by him, was to be responsible to the Assembly. By implication, if not by specific affirmation, France was once again a Republic.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE THIRD REPUBLIC (1870-1905)

'The Republic is the Government that divides us least.'

THIERS

§ A NEW ERA. For the whole world the year 1870-1 is a dividing line. The Vatican Decrees, the unification of Italy and Germany, the revival of the Republic in France, the advent of the era of *Welt-politik* constitute a watershed in modern history.

§ THE RECOVERY OF FRANCE. To England, Disraeli announced the advent of the new Imperialism. Chamberlain was the disciple less of Gladstone than of Disraeli.¹ In France *Welt-Politik* had arrived. In domestic affairs the year 1870-1 marked the opening of a new period in French history: France embarked upon the latest of her many constitutional experiments. The outlook had, indeed, never seemed more uncertain than in 1871. What form of government should France adopt? Twice she had made trial of a Republic.

¹ See, for development of the thesis of this paragraph, Marriott: *Modern England and Europe, 1815-1937*, pp. 5 f. and 266 f.

Twice the Republic had proved the prelude to a Napoleonic Empire. On the downfall of the first Empire she had tried the experiment of 'Legitimacy limited by Charter'. She then tried a parliamentary monarchy *à la mode anglaise*. Every experiment had in turn failed. What remained?

Of the three parties into which France was in 1871 divided, the monarchist, the Bonapartist, and the republican, the monarchist was much the largest, but it was weakened by the hostility between the Legitimist and the Orleanist standard-bearers, and Paris was, despite the Commune, still immutably republican. The constitutional issue could, however, wait. Thiers, as Head of the Executive Government, had more immediate tasks to perform, and the veteran statesman, vigorous and alert in mind if stricken in years, performed them with astonishing rapidity and success.

As a social figure-head, the stout little bourgeois would have been grotesque, and Thiers, conscious of his limitations, never attempted to play the rôle. But he was a genuine patriot and in the best sense a Liberal. Liberalism, not to say liberty, was threatened by three dangers: by Imperialism, by Communism, and not least by Clericalism.

§ THIERS. The elections of 1871 went strongly in favour of the Republicans. Thiers, with his superb political instinct, moved cautiously, slowly, but definitely towards the Left, and with the help of men like Casimir Périer and Remusat—who soon replaced Jules Favre and Picard—formed a Left-Centre party pledged to the support of a government which 'though republican in form was conservative in policy'.

Thiers' first task was to get rid of the German army of occupation. In less than four years it was accomplished. With the payment of each instalment of the German indemnity, the area of occupation was reduced. In June 1871 Thiers raised at 5 per cent a loan of 2½ milliard francs issued at 82½; 1½ milliards was paid to Germany; two-thirds of occupied France was evacuated. A second loan for 3 milliards was raised in July 1872, and by the autumn of 1873 not a German soldier remained on French soil. Thiers was justly acclaimed as the 'Liberator of the *Patrie*', but the Liberator had already ceased (May 1873) to be President of the Republic.

Not, however, before he had passed several important measures to fortify the position of a Conservative Republic. The first was a reorganization of Local Government. The scheme of 1871 was a triumph of compromise. The larger towns remained under prefects appointed by the Central Government, but all towns with less than 20,000 inhabitants were allowed the democratic luxury of election. The powers of the *Conseils Généraux* of Departments were considerably extended, and Departmental Commissions were created to assist the prefects. France was still haunted by fears of the *Commune*,

and by these laws Thiers hoped to strengthen the provinces against a too easily excited capital.

Still more important were the measures taken (1871-2) to defend France against external enemies. The new frontier was heavily fortified, and by the military law of July 27th, 1872, compulsory military service was introduced. Every citizen (with a few exceptions) was obliged to serve for five years in the regular army and four years in the territorial reserve.

Only Thiers could have persuaded France, even after the lesson of 1870, to impose such a heavy burden on its young manhood, and even his power rested on a dangerously narrow basis. The monarchists and clericals were actively working for a 'restoration'; Gambetta, waging war on both, was rousing the country to demand the summoning of a Constituent Assembly charged to devise a permanent Republican and Democratic Constitution. In November 1872 Thiers did appoint a Committee of Thirty to draft a Bill, 'determining the attributes of the public powers and the conditions of ministerial responsibility'. Though heavily weighted in favour of a monarchy, this committee was responsible for the Republican Constitution of 1875. But before that constitution was adopted, the ministry was defeated in the Assembly on a vote of confidence by a majority of thirteen (May 24th, 1873). Instead of dismissing the defeated ministers, Thiers preferred to resign. He had always refused to accept the principle of ministerial responsibility on the ground that, 'though it was perfectly consistent with the dignity of a Constitutional King, it was for him, a little bourgeois, out of the question'. Conformably with this view of his position, Thiers, now nearing eighty years of age, resigned. Six years later he died (September 3rd, 1877).

The debt of France to Thiers is literally incalculable. His activity and fortitude in face of the disasters of 1870-1; the determination with which he suppressed the Paris Commune; his promptitude in relieving France of the incubus of the German indemnity and the humiliation of the German army of occupation; his prudence in pursuing the *via media*, thus saving France both from reaction and revolution—the memory of all this is imperishably enshrined in the heart of every patriotic Frenchman, and stands in the account-book of history, to the credit of the 'little bourgeois', the true begetter of the Third Republic. On the overthrow of Thiers, for which they were largely responsible, the Orleanists had some thoughts of putting forward the Duc d'Aumale, but wisely decided to support Marshal MacMahon, who, though defeated at Sedan, was better remembered as the victor of Magenta, and was more acceptable than any Orleanist to all sections of monarchists. Elected by an almost unanimous vote, MacMahon retained office until 1877.

§ PRESIDENT MACMAHON. MacMahon was devoted to monarchy and Catholicism. His Chief of the Cabinet, the Duc de Broglie,

though a monarchist, was not a Legitimist, and though a Catholic, was not, like MacMahon, an ultramontane.

Their first step was to give the President greater security of tenure by the enactment (November 1873) of the 'Septennate', extending the President's term of office to seven years. A month earlier Marshal Bazaine had been arraigned before a Council of War, and after a trial lasting for two months had been condemned to death, a sentence speedily commuted into twenty years' detention. Loosely guarded in the island of Sainte Marguerite, near Cannes, the Marshal soon effected his escape to Spain, where in 1888 he died. That he was guilty of extreme pusillanimity, if not of treachery, is undeniable. That he escaped the penalty inflicted upon Marshal Ney by the ultras of 1815, was to the credit of the Third Republic.

§ LEGITIMISTS AND ORLEANISTS. France, though republican in form, was still at heart monarchical. But the monarchists found it difficult to agree on a candidate for the throne. The death of Napoleon III at Chislehurst on January 9th, 1873, removed one complication. The Prince Imperial, being only seventeen, was not a serious claimant. But could the Legitimists and the Orleanists be reconciled? In August 1873 the Comte de Paris was induced to pay a ceremonial visit to the Comte de Chambord, and the latter, being childless, recognized him as heir-presumptive in return for a promise of Orleanist support to the Legitimists during the lifetime of the Comte de Chambord. Nevertheless, 'Henri V' issued from Frohsdorf (October 17th, 1873) a letter insisting on the acceptance of the 'White Flag'. As if to dissipate the last hope of the monarchy, he also insisted on a restoration of the Temporal Power of the Papacy, despite the fact that Pope Pius IX was contemptuous of the emblem of the white flag: 'tout cela pour une serviette'.

The Republic profited greatly from the dissensions of the monarchists. De Broglie had already alienated the extreme Right by the 'Septennate' Law; he alienated the Left by his refusal to declare unambiguously for a Republic, and on May 16th, 1874, he was defeated on a Municipal Election Bill. One month later Casimir-Perier carried a motion which virtually committed the Government to constitutional revision.

§ THE CONSTITUTION OF 1875. A series of laws passed in 1875 defined the Republican Constitution under which, with a few modifications, France was governed until 1940.

§ THE EXECUTIVE. The Executive is vested in a President elected for seven years by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies sitting in a joint session as the 'National Assembly' at Versailles. The President is re-eligible, but in fact Jules Grévy (1879-87) was the only President ever re-elected,¹ and, in consequence of a financial scandal in which

¹ With the exception of M. Lebrun, re-elected on the eve of war, 1939.

his son-in-law was involved, Grévy resigned early in his second term (1885-7). The President is irresponsible except for high treason. Responsibility is assumed by his ministers, one of whom must counter-sign all his proclamations. But the Executive was, in 1875, designedly made weak. 'The President,' as Poincaré wrote, 'presides but does not govern.' But though he does not reign or govern, his position in a ceremonial sense is one of high dignity. In all external affairs he represents the State; the majesty of his person is secured by law; he shares with both Chambers the right to initiate legislation, and can exercise a veto on it—though only for one month. He convokes and prorogues the Legislature, and can summon extraordinary sessions, and with the assent of the Senate he can dissolve it before its legal term expires, but the Legislature must meet on a given date and sit for at least five months. In a constitutional crisis the President, like the English sovereign, may exercise real power.

He selects the Prime Minister, and may proffer advice to him as President of the Council about the selection of the other ministers. He regularly presides over the Cabinet when it meets as the *Conseil des Ministres*, though not over the *Conseil de Cabinet*, which consists of the responsible ministers. The former is something between the English Privy Council and the Cabinet Council. At its meetings at the President's palace, the Élysée, it lays down the main lines of State policy, especially in relation to foreign affairs, over which the President exercises great influence, though not control. He concludes treaties, and declares war, but only with the assent of both Chambers. That the Constitution vested so much of power in the President was doubtless due to the hope of its sponsors that the monarchy would presently be restored.

§ THE LEGISLATURE. The Legislature was to consist of two Houses: a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. In joint session they elect the President and can amend the Constitution, though in 1884 it was ordained that 'the republican form of government shall not be made the subject of a proposed revision', and that 'members of families that have reigned in France are ineligible for the presidency of the Republic and for the Senate'. In 1879 the seat of government was transferred from Versailles, where it was fixed in 1875, to Paris; the National Assembly must still meet at Versailles.

The Senate was, under the Laws of 1875, to consist of 300 members, of whom 75 were to be elected for life by the National Assembly, and the rest for nine years (one-third retiring every year) by electoral colleges in each Department and Colony, by the method of *scrutin de liste*. Since 1884 all Senators (314 in number) have been elected on the same basis. The Senate has the right to reject, but not to initiate, Money Bills, and except in the latter respect has concurrent and equal rights with the Chamber of Deputies. Only with the assent

of the Senate can the President dissolve the Legislature, but only once has that power been exercised.

The Chamber of Deputies was to consist of 597 (now 615) members, elected for four years by manhood suffrage. The mode of election has at different times been by *scrutin de liste*, where the election is by departments and every elector may record as many votes as there are members, and *scrutin d'arrondissement*, where only a single vote can be recorded in smaller single member constituencies.

§ PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE. 'Questions' in the English parliamentary sense are relatively infrequent and unimportant in France, but 'interpellations' are frequent and often lead to ministerial crises. Both Chambers work largely by means of standing committees where proceedings are secret. Ministers may attend these committees only as auditors, though they may (like permanent officials) be required to attend as witnesses. These committees give the Legislature more effective control over the Executive than is now (in practice) exercised by an English Parliament.

§ THE JUDICIARY. Particularly characteristic of the French Constitution is the position of the Judiciary, whose powers are much less sharply separated from those of the Executive than is the case in England. By the Law of July 13th, 1879, the *Conseil d'État* was definitely established as an essential institution of the Republic. The *Conseil* is the supreme tribunal in the hierarchy of administrative courts, characteristic of the legal system of France, and forms 'the great buffer between the public and the bureaucrat'.¹ The Constitution of 1875 despite many obvious defects has endured much longer than any other constitution devised since 1789. Avowedly designed to establish the Republic, its provisions were made adaptable to a monarchy, the restoration of which was expected by all parties, and by some was ardently desired. Parliamentary democracy can function effectively only if the delicate balance between Executive and Legislature is scrupulously maintained. In England the Executive has powers over the Legislature almost amounting to control. But Parliament can compel the Executive to appeal to the electorate, as the Executive can at any time compel the elected representatives to face the ordeal of a fresh election. The French Chamber is virtually indissoluble until the expiry of its four years' term. By the operation of the committee system the French Legislature shares the functions and responsibilities of the Executive, and any deputy can propose an increase of expenditure—a function reserved in England to the Crown. Nothing has done more to encourage corruption in France, or to upset the balance of budgets. Nor does the electoral machinery work more efficiently

¹ The Council was reorganized in 1910, but the whole position of the Judiciary in France is too technical for treatment in this volume. Readers may consult Marriott: *Modern State*, Vol. II, Chapter XXXIV.

than the Legislature. The device of the 'second ballot', dear to the heart of political theorists, has in practice done more than anything else to prevent the Legislature from truly reflecting the opinion of the electorate.

The election of 1876 gave the Republicans a majority of nearly two to one in the Chamber and a large majority in the Senate. The monarchical President was thus placed in a most embarrassing position. He tried one Ministry after another. None survived more than a few months. At last, in May 1877, the President, in despair, fell back once more on the ultra-conservative de Broglie, who immediately obtained the assent of the Senate—reluctantly given by a small majority—to a dissolution of the recently elected Chamber.

The appeal to the electorate—though enthusiastically seconded by the Church and sustained by every device which the President could control—resulted in a crushing and humiliating defeat for MacMahon. De Broglie consequently resigned on November 23rd. Dufaure's Left-Centre Ministry (December 1877–February 1879) commanded a majority in the Chamber, but the perpetual conflict between the Minister and the President made the position of both insupportable. The President resigned on January 30th, 1879: Dufaure on February 4th.

Marshal MacMahon had rendered invaluable service to France. Personally an ultramontane and a monarchist he established the Republic in France and conciliated for it the respect of Europe. That respect was strikingly manifested in 1875, when Bismarck, dismayed by the rapid recovery of France, sought to repair his error in not 'bleeding her white' when, in 1871, he had the chance. France had given Germany no sort of pretext for renewed attack. Not only had she fulfilled all her obligations punctually—too punctually—but had wisely followed Gambetta's sage advice in regard to Alsace-Lorraine, 'N'en parler jamais, y penser toujours'. Even Bismarck could hardly make war on unexpressed thought. Yet his own master confided to Prince Hohenlohe his fear that 'Bismarck might drag him into war little by little'. On April 15th there appeared in the *Berlin Post* an article evidently inspired: '*Krieg in sicht*'! In Paris it was rumoured that Bismarck intended to demand from her a fine of £400,000,000, payable in twenty instalments, and to maintain a German army of occupation in France until the fine was paid. Reports to the same effect reached the Tsar Alexander and Queen Victoria, who successfully appealed to the Emperor William. Bismarck had been outplayed at his own game. The scare was over. But the seed ultimately reaped in the *Triple Entente* had been sown.¹

JULES GRÉVY (1879–87). MacMahon's successor was M. Jules Grévy, the President of the Chamber, elected to the Presidency of the Republic by 563 votes against 99 for General Chanzy, the

¹ On the whole episode cf. Marriott and Robertson: *Prussia*, pp. 403 f.

candidate of the Right, 5 for Gambetta, and 1 for the Duc d'Aumale. 'At last the Republic is founded! At last the era of Liberty begins!' These were the cries in the Chamber when the figures were announced. Jules Grévy was a lawyer, of bourgeois origin, unshakably attached to the Republic, a man of sound sense, modest bearing, universally trusted if not beloved, of all the fourteen Presidents of the Third Republic the only one to be elected for a second time.¹

On the resignation of Dufaure (February 4th, 1879), Grévy entrusted the administration to W. H. Waddington, more than half an Englishman, educated at Rugby and Cambridge, and married to an American wife. Waddington retained the Foreign Office, but the two strong men of the Cabinet were de Freycinet (1828-1923) and Jules Ferry (1832-93). De Freycinet, destined to hold office four times as Prime Minister, carried through a large programme of railway and canal construction as Minister of Public Works. Jules Ferry, though only twice at the head of an administration, was (with the possible exception of Victor Duruy) the greatest Minister of Education France ever had, and was hardly less remarkable for his achievements in the sphere of colonial and foreign affairs.

§ THE CHURCH AND EDUCATION. Of all the problems confronting the Third Republic the most intractable was that of the relations between the State and the Church. In that problem were also inextricably involved all questions concerned with the system and machinery of education.

The problem was not new. It had perplexed every Government since the downfall of the Ancient Monarchy. Under the Second Empire the Clericals had occupied the educational field. It was the task of the Third Republic to clear the ground. During the MacMahon régime this could not be done. The *coup d'état* known as the *Seize Mai*, 1877, was in effect a trial of strength between the President and the Clericals on the one side and the Republican Ministry headed by Jules Simon on the other. The President won: Simon was forced into resignation. In 1877 MacMahon fell. Gambetta gave blunt expression to the Republican policy '*le Cléricalisme voilà l'ennemi*': not religion but clericalism must be expropriated. Jules Ferry, though not himself a Catholic, was no hot-headed secularist, but he profoundly mistrusted the influence of the priest, and still more that of the Religious Orders, in politics and particularly in education. He was genuinely anxious to rescue education from the stranglehold they had established, and, without any avoidable offence to sincere Catholics, to give the country the best system of education that could be devised.

That the tendency of education was, in the hands of the clericals, towards obscurantism, was undeniable. Ferry's first blow was prudently directed against the Jesuits: 'it is from them,' he said,

¹ Until Lebrun's re-election in April 1939.

'that we wish to rescue the soul of the youth of France'. The Jesuits were, not for the first time, expelled from France, together with those Religious Congregations which refused to conform to the regulations imposed by the State. The Congregations were deprived of the right to grant degrees, or to appoint teachers without a University degree, and clergy were excluded from the University Councils. In 1881 primary education was made gratuitous and (in 1882) compulsory. All State schools were to be 'secular and neutral' and the State accepted responsibility for the training of teachers in all primary schools. Normal schools were also established for teachers in secondary schools, and comprehensive reforms were carried out in technical and higher education.

As a result of Ferry's policy, carried on by the disciples whom he inspired, France now possesses a complete and comprehensive system of education, primary, secondary, and superior. But it is unfortunate that a system otherwise admirable should have been marred by an illiberal attitude towards religion, which culminated in the Separation Laws passed by the Combes Ministry in 1905.

§ CHURCH AND STATE. So long as Pope Pius IX lived there had been no compromise. In 1878, however, that fiery old Pontiff died and was succeeded by Leo XIII, who quickly established improved relations between Church and State. In a series of Encyclicals issued between 1885 and 1892, and conceived in a true spirit of conciliation, Catholics in France were ordered to abandon all attempts at domination and to rally to the support of the Republic threatened, on the one hand, by the revelation of grave financial scandals, and, on the other, by the rapid advance of socialism and—rather later—by a series of anarchist plots, culminating in 1894 in the assassination of President Carnot.

Under the combined influence of a wise President and a wise Pope, a truce was called between the Republican secularists and the clericals, and various anti-clerical projects were deleted from the Republican programme. The pity was that the ultramontanes wrecked all hopes of permanent peace by declaring war on the Protestants and Jews, and the State retorted by the legislation of 1904-5.

The Third Republic was not, however, concerned only, even in its early days, with problems of constitutional reconstruction and of education. The name of Jules Ferry, in particular, is remembered not only as that of the man who reshaped national education, but as having given a new turn, and imparted a new vigour, to the conduct of foreign and colonial policy.¹

¹ The present tense used in this chapter is not, since 1940, always appropriate.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE ENTENTE (1882-1914)

'France would attack us if she thought she was strong enough; England would do so only if she thought she could not defend her vital interests except by force. The mainspring of English policy towards us is national egoism; that of French policy is national idealism. He who follows his interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he who possesses an idea.'

PRINCE VON BULOW

§ GAMBETTA. The policy of the Third Republic was to a large extent dominated in its first decades by two forces. Both were indirect if not subterranean. Léon Gambetta was never President of the Republic: he declined to become a candidate after MacMahon's resignation. He was in office as President of the Council (Premier) for less than three months (November 15th, 1881-January 26th, 1882). Yet his power was, after the retirement of Thiers, greater than that of any other French statesman: his was 'the power behind the throne'; he was even suspected, despite his reluctance to take office, of aiming at a dictatorship. Had he not died, prematurely and accidentally, in 1882, it is impossible to say what the future might have had in store for him.

§ BISMARCK. An influence even more direct than Gambetta's was that of Bismarck. Bismarck's one ambition after 1871 was to secure the stability of the structure he had created by dividing his potential enemies, by keeping France at daggers drawn with Italy and England, and by stimulating suspicion between England and Russia.

§ AFRICA. Tunis served to keep France and Italy apart. In 1878 Bismarck had broadly hinted to Italy that the Tunisian pear was ripe. Italy, out of regard for French susceptibilities, would not pluck it. If Italy would not offend France, France must be urged to quarrel with Italy. Under Bismarck's indirect prompting Jules Ferry, in 1881, occupied Tunis. Pretexts for interference in Tunis were not indeed wanting. The wild tribesmen of Tunis were troublesome neighbours to the French rulers of Algeria. For their repeated inroads France demanded reparation, and in default occupied Tunis and established a formal protectorate over the country (1883). In 1882 Italy had joined Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance.

Ferry's activity was not confined to North Africa. He strengthened the position of France in Senegal, and on the Niger; he obtained for France a footing on the Red Sea; and in 1890 established a French protectorate over Madagascar. After the Partition of 1890 France

became territorially the largest owner of African soil, though much of it was desert.

§ INDO-CHINA. In the Far East also Ferry was active. From the early years of the nineteenth century France and England had co-operated in opening up trade with China but in 1859 found themselves at war with her. As a result France occupied and retained Saigon. Cochin-China was ceded to France in 1862, a French protectorate was established over Cambodia in 1863, and in 1874 the Emperor of Annam conceded to France a predominant position in his country, which was then cut off from China. In 1884, in consequence of trouble with China in Tonkin, Ferry declared a formal protectorate over Annam. In 1887 all four territories, with a population of about twenty-four million, were grouped together under a Governor-General of Indo-China. But three years before that happened the great minister, derided by the boulevards as '*Le Tonquinois*', had been driven from office by the fabricated rumour of a great disaster to French arms in the Far East. Nor was Ferry's foreign policy universally approved. Was it really worth while to fling Italy into the arms of Germany for the sake of Tunis? Why spend good French money on Indo-China while Alsace and Lorraine were still unredeemed? Moreover, what had become of the vital interests of France in Egypt while Jules Ferry was prancing about in Tunis and Tonkin? Was Bismarck's feline policy to succeed in Egypt as well as in Tunis? Was England, like Italy, to be driven into the arms of Germany? It was not only Georges Clemenceau, burning for revenge on Germany, that asked these questions.

§ EGYPT. The long-standing interest of France in Egypt and in the Levant had lately been stimulated by Lesseps' brilliant achievement in constructing the Suez Canal (1869). Disraeli's spectacular *coup* in the purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Canal (1875) had somewhat dimmed the glory of Lesseps, but the establishment of the *Caisse de la dette* (1876) had virtually resulted in the dual control of England and France over Egyptian affairs.

In 1881, however, Arabi Pasha, an obscure colonel, headed a revolt which, though primarily military, was directed also against Turkish suzerainty, and still more against Occidental intervention. Order had to be restored in Egypt. But by whom? Gambetta, who in November 1881 had come into office, desired that the task should be undertaken conjointly by France and England. De Freycinet, who in January 1882 had succeeded Gambetta, favoured international action. But an *émeute* at Alexandria, followed by the murder of some fifty Europeans, precipitated a crisis, and the British fleet off Alexandria was ordered to prevent, if necessary by force, a further massacre of Europeans. Order was accordingly restored in a city which for two days had been the scene of fire, pillage, and

massacre. From the moment it became clear that force must be applied France refused to co-operate with England; England was left to finish off the business single-handed, but in the end remained virtually mistress of Egypt. France had abdicated. A French historian has put the whole matter in a nutshell: 'En somme, l'Égypte était perdue pour nous par notre faute, et nous étions brouillés avec l'Angleterre comme nous l'étions depuis 1881 avec l'Italie.'¹

For some twenty years Egypt was virtually ruled by Lord Cromer; France put every difficulty in his way, and the reconquest of the Soudan effected by General Kitchener in 1896-8 brought France and England into actual collision. Though bowed out of Egypt France had been busy in other parts of Africa, notably in the west. In 1892 an expedition to Dahomey was followed by its establishment as a French colony; a treaty was concluded with Liberia (December 1892) defining boundaries in the district of Lake Chad, and with Great Britain (July 1893) in regard to the Gold Coast and Ivory Coast. In 1894 Joffre, a young French engineer, occupied Timbuktu. By a treaty concluded with Germany in the same year France obtained undisputed access to Lake Chad. Nevertheless she felt herself encircled by Belgium and by Germany in her Congo colony. England also had acquired from King Leopold of the Belgians a strip of territory between Lakes Albert and Tanganyika which cut France off from access to the Upper Nile and thus from all hope of menacing England's position in the Soudan and Egypt. This strip meant much to England: it kept open the possibility of connecting Cairo and the Cape by an 'all red' railway; but inevitably its acquisition was correspondingly irritating to France.

§ MARCHAND AND KITCHENER. For some time past a young captain of Marines who had already distinguished himself in native wars in Africa had been trying to persuade the French Government to authorize an expedition to set up the flag of France on the Upper Nile and thus frustrate all the ambitions of England. Permission was given; and in February 1896 Captain Marchand, with a small force of Senegalese troops and a handful of French companions, started to march from the French Congo across Central Africa to the sources of the Nile. In the course of two years this intrepid Frenchman pushed his way, in the face of incredible difficulties, across deserts and through thick forests, and on July 5th, 1898, reached the White Nile.

The English Foreign Office was not unaware of Marchand's intentions, and, despite the 'pacific' character of the expedition, Sir Edward Grey had deemed it prudent to warn the French Government, as early as March 1895, that 'the advance of a French force . . . into a territory over which our claims had been known for so long would be . . . an unfriendly act, and would be so viewed by

¹ Débidour: *Hist. Diplomatique*, I, p. 67.

Great Britain'. The warning, if conveyed to Marchand, did not give him pause. On July 16th he reached Fashoda, and over that ruined village he hoisted the French flag.

At Fashoda he hoped to be joined by another French force which was to make its way from Abyssinia to the White Nile. The Abyssinian force never appeared. Instead there appeared a British force under the command of General Kitchener, who, by his victory at Omdurman (September 2nd, 1898) had established Anglo-Egyptian ascendancy over the Soudan, and at a solemn service held on the spot where General Gordon had been killed in January 1885 had 'avenged' the death of that heroic, if impetuous, Christian martyr. Informed of Marchand's arrival at Fashoda, Kitchener steamed up the Nile and firmly denied Marchand's right to be there as the representative of France. Marchand refused to budge, thus earning the respect and ultimately the affection of his opponent. Kitchener was equally firm that withdraw Marchand must. But the matter was too serious to be settled by soldiers on the spot. Lord Salisbury made it clear to M. Delcassé, then at the Quai d'Orsay, that Great Britain must claim for the Khedive all the lands over which the Khalifa had borne sway, and that the claim would be maintained by the whole force of Great Britain. Delcassé was strong enough to brave popular clamour and on November 4th ordered Marchand to withdraw. The action of Salisbury and Delcassé paved the way for Anglo-French friendship. In March 1899 the two countries concluded a comprehensive agreement, by which France acknowledged the rights of Great Britain over the whole of the Nile basin from the source of that river to its mouth, and France was confirmed in the possession of a great West African Empire. But the Cape to Cairo route remained unblocked.

From that moment Anglo-French relations rapidly improved. The result was not unforeseen by acute observers. 'The defeat of France in the Fashoda affair resulted,' said von Bülow, 'in renewed hatred of Germany rather than in hostility towards England.' Though paradoxical the observation was true.

§ FRANCE AND ITALY. Italy, whose ardour for colonial adventures in East Africa had been cooled by the disaster to her arms at Adowa (1896) was by this time in a mood to respond to the advances of France. In 1896 she recognized the French protectorate in Tunis, and in 1898 concluded a treaty of commerce and navigation. Conventions signed in 1900 and 1902 assured to France a free hand in Morocco, while France engaged not to frustrate the ambitions of Italy on the side of Tripoli. These conventions rendered the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1903 a meaningless mockery. By that time things were evidently moving towards the *Triple Entente*, but the story of French diplomacy must now be interrupted by an account of domestic affairs after 1885.

§ BOULANGER. In 1886 there took office as Minister of War in de Freycinet's third administration a new-comer to French politics. General Boulanger was now nearing fifty. He had lately been military governor of Tunis, and though a man of mediocre ability, and lacking in courage and conviction, was to public eyes 'a fine figure of a man'. The changes and chances of French politics gave him a great opportunity, which, fortunately for Europe, and, on the whole, for France, he was not big enough to redeem.

Essentially an adventurer General Boulanger did not lack patriotic ardour, though whether he meant to play the part of Monk and restore the monarchy is doubted. Anyway, he advocated a revision of the Constitution, in particular such an increase in the powers of the President, as would have given him the position not of a 'Constitutional' King but an American President. Consequently he was suspected of contemplating a *coup d'état*—whether justly or not remains doubtful. That he stood for a 'spirited' foreign policy, that he was the champion of the nationalists and the army, and that for two years he was the darling of the Parisian populace is certain.

§ THE SCHNAEBELE INCIDENT. A frontier incident which occurred on April 20th, 1887, increased Boulanger's popularity. M. Schnaebele, a French Police Commissioner was, with every circumstance of insolence and brutality, arrested by German agents on the Alsatian frontier, and flung into prison. The incident roused intense excitement in France and—curiously enough—hardly less in Russia. Shortly after the news reached St. Petersburg the Tsar Alexander III informed the Kaiser, by autograph letter, that Russia no longer held herself under the obligation (undertaken by Bismarck's 'Reinsurance Treaty' of 1884) to maintain neutrality in the event of war between France and Germany. The Emperor William, pacifically minded, promptly gave orders, without even consulting Bismarck, for the immediate release of Schnaebele. This particular incident was closed, but as will appear presently the Tsar's letter had a wider significance.

Suspensions of the ulterior designs of Boulanger were, meanwhile, developing in France, particularly in the Senate. In December 1886 the General had resigned with de Freycinet, and in May 1887 the Senate refused to support any Cabinet of which he was a member. De Freycinet would not resume office without him and until, in March 1890, de Freycinet formed his fourth administration, France had to put up with a rapid succession of Cabinets under ministers whose names it is superfluous to recall. Before then Boulanger had disappeared from public life. Threatened with a trial for high treason he fled to Brussels and there in 1891 he ended a picturesque though futile career by deliberate suicide.

§ THE RUSSIAN ALLIANCE. Russia and France were by then

coming together. Russia was, as usual, in want of money. Berlin had in 1888 refused her credit, but from that year onwards a series of Russian loans were issued in Paris amounting by 1896 to more than 4,000 million francs.

The *rapprochement* was not merely based on finance, but moved towards an entirely new orientation in foreign affairs. In 1890 the Russian Government was gratified by two striking acts of courtesy at the hands of France. The great armament factory, Chatellerault, was placed by the French Government at the disposal of Russia, and, about the same time a notorious gang of Nihilist conspirators, engaged in the manufacture of bombs for use in Russia, was cleverly arrested by the police in Paris. In July 1891 an even more conspicuous demonstration of courtesy was given. A French fleet, under the command of Admiral Gervais, paid a ceremonial visit to Cronstadt and was received with great cordiality both by the Government and the populace in Russia. The French people were deeply touched by a friendliness to which since 1870 they had not been accustomed from foreigners. The exchange of compliments in 1891 was followed between 1892 and 1893 by a defensive military convention, a comprehensive Commercial Treaty and an exchange of visits between the fleets.

The premature death of Alexander III in 1894 and the accession of Nicholas II, who had an unstinted admiration for his cousin, the Kaiser, rendered the diplomatic position more uncertain. In June 1895, however, the conclusion of a Franco-Russian alliance was officially announced by M. Hanotaux who in 1894 had become Foreign Minister. The alliance was sealed by a visit of the Tsar and his young bride to Paris in October 1896, where they received an enthusiastic welcome. Ten months later, in August 1897, President Faure visited the Tsar who, in a speech on board the French flagship, declared that 'as friendly and allied powers France and Russia were equally resolved to maintain the world's peace in a spirit of right and equity'. M. Tardieu, distinguished alike as a publicist and a politician, has assessed the value of the Russian alliance as follows: 'It augmented our diplomatic value, it opened to us the field of political combinations from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power.'¹ The Triple Alliance was now confronted by a 'Dual Alliance'. Germany had to face the possibility of war on two fronts.

§ L'AFFAIRE DREYFUS. One of the cries that had won for Boulanger his transient popularity was Anti-Semitism. The cry awoke echoes among the Clericals and the Army chiefs, and became louder as the public realized the part played by Jewish financiers in the 'Panama Scandal'. A company formed to cut a canal through

¹ Tardieu: *France and her Alliances* (E. T.), p. 14.

the isthmus of Panama and in which thousands of peasants and bourgeoisie had invested all their savings went bankrupt in 1888. The bankruptcy revealed gross corruption among politicians and financiers. The outcry against the scandal was shrill and sustained. The most conspicuous victim of the agitation was wholly unconnected with its origin. But Captain Alfred Dreyfus was a Jew. He was accused, while attending the Staff College in Paris, of giving military information to the Germans. The only evidence against him was a document known as the *bordereau* which was said to be in his handwriting. After a secret trial by a military tribunal, Dreyfus was sentenced to degradation and to life imprisonment on Devil's Island off the coast of French Guiana. Colonel Picquart, lately appointed chief of the Intelligence Department, soon discovered that the leakage of information had not ceased with the deportation of Dreyfus. A certain Major Esterhazy was then accused of having sold the secrets and forged the *bordereau*. The Government only desired that the scandal should be buried and as soon as possible forgotten. Picquart, being as a Protestant, only less odious than a Jew to the Clericals, was sent abroad, and Esterhazy was acquitted.

But the agitation did not abate. The whole country relapsed, on one side or the other, into a condition of hysteria. Domestic tranquillity was banished: fathers took sides against children, wives against husbands. The generals and the priests could believe anything of a Jew. But a few men combining sanity and eminence kept their heads. Among them were Clemenceau, Jaurès, the Labour leader, Reinach, and a popular novelist, Émile Zola. Convinced of the innocence of Dreyfus they resolved to see justice done. Then Colonel Henry, appointed in Picquart's place, having confessed that he was the author of the forged *bordereau*, committed suicide. In 1900 the innocence of Dreyfus was finally established by a Court of Cassation, but not until 1906 was either Dreyfus or Picquart fully reinstated in the army.

The significance of the *Affaire Dreyfus* lay chiefly in the evidence it afforded of the untiring activity of the Clericals and their somewhat sinister alliance with the Army chiefs. That justice, if partial and tardy, had been done to Dreyfus was due mainly to two men, Loubet and M. Waldeck-Rousseau who in June 1899 became Prime Minister. Himself a man of ability and character, Waldeck-Rousseau presided over a Cabinet representative of all the best elements in Republican politics, among whom was Delcassé. The latter's tenure of the Foreign Office, continuous from June 1898 to June 1905, was responsible for a remarkable recovery in the international position of France.

§ SOCIAL REFORM. To the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Waldeck-Rousseau appointed M. Millerand who, starting as a Socialist, presently revealed as Prime Minister and President an

unmistakably authoritarian tendency, but was in the meantime also responsible for some useful social legislation. Socialism in France had not for some years recovered from the blow inflicted upon it by the Commune of 1871. But from the declaration of an amnesty in 1879 it began to play an increasingly important part in public affairs alike in the Press and in Parliament. Trade Unions were legalized (1884), the Co-operative movement was encouraged, at the general election of 1893, fifty Socialists were returned to the Chamber; and in 1899 a Socialist was for the first time admitted to Cabinet office.

Millerand's acceptance of office was, like that of John Burns in England, denounced by the apostles of the class-war, but approved by sensible Socialists of the type of Briand, Viviani, and Jaurès. Millerand quickly justified his appointment. He organized in his Department a Board of Labour; limited the hours of labour; improved sanitary conditions in factories and workshops; set up Labour Councils for adjusting disputes between employees and employed; in 1902 he passed a Public Health Act, under which improved dwellings were provided for workmen, and he did much preliminary work on a scheme for old age pensions.

§ CHURCH AND STATE. Unfortunately Waldeck-Rousseau, owing to failing health, resigned in June 1902. The best and strongest Ministry since 1870 was succeeded by the worst if not the weakest.

M. Combes, the new Prime Minister, was a man of coarse fibre and strong will who had been trained for the priesthood but had forsaken that vocation for that of a provincial doctor. He was obsessed by the malignity so often found in renegades, and began his crusade against clericalism by dissolving all religious associations (except those administering charity) which refused to render an account to the State of all their rules, ordinances, and endowments. The tactlessness and folly of Pius X, who in 1903 was chosen to succeed the statesmanlike Leo XIII, gave the anti-clericals an excuse. When in April 1904 President Loubet paid an official visit to King Victor Emmanuel III in Rome, Pope Pius X refused to receive the French President at the Vatican, and entered a formal protest against a ruler of France, bound by Napoleon's Concordat, paying a visit to the 'person' who had usurped the sovereign rights of the Papacy in Rome.

This insult was deeply resented in France. The Ambassador to the Vatican was immediately withdrawn, and in 1905 Aristide Briand, as Minister of Public Worship, was able to carry through the *Separation Law*. No religious body was henceforth to be officially recognized by the State: working priests were to receive salaries for four years, and pensions were to be provided for aged and infirm priests. Freedom of conscience was assured to all citizens, and *Associations Cultuelles* were set up in every Commune in which the churches (to

be used exclusively for religious purposes) were vested. Episcopal residences, presbyteries, and seminaries were, after the expiry of five years, to revert to the State. Inventories of all Church property, including the most sacred emblems, were to be made, and though Clemenceau on coming into office in 1906 countermanded the order, the tactlessness of the agents employed had deeply violated the feelings of devout Catholics, and had even led to rioting. The intransigent attitude of the hot-tempered Pope made bad worse. He ordered all Catholics to treat as 'null and void' the *Separation Law* and thus obliged many religious bodies, though not generally forced to do so, to leave the country, and the Church at large to forfeit its property. The French Catholics did not approve the attitude of the Papacy, and although the Church finally lost all its privileges and rights, Catholics were able freely to avail themselves of the consolations afforded by the Church to which the vast majority of French citizens steadfastly adhered.

§ THE ANGLO-FRENCH TREATY. Before leaving the Quai d'Orsay M. Delcassé achieved the supreme object of his diplomatic career. Since Fashoda relations between France and England had become increasingly friendly. During the South African War (1899–1902) England discovered that isolation, however splendid, did not make for security. She emerged from it in 1902 to conclude a treaty with Japan. That treaty being aimed (at least on the Japanese side) against Russia, caused some disquietude in France, but the benevolent attitude taken up by England in regard to French interests in Morocco reassured Delcassé, and the visits exchanged in 1903 between President Loubet and King Edward VII cemented a growing friendliness. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904 left France exposed to attack from Germany. It became, therefore, important for France to find a new ally. Lord Lansdowne was more alive than his predecessor Lord Salisbury to the dangers of isolation, and was ready to meet the advances of Delcassé. After negotiations, prolonged and sometimes difficult, but facilitated by M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, and by Lord Cromer, an agreement was reached in April 1904. All differences between the two countries, many of them of long standing, were composed. England made important concessions to France on the Gambia and the Niger, and in Guinea; the dispute outstanding since 1713 about French fishing rights in Newfoundland was finally adjusted; boundary questions in Siam, tariff difficulties in Zanzibar and Madagascar respectively, and various small points about the New Hebrides were all settled. The central point of the agreement was, however, North Africa. Great Britain recognized the predominant claims and interests of France in Morocco. France for the first time accepted the actual position of England in Egypt. The two Governments declared that they had no intention of altering the political status of Egypt or Morocco

respectively, but by a secret article it was admitted that either country might be 'constrained by force of circumstances to modify this policy'. A pendant to the Treaty of London was supplied by a Franco-Spanish Treaty signed on October 6th, 1904. Spain formally adhered to the Anglo-French Convention of April 8th, thereby acknowledging the predominant interest of France in Morocco, while accepting from France and England a guarantee of Moroccan independence.

§ FRANCE AND GERMANY. And Germany? The Chancellor, Prince von Bulow, declared that Germany had no objection to make to the Anglo-French agreement, but the Kaiser at once set to work to nullify it. In March 1905 he visited Tangier and in a menacing speech announced to the world that Germany was the protector of the independence of Morocco and of the sovereignty of its sultan. A special envoy from Berlin to Paris virtually demanded the dismissal of Delcassé on pain of war with Germany.

§ THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE. France, conscious of unpreparedness for war, allowed Delcassé to resign, but Rouvier's government at once set to work to improve the army organization and to construct strategic railways. In January 1906 a Conference, attended by most of the European Powers as well as by the United States and Morocco, was held under the presidency of M. Fallières at Algeciras to decide the future of Morocco. Germany congratulated herself that at Algeciras she had bolted the door against the attempts of France to compass the 'Tunification' of Morocco and had exhibited to the world the breakdown of the Anglo-French *entente*. Algeciras served, on the contrary, to demonstrate its strength. The continued estrangement of England and Russia remained nevertheless a great embarrassment to their common ally. In 1907, however, an agreement covering all outstanding questions in the Middle East was concluded between England and Russia. Hardly was it signed before a grave crisis arose in the Near East over the formal annexation by the Habsburg Empire of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of which it had been in occupation since 1876. Serbia protested and appealed to the Powers and in particular to Russia. Russia was deeply perturbed, but, weakened by her recent defeat at the hands of Japan (1904-5), perforce gave way, though she did not forget the humiliation inflicted upon her by Germany.¹ Between 1909 and 1914 there was indeed a temporary improvement in the international situation. In 1907 France had made a treaty with Japan, mutually guaranteeing their respective possessions in the Far East as well as the integrity of China. In the same year France and England joined with Italy in recognizing the *status quo* in Abyssinia,

¹ For the Crisis of 1908 and its sequel see Marriott: *The Eastern Question*, Chapters XIV, XV, XVI.

and in 1909 France came to terms with Germany about Morocco and shortly afterwards about Equatorial Africa.

§ AGADIR. So appalling, however, was the anarchy in Morocco that in April 1911 the French were compelled to land troops in Morocco, but were withdrawing from Fez when they were officially informed by Germany that the *Panther*, a German gunboat, had been dispatched to Agadir, an open roadstead on the west coast of Morocco, in order to protect the lives and interests of German subjects in that country. To a thinly veiled demand for the partition of Morocco between Germany, France, and Spain, France hotly retorted that she was the paramount power in Morocco, that her paramountcy had been internationally recognized, and that she was determined to maintain it. Great Britain firmly ranged herself on the side of France, and although Europe remained on the brink of war for nearly three months Germany at the eleventh hour gave way, and concluded with France a comprehensive treaty. Germany virtually acknowledged a French Protectorate over Morocco, while M. Caillaux, then in power, ceded to Germany half the French Congo, thus giving her much desired access to the rivers Congo and Ubangi, and promised that France would not exercise her right of pre-emption over the Belgian Congo without previous agreement with Germany.

So the cracks were temporarily papered over. Caillaux, however, was accused of subservience to Germany if not of treason towards France. Consequently, in January 1912 he was thrown out and succeeded by Raymond Poincaré, who formed an exceptionally strong government including Delcassé (Marine), Millerand (War), and Briand.

§ AVERNUS. Between January 1912 and August 1914 events moved rapidly. Shortly before his death Bismarck had foretold the world war and that it would come from the East. It did. In the East the rift in the Triple Alliance was first revealed. In 1911 Italy attacked Turkey (a sleeping partner in the alliance) and annexed Tripoli and the Dodecanese Archipelago. In 1912-13 two wars were fought in the Balkans and two days before the Peace was signed at Bucharest (August 10th, 1913) Austria informed her allies that she meant to attack Serbia, and claimed their assistance. At their instance the war was postponed—for eleven months. But on June 28th, 1914, the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, the heir to the Habsburg Empire, was murdered at Serajevo, and to chastise the Serbs for a crime ascribed to them, Austria on July 28th declared war on Serbia.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE WAR AND AFTER (1914-18)

‘Le plan pangermaniste constitue la raison unique de la guerre. Il est, en effet, la cause à la fois de sa naissance et de sa prolongation jusqu’à la victoire des alliés indispensable à la liberté du monde.’

ANDRE CHERADAME (1916)

WHO was responsible for the Great War? That question, though endlessly canvassed, has become since 1939 purely academic. By Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles Germany was compelled to ‘accept the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the allied and associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the War imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies’.

The ‘War Guilt lie’ evoked profound resentment in Germany, yet the statement is incontrovertible. France emphatically did not want war, but was bound by treaty to Russia. Great Britain, though not by treaty, was morally bound to join France, if only to protect the Channel coasts and shipping of France. Nor could she without dishonour accept the bargain offered at the eleventh hour by Germany to ‘stand by while French Colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the Colonies’. Sir Edward Grey has been blamed both in Germany and in France for not at once declaring that England would support France.¹ M. Poincaré personally appealed to King George V to make such a declaration, but King George was not an entirely free agent.²

§ POLITICS AND ECONOMICS. France was ill-prepared for war. The parliamentary machine was functioning badly. In the ten years preceding the outbreak of war ten different Prime Ministers had taken office; no fewer than five in 1913-14. The country was, moreover, perturbed by rumours of corruption among politicians. Among those to whom the finger of suspicion pointed, the two most prominent were M. Caillaux and M. Malvy. Caillaux had in 1907 cut down the estimate for the fighting services; he was suspected of undue tenderness towards Germany, and the treaty he concluded with her in 1911 had almost involved him in a trial for treason. In conjunction with Malvy, the rising hope of the Radical-Socialists, Caillaux had overthrown Briand’s Ministry in December 1913 and taken office under M. Doumergue. Malvy remained at the Ministry of the Interior in a key position until, in November 1917, to the great

¹ See e.g. Hermann Lutz: *Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg* (E. T., p. 300).

² See Vol. XI of *British Documents* (H.M.S.O.); Poincaré: *Memoirs*, the French *Yellow Book*, and P. Renouvier: *Les Origines immédiates de la Guerre* (1925).

advantage of his country, Clemenceau made a clean sweep of the defeatists. Meanwhile Caillaux had been compelled to resign by a sensational crime. On March 16th, 1914, Paris was startled to learn that Madame Caillaux had in revenge for his bitter attacks upon her husband, murdered M. Calmette, the editor of the conservative *Figaro*. The lady, though confessing to the murder, was, to the consternation of stricter moralists in domestic or political affairs, acquitted.

§ LABOUR UNREST. M. Caillaux, though the parliamentary leader of the political socialists, was himself a highly placed civil servant, a wealthy capitalist, and a successful financier. In no way was he representative of the Labour movement which in the previous decade had been making rapid strides and had caused much industrial strife. The task of dealing with the labour troubles had fallen, paradoxically but fortunately, to the first Socialist to become Prime Minister of France, M. Aristide Briand.

§ BRIAND. Briand was a man of humble birth, a barrister with a moderate practice, a brilliant orator, a most engaging personality, and gifted with a rich sense of humour and a ready wit. Above all, he was a born negotiator and peacemaker. As Prime Minister after Clemenceau's defeat on the Navy Estimates (July 1909), Briand thought to raise the level of deputies by substituting '*scrutin de liste*' for single member constituencies. The only result was to alienate the Radicals and to weaken the Executive in face of the Legislature. To the Socialists a more heinous offence was his stern repression of strikes. The foundation in 1895 of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* had been the first step taken by organized labour in France towards a militant policy. Even more definitely militant were the *Bourses du Travail*, whose Secretary Pelloutier had been the schoolfellow and friend of Aristide Briand. These *Bourses* were the characteristic feature of syndicalism which, repudiating the root ideas of bureaucratic or State Socialism, relied upon industrial as opposed to political weapons. 'Direct Action' was, however, only a means towards the end at which the syndicalist aimed. To 'nationalization' as a solution of the industrial problem syndicalists were strongly opposed, since it would merely substitute a Government department for the individual employer or limited company, and the last state of the manual worker would be worse than the first. The syndicalist prescription was that one industry and service after another should be taken over by the workers engaged in it and conducted in their exclusive interests. Bloody revolution should, if possible, be avoided. The gradual elimination of the capitalist and the employer should be effected by steady economic pressure, by raising wages and limiting hours to the point of extinguishing profits and interest, by *sabotage* and the destruction of property, by *Ca Canny*

(go slow), and by *chasse aux renards* (persecution of blacklegs). Each industrial group having been organized in the local *syndicats*, the *syndicats* would be federated by the *Bourses du Travail*; ultimately all the 'workers' would be combined in one vast organization which would at last dominate the State.

Aristide Briand, though the lifelong friend of Labour, soon discarded his youthful syndicalism, recognizing clearly that the class-war of the syndicalist meant sectionalism and civil war, holding that the statesmen's duty is to protect the whole community. When in 1910 the community was threatened by the strike of the seamen and railwaymen, Briand effectively protected it. When to protect it he had to intervene, he struck hard. The leaders were promptly arrested and the rank and file called up as Army reservists. The strikes were broken. But Briand's vigorous action widened still further the breach between the disciples of George Sorel¹ and the modern Socialists, like Millerand, Viviani, Jean Jaurès, and Briand himself. Briand's first thought was to save the Republic. He was convinced that it could be saved only by parliamentary methods, and in alliance with the bourgeois Radicals. Unfortunately the Radicals were as completely alienated by the *scrutin de liste* as were the Syndicalists by strike-breaking. Consequently, in February 1911, Briand had to resign. No fewer than seven ministries intervened between his resignation and the accession to power of his friend and associate M. Viviani in June 1914.

§ THE WAR—THE HOME FRONT. M. Viviani, strongly backed by M. Raymond Poincaré, who in January 1913 had exchanged the Presidency of the Council for the Presidency of the Republic, soon proved that his sympathy with socialism was in no way inconsistent with fervent devotion to the honour of France.

At the eleventh hour Germany made a bid to France for her neutrality, as she had bid for England's, and in terms even more insulting. As a guarantee of her neutrality France was to hand over the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which were to be restored to her after the conclusion of the war against Russia. M. Poincaré and M. Viviani, who were actually on a visit to Russia between July 17th and 29th, had assured her that, in the event of war, France would stand by her. But France was ill-prepared for war. The Three Years' Service Law passed in July 1913 was not yet productive of results, and in the spring of 1914 France had been deeply perturbed by the revelation of scandals connected with army administration. On July 31st a great blow had fallen upon the public life of France. Jean Jaurès, the close associate of Viviani and Briand, the man who had worked not less hard than they to persuade the sane socialists to co-operate with the Left parliamentarians for the salvation of

¹ Sorel's *Reflections on Violence* (1906) supplied a philosophical antidote to Marxianism.

France, was assassinated by a mad Royalist. Nevertheless, the insulting proposal of Germany met with the only reply consistent with honour—the order for mobilization. On August 3rd Germany declared war on France. England, having received from France an affirmative and from Germany a negative reply to the demand that Belgian neutrality should be respected, declared war on Germany on August 4th.

§ THE WAR. The German plan was to march through Belgium, thrust rapidly at Paris, and having captured Paris, and perhaps the Channel ports, to impose terms on France, then to deal effectively with Russia, and finally, on pain of surrender, with Great Britain. This simple plan was frustrated by the heroic if brief resistance of Belgium, by the prompt dispatch to France of a British Expeditionary Force—perfectly trained and equipped but tragically inadequate in numbers—and above all by the courage of the French *poilus*, and the superb strategy of their Commander-in-Chief, General Joffre, who since 1911 had been Chief of the General Staff and designated to command the army in the field.

The Germans had hoped to crush France in a month. The refusal of the Belgian Government to give free passage to the German army brought upon their country every imaginable horror at the hands of an army whose time-table was thus seriously dislocated. But Belgium could not long delay the German advance. Liège surrendered on August 7th, Brussels on the 20th, and Namur on the 24th. Antwerp, though closely invested, held out until October 10th. The Belgian Government had meantime transferred itself to Le Havre. On August 16th the British force landed in France, and exactly a week later found itself in the firing-line at Mons, whence, hopelessly outnumbered, it was compelled to retreat. Not until September 5th was the retreat arrested. Meanwhile the Russians had been cleared out of East Prussia by Hindenburg's great victory at Tannenberg (August 26th). On the Western Front the Germans had forced the passage of the Aisne, and having driven the French out of Amiens had occupied Laon (August 20th) and come within striking distance of Paris.

On August 26th Viviani had reconstructed and strongly reinforced his Ministry. Delcassé took the Foreign Office, Millerand the Ministry of War, Briand the Ministry of Justice, and General Gallieni was appointed Military Governor of Paris, where German aircraft were already disturbing the equanimity of the population. On September 3rd the seat of executive government was removed to Bordeaux and the Legislature adjourned. But the turn of the tide was at hand. On August 31st the German Commander Von Kluck began his critical manœuvre. Joffre issued his famous order that the retreat was at an end, that 'no man must go back farther, but each be killed on the spot rather than give way an inch'. The response was worthy of the best traditions of the French army. Joffre's order was obeyed to the

letter, and for a week (September 6th to 12th) the hosts of France, England, and Germany were engaged in the historic battle of the Marne. The German retreat began. The battle was continued on the Aisne (September 14th–28th), and there the Germans dug themselves in, and for four long years the opposing armies faced each other in a series of trenches which extended from the Channel to the frontier of Switzerland. Great and bloody battles were fought on the Western Front in the autumn of 1914, and in the spring and autumn of 1915—particularly round Ypres (October 12th to November 20th, 1914, and April 22nd–May 24th, 1915), but early in 1915 the centre of interest had shifted to the Near East.

§ THE NEAR EAST. Many problems, diplomatic and military, were raised by the course of the struggle in that theatre of war. Whether, by more adroit diplomacy or more timely display of force, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece could have been brought into the war on the side of the allies; whether the cruel blow could have been warded off from Serbia and Montenegro; whether Roumania came in too tardily or moved too soon and in a wrong direction; whether the Dardanelles expedition was faulty only in execution or unsound in conception—these and other questions still remain unanswered.

The Germans had for a decade been dominant at Constantinople, and the Porte quickly decided to fight against its former friends, France and England. On October 28th the Turkish fleet bombarded Odessa and other unfortified Russian ports on the Black Sea. In November the Ambassadors of the allies quitted Constantinople, and a few days later French and English ships bombarded the forts of the Dardanelles. Early in 1915 it was decided to attempt to force the narrow Straits and send the French and English squadrons into the Black Sea. Had the attempt succeeded history would have acclaimed it as a master-stroke. But the failure of the joint naval attack on March 18th made it clear that the navies could not alone force the Straits. Towards the end of April a large British army with three French Divisions landed on the Gallipoli peninsula. The spring and summer went by. On August 6th a second army, consisting mainly of Australians, New Zealanders, and English Territorials, was thrown on to the peninsula. The troops displayed superb courage, but in December the heroic attempt was abandoned, and with superb skill the evacuation of the peninsula was, without loss, accomplished.¹

§ SALONIKA. French military and political opinion—so far as it approved a Balkan campaign at all—favoured an expedition to Salonika. From the outset of the War the French had been anxious to secure the co-operation of King Constantine of Greece. They had pressed England to purchase Greek support by the cession of Cyprus,

¹ For the Gallipoli campaign, cf. Masfield's *Gallipoli*, the *Life of Lord Wester-Wemyss*, by his widow; and Winston Churchill: *World Crisis*, Vol. II.

formally annexed by England on November 5th, 1914, but England thought the price too high. Nor could Venizelos persuade his Sovereign either to join the Western allies himself or bribe Bulgaria to do so. Bulgaria, consequently, joined Germany; Greece remained 'neutral'. On October 5th, 1915, an Anglo-French force landed at Salonika. The French force was under the command of Caillaux's favourite soldier, General Sarrail, whom Joffre was glad to send off to a distant theatre of war, where he and his political friends could do comparatively little harm. The landing of the allies at Salonika, though they went there at the suggestion of Venizelos, was a technical violation of Greek neutrality, and King Constantine, resenting it, threw in his lot, though not formally, with the autocracies.

Serbia, meantime, having gallantly repulsed the Austrian attack in 1914, was in the autumn of 1915 annihilated by a great Austro-German army under the command of Field-Marshal von Mackensen. In September 1916 a Greek Committee of National Defence was set up by the Venizelists at Salonika where Venizelos himself joined them in October. Meanwhile Roumania had declared war against Germany in August 1916 only to be crushed, after some initial success, before the year ended.

§ THE WESTERN FRONT—VERDUN. Great events were meanwhile in progress in the West. From February to July the battle raged round the great fortress of Verdun. Terrific assaults made by the German army under the Crown Prince and Falkenhayn were heroically resisted; a final assault was launched on July 11th–12th. It was repulsed: Verdun was saved. At the end of October a brilliant counter-attack, planned and led by General Nivelle, recovered much of the ground which the Germans had gained. The casualties, not less than 300,000 on each side, had, however, been appalling.

Yet they were almost insignificant as compared with those suffered in the great battle of the Somme. That battle opened on July 1st and at once relieved the pressure on Verdun, where up to that moment the position had been critical. The battle lasted all through the summer and autumn and was only brought to an end by the weather and by sheer exhaustion. The British had lost 400,000 men; the French half as many. The Germans had lost perhaps 300,000 men and a few square miles of territory.

Bitter was the disappointment both in France and England. In England a political crisis led to the resignation of the Asquith Coalition Ministry and Mr. Lloyd George's accession to power (December 1916). In France, the crisis produced changes much more startling: Joffre was superseded in command of the armies in the field by General Nivelle, the hero of Verdun,¹ was created a Marshal of France, and disappeared from the scene. The debt which France owes to Joffre for his conduct of the earlier campaigns of the war is

¹ The title is sometimes but less justly ascribed to Marshal Pétain.

incalculable, and can never be forgotten, but when Gallieni, already a sick man, succeeded Millerand as Minister of War (October 1915), Joffre lost his only firm ally and friend among the politicians. Millerand's administration of the War Office created almost equal dismay among the soldiers and the politicians. Joffre's conduct of the war in 1916 created hardly less. The position reached on the Western Front at the end of that year was stalemate, and Germany made 'Peace Proposals' which neither France nor England, war-weary as they were, could entertain.

§ 1917. Yet the position in France was very critical in 1917. On the home front there was confusion. General Lyautey, who had won fame as Governor of Morocco, was recalled by Briand to be Minister of War in December 1916, but great proconsuls are not invariably successful as parliamentary ministers. Lyautey too openly showed his contempt for a 'monkey-shop' which in its turn deeply resented the minister's reluctance to entrust them with military information. Accused of 'insulting the Chamber', he resigned in March 1917; Briand also resigned, giving place to his Finance Minister, Ribot, who retained most of the Briand Cabinet, but appointed to the War Ministry M. Painlevé. Painlevé was a distinguished mathematician with an exalted idea of his own capacity, not only for administering an office, but for directing the operations of war. This quickly brought him into conflict with Joffre's successor, General Nivelle.

On April 9th a terrific attack launched by the British army at Arras, resulted in the capture of Vimy Ridge, and two months later they won a second victory not less brilliant at Messines Ridge. But despite the gallantry of the Canadian Division there was no breakthrough. Still less could the French break through the new 'Hindenburg Line' in the (second) battle of the Aisne. Before these operations were concluded Nivelle was superseded by General Pétain, whose duties as Chief of Staff in Paris were entrusted to General Foch.

§ RUSSIA AND ITALY. Nor were the troubles of the allies confined in 1917 to the Western Front. In March the long-threatened revolution broke out in Russia, and in March 1918 the new Bolshevik rulers concluded peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk.

The defection of Russia enabled Austria, whose army was reinforced by six German Divisions, to concentrate her efforts upon Italy, who in May 1915 had been brought into the war by lavish promises of loot made to her by the allies. But ill-prepared for war, the Italians made a poor fight against the Austrians, and in October 1917 suffered a crushing defeat at Caporetto. France and England, realizing the danger to the common cause, were constrained to send large reinforcements which could ill be spared from the Western Front, where the Germans were greatly strengthened by Divisions liberated by the

Russian defection. The arrival of French and British troops commanded by General Fayolle, Sir Herbert Plumer, and Lord Cavan, stiffened the Italian defence, and when the Austro-German army again attacked somewhat tardily, in June 1918, it was vigorously repulsed, and the Italians, in a brilliant counter-attack, forced the passage of the Piave. On November 4th Austria begged for an armistice.

§ FRANCE. Meanwhile, France had passed through an anxious time. If the politicians were impeding the efforts of the soldiers, if the War Office and G.H.Q. were at variance, if generals, one after another, were superseded, there was great discontent amongst the subalterns and active mutiny in the ranks. The slaughter at Verdun and on the Somme had been enough to appal the stoutest heart; the treatment of the *poilus* by their officers was generally inconsiderate and sometimes brutal; three years of war had exhausted the manpower of France; and the men in the lines were too war-weary to respond to calls for new efforts. Moreover, the example of Russia and the propaganda of Germany were operating powerfully on their minds. The facile lie that 'England was ready to fight to the last Frenchman' deepened jealousies and impaired co-operation. Malvy, still entrenched at the Home Office, was busily organizing a defeatist party, with the help of Caillaux, and preaching the virtue of a 'peace without victory'. The result of all this was seen in the mutinies which broke out in sixteen different areas in the summer of 1917, behind the lines as well as at the front.

The mutinies were quelled by Pétain's well-judged consideration for his men, whose hearts were touched by his sympathy, and whose comforts were sensibly increased by his administration. That one result of his consideration for his own men was to throw added responsibility on to his allies, did not—cynicism apart—diminish his popularity with the French. Treachery in Paris was ruthlessly exposed and punished by a 'Saviour of Society'. In November 1917 Clemenceau became Prime Minister; Painlevé retired into the background of public affairs to reappear in 1924 as the unsuccessful candidate of the Left for the Presidency of the Republic; Malvy was at last dislodged from the Home Office to be brought before the High Court of the Senate, and, escaping the death sentence passed on Bolo Pasha, Duval, and many others, and even the imprisonment suffered by Caillaux and their friends, was banished from France (August 5th, 1918).

Clemenceau's 'Victory Cabinet' was happily dominated by its chief, who came in determined to deal drastically with traitors and strikers and to concentrate the whole effort of the country on winning the war. 'France, in accord with her Allies, will not lay down her arms until she has avenged outraged right, regained for ever the provinces ravaged from her by force . . . and broken Prussian Militarism.' The time had come for fulfilling the promise made to Parliament by

Viviani in November 1914. That Clemenceau was, at long last, able to fulfil it was made possible by three things: the unbroken spirit of England, the too tardy unification of command under Marshal Foch when in April 1918 the outlook was darkest; and the invaluable, if long delayed, help of America.

In April 1917 the United States had declared war on Germany, though not until the summer of 1918 did their intervention become effective. Thanks to the British Navy, forty-two American Divisions, totalling about 1,500,000 men, were safely landed in France between March and September. They were badly needed. Between March and July the Germans launched four terrific attacks. The first two fell mainly on the British. Six hundred thousand Germans attacked the weakest point in the Anglo-French line and by the mere weight of numbers pierced it (March 21st–April 30th). Only in front of Amiens was the German advance stayed. A third attack opened on May 26th and brought the Germans once more on to the Marne. Within forty miles of Paris, they bombarded the capital with 'Big Bertha', and the civilian population began to flee in panic. Foch's nerve was not affected. On June 11th he brought the German advance to a standstill at Château Thierry. Once more and for the last time Germans attacked and were permitted by Foch to cross the Marne. Foch then let loose his reserves and the Germans were driven back with great slaughter. Foch, having performed something like a miracle, now decided that victory might be achieved, sooner than he had dared to hope, by a counter-attack delivered with the whole force of the French, British, and Americans. Sir Douglas Haig and General Pershing, the American commander, concurred.

The series of operations between August and November may be regarded as one almost continuous battle in which the French took 140,000 prisoners and nearly 2,000 guns, the British captured 200,000 prisoners and about 3,000 guns, while to the Americans fell 43,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns. Details of the fighting can be followed only in specialized histories. The result can be chronicled in a sentence. The great military machine of Germany was at last broken into fragments; the German people turned in anger against the dynasty; Bulgaria had surrendered on September 29th; the Turks signed an armistice at Mudros on October 30th, and the Austrians signed an armistice with Italy on November 4th. On that same day the German sailors mutinied at Kiel; the red flag was hoisted in several German towns; by November 9th the Revolution had reached Berlin; a Republic was declared, the Kaiser, with the Crown Prince, fled to Holland, whence he issued a formal notice of his abdication. The Germans had, meanwhile, applied to Marshal Foch for an armistice (November 6th). Foch refused to parley and dictated terms which involved unconditional surrender. At 5 a.m. on November 11th they were accepted. At 11 o'clock a.m. the 'cease-fire' was sounded.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE PEACE AND AFTER (1919-41)

'France in 1919 was in a mixed mood of elation and fear. . . . The peace settlement, though it apparently gave to the French the hegemony of Europe, was a great disappointment for France. . . . The effects of the Lost Peace "are to be found everywhere in France's post-war policy".'

HUGH SELLON

THE Peace Conference met in Paris on January 18th, 1919. The choice of venue, though unfortunate, was inevitable. For more than four years the soil of France had been besmirched by the presence of German soldiers. On French soil the decisive victory had been achieved. The price that France had paid for it was terrible: '1,300,000 of her sons had fallen and more than 700,000 had lost sight or limb. From the North Sea to Switzerland, there stretched an unbroken belt of devastation through some of what had been the richest industrial and agricultural districts of France. 500,000 houses had been destroyed and whole villages had been completely obliterated. . . . In a great part of the principal weaving, sugar, and coal areas of France all the factories had been destroyed.'¹ To Paris, then, rightly belonged the honour of welcoming the Peace Conference.

§ THE PEACE TREATIES. The terms of the settlement were embodied in the Treaties of Versailles (with Germany), Saint-Germain-en-Laye (with Austria), Neuilly (with Bulgaria), Trianon (with Hungary), and Sèvres (superseded in 1923 by that of Lausanne) (with Turkey). The treaties, for which M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, and President Wilson were mainly responsible, have been subjected to criticism severe, often ill-informed, and not seldom grossly unfair. Only those articles which concern France are here considered.²

§ ALSACE-LORRAINE. France claimed the restoration of stolen goods: reparation for damage caused by the Germans, and, above all, security for her frontiers. In 1871 Alsatians and Lorrainers had cried in chorus: 'Frenchmen we are and French we wish to remain.'

The day foreseen at Bordeaux³ in 1871 seemed to have dawned when in November 1914 General Joffre had assured the cheering inhabitants: 'Notre retour est définitif, vous êtes Français pour toujours.' The assurance was premature; but the promise was fulfilled in 1919. Hardly indeed had the armistice been signed when

¹ Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, ap. *France* (ed. John Buchan), pp. 209-10. On his account of the war my own short summary is largely based and to it English readers may usefully refer.

² For a more comprehensive survey see Marriott: *History of Europe, 1915-1937*, pp. 266-7.

³ See *supra*, p. 287.

Foch and Pétain led their soldiers into Metz (November 19th) and Strasburg (November 25th). All German State property in Alsace and Lorraine, including the nationalized railways, was transferred, as from November 11th, 1918, to France. No question was raised at the Peace Conference as to the reannexing of these provinces to Germany.

§ THE RHINE FRONTIER. Far otherwise was it in regard to the Rhine frontier. Marshal Foch insisted that it was essential to the security of France. Unwisely that security was withheld, but, in compensation, Great Britain and the United States entered into a solemn engagement with France that they would immediately come to her assistance 'in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany'. The American Senate refused to implement the President's promise, and the guarantee given to France consequently lapsed.¹ France did, nevertheless, obtain substantial concessions. Both banks of the Rhine were to be permanently demilitarized: neither on the left bank nor within fifty kilometres of the right bank was Germany to maintain or construct any fortification, maintain any armed forces, hold any manœuvres, or maintain any works to facilitate mobilization. Moreover, for fifteen years the left bank and the bridge-heads were to be occupied by the allies. France also claimed the Saar Valley. Both on military and economic grounds the claim could be substantiated. But the region was indisputably German. It was, therefore, agreed that it should be administered for fifteen years by the League of Nations, and that a plebiscite should then be taken as to its future.² But the coal-fields, with a pre-war output of 18,000,000 tons, were handed over to France as just, if partial, compensation for the wanton destruction of her own coal-mines by Germany. Germany, however, was to have a right to re-purchase the mines at the end of fifteen years on terms to be settled by arbitration. Meanwhile, Germany was also to deliver 20,000,000 tons of coal annually to France for five years, and 8,000,000 for a further five years. These provisions were naturally more agreeable to France than to England, who lost thereby one of her most valuable markets. The question of the amount to be paid by Germany in 'reparations' was to be decided by a commission on which the United States, who 'wanted nothing for themselves', was to be invited (but ultimately declined) to serve.

§ DISARMAMENT. What should have been the greatest guarantee

¹ Cf. Anglo-French Treaty Act (9 & 10 George V), 1919 and Cmd. 2169 and 1924 for negotiations leading thereto.

² The League encountered great difficulties in administering the Saar, but they were in the end largely overcome by the tact and courage of Sir Geoffrey Knox. At the plebiscite taken in 1935 there voted for a reunion with Germany, 477,119; *status quo*, 46,613; for France, 2,214. The League was thus relieved of an embarrassing trusteeship, and Herr Hitler rejoiced.

for 'security' if adequately enforced was the disarmament of Germany. The terms were laid down in the treaty: the actual task was supervised by special commissions. The German High Seas Fleet was scuttled in Scapa Flow; all their submarines were handed over at the Armistice and their navy was cut down to a minimum in ships and personnel. Aeroplanes, motors, hangars, etc., were handed over or destroyed; the army was cut down to 100,000 men and drastic regulations were imposed—on paper—to prevent rearmament.

§ THE GERMAN COLONIES. Germany lost all her colonies. The French Empire in West Africa was rounded off by the acquisition of Togoland, the Cameroons were divided between France and England to be held under mandate, and France recovered the Congo territories ceded to Germany after the Agadir crisis. To France was assigned also the mandate for Syria and the Lebanon (taken from Turkey).

The Treaty of Versailles was dictated to Germany, who signed it under duress in the Hall of Mirrors in the Great Palace of Louis XIV on June 28th, 1919. The terms, though severe, were less rigorous than a victorious Germany would have imposed, and much less than France, if unrestrained by her allies, would have demanded. 'Versailles' was nevertheless deeply resented by Germany, and though in such matters as Schleswig-Holstein and Silesia the allies adhered to principles which in their application favoured Germany, it was from the first certain that Germany would fulfil the terms of the treaty only so long as she was too weak to repudiate them. To impose such terms and at the same time to deny to France the means of enforcing them was sheer insanity. For this contradiction history will assign the main responsibility to the United States, though paradoxically it is Great Britain that France has blamed most bitterly.

§ FRANCE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Any imperfections in the treaty were to be remedied by the League of Nations, but, ironically, the League served rather to perpetuate them. France in particular regarded the League as the bulwark of the *status quo*. 'Collective Security' was in her eyes a means to that end. Criticize and vilify the Peace Settlement as she might, France, like England, was, after 1919, a 'satisfied' Power. She had, therefore, a vested interest in 'Peace', but she was too realistic in her political outlook to cherish the illusion, so fatal to England, that she could preserve it without adequate armaments. Consequently, though Briand was the joint author with Kellogg of the 'Paris Pact' for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy (1928), and though France participated in the Disarmament Conference (1932-4), she never had any serious intention of disarming. It was in fact M. Barthou's bitter attack upon Great Britain (May 29th, 1934) which dealt the Disarmament Conference its death-blow.

Aristide Briand was, perhaps, the only French statesman of the

post-war period who was *au fond* a 'good European', and even his disinterestedness was sometimes suspect. His project for a United States of Europe was in some quarters regarded as thin veneer for a 'gallicized Europe'.¹

§ SECURITY AND REPARATIONS. Clemenceau's popularity did not long survive the conclusion of peace. The *Père à Victoire* quickly became, in a capital too ready to prefer wit to wisdom, *Perd à Victoire*. The Diehards could not forgive the author of the treaty; the socialists were bitter against the radical individualist; the Catholics detested the enemy of their Faith. Defeated by Paul Deschanel in a contest for the Presidency of the Republic, Clemenceau resigned the Premiership in 1920, went into straitened retirement, and was succeeded as Prime Minister by M. Millerand.² Deschanel resigned after holding office for seven hectic months and Millerand exchanged the Presidency of the Council for the Presidency of the Republic. He was, however, determined not to surrender his control over policy, holding that the Constitution imposed upon the President the duty of active participation in the government of the State, particularly in relation to foreign affairs. This contention was hotly disputed. The defeat of the *Bloc National* in the spring of 1924 brought matters to a crisis, and after a brief struggle Millerand was constrained to resign. France had again proved its adhesion to the parliamentary principle that the chief of the State must not 'govern'.

§ THE SOCIALISTS. The extreme Left had other grievances against Millerand. During the earlier years of the war the *Union Sacrée* proclaimed by Jaurès in July 1914 was loyally maintained, but the Russian Revolution of 1917 caused much unrest among French communists, and it was intensified by the economic dislocation which, though less severe than in over-industrialized England, was a serious menace to public order. Problems of demobilization, the housing shortage, high prices and unemployment, contributed in France, as in England, to the general discontent. This was exacerbated by the action of the Government, who in July 1920 sent help to Poland to resist the attack made upon it by Bolshevist Russia. Hands off Russia was a popular cry among communists in France, as in England, and the action of Millerand in suppressing their activities, roused as much bitterness in France as did that of Mr. Lloyd George in England. The communists also resented the help given to the 'White Armies' in Russia itself.

✓ § REPARATIONS. The absorbing question was, however, how much was France going to obtain from Germany to repair her war-damage? Germany was to be made to pay to the uttermost. But how? Gold, except in very limited amount, was out of the question.

¹ See Marriott: *Tragedy of Europe* (1941), pp. 165-8 for details.

² Clemenceau died in 1929.

Coal? Coal was for some years delivered in large quantities—and the English coal industry was dislocated. But coal was a relatively small item in the total bill. The sum of £6,600,000,000, fixed in April 1921 by the Reparations Commission, though less by at least one-third than Germany would have extorted, is now admitted to have been fantastic. Of the total France was to receive, most justly, 58 per cent, but even this fell short of the sum (about £4,000,000,000) at which France estimated her 'damages'. At the Spa Conference of 1920 Millerand, unwisely, declined the German offer of direct labour for the rehabilitation of the devastated areas. By the occupation of Duisburg and Dusseldorf the allies did, in 1921, extract an immediate payment of some £50,000,000. But Aristide Briand, who in January 1921 had become for the seventh time Prime Minister, was, with all his virtues, hardly the man to force a fraudulent bankrupt to pay, and at the Cannes Conference (January 1922) he agreed to a moratorium. Still worse, he had taken at Cannes a lesson in golf from Mr. Lloyd George. The President of the Republic promptly recalled Briand from such dangerous company and a horrified Chamber turned him out of office.

§ POINCARÉ AND THE RUHR. His successor was Raymond Poincaré, the successful war President and as a typical Lorrainer bitterly hostile to Germany. By sheer bad luck (1922) the victory of the Right in France coincided with the formation of a more conciliatory Government in Germany under Dr. Wirth and Herr Bauer, with Dr. Walter Rathenau as Minister of Reconstruction. This Government frankly adopted the policy of 'fulfilment' which was as unpopular in Germany as was Briand's accommodation policy in France. In June 1922 Rathenau, unpopular as a Jew and suspect as the author of the Treaty of Rapallo, was murdered. With him perished all hope of 'fulfilment'.

In December 1922 the Reparation Commission declared Germany to be in default on its deliveries of coal and iron. Poincaré, though strongly opposed by Great Britain,¹ forthwith decided to enforce payment by the military occupation of the Ruhr. In January 1923 French and Belgian troops began to occupy a district which produced some 80 per cent of Germany's coal, steel, and pig-iron, and contributed to the German railways 70 per cent of their goods and mineral traffic. This paralysing blow Germany attempted to parry by suspending all reparation payments to France and Belgium, and by ordering the inhabitants of the district to offer passive resistance to the invaders. The French then deposed all the State and municipal officials, imprisoned mine-owners and managers, and expelled from the district nearly 150,000 of its inhabitants.

¹ Mr. Lloyd George and his Coalition Ministry resigned in October 1922. Bonar Law came into power. Lord Curzon emancipated at last from thralldom to Lloyd George remained at the Foreign Office.

Workmen imported from France made a very poor job of working mines and transport systems to which they were unused; German industry was ruined; the currency collapsed; foreign exchange which in 1920 was at 254 marks to the pound, fell in January 1923 to 83,000, and by October of the same year to eighteen billions. Appalled by the suffering caused by inflation, Gustav Stresemann, who became Chancellor in August 1923, at once called off passive resistance.¹ Whether the Separatist movement in the Rhine was in any degree spontaneous; how far it was initiated and fomented by France are disputable questions. A Rhineland republic was proclaimed at Coblenz on October 25th, at Aachen on the 31st, and about the same time in other Rhineland towns. A crowd of ruffians, ex-convicts and the like, were imported into the district and gave their mercenary support to a movement with which genuine Rhinelanders were mostly out of sympathy. The French Government presently withdrew its support. By the end of February 1924 the Rhineland movement, deprived of French support, had evaporated, and the publication of the Dawes Plan (in April) combined with the failure of the Ruhr occupation to discredit Poincaré's policy.

The committees over which an American financier, General Dawes, presided postponed the question of total indebtedness, but required Germany to pay amounts rising over a period of five years from £50,000,000 to £125,000,000 per annum. Germany did in fact pay under this scheme £400,000,000, most of which was provided by loans from America and Great Britain, and was paid over to France.

§ ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS. Poincaré's policy in the Ruhr had broken the Anglo-French *entente*, already weakened by a real divergence of interests. France was bent on 'bleeding Germany white' even if it impaired her ability to pay reparations: England, faced with the problems of unemployment and devastated areas, wished to nurse her 'best customer' into commercial convalescence. Nor was the divergence of policy revealed only in Germany. In October 1921 M. Franklin-Bouillon had, on behalf of France, concluded an agreement with the Kemalist Turks. Mr. Lloyd George, fascinated by Venizelos, supported the Greek claims in Asia Minor. But Kemal Pasha, having turned the Greeks out of Asia Minor, then advanced towards the Dardanelles and from Chanak threatened the allies, who, under General Sir Charles Harington, were occupying Constantinople. Neither France nor Italy were disposed to back Great Britain in resisting the Kemalists, and she was extricated from a dangerous situation almost entirely by the firmness and tact of General Harington.

Rupture of the Franco-British alliance was in part responsible for the crushing defeat inflicted on Poincaré at the elections of May

¹ For Hitler's bitter indictment of German policy at this crisis cf. *Mein Kampf* (Eng. ed. 1939), pp. 453, 548 f.

1924, though other reasons had contributed to his waning popularity. Prices were rising; the value of the franc was falling; an increase of taxation was inevitable; a socialistic spirit was permeating two important classes—the lower *fonctionnaires* and the elementary teachers—and indeed the whole country, tired of heroics in foreign policy, desired only peace and repose.

§ LOCARNO. M. Edouard Herriot was the new Prime Minister, but the coalition of radicals and socialists which put him into power was very unstable, and after eleven months of office Herriot gave place to Painlevé, with Briand at the Quai d'Orsay. Painlevé survived less than eight months. Briand again became Prime Minister in November 1925. He already had one diplomatic success to his credit. On October 5th, 1925, he had signed with Gustav Stresemann and Austen Chamberlain the Pact of Locarno. France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and Belgium undertook 'collectively and severally' to guarantee the inviolability of the frontiers between France and Belgium respectively and Germany, as defined by the Treaty of Versailles. In the event of invasion from either side, or any violation of the treaty regarding the demilitarized zone, the guarantors undertook to take immediate action against the aggressor. For five years after Locarno the international horizon cleared, and for this 'patch of blue sky in the storm-swept sky', Briand must have a large share of credit. The Nobel Peace Prize, appropriately awarded to Chamberlain in 1925, was in 1926 shared between Briand and Stresemann.

§ FINANCE AND POLITICS. But even Locarno did not arrest the rapid fall in the value of the French franc. Though Briand reshuffled his ministries again and again the country at last turned once more to Poincaré as a 'Saviour of Society'. He took office again in 1928 at the head of a National Government, including Herriot, and retaining the indispensable Briand at the Foreign Office. In the course of three years, by a series of strong measures, he re-established French finance: France was compelled at last to submit to increased taxation; methods of collection were tightened up; budgets were framed to reveal without evasion the true state of the national revenue and expenditure; real economies were made in administration, and by cautious degrees the franc, which had fallen to 240, was stabilized at 124 or about one-fifth of its pre-war value. This was, in effect, repudiation; but the *rentiers* preferred 4s. in the pound to bankruptcy. In the Locarno spirit relations between France and Germany improved: in January 1927 the inter-allied mission of military control was withdrawn and France concluded with Germany a commercial treaty (August 1927). In July 1929, however, Poincaré, worn out by labour and anxiety, resigned. In 1931 President Hoover proposed a year's moratorium, necessitated by the world economic blizzard, on all debts. There was no further question of any payment

at all by Germany, and in June 1932 a conference at Lausanne formally accepted the principle of final remission, subject only to a satisfactory settlement of the debts due from Germany and its creditors to the United States!¹ M. Poincaré was temporarily succeeded as Premier by Briand, who though he soon gave up the Premiership, remained at the Quai d'Orsay under no fewer than six short ministries, until his death on March 7th, 1932. All Briand's activities were directed, all his many schemes devised, to one end—appeasement. Primarily a brilliant rhetorician, he was none the less a persevering, stout-hearted, and idealistic statesman, and, above all, a most lovable man.² Briand's untiring efforts for appeasement were disappointed.

Everything tended to deterioration in the international situation. In March 1931 Germany's effort to secure a Customs-Union with Austria was frustrated—mainly by French financiers.³ In September Japan attacked Manchuria, and in 1933 withdrew from the League of Nations. In that same year Hitler came into power in Germany, who withdrew from the League of Nations, and in 1934 from the Disarmament Conference. France naturally would not disarm while Germany rearmed; in 1935 Germany re-adopted conscription; France extended it; even Great Britain was constrained to embark upon a rearmament programme.

§ THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. While the world situation deteriorated, domestic affairs in France were falling into greater and greater confusion. A rapid succession of Conservative and 'Moderate' ministries (1925–32) terminated with the return of Herriot to power in May 1932. Under five different Prime Ministers the *Cartel des Gauches* retained office until January 1934, when it was brought down by the revelation of the most dangerous of the periodical 'scandals' in financial and political circles. One Serge Stavisky, a Russian Jew, was believed to have suborned many of the police and the minor civil servants, some deputies, and even one or more ministers. In January 1934 Stavisky, after a number of escapades, committed suicide (it was supposed) in Switzerland, whither he had fled to escape arrest. A serious demonstration against the Government of the Left was followed by street rioting so serious that seventeen persons were killed and thousands wounded. A succession of ministers attempted in vain to stem the storm, and at last France turned to an old man but a trusted patriot.

§ GASTON DOUMERGUE. M. Gaston Doumergue, who had been President of the Republic from 1924 to 1931, now emerged from his retirement to save France from threatened revolution. He formed

¹ For this cf. Marriott: *The Tragedy of Europe*, p. 90.

² A charming portrait of Briand was drawn by Sir Austen Chamberlain in *Down the Years* (1935).

³ The Hague Court pronounced against its legality by one vote.

a 'Government of truce, peace, and justice', including Herriot and Tardieu with Louis Barthou, Poincaré's disciple and the strongest man in the team, as Foreign Minister. The new Ministry restored public order, but Doumergue was convinced that drastic constitutional reform was essential if the Government was really to govern. He, accordingly, proposed to strengthen the Executive by giving the Prime Minister the right to dissolve Parliament and to adopt the English rule that only the Executive could propose expenditure. His proposals, deeply resented by a Legislature which had always been disproportionately powerful *vis-à-vis* the Executive, aroused a suspicion that Doumergue was aiming at a dictatorship. The suspicion deepened when the Premier made a practice of broadcasting to the electorate. On October 9th Barthou was killed while attempting to shield King Alexander of Serbia from his assassins at Marseilles. In November Doumergue, disgusted by the 'ingratitude' of his countrymen, resigned. M. Flandin became Prime Minister, but it was M. Laval, the successor of Barthou at the Quai d'Orsay, who inspired the policy of the Ministry, still more after he himself became Prime Minister in June 1935.

§ M. LAVAL. The keynote of Laval's policy was friendship with Germany and more immediately with Italy. In January 1935 he visited Rome and purchased Italian friendship by a few cheap concessions about the position of Italians in Tunis, about boundaries in Libya and Eritrea, with perhaps some assurances about Abyssinia. In April Laval again met Mussolini at Stresa, where, with the help of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the English Premier, and Sir John Simon, his Foreign Secretary, the 'Stresa Front' was erected. Fragile from the first, the 'Stresa Front' collapsed when (June 18th, 1935) Great Britain without consulting either of her Stresa allies, concluded with Germany a treaty for the limitation of naval armaments. Assuming the good faith of Germany, the treaty was in itself desirable, but it naturally excited anger and suspicion in France.

Attention was, however, by now concentrated on Abyssinia. Mussolini, having contemptuously rejected the intervention of the League of Nations, invaded Abyssinia on October 2nd. The League thereupon imposed 'Sanctions' against Italy, but in December M. Laval agreed with Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Minister, to propose to Italy terms which, by conceding to her a large tract of Abyssinia and economic control over much more, would have enabled Mussolini to withdraw from a difficult adventure with considerable booty and without loss of prestige.

A premature disclosure of the Hoare-Laval scheme caused great excitement in England: Hoare was thrown to the lions. France became increasingly lukewarm about 'Sanctions'; Italy deposed the Negus and annexed Abyssinia; 'Sanctions' were lifted; Herr Hitler took advantage of the general confusion to occupy the demilitarized

Rhineland, to conclude an anti-Comintern Pact with Japan (March), and to construct with Mussolini, thrown by 'Sanctions' into the arms of Germany, the Rome-Berlin Axis.

Joint action by France and England, promptly taken, would, as is now known, have deterred Germany from breaking the Locarno Pact. But France was increasingly suspicious of England, afraid of Fascists at home, yet anxious to appease Fascist Italy.

§ THE FRONT POPULAIRE. Fear of domestic Fascism was, however, the stronger sentiment. The *Front Populaire*—a combination of all the extreme Left parties victorious at the polls—put M. Léon Blum into power as Prime Minister (June 1936). The *rapprochement* with Soviet Russia¹ had proved helpful to the *Front Populaire*, though to Blum's disappointment the Communists refused to join his Ministry. Embarrassed by a number of strikes organized on characteristic syndicalist lines, M. Blum cut the ground from under their feet by compelling both employees and employed to accept the principle of collective bargaining, thus virtually re-establishing the authority of the Trade Unions.² He also instituted the forty-hour week and holidays with pay; he set up an *Office du Blé* to fix agricultural prices at a remunerative level, and to bring wages and agriculture generally under the close supervision of the Government, and he embarked on an elaborate programme of public works. But all this brought the *Front Populaire* up against the intractable problem of finance. Nor was it solved by a further devaluation of the franc, and other deflationary expedients. But even currency complications, always dogging the uncertain steps of socialist Governments—were less fatal to the *Front Populaire*³ than its policy in regard to the Civil War in Spain, which had broken out in July 1936. M. Blum probably interpreted aright the sentiment of most Frenchmen in basing his foreign policy upon firm alliance with England. But alliance with England meant non-intervention in Spain. To non-intervention the French communists, like the English socialists, were hotly opposed. England, moreover, had no wish to become involved in the French commitments to the *Little Entente*, still less in the Franco-Soviet alliance. France, anxious to retain English friendship, might have been willing to cut herself free from her Eastern commitments, but only in exchange for a firm military alliance with England. Hence a vicious circle in French diplomacy.

Germany was free from any such embarrassment. Herr Hitler followed up one discreditable triumph with another. He annexed

¹ France had supported Russia's admission to the League of Nations in 1934 and on May 2nd, 1935, a Franco-Soviet Pact was concluded.

² Membership of the C.G.T., which had fallen in 1921 to zero, rose in 1936 to 5,000,000.

³ For a mordant criticism of the 'Front Populaire' see Sir John Pollock, *ap. Quarterly Review* for January 1942.

Austria on March 12th, 1938; he fooled England, France, and (possibly) Italy, at Munich in September; he occupied the Sudetenland of Bohemia in October, and the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. He occupied Memel and Dantzig in the same month; concluded a Pact with Russia in August; and invaded Poland on September 1st. Two days later Great Britain and France, in accordance with a pledge given to Poland on March 30th, declared war on Germany.

Germany, having in September conquered Poland and divided the spoils with Russia, gathered strength for the decisive struggle against the Western democracies. As a preparatory step Hitler occupied Denmark and conquered Norway in April 1940; invaded the Low Countries (May 10th). Finland, after a brief but brave fight against Russia, had made peace with the Soviet on March 13th; Holland surrendered to Germany on May 15th, and King Leopold of the Belgians capitulated on May 27th. On May 15th the German armies had broken through into France on the Meuse; they turned the 'impregnable' Maginot Line; advanced with terrific rapidity on Paris, and entered it as 'an open city' on June 14th. Between May 17th and June 20th they had occupied one after another Flushing, Antwerp, Boulogne, Ostend, Dieppe, Cherbourg, and Brest. The French and British armies had hung on to Dunkirk until by the 30th of June 330,000 men had by heroic efforts been evacuated. On June 10th Italy declared war on stricken France; on the 16th Marshal Pétain had become Prime Minister of France, and on June 21st France signed an armistice with Germany on the exact spot in the Forest of Compiègne where Foch had dictated terms to the Germans in November 1918.

A conquered Germany lay in 1918 at the feet of France; in June 1940 a conquered and humiliated France lay at the feet of Germany. The British Empire continued to fight on alone.


Comment on events so overwhelming and so recent cannot usefully be made while the war against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and their minions still rages. That a History of France should have to close, though temporarily, with a surrender so humiliating is truly lamentable. But all lovers of France, all indeed who have not lost faith in the future of civilization, will turn this latest page in the assured conviction that it is not the last, that at no distant date there will arise on the present ruins a new and even more glorious France:

'Broke to every known mischance, lifted over all
By the light sane joy of life, the buckler of the Gaul,
Furious in luxury, merciless in toil,
Terrible with strength renewed from a tireless soil,
Strictest judge of her own worth, gentlest of man's mind,
First to follow truth, and last to leave old Truths behind,
France beloved of every soul that loves its fellow kind.'

APPENDIX A

MONTMORENCY AND COLIGNY (CHÂTILLON)


(see pp. 63-69)



THE GUISES

(see *Supra* c. xi)

Antoinette (Antoinette de Bourbon) = Claude of Lorraine D. of Guise, ob. 1550



CONDÉ AND VENDÔME (BOURBONS)

(see pp. 66, 77, 84, 95)

Francis, C. of Vendôme (descended from Beatrice, heiress of Bourbon, and Robert, son of Louis IX, K. of France)
ob. 1495

Henry II, K. of Navarre

Jeanne D'Albret = Anthony,
Q. of Navarre | D. of Bourbon

Henry IV,
K. of France

Charles, D. of Bourbon and D. of Vendôme, ob. 1537

Antoinette = Claude, D. of
Guise, ob. 1550

Charles,
Cardl. of Bourbon
(‘Charles X’)
ob. 1590

Louis I,
P. of Condé
(Killed at Jarnac, 1569)

Henry I
P. of Condé

Charles,
C. of Soissons
ob. 1612

Francis,
P. of Conti
ob. 1614

Charles,
Cardl. of Vendôme
ob. 1594

Henry II (of Condé) = Charlotte de Montmorency

Louis II,
The Great Condé
D. of Enghien
ob. 1686
(Ancestor of D. of Enghien, murdered 1804)

Armand,
P. of Conti
(see *supra*, p. 85)

Anne Genevieve = ¹ Henry III,
(see *supra*, p. 85) D. of Longueville
ob. 1663

HOUSE OF BOURBON

Henry IV = ¹ Marguerite de Valois
1580-1610 | ² Marie de Medicis

Louis XIII = Anne, dau. of Philip III
1610-1643 | of Spain

Louis XIV = Maria Theresa, dau. of
1643-1715 | Philip IV of Spain

By Madame de Montespan

Louis Dauphin = Maria Anna
ob. 1711 | of Bavaria

Louis, Duke = Marie Adelaide
of Burgundy | of Savoy

Louis, Duke = Marie, dau. of Stanislaus
of Brittany, 1715-1774 | Leczinsky of Poland
ob. 1712

Louis Dauphin = Maria Josepha of
Poland and Saxony

Louis XVI = Marie Antoinette
1774-1792 ob. | dau. of Emp. Francis I
executed 1793 | (Louis XVIII)
1814-1824 ob. s.p. 1824-1830

Louis Joseph
ob. s.p. 1789

Charles Louis
(Louis XVII)
ob. s.p. 1795

Maria Theresa =
ob. s.p.

Louis, Duke
of Angoulême

Charles, Duke =
of Berri |
murd. 1820

Henry, Duke of Bordeaux, Count of Chambord
ob. 1883 s.p.

Louis Auguste
Duke of Maine

Charles, Duke
of Berri |
ob. 1714 s.p.

Maria Louisa =
Charlotte

Francis III
Duke of
Modena

Louis Alexander
Count of Toulouse

Françoise
Mlle de Blois

Philip Regent
ob. 1723

Louis = Princess of
obs. 1752 | Baden
Louis Philippe = Louise Henriette
ob. 1785 | de Bourbon-Conti

Louis Philippe = Louise Marie de Ponthière
(Egalité)
executed 1795

Louis Philippe = Marie Amelie, dau. of
Ferdinand, K. of Naples

Ferdinand ob. 1842
D. of Orleans

Louise = Leopold I
K. of the Belgians
(Pr. of Saxe-Coburg-
Gotha, ob. 1865

Louis Philippe
Count of Paris

Marie Amelie = Chas., K. of Portugal
murd. 1908

DUKES OF ORLEANS


Philip
ob. 1701

= ¹ Henrietta Maria
of England
= Elizabeth, dau. of Charles Lewis (El
Palatine)


Three daughters

THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

(see page 98)



CARLO MARIA BONAPARTE=M. LETIZIA RAMOLINO



APPENDIX B

SOME USEFUL BOOKS

A. GENERAL

- E. Lavissee (ed.): *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu' à la Révolution*. This work, written by historians of the highest eminence, is now the standard history of France. 9 Vols. (1900–11).
- F. Funck-Brentano, L. Madelin, and others: *The National History of France*. 6 Vols. 1915.
- W. H. Hudson: *France* (1919).
- J. R. Moreton Macdonald: *A History of France*. 3 Vols. (o.p. 1915).
- Jacques Bainville: *History of France*. (E.T. 1926).
- C. Seignobos: *A History of the French People* (1933).
- V. Duruy: *A Short History of France*. (E.T. 2 Vols. 1917).
- T. Lavallée: *Histoire de France*. 7 Vols. (1874–1901).
- E. Lavissee et Alfred Rambaud: *Hist. Générale de France depuis le IV^{me}. Siècle à nos jours* (1898).
- Sir J. Stephen: *Lectures on the History of France* (1851).
- F. P. G. Guizot: *Histoire de la Civilisation en France* (1851).
- F. Hélie: *Les Constitutions de la France* (1879).
- A. Rambaud: *Histoire de la Civilisation Française*. 2 Vols. (1888).
- N. D. Fustel de Coulanges: *Histoire des Institutions Politiques de l'ancienne France* (1888–92).
- A. Luchaire: *Manuel des Institutions Françaises* (1902).
- A. Esmein: *Histoire du Droit Français*. (13th ed. 1920.)
- (ed.) J. Buchan: *France*.
- Encyclopaedia Britannica*, article *France* and *French Kings, Statesmen, etc.* (1928).
- Cambridge Medieval History* and *Cambridge Modern History* (relevant chapters).
- J. E. C. Bodley: *France* (1899).
- P. Cohen-Portheim: *The Spirit of France* (1933).
- A. Siegfried: *France* (1930).

B. GEOGRAPHY

- E. A. Freeman: *Historical Geography of Europe* (1904).
- A. Longnon: *Atlas Historique de France depuis César jusqu' à nos jours* (1885).
- R. L. Poole: *Historical Atlas of Modern Europe* (1902).
- A. Himly: *La formation territoriale*.
- H. B. George: *Relations of Geography and History* (n.d.).

C. SPECIAL PERIODS

(i) MEDIEVAL FRANCE, Chapters III–VIII (–1461).

General as in A.

Julius Caesar: *Commentaries: De Bello Gallico*.

J. Buchan: *Augustus* (1937).

T. Rice Holmes: *Caesar's Conquest of Gaul* (1889).

M. Prou: *La Gaule Mérovingienne* (1897).

H. W. C. Davis: *Charles the Great* (1900).

E. A. Freeman: *West Goths and Burgundians* (1909).

- E. A. Freeman: *Western Europe in the Eighth Century and onward* (1904).
 F. Lot: *Les derniers Carolingiens* (1892).
 A. Luchaire: *Hist. des Institutions Monarchiques de la France sous les premiers Capétiens* (987-1180).
 A. Luchaire: *Les Communes françaises* (1890).
 A. Longnon: *La formation de l'unité française* (1904).
 F. Aubert: *Le Parlement de Paris*. 2 Vols. (1890-97).
 C. H. Haskins: *Norman Institutions* (1918).
 C. H. Haskins: *The Normans in European History* (1915).
 E. C. Lodge: *Gascony under English Rule* (1925).
 F. M. Powicke: *The Loss of Normandy* (1913).
 C. V. Langlois: *St. Louis* (ap. Lavissee, op. cit., Vol. III).
 S. Luce: *La France pendant la Guerre de Cent Ans*. 2 Vols. (1890-3).
 G. Hanotaux: *Jeanne d'Arc* (1911).
 T. A. Taylor: *Joan of Arc, Soldier and Saint* (1920).
 O. Rutter: *The Land of St. Joan* (1940).

(ii) THE ZENITH OF THE MONARCHY (1461-1715)

- Philippe de Commines: *Mémoires*. 3 Vols. (1840).
 P. A. Cheruel: *Hist. de l'administration monarchique en France depuis Philippe Auguste à Louis XIV*. 2 Vols. (1853).
 A. J. Grant: *The French Monarchy (1483-1789)*.
 J. F. Kirk: *History of Charles the Bold*. 3 Vols. (1864-8).
 Pierre Champion: *Louis XI*. 2 Vols. (1927).
 A. C. Hare: *The Life of Louis XI* (1907).
 C. Petit-Dutaillis (ap. Lavissee, op. cit., Vol. IV).
 C. Petit-Dutaillis (ap. *Cambridge Medieval History*, Vol. VIII).
 C. H. McIlwain (for States-General), (ap. *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VII, Chapter XXIII).
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APPENDIX C

KINGS OF FRANCE

MEROVINGIANS

Clovis, 481-511 (Frankish monarchy divided among sons of Clovis, 511-558)

Chlothar I, 558-561 (Frankish monarchy again divided among sons and grandsons of Clothar I, 561-613)

Chlothar II, 613-628

Dagobert, 628-638

Clovis II, 656

Childeric II, 673

Theodoric III, 691 and other Rois Fainéants

CAROLINGIANS

Pippin d'Héristal, 687

Charles Martel, 715

Pippin the Short (Mayor 741, King 752)

Charlemagne, 768 (Emperor 800-814)

Louis I le Débonnaire (Emperor), 814

Charles II (the Bald), 840

Louis II (the Stammerer), 877

Louis III, 879

Carloman, 884

Charles the Fat (and Emperor), 884

Odo (Duke), 887

Charles the Simple, 898

Rudolph, 923

Louis IV, 936

Lothaire, 954

Louis V, 986

THE CAPETIANS

Hugh Capet, Duke of West Franks, King, 987

Robert, 996

Henry I, 1031

Philip I, 1060

Louis VI (the Fat), 1108

Louis VII, 1137

Philip II, 1180

Louis VIII, 1223

Louis IX (St. Louis), 1226

Philip III (the Bold), 1270

Philip IV (the Fair), 1286

Louis X, 1314

Philip V, 1316

Charles IV, 1322

THE VALOIS

Philip VI, 1328

John II (the Good), 1350

Charles V (the Wise), 1364

Charles VI, 1380

Charles VII, 1422

Louis XI, 1461

Charles VIII, 1483

Louis XII, 1498 (cousin of C. VIII)

Francis I, 1515 (cousin of L. XII)

Henry II, 1547

Francis II, 1559

Charles IX, 1560

Henry III, 1574

THE BOURBONS

Henry IV, 1589

Louis XIII, 1610

Louis XIV, 1643

Louis XV, 1715

Louis XVI, 1774

(The First Republic, 1792

The Consulate, 1799)

Napoleon I (Emperor of the French, 1804)

Louis XVIII, 1814

Napoleon I, 1815

Louis XVIII, 1815

Charles X, 1824

Louis Philippe (of Orleans), 1830

(The Second Republic, 1848)

Napoleon III (Emperor), 1852

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Presidents:

Marie E. P. MacMahon, 1873

Jules Grévy, 1879

Sadi Carnot, 1887

Jean Casimir-Périer, 1894

Félix Faure, 1895

Émile Loubet, 1899

Armand Fallières, 1906

Raymond Poincaré, 1913

Paul Deschanel, 1920

Alexandre Millerand, 1920

Gaston Doumergue, 1924

Paul Doumer, 1931

Albert Lebrun, 1932

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[*Note:* Great pains have been taken by the author to make the index of real use to students, but limitations of space have compelled some inconsistencies of method and arrangement.]

